The Communist leadership has sent a clear signal with the appointment of Zheng Yanxiong as the new head of the Beijing Liaison Office in Hong Kong. Zheng, who is known as a hardliner, succeeds Luo Huining. Zheng is notorious for his crackdown on a mass protest in Wukan in 2011, a village in Guangdong Province, which borders Hong Kong, where the now 59-year-old had accused residents of “collaborating with foreign media to cause trouble”.
Marcel Grzanna took a closer look at Zheng’s appointment and spoke with Hong Kongers living in exile. “The fact that a hardliner is rotating into the post of top representative shows Beijing’s continuing concern that residents could still cause trouble,” says former Hong Kong politician and student leader Sunny Cheung in an interview. What primarily sounds daunting, however, will uplift Hong Kong, as the CP hopes. After all, a tough approach means stability, especially for foreign investors.
How to make Beijing happy is not only on the minds of the government in Hong Kong but also on those in Jakarta. After all, China is Indonesia’s most important business partner. At the same time, however, the island state is also defending itself against the People’s Republic’s aggressive actions in disputed waters. Christiane Kuehl analyzes Jakarta’s complicated relationship with Beijing and how Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo is doing in his balancing act with the West.
The Communist Party has sent a signal of determination by appointing Zheng Yanxiong as the new head of the Beijing Liaison Office in Hong Kong. The appointment indicates that the Chinese central government is putting its unrestricted claim to power in the city ahead of its economic development.
As director of the National Security Bureau, the 59-year-old has recently developed the profile of an uncompromising purger willing to subordinate Hong Kong’s productivity to an enforced political consensus at any cost. Critics accuse him not only of cleaning up at the political level but also of infiltrating formerly independent and internationally respected professional associations such as the law society, founded in 1907, the Advisory Council of Accountants or the Teachers’ Association with Beijing loyalists.
Appointing Zheng, of all people, as liaison chief and thus at the same time as Beijing’s highest representative of interests in the metropolis thus acts not only as a warning to all remaining opposition members in Hong Kong but also to the pro-Beijing part of the elite. Former Hong Kong politicians and parliamentarians express their dismay in an interview with China.Table.
“I am downright shocked. This appointment is an unprecedented move. It expresses that Beijing no longer cares about the public perception of what is happening in Hong Kong. Neither in the city itself nor in the rest of the world,” says former Democratic MP Ted Hui, who now lives in exile in Australia, where he has escaped prosecution by Hong Kong authorities. “Only Beijing’s views matter,” Hui said.
Under Zheng’s leadership, since the introduction of the national security law in 2020, the city government also implemented an oath of office for officials that henceforth holds them legally accountable should they even appear not to be acting 100 percent in line with central government. “Zheng has put such pressure on the entire administration that a large majority of civil servants have seen no alternative but to comply,” Hui says. Only a few have resigned from the service, he says.
Zheng generated international attention more than a decade ago when, as the top party official in the city of Shanwei in Guangdong Province, which borders Hong Kong, he had to counter mass protests in a rebellious village. He accused the residents of Wukan of conspiring with foreign media to stir up trouble.
Zheng uses the same arguments today to dismiss dissent with the Hong Kong government as the result of diabolical influence by foreign forces. During his New Year’s speech last Sunday, he formulated a counteroffer. “The mainland’s vast hinterland, consumer market and inexhaustible innovation have provided Hong Kong residents with a huge platform to realize their dreams,” Zheng said, suggesting that Hong Kongers’ dreams consist solely of a desire for prosperity. Yet the protests in the city essentially reflected a desire for democratic structures.
“Rotating a hardliner to the post of top representative shows Beijing’s continuing concern that residents could still cause trouble,” says former Hong Kong politician and student leader Sunny Cheung, who now lives in Washington. Cheung believes Beijing can force an economic strengthening of the metropolis by increasing authority. “A strong Hong Kong is supposed to shore up the flagging Chinese economy. But the central government senses that many residents have no confidence in the party,” Cheung said.
By tightening the reins, the leadership robs the city of its last breath. But the CP is hoping to achieve an upswing by not compromising. Foreign investors in particular should get the feeling that stability has returned to Hong Kong and that they no longer need to worry about their investments.
