Chinese scientists are finding it increasingly difficult to obtain visas for Germany, as renowned migration researcher Xiang Biao from the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in Halle observes. Xiang sees this as a discreet policy change to impede access for Chinese academics. However, he believes that this will do Germany more harm than good: “De-risking should be implemented in the way of a surgeon, very targeted on specific areas. But right now it is executed in the style of a security guard, blocking everything,” says Xiang in an interview with Fabian Peltsch. He says that moralizing without a plan won’t help Germany.
Hungary’s presidency of the EU Council has not even begun and a dispute over one important issue is already looming. Viktor Orbán is known to be a big friend of China. Accordingly, his concept for greater economic security envisages expanding and deepening cooperation with Beijing. If this sounds very different from Ursula von der Leyen’s previous ideas, it is simply because it is the opposite concept. However, even reputable researchers criticize von der Leyen’s one-sided focus on risk minimization, writes Amelie Richter.
Hungary takes over the EU Council presidency this Monday. For the rest of the year, this means a showdown over relations with China between
Hungary aims to strengthen the EU’s economic security. As the EU Council Presidency, Hungary is pursuing this goal and is initially in line with the entire EU Council, which represents the governments of the member states.
In its strategic agenda until 2029, which the EU Council adopted last week, the EU Council decided to strengthen economic security. However, discussions continue on how more security can be achieved and what role China will play in this. All of this is against the backdrop of the ongoing trade dispute between the EU and the People’s Republic over extra tariffs and subsidies.
Above all, it is unclear whether Hungary also understands greater economic security as a tendency towards less involvement with China, as other EU states currently do. So far, it does not seem that way. According to a report by the Hungarian news agency MTI, Foreign and Trade Minister Péter Szijjártó said last week after a telephone call with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi that promoting cooperation with China would be an important goal of the Hungarian EU Council presidency.
Promoting cooperation with China and returning to a stable path could significantly contribute to achieving environmental and competitiveness goals, Szijjártó reportedly said. It was “essential” for European-Chinese relations to be “pragmatic, objective cooperation based on mutual respect rather than ideology.”
Szijjártó emphasized that economic cooperation with China “would play a major role in restoring competitiveness.” Hungary is “the best example” of the positive effects of economic cooperation between East and West, which is based on mutual respect and common sense, he added. “The European Union would be well served economically if in the coming period it were to make its economic cooperation with China even closer and more effective, if it did not take an ideological approach, if it did not seek isolation, if it did not introduce punitive tariffs,” he said. He went on to say that a trade war with China would jeopardize “hundreds of thousands” of jobs.
Hungary is the largest beneficiary of Chinese direct investment: BYD and CATL are building plants in the EU country. Hungary theoretically stands to benefit the most from the extra tariffs on Chinese electric cars – after all, Budapest offers access to the EU market by allowing Chinese manufacturers to increase their production in Hungary. However, any further deterioration in relations between the EU and China could also jeopardize Budapest’s bright trade relations.
Hungary also advocates this approach in its EU Council presidency program: “A pragmatic and balanced approach towards China is a key objective of the Hungarian Presidency. China is an important trade and economic partner.” Hungary considers a constructive dialogue on the economy and strategic security particularly important.
János Bóka, Hungary’s State Secretary for European Affairs, sees the economic relationship with China as the biggest challenge for the new Commission’s upcoming mandate. “There is no such thing as economic security in general,” Politico quoted him as saying. “If there are risks to our security, these risks must be specifically identified and addressed. If you speak of economic security in general, then you speak of decoupling … we made the decision that we are not decoupling, we’re de-risking.”
Hungary’s interpretation of economic security is at odds with EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. She pushed the issue to the top of the agenda over the past two years. Von der Leyen will likely maintain this course in her potential second term of office. “With its economic security strategy and de-risking paradigm, the EU has begun to reestablish the dormant link between its security and economic policies,” writes the think tank European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) in a new study, in which it calls for a “bold” upgrade of the EU’s economic security strategy.
However, even if Hungary’s view is controversial, the researchers do not consider the EU’s stance on China fully mature either. Focusing solely on risk minimization is too short-sighted. It prevents the EU from effectively steering its geo-economic position, as the ambitions of other powers threaten to limit its room for maneuver, Tobias Gehrke and Filip Medunic write in the study.
Gehrke told Table. Briefings that the EU urgently needs to expand the foundation for analyzing strategic trade chains. “The risk analyses are an important first step, but still fall short of understanding deeper insights into technologies and their applications, as well as production and trade patterns. New structures need to be created here.” In other words, the EU needs to know and understand China much, much better.
A lot of attention is being paid to the upstream part of important value chains, such as raw materials, says Gehrke. “But China’s dominance is particularly large and problematic in the middle, with intermediate products such as electronic and machine components or battery parts.”
Gehrke sees a reform of the EU’s approach to economic security as inevitable: “The controversial issue of competencies does not necessarily have to be on the table. A new executive vice-president role in the Commission can help with the often difficult coordination of different policy areas and analyses.”
Your research looks into different forms of migration. How do Chinese citizens and academics actually perceive the German migration policies of the last few years, which are now mirrored in a shift to the political right, for example, during the last European elections?
In my view it is not a major topic. I am not aware of a particularly critical view. Ordinary Chinese don’t care how other countries regulate migration. They might know a little more about the US-policies. I think the people still have the general impression that Germany is very actively internationalizing itself in the domains of education, arts, and high-tech industry, and is, of course, very interested in expanding trade. But in the academic field we saw over the last year that it is getting harder for academics and students to receive visas. It seems to be the result of a new policy, one that is not written down on paper, but nevertheless creates a lot of stress.
The debate about the risks of cooperation between Chinese and German researchers is still in full swing.
I am aware that politicians are talking about de-risking. But you don’t de-risk by slowing down the visa process. De-risking should be implemented in the way of a surgeon, very targeted on specific areas. But right now it is executed in the style of a security guard, blocking everything.
The notion of some politicians and academics is that every Chinese researcher and student has to report to the Chinese government.
I know where this impression comes from. There is a government scholarship. And the students who receive this scholarship need to sign a contract that says somewhere, that the students are supposed to report about their progress. So far I have not heard of any cases where the students were actually asked to report their results to Government bureaus. The question is: are we going to deprive these young people of the opportunity of coming to Germany to learn because they already suffer from the lack of freedom? Do we see them as agent for change in the next generation, or do we treat them as potential threats?
So you don’t see any risk for Germany?
There can be a risk for a very specific field of strategic technology that can be used by the military. And I fully understand that German politicians pay attention to this as they should. But there remains the question of how to assess and regulate these risks. Is it a risk that is higher than the potential benefit of having more interactions? The public debate in Germany appears to have a tendency to put a lot of moral coloring to the geopolitics discussion, which is surprising to foreigners like me, because we always thought German politics have always been quite pragmatic. Moralizing makes sense in family relations and community matters. But geopolitics has its own logic and is constantly changing. If you bring an excessively moralizing language into it, you corner yourself down and lose the necessary flexibility. Furthermore, moralization exacerbates conflicts and, in the end, could destabilize the domestic society.
So you believe that Germany can still benefit a lot from cooperation with China?
I think open communication will give more benefits to Germany. The economic prosperity, as well as the social future of German society, relies upon further internationalization. We must face that Germany is running out of its technology powerhouse legacy. As powerful as it is, Germany cannot set global agendas itself and has to navigate between bigger powers. It is therefore not healthy to be overly one-sided. Furthermore, Chinese society and even politics are changing fast. You can see its international policies are already changing over the last couple of years, and some channels are open again. You cannot follow these changes from a distance; you have to be engaged in order to feel the temperature and to push for something quickly.
As a scientist of Chinese origin, are you personally affected by these problems?
I don’t feel affected in my daily work; personally, I feel very welcomed here. But I do receive some kind of mediate inquiries, which are not just innocent but seem to have a kind of hunting intention behind them to catch a hidden enemy. It seems to be a new political culture. I feel the German public is quite open and dynamic, but somehow, the political class has difficulty representing the diversity and dynamics.
Let’s talk a little about your field of research. What fascinates you about migration?