The fact that this can only be achieved through even closer ties with the People’s Republic, although the 1997 handover agreement had promised “two systems” for the duration of half a century, was formulated by Chief Executive John Lee. He praised Zheng for the city government’s “coordination, supervision and leadership” in the area of national security and promised in turn to push ahead with “Hong Kong’s integration into national development”.
How does it feel when your most important business partner has been laying claim to part of your land for many years? Ask Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo. His country’s biggest trading partner for the past ten years has been China. At the same time, Beijing keeps sending its coast guard ships into the waters around Indonesia’s Natuna archipelago between Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam. Parts of this sea lie on the very edge of China’s vast claim area in the South China Sea, with raw materials, such as natural gas, lying dormant underneath.
Widodo, also known as Jokowi, meanwhile, insists on Indonesia’s right to exploit natural resources in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) around the islands and on Jan. 2 approved the development of the Tuna gas field in the waters, including a deal to export that gas to Vietnam. Indonesia also moved a naval command to the nearby Riau archipelago, where it had begun construction of a submarine base in 2021.
At the same time, the two sides maintain close channels of communication through regular meetings, most of which focus on economic cooperation. In July 2022, Jokowi traveled to Beijing and met with his counterpart Xi Jinping – the first head of state to do so since the Beijing Winter Olympics in February 2022. The two sides agreed to expand their trade relations and strengthen their cooperation in the fields of agriculture and food security.
Jokowi also met bilaterally with Xi at the G20 summit on the Indonesian island of Bali in November. There, the two demonstratively joined the Chinese-funded test operation of the 142-kilometer Jakarta-Bandung high-speed rail line, one of Beijing’s major projects in Indonesia, via video. A short time later, they spoke again at the APEC summit in Bangkok.
The Indonesian discord shows how difficult it is for the states of Southeast Asia to navigate security and economic issues in their region and the world. They all trade intensively with China and try to avoid clear positioning in the geopolitical tussle between China and the West. China views the region as its sphere of influence from which it wants to oust the United States. It initiated the world’s largest free trade zone RCEP there, which was launched exactly one year ago. In addition to China and Southeast Asia, it also includes India, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.
But Indonesia has a long tradition of non-alignment, which it does not want to give up. Thus, the country holds military exercises with both the US and China. It buys fighter jets from France and the USA. But it is also a guest in China’s security alliance Shanghai Cooperation Association. In his role as G20 president in 2022, Widodo visited both Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy in Kyiv and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow. Indonesia was ready to be a “communication bridge” between the two sides, he stressed at the time. Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto told reporters in late November: “I like to emphasize that Indonesia always takes the position of trying to maintain the best relationships with all nations, especially all the major powers.” Indonesia considers China a friendly nation and expects overlapping territorial claims to be resolved through negotiations, Subianto said.
With its growing geopolitical weight, emerging Indonesia is too big to be regarded by Beijing simply as a minor nuisance in its backyard. China is definitely interested in close relations with Indonesia, in which it is also willing to invest. This can be seen, for example, in active vaccination diplomacy. Sinovac from China is the most frequently vaccinated vaccine in Indonesia. The Chinese-developed mRNA vaccine AWcorna was launched in Indonesia in October before it was even approved in China.
This is because the island state is also a potentially huge sales market and raw materials partner for China. With 276 million people, the country has the fourth largest population in the world and is by far the largest of the ASEAN states. Beneath many of the country’s islands lie raw materials that China has its eye on. For example, Indonesia has more than one-fifth of the world’s nickel deposits, which are an important component of EV batteries.
According to the World Bank, the country is the tenth-largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity. It expects growth of 5.2 percent in 2022, according to a December report. In the medium term (2023-25), the bank projects an annual average of 4.9 percent.
In 2013, Jokowi’s predecessor Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono concluded a “comprehensive strategic partnership” with China. Since then, many investments have been flowing into the country, including under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In the first half of 2022, mainland China and Hong Kong ranked second and third, respectively, among Indonesia’s foreign direct investment, with $3.6 billion and $2.9 billion, according to the state newspaper Global Times. Bilateral trade was nearly $114 billion in 2021, according to IMF data – far greater than the exchange of goods with the number two country, the United States ($37 billion). In 2021, Indonesia achieved a trade surplus with China for the first time in more than ten years.