I started working on migration when I was an undergraduate student in 1992. I realized that migration within China was a very important driving force pushing Chinese society to change bottom up. Rural-urban migration was not an official initiative but a people’s initiative, which, in the end, changed policies and people’s lives in many aspects. It is a myth that China’s development has been entirely driven by the government.
You are talking about phenomena such as migrant workers. What about international migration?
International migration from China changed a lot. Before the 2010s it was driven by the dream of going overseas and getting rich. They assumed the West was perfect; the countries were economically prosperous, politically progressive, and free. But it is different after the 2010s. Many young people, especially those who went to the US, were disillusioned by the poverty, class inequality as well as the brutality of politics under the Trump presidency. In Germany, they are surprised by the controversy related to Gaza. Some Chinese experienced what you can call “reversed culture shock.” They are shocked not by how Germany is different from China but by how similar they look when it comes to censoring journalists, artists, and academia.
Many younger Chinese are now moving to Thailand for a more relaxed life instead of the US or Europe …
After Covid, international migration changed again, because of the economic slowdown and the political oppression in China. A lot of migration is now not pulled by hope, but rather pushed by disillusionment at home. They care less about which destination they are going to; the priority is to leave. Thailand, South Korea or Hungary are places that weren’t first choices before. The goal is not to make money but to have a peaceful lifestyle where you can balance work and Relaxation. Relaxation and freedom have become an important value for many.
Your lectures, books and podcasts are very popular in China and even go viral. Were you surprised that these kinds of academic topics from your research would gain such popularity?
I am surprised about how widely they spread. The last time I was in China, I went into a restaurant and the chef came out to ask me questions based on his reading of my book. Some of my articles are even used in school exams. I think young people in China are very hungry for critical, new ideas. They are educated and grew up much more prosperous than their parents. They are not worried about hunger and such, but they have lots of questions about what a good life means, why the world is like this, and how it can be different.
Xiang Biao 项飙, born in 1972, is one of the most influential anthropologists in China today. He made a name for himself during his studies at Peking University with his field research among the migrant population. In 2003, he moved to Oxford University, where he completed his doctorate on the global recruitment of Indian IT professionals. Since 2020, he has worked as Director of the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in Halle. His book “The Self as Method” was named the most influential non-fiction title of 2020 in the People’s Republic of China.
The European Football Championship is on. Which means that the action on the pitch is once again fierce. Unfortunately, the fierce duels on the pitch result in numerous football widows outside the pitch. Thankfully, we’re not talking about actual deaths here. Because the spouse is not turning in his grave, but at the very most on the couch … or he is shouting lively in the stadium … or he is roaring and drinking vigorously at a public viewing.
However, football is known to completely kill off the love life during FIFA football festivals. After all, many men only have eyes for leather balls and football legs these days. Chinese women have coined the term “football widow” (足球寡妇 zúqiú guǎfu) – a tongue-in-cheek term used by neglected partners to verbally show their heartless sweetheart the yellow card. Of course, it can also be used the other way around! When the ladies get football fever, male football haters sometimes become football widowers (足球寡夫 zúqiú guǎfū – note the different spelling with the character 夫 fū as in 丈夫 zhàngfu “husband, spouse,” otherwise widower also means 鳏夫guānfū).
In Mandarin, there are plenty of other quirky football expressions. Don’t be surprised if Chinese commentators speak of tea goals, cow tails and butter fingers. That’s within the rules! Here is the vocabulary proof in slow motion:
If the ball hits the wrong square – in other words, an own goal ends up in the net – the Chinese call it an oolong ball (乌龙球 wūlóngqiú). Land of tea drinkers or not, what do fermented tea leaves have to do with frenetic ball sports? Well, China has the creativity of its Hong Kong football fans to thank for that. The term “own goal” reminded them of the Chinese word “wūlóng”. And since the regional expression 摆乌龙 bǎi wūlóng means “to mess something up” (literally “to swing an oolong”) in the Hong Kong-Guangdong region, ball sports fans quickly combined the two and christened the own goal “oolong goal”, i.e. a “messed-up goal.”
While an “underdog” can sometimes break the winning streak of the big players in the West, “black horses” gallop past the supposed favorite in China. 黑马 hēimǎ (“black horse”) is the Chinese term for underdogs. Sometimes butter hands (黄油手 huángyóushǒu) are also involved. They belong to the unlucky goalie who let balls slip through their fingers into the goal.
Keepers don’t have an easy time of it anyway. For example, when strikers hit them with an upside-down “golden hook.” 倒挂金钩 dàoguà jīngōu (literally: “upside-down golden hook”) is the Chinese equivalent of the equally creative “bicycle kick.”
Chinese even come up with metaphors for dribbling feints. Do you want to really show off at your next football evening with Chinese friends? Then simply memorize the following vocabulary repertoire to describe ball skills:
Some lovebirds who thought they could finally throw their mourning gowns away after the European Championship final may be disappointed. Because in China, we know that, in addition to football widows, there are sadly many other instances of mourning in everyday relationships in which people lose their partners. For example, there are lonely stock widows (股票寡妇 gǔpiào guǎfu – when all the man can think about is stock prices) or online gaming widows (网游寡妇 wǎngyóu guǎfu – when all he does is play video games). But married life can sometimes be a tragedy for the men, too. For example, around the double-eleven shopping festival in China, the double-eleven widowers (‘双11’寡夫 shuāng-shíyī guǎfu) wail their sorrow – because their loved ones have lost themselves in a shopping frenzy.
Some drown their sorrows in alcohol in such cases. This may sometimes be comforting. However, straw widowers and straw widows all over the world should avoid drinking “widow’s liquor” (喝寡酒 hē guǎjiǔ “to drink widow’s liquor”). In Mandarin, this actually refers to drinking on an empty stomach. And as we all know, that’s not really recommended. Because you could end up missing the final whistle, not just in European Championship times, but in all situations in life.
Verena Menzel runs the online language school New Chinese in Beijing.
Gambling is actually illegal in China – as long as it is played directly for money. This is not the case here at the poker festival in the city of Fuyang, Anhui province. However, the winner of the tournament is allowed to win a bonus. If the prize money of around 10,000 euros were not so high, there would certainly not be so many participants – despite the popularity of poker in China.
Chinese scientists are finding it increasingly difficult to obtain visas for Germany, as renowned migration researcher Xiang Biao from the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in Halle observes. Xiang sees this as a discreet policy change to impede access for Chinese academics. However, he believes that this will do Germany more harm than good: “De-risking should be implemented in the way of a surgeon, very targeted on specific areas. But right now it is executed in the style of a security guard, blocking everything,” says Xiang in an interview with Fabian Peltsch. He says that moralizing without a plan won’t help Germany.
Hungary’s presidency of the EU Council has not even begun and a dispute over one important issue is already looming. Viktor Orbán is known to be a big friend of China. Accordingly, his concept for greater economic security envisages expanding and deepening cooperation with Beijing. If this sounds very different from Ursula von der Leyen’s previous ideas, it is simply because it is the opposite concept. However, even reputable researchers criticize von der Leyen’s one-sided focus on risk minimization, writes Amelie Richter.
Hungary takes over the EU Council presidency this Monday. For the rest of the year, this means a showdown over relations with China between
Hungary aims to strengthen the EU’s economic security. As the EU Council Presidency, Hungary is pursuing this goal and is initially in line with the entire EU Council, which represents the governments of the member states.
In its strategic agenda until 2029, which the EU Council adopted last week, the EU Council decided to strengthen economic security. However, discussions continue on how more security can be achieved and what role China will play in this. All of this is against the backdrop of the ongoing trade dispute between the EU and the People’s Republic over extra tariffs and subsidies.
Above all, it is unclear whether Hungary also understands greater economic security as a tendency towards less involvement with China, as other EU states currently do. So far, it does not seem that way. According to a report by the Hungarian news agency MTI, Foreign and Trade Minister Péter Szijjártó said last week after a telephone call with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi that promoting cooperation with China would be an important goal of the Hungarian EU Council presidency.
Promoting cooperation with China and returning to a stable path could significantly contribute to achieving environmental and competitiveness goals, Szijjártó reportedly said. It was “essential” for European-Chinese relations to be “pragmatic, objective cooperation based on mutual respect rather than ideology.”