China’s investments are – unsurprisingly – focused on infrastructure and raw materials projects, for example, in the metallurgy sector. This fits insofar as Jokowi wants to build both, infrastructure and a domestic raw materials industry. In 2014, Indonesia banned the export of unrefined ores from Indonesia for this purpose, so China and other local investors will have to get into metal processing.
China’s Tsingshan Group, the world’s largest nickel producer, led the construction of the Morowali Industrial Park in Sulawesi, where at least 11 smelters are in operation. It is one of the country’s key raw materials projects. In the same region, Jiangsu Delong Nickel Industry Co. established the Virtue Dragon Nickel Industrial Park, where nickel and stainless steel are produced. “We are also making plans surrounding power batteries used for new-energy vehicles,” the Global Times quoted general manager Zhou Yuan. Jokowi aims to make its land a base for manufacturing precursors for the EV industry.
Jokowi showed in December 2022 that he intends to stick to his strategy of controlling domestic raw materials himself when he also banned exports of the aluminum raw material bauxite – which will hit China, the largest importer, hard. A tin export ban is also being studied. Jakarta is likely to hope for local investment in these sectors as well. As in other countries, however, there is always controversy surrounding Chinese projects. Accusations revolve around environmental damage, corruption, residents’ anger or delays. At a smelter owned by PT Gunbuster Nickel Industry on Sulawesi, which belongs to Jiangsu Delong, there were recent riots during protests against poor pay and safety precautions, in which two workers died.
China is not an easy partner for anyone. So far, Jokowi remains steadfast in the territorial dispute as well as in raw materials policy. Whether China can get everything – lucrative contracts and the claimed sea areas – is far from a foregone conclusion. It is also up to China how relations develop.
China’s weak economic data for 2022 substantiate the suspicion that the country could soon reach the peak of its CO2 emissions. The Chinese economy grew by just three percent last year, and there was even a decline in economic output in particularly emissions-intensive industries, according to official data from the National Bureau of Statistics. Originally, the People’s Republic had targeted growth of 5.5 percent.
The following industrial data are particularly relevant to China’s CO2 emissions:
According to Lauri Myllyvirta, China expert at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air in Helsinki, these figures indicate a decline in CO2 emissions in 2022. Emissions already fell between Q3 2021 and Q2 2022 in each case. A weakening real estate sector and the COVID-19 pandemic are responsible for this. nib
Last December, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida surprised the world public with a new Japanese security strategy. It represents a far-reaching reinterpretation of the pacifist-oriented security doctrine in force since the end of World War II. Defense spending will be doubled and thus increased by approximately $315 billion by 2027, making Japan’s military budget the third largest in the world after the United States and China. The country has also entered into negotiations with the US to purchase 500 Tomahawk missiles, and it plans to expand its own missile program. This will give it the ability to “counterattack,” in other words, to hit positions on the Chinese mainland from submarines or other bases. “Counterattack is,” says Premier Kishida, “an essential element of our deterrence strategy.”
Since World War II, the core of the security doctrine in force in Japan has been self-defense, as laid down in the constitution. Thus, Japan’s armed forces are referred to as a self-defense force, the country’s defense spending has been firmly capped at one percent of the gross national product since the 1950s, and Japan has refrained from projecting military power through the acquisition of weapons categories such as long-range missiles, amphibious vehicles or large aircraft carriers. Attempts to change this were firmly rejected by the Japanese population, countered by opposition parties and subjected to biting criticism by neighboring China and Korea.
The new strategic orientation is based on the “harshest and most complex security environment since World War II”. China, in particular, is described as the “greatest strategic challenge”. This is characterized by the consistent buildup of conventional and nuclear arsenals, which goes hand in hand with threats of an invasion of Taiwan, the establishment of military bases in the disputed South China Sea, and increasingly frequent attacks in the catchment area of the Senkaku Islands controlled by Japan.
The strategic alliance between China and Russia is another cause for concern. In the event of an expansion of the Ukraine war, which has been strongly condemned in Japan, it could have fatal consequences: China and Japan would face each other as parties to the conflict.
The unpredictable nuclear power North Korea also poses a growing threat. In 2022, the country conducted no fewer than 70 missile tests, and this year it plans to expand its nuclear program and send a spy satellite into space.