Szijjártó emphasized that economic cooperation with China “would play a major role in restoring competitiveness.” Hungary is “the best example” of the positive effects of economic cooperation between East and West, which is based on mutual respect and common sense, he added. “The European Union would be well served economically if in the coming period it were to make its economic cooperation with China even closer and more effective, if it did not take an ideological approach, if it did not seek isolation, if it did not introduce punitive tariffs,” he said. He went on to say that a trade war with China would jeopardize “hundreds of thousands” of jobs.
Hungary is the largest beneficiary of Chinese direct investment: BYD and CATL are building plants in the EU country. Hungary theoretically stands to benefit the most from the extra tariffs on Chinese electric cars – after all, Budapest offers access to the EU market by allowing Chinese manufacturers to increase their production in Hungary. However, any further deterioration in relations between the EU and China could also jeopardize Budapest’s bright trade relations.
Hungary also advocates this approach in its EU Council presidency program: “A pragmatic and balanced approach towards China is a key objective of the Hungarian Presidency. China is an important trade and economic partner.” Hungary considers a constructive dialogue on the economy and strategic security particularly important.
János Bóka, Hungary’s State Secretary for European Affairs, sees the economic relationship with China as the biggest challenge for the new Commission’s upcoming mandate. “There is no such thing as economic security in general,” Politico quoted him as saying. “If there are risks to our security, these risks must be specifically identified and addressed. If you speak of economic security in general, then you speak of decoupling … we made the decision that we are not decoupling, we’re de-risking.”
Hungary’s interpretation of economic security is at odds with EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. She pushed the issue to the top of the agenda over the past two years. Von der Leyen will likely maintain this course in her potential second term of office. “With its economic security strategy and de-risking paradigm, the EU has begun to reestablish the dormant link between its security and economic policies,” writes the think tank European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) in a new study, in which it calls for a “bold” upgrade of the EU’s economic security strategy.
However, even if Hungary’s view is controversial, the researchers do not consider the EU’s stance on China fully mature either. Focusing solely on risk minimization is too short-sighted. It prevents the EU from effectively steering its geo-economic position, as the ambitions of other powers threaten to limit its room for maneuver, Tobias Gehrke and Filip Medunic write in the study.
Gehrke told Table. Briefings that the EU urgently needs to expand the foundation for analyzing strategic trade chains. “The risk analyses are an important first step, but still fall short of understanding deeper insights into technologies and their applications, as well as production and trade patterns. New structures need to be created here.” In other words, the EU needs to know and understand China much, much better.
A lot of attention is being paid to the upstream part of important value chains, such as raw materials, says Gehrke. “But China’s dominance is particularly large and problematic in the middle, with intermediate products such as electronic and machine components or battery parts.”
Gehrke sees a reform of the EU’s approach to economic security as inevitable: “The controversial issue of competencies does not necessarily have to be on the table. A new executive vice-president role in the Commission can help with the often difficult coordination of different policy areas and analyses.”
Your research looks into different forms of migration. How do Chinese citizens and academics actually perceive the German migration policies of the last few years, which are now mirrored in a shift to the political right, for example, during the last European elections?
In my view it is not a major topic. I am not aware of a particularly critical view. Ordinary Chinese don’t care how other countries regulate migration. They might know a little more about the US-policies. I think the people still have the general impression that Germany is very actively internationalizing itself in the domains of education, arts, and high-tech industry, and is, of course, very interested in expanding trade. But in the academic field we saw over the last year that it is getting harder for academics and students to receive visas. It seems to be the result of a new policy, one that is not written down on paper, but nevertheless creates a lot of stress.
The debate about the risks of cooperation between Chinese and German researchers is still in full swing.
I am aware that politicians are talking about de-risking. But you don’t de-risk by slowing down the visa process. De-risking should be implemented in the way of a surgeon, very targeted on specific areas. But right now it is executed in the style of a security guard, blocking everything.
The notion of some politicians and academics is that every Chinese researcher and student has to report to the Chinese government.