The Japanese population supports the new security strategy. According to a Kyodo News Agency poll conducted shortly after the announcement, 53 percent of respondents approved of acquiring the ability to counterattack, while 42.6 percent were opposed, although the majority opposed funding through tax increases. This is consistent with several other surveys that indicate Japanese opinion of China has dimmed considerably over the past 10 years. Today, the vast majority of the population rates relations with China as not good, and only a minority claims to have a friendly attitude toward China.
As expected, China strongly criticized the new strategy. A Foreign Ministry spokesman said “Japan would ignore facts, deviate from commitments in Sino-Japanese relations and common understanding between the two countries, and discredit China for no reason.” A visit by Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi, who is considered China-friendly and was scheduled to coincide with the announcement of the new security strategy to appease Chinese policy makers, had to be postponed until late January at the earliest due to the recent Covid wave gliding over the country.
Legitimate and understandable from Japan’s point of view and desirable from the US perspective, nothing can hide the fact that the new security strategy represents a further escalation in the already very tense relations between the powers of the Western community of values and China.
In this situation, in which there is now not only talk of a cold war but fears of military attacks are also increasingly part of the discussion, Europe has a role to play as a mediator between the adversaries. It brings years of good and resilient relations in business, science and culture and would have the necessary trust on the Chinese side as well as the corresponding gravitas.
That Europe defends its own values vis-à-vis China is as self-evident as it is important. All too often in the past, this has been neglected in favor of unacceptable economic opportunism and due to excessive superficiality. This has played into China’s hands. However, despite all understanding for a tougher stance toward the country, the current offensive appearance only fuels the rhetoric on both sides and thus increases the existing tensions.
Defending our values does not mean renouncing pragmatism. Instead of ideologized approaches that are more oriented toward narratives than facts, we should advocate a policy that focuses on solving concrete problems. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger set an example: In the midst of the Cultural Revolution, they set out for China to seek new ways of cooperation with a country whose values could not have been more different. The result was 50 years of joint development that brought unprecedented prosperity not only to these two countries.
In the meantime, we have reached a point where the stakes are no less than war or peace. We can see what war looks like every day in Ukraine. It must be the top priority of our rulers to work on the stability of relations with China that spares the population a destructive and ultimately senseless confrontation. The values of the West and China are not the same and probably never will be. But we cannot renounce each other for that reason. Europe should not allow itself to be infected by the polarization that is spreading around the world. As a reliable partner within the Western community of values, it should confidently assume a role as a mediator between today’s irreconcilable powers. It would be a contribution to peace and freedom – the highest values the West can pursue.
Gerhard Hinterhaeuser is Senior Advisor of Strategic Minds Company. He lives in Asia and Germany and was a member of the management board of the investment house PICC Asset Management in Shanghai from 2006 to 2014. His professional stations in Asia included Deutsche Bank, Hypovereinsbank and Munich Re.
Internet star and beer fast drinker Hebei Pangzai has his eye on the biggest beer festival in the world. He would like to attend Oktoberfest this year and is looking for sponsors, as the Youtuber wrote on Twitter. Hebei Pangzai (meaning “Hebei fatty”) gained fame with the so-called beer tornado – a drinking technique in which a beer bottle is emptied in one go. Circular movements create a vortex in the bottle, virtually pushing the beer down the drinker’s throat. Effective. It might be more difficult with a Mass (a 1 liter mug), though.
The Communist leadership has sent a clear signal with the appointment of Zheng Yanxiong as the new head of the Beijing Liaison Office in Hong Kong. Zheng, who is known as a hardliner, succeeds Luo Huining. Zheng is notorious for his crackdown on a mass protest in Wukan in 2011, a village in Guangdong Province, which borders Hong Kong, where the now 59-year-old had accused residents of “collaborating with foreign media to cause trouble”.
Marcel Grzanna took a closer look at Zheng’s appointment and spoke with Hong Kongers living in exile. “The fact that a hardliner is rotating into the post of top representative shows Beijing’s continuing concern that residents could still cause trouble,” says former Hong Kong politician and student leader Sunny Cheung in an interview. What primarily sounds daunting, however, will uplift Hong Kong, as the CP hopes. After all, a tough approach means stability, especially for foreign investors.