I know where this impression comes from. There is a government scholarship. And the students who receive this scholarship need to sign a contract that says somewhere, that the students are supposed to report about their progress. So far I have not heard of any cases where the students were actually asked to report their results to Government bureaus. The question is: are we going to deprive these young people of the opportunity of coming to Germany to learn because they already suffer from the lack of freedom? Do we see them as agent for change in the next generation, or do we treat them as potential threats?
So you don’t see any risk for Germany?
There can be a risk for a very specific field of strategic technology that can be used by the military. And I fully understand that German politicians pay attention to this as they should. But there remains the question of how to assess and regulate these risks. Is it a risk that is higher than the potential benefit of having more interactions? The public debate in Germany appears to have a tendency to put a lot of moral coloring to the geopolitics discussion, which is surprising to foreigners like me, because we always thought German politics have always been quite pragmatic. Moralizing makes sense in family relations and community matters. But geopolitics has its own logic and is constantly changing. If you bring an excessively moralizing language into it, you corner yourself down and lose the necessary flexibility. Furthermore, moralization exacerbates conflicts and, in the end, could destabilize the domestic society.
So you believe that Germany can still benefit a lot from cooperation with China?
I think open communication will give more benefits to Germany. The economic prosperity, as well as the social future of German society, relies upon further internationalization. We must face that Germany is running out of its technology powerhouse legacy. As powerful as it is, Germany cannot set global agendas itself and has to navigate between bigger powers. It is therefore not healthy to be overly one-sided. Furthermore, Chinese society and even politics are changing fast. You can see its international policies are already changing over the last couple of years, and some channels are open again. You cannot follow these changes from a distance; you have to be engaged in order to feel the temperature and to push for something quickly.
As a scientist of Chinese origin, are you personally affected by these problems?
I don’t feel affected in my daily work; personally, I feel very welcomed here. But I do receive some kind of mediate inquiries, which are not just innocent but seem to have a kind of hunting intention behind them to catch a hidden enemy. It seems to be a new political culture. I feel the German public is quite open and dynamic, but somehow, the political class has difficulty representing the diversity and dynamics.
Let’s talk a little about your field of research. What fascinates you about migration?
I started working on migration when I was an undergraduate student in 1992. I realized that migration within China was a very important driving force pushing Chinese society to change bottom up. Rural-urban migration was not an official initiative but a people’s initiative, which, in the end, changed policies and people’s lives in many aspects. It is a myth that China’s development has been entirely driven by the government.
You are talking about phenomena such as migrant workers. What about international migration?
International migration from China changed a lot. Before the 2010s it was driven by the dream of going overseas and getting rich. They assumed the West was perfect; the countries were economically prosperous, politically progressive, and free. But it is different after the 2010s. Many young people, especially those who went to the US, were disillusioned by the poverty, class inequality as well as the brutality of politics under the Trump presidency. In Germany, they are surprised by the controversy related to Gaza. Some Chinese experienced what you can call “reversed culture shock.” They are shocked not by how Germany is different from China but by how similar they look when it comes to censoring journalists, artists, and academia.
Many younger Chinese are now moving to Thailand for a more relaxed life instead of the US or Europe …
After Covid, international migration changed again, because of the economic slowdown and the political oppression in China. A lot of migration is now not pulled by hope, but rather pushed by disillusionment at home. They care less about which destination they are going to; the priority is to leave. Thailand, South Korea or Hungary are places that weren’t first choices before. The goal is not to make money but to have a peaceful lifestyle where you can balance work and Relaxation. Relaxation and freedom have become an important value for many.
Your lectures, books and podcasts are very popular in China and even go viral. Were you surprised that these kinds of academic topics from your research would gain such popularity?
I am surprised about how widely they spread. The last time I was in China, I went into a restaurant and the chef came out to ask me questions based on his reading of my book. Some of my articles are even used in school exams. I think young people in China are very hungry for critical, new ideas. They are educated and grew up much more prosperous than their parents. They are not worried about hunger and such, but they have lots of questions about what a good life means, why the world is like this, and how it can be different.
Xiang Biao 项飙, born in 1972, is one of the most influential anthropologists in China today. He made a name for himself during his studies at Peking University with his field research among the migrant population. In 2003, he moved to Oxford University, where he completed his doctorate on the global recruitment of Indian IT professionals. Since 2020, he has worked as Director of the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in Halle. His book “The Self as Method” was named the most influential non-fiction title of 2020 in the People’s Republic of China.