How to make Beijing happy is not only on the minds of the government in Hong Kong but also on those in Jakarta. After all, China is Indonesia’s most important business partner. At the same time, however, the island state is also defending itself against the People’s Republic’s aggressive actions in disputed waters. Christiane Kuehl analyzes Jakarta’s complicated relationship with Beijing and how Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo is doing in his balancing act with the West.
The Communist Party has sent a signal of determination by appointing Zheng Yanxiong as the new head of the Beijing Liaison Office in Hong Kong. The appointment indicates that the Chinese central government is putting its unrestricted claim to power in the city ahead of its economic development.
As director of the National Security Bureau, the 59-year-old has recently developed the profile of an uncompromising purger willing to subordinate Hong Kong’s productivity to an enforced political consensus at any cost. Critics accuse him not only of cleaning up at the political level but also of infiltrating formerly independent and internationally respected professional associations such as the law society, founded in 1907, the Advisory Council of Accountants or the Teachers’ Association with Beijing loyalists.
Appointing Zheng, of all people, as liaison chief and thus at the same time as Beijing’s highest representative of interests in the metropolis thus acts not only as a warning to all remaining opposition members in Hong Kong but also to the pro-Beijing part of the elite. Former Hong Kong politicians and parliamentarians express their dismay in an interview with China.Table.
“I am downright shocked. This appointment is an unprecedented move. It expresses that Beijing no longer cares about the public perception of what is happening in Hong Kong. Neither in the city itself nor in the rest of the world,” says former Democratic MP Ted Hui, who now lives in exile in Australia, where he has escaped prosecution by Hong Kong authorities. “Only Beijing’s views matter,” Hui said.
Under Zheng’s leadership, since the introduction of the national security law in 2020, the city government also implemented an oath of office for officials that henceforth holds them legally accountable should they even appear not to be acting 100 percent in line with central government. “Zheng has put such pressure on the entire administration that a large majority of civil servants have seen no alternative but to comply,” Hui says. Only a few have resigned from the service, he says.
Zheng generated international attention more than a decade ago when, as the top party official in the city of Shanwei in Guangdong Province, which borders Hong Kong, he had to counter mass protests in a rebellious village. He accused the residents of Wukan of conspiring with foreign media to stir up trouble.
Zheng uses the same arguments today to dismiss dissent with the Hong Kong government as the result of diabolical influence by foreign forces. During his New Year’s speech last Sunday, he formulated a counteroffer. “The mainland’s vast hinterland, consumer market and inexhaustible innovation have provided Hong Kong residents with a huge platform to realize their dreams,” Zheng said, suggesting that Hong Kongers’ dreams consist solely of a desire for prosperity. Yet the protests in the city essentially reflected a desire for democratic structures.
“Rotating a hardliner to the post of top representative shows Beijing’s continuing concern that residents could still cause trouble,” says former Hong Kong politician and student leader Sunny Cheung, who now lives in Washington. Cheung believes Beijing can force an economic strengthening of the metropolis by increasing authority. “A strong Hong Kong is supposed to shore up the flagging Chinese economy. But the central government senses that many residents have no confidence in the party,” Cheung said.
By tightening the reins, the leadership robs the city of its last breath. But the CP is hoping to achieve an upswing by not compromising. Foreign investors in particular should get the feeling that stability has returned to Hong Kong and that they no longer need to worry about their investments.
The fact that this can only be achieved through even closer ties with the People’s Republic, although the 1997 handover agreement had promised “two systems” for the duration of half a century, was formulated by Chief Executive John Lee. He praised Zheng for the city government’s “coordination, supervision and leadership” in the area of national security and promised in turn to push ahead with “Hong Kong’s integration into national development”.
How does it feel when your most important business partner has been laying claim to part of your land for many years? Ask Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo. His country’s biggest trading partner for the past ten years has been China. At the same time, Beijing keeps sending its coast guard ships into the waters around Indonesia’s Natuna archipelago between Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam. Parts of this sea lie on the very edge of China’s vast claim area in the South China Sea, with raw materials, such as natural gas, lying dormant underneath.
Widodo, also known as Jokowi, meanwhile, insists on Indonesia’s right to exploit natural resources in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) around the islands and on Jan. 2 approved the development of the Tuna gas field in the waters, including a deal to export that gas to Vietnam. Indonesia also moved a naval command to the nearby Riau archipelago, where it had begun construction of a submarine base in 2021.
At the same time, the two sides maintain close channels of communication through regular meetings, most of which focus on economic cooperation. In July 2022, Jokowi traveled to Beijing and met with his counterpart Xi Jinping – the first head of state to do so since the Beijing Winter Olympics in February 2022. The two sides agreed to expand their trade relations and strengthen their cooperation in the fields of agriculture and food security.
Jokowi also met bilaterally with Xi at the G20 summit on the Indonesian island of Bali in November. There, the two demonstratively joined the Chinese-funded test operation of the 142-kilometer Jakarta-Bandung high-speed rail line, one of Beijing’s major projects in Indonesia, via video. A short time later, they spoke again at the APEC summit in Bangkok.
The Indonesian discord shows how difficult it is for the states of Southeast Asia to navigate security and economic issues in their region and the world. They all trade intensively with China and try to avoid clear positioning in the geopolitical tussle between China and the West. China views the region as its sphere of influence from which it wants to oust the United States. It initiated the world’s largest free trade zone RCEP there, which was launched exactly one year ago. In addition to China and Southeast Asia, it also includes India, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.
But Indonesia has a long tradition of non-alignment, which it does not want to give up. Thus, the country holds military exercises with both the US and China. It buys fighter jets from France and the USA. But it is also a guest in China’s security alliance Shanghai Cooperation Association. In his role as G20 president in 2022, Widodo visited both Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy in Kyiv and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow. Indonesia was ready to be a “communication bridge” between the two sides, he stressed at the time. Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto told reporters in late November: “I like to emphasize that Indonesia always takes the position of trying to maintain the best relationships with all nations, especially all the major powers.” Indonesia considers China a friendly nation and expects overlapping territorial claims to be resolved through negotiations, Subianto said.
With its growing geopolitical weight, emerging Indonesia is too big to be regarded by Beijing simply as a minor nuisance in its backyard. China is definitely interested in close relations with Indonesia, in which it is also willing to invest. This can be seen, for example, in active vaccination diplomacy. Sinovac from China is the most frequently vaccinated vaccine in Indonesia. The Chinese-developed mRNA vaccine AWcorna was launched in Indonesia in October before it was even approved in China.
This is because the island state is also a potentially huge sales market and raw materials partner for China. With 276 million people, the country has the fourth largest population in the world and is by far the largest of the ASEAN states. Beneath many of the country’s islands lie raw materials that China has its eye on. For example, Indonesia has more than one-fifth of the world’s nickel deposits, which are an important component of EV batteries.
According to the World Bank, the country is the tenth-largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity. It expects growth of 5.2 percent in 2022, according to a December report. In the medium term (2023-25), the bank projects an annual average of 4.9 percent.
In 2013, Jokowi’s predecessor Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono concluded a “comprehensive strategic partnership” with China. Since then, many investments have been flowing into the country, including under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In the first half of 2022, mainland China and Hong Kong ranked second and third, respectively, among Indonesia’s foreign direct investment, with $3.6 billion and $2.9 billion, according to the state newspaper Global Times. Bilateral trade was nearly $114 billion in 2021, according to IMF data – far greater than the exchange of goods with the number two country, the United States ($37 billion). In 2021, Indonesia achieved a trade surplus with China for the first time in more than ten years.
China’s investments are – unsurprisingly – focused on infrastructure and raw materials projects, for example, in the metallurgy sector. This fits insofar as Jokowi wants to build both, infrastructure and a domestic raw materials industry. In 2014, Indonesia banned the export of unrefined ores from Indonesia for this purpose, so China and other local investors will have to get into metal processing.
China’s Tsingshan Group, the world’s largest nickel producer, led the construction of the Morowali Industrial Park in Sulawesi, where at least 11 smelters are in operation. It is one of the country’s key raw materials projects. In the same region, Jiangsu Delong Nickel Industry Co. established the Virtue Dragon Nickel Industrial Park, where nickel and stainless steel are produced. “We are also making plans surrounding power batteries used for new-energy vehicles,” the Global Times quoted general manager Zhou Yuan. Jokowi aims to make its land a base for manufacturing precursors for the EV industry.