The European Football Championship is on. Which means that the action on the pitch is once again fierce. Unfortunately, the fierce duels on the pitch result in numerous football widows outside the pitch. Thankfully, we’re not talking about actual deaths here. Because the spouse is not turning in his grave, but at the very most on the couch … or he is shouting lively in the stadium … or he is roaring and drinking vigorously at a public viewing.
However, football is known to completely kill off the love life during FIFA football festivals. After all, many men only have eyes for leather balls and football legs these days. Chinese women have coined the term “football widow” (足球寡妇 zúqiú guǎfu) – a tongue-in-cheek term used by neglected partners to verbally show their heartless sweetheart the yellow card. Of course, it can also be used the other way around! When the ladies get football fever, male football haters sometimes become football widowers (足球寡夫 zúqiú guǎfū – note the different spelling with the character 夫 fū as in 丈夫 zhàngfu “husband, spouse,” otherwise widower also means 鳏夫guānfū).
In Mandarin, there are plenty of other quirky football expressions. Don’t be surprised if Chinese commentators speak of tea goals, cow tails and butter fingers. That’s within the rules! Here is the vocabulary proof in slow motion:
If the ball hits the wrong square – in other words, an own goal ends up in the net – the Chinese call it an oolong ball (乌龙球 wūlóngqiú). Land of tea drinkers or not, what do fermented tea leaves have to do with frenetic ball sports? Well, China has the creativity of its Hong Kong football fans to thank for that. The term “own goal” reminded them of the Chinese word “wūlóng”. And since the regional expression 摆乌龙 bǎi wūlóng means “to mess something up” (literally “to swing an oolong”) in the Hong Kong-Guangdong region, ball sports fans quickly combined the two and christened the own goal “oolong goal”, i.e. a “messed-up goal.”
While an “underdog” can sometimes break the winning streak of the big players in the West, “black horses” gallop past the supposed favorite in China. 黑马 hēimǎ (“black horse”) is the Chinese term for underdogs. Sometimes butter hands (黄油手 huángyóushǒu) are also involved. They belong to the unlucky goalie who let balls slip through their fingers into the goal.
Keepers don’t have an easy time of it anyway. For example, when strikers hit them with an upside-down “golden hook.” 倒挂金钩 dàoguà jīngōu (literally: “upside-down golden hook”) is the Chinese equivalent of the equally creative “bicycle kick.”
Chinese even come up with metaphors for dribbling feints. Do you want to really show off at your next football evening with Chinese friends? Then simply memorize the following vocabulary repertoire to describe ball skills:
Some lovebirds who thought they could finally throw their mourning gowns away after the European Championship final may be disappointed. Because in China, we know that, in addition to football widows, there are sadly many other instances of mourning in everyday relationships in which people lose their partners. For example, there are lonely stock widows (股票寡妇 gǔpiào guǎfu – when all the man can think about is stock prices) or online gaming widows (网游寡妇 wǎngyóu guǎfu – when all he does is play video games). But married life can sometimes be a tragedy for the men, too. For example, around the double-eleven shopping festival in China, the double-eleven widowers (‘双11’寡夫 shuāng-shíyī guǎfu) wail their sorrow – because their loved ones have lost themselves in a shopping frenzy.
Some drown their sorrows in alcohol in such cases. This may sometimes be comforting. However, straw widowers and straw widows all over the world should avoid drinking “widow’s liquor” (喝寡酒 hē guǎjiǔ “to drink widow’s liquor”). In Mandarin, this actually refers to drinking on an empty stomach. And as we all know, that’s not really recommended. Because you could end up missing the final whistle, not just in European Championship times, but in all situations in life.
Verena Menzel runs the online language school New Chinese in Beijing.
Gambling is actually illegal in China – as long as it is played directly for money. This is not the case here at the poker festival in the city of Fuyang, Anhui province. However, the winner of the tournament is allowed to win a bonus. If the prize money of around 10,000 euros were not so high, there would certainly not be so many participants – despite the popularity of poker in China.