Jokowi showed in December 2022 that he intends to stick to his strategy of controlling domestic raw materials himself when he also banned exports of the aluminum raw material bauxite – which will hit China, the largest importer, hard. A tin export ban is also being studied. Jakarta is likely to hope for local investment in these sectors as well. As in other countries, however, there is always controversy surrounding Chinese projects. Accusations revolve around environmental damage, corruption, residents’ anger or delays. At a smelter owned by PT Gunbuster Nickel Industry on Sulawesi, which belongs to Jiangsu Delong, there were recent riots during protests against poor pay and safety precautions, in which two workers died.
China is not an easy partner for anyone. So far, Jokowi remains steadfast in the territorial dispute as well as in raw materials policy. Whether China can get everything – lucrative contracts and the claimed sea areas – is far from a foregone conclusion. It is also up to China how relations develop.
China’s weak economic data for 2022 substantiate the suspicion that the country could soon reach the peak of its CO2 emissions. The Chinese economy grew by just three percent last year, and there was even a decline in economic output in particularly emissions-intensive industries, according to official data from the National Bureau of Statistics. Originally, the People’s Republic had targeted growth of 5.5 percent.
The following industrial data are particularly relevant to China’s CO2 emissions:
According to Lauri Myllyvirta, China expert at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air in Helsinki, these figures indicate a decline in CO2 emissions in 2022. Emissions already fell between Q3 2021 and Q2 2022 in each case. A weakening real estate sector and the COVID-19 pandemic are responsible for this. nib
Last December, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida surprised the world public with a new Japanese security strategy. It represents a far-reaching reinterpretation of the pacifist-oriented security doctrine in force since the end of World War II. Defense spending will be doubled and thus increased by approximately $315 billion by 2027, making Japan’s military budget the third largest in the world after the United States and China. The country has also entered into negotiations with the US to purchase 500 Tomahawk missiles, and it plans to expand its own missile program. This will give it the ability to “counterattack,” in other words, to hit positions on the Chinese mainland from submarines or other bases. “Counterattack is,” says Premier Kishida, “an essential element of our deterrence strategy.”
Since World War II, the core of the security doctrine in force in Japan has been self-defense, as laid down in the constitution. Thus, Japan’s armed forces are referred to as a self-defense force, the country’s defense spending has been firmly capped at one percent of the gross national product since the 1950s, and Japan has refrained from projecting military power through the acquisition of weapons categories such as long-range missiles, amphibious vehicles or large aircraft carriers. Attempts to change this were firmly rejected by the Japanese population, countered by opposition parties and subjected to biting criticism by neighboring China and Korea.
The new strategic orientation is based on the “harshest and most complex security environment since World War II”. China, in particular, is described as the “greatest strategic challenge”. This is characterized by the consistent buildup of conventional and nuclear arsenals, which goes hand in hand with threats of an invasion of Taiwan, the establishment of military bases in the disputed South China Sea, and increasingly frequent attacks in the catchment area of the Senkaku Islands controlled by Japan.
The strategic alliance between China and Russia is another cause for concern. In the event of an expansion of the Ukraine war, which has been strongly condemned in Japan, it could have fatal consequences: China and Japan would face each other as parties to the conflict.
The unpredictable nuclear power North Korea also poses a growing threat. In 2022, the country conducted no fewer than 70 missile tests, and this year it plans to expand its nuclear program and send a spy satellite into space.
The Japanese population supports the new security strategy. According to a Kyodo News Agency poll conducted shortly after the announcement, 53 percent of respondents approved of acquiring the ability to counterattack, while 42.6 percent were opposed, although the majority opposed funding through tax increases. This is consistent with several other surveys that indicate Japanese opinion of China has dimmed considerably over the past 10 years. Today, the vast majority of the population rates relations with China as not good, and only a minority claims to have a friendly attitude toward China.
As expected, China strongly criticized the new strategy. A Foreign Ministry spokesman said “Japan would ignore facts, deviate from commitments in Sino-Japanese relations and common understanding between the two countries, and discredit China for no reason.” A visit by Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi, who is considered China-friendly and was scheduled to coincide with the announcement of the new security strategy to appease Chinese policy makers, had to be postponed until late January at the earliest due to the recent Covid wave gliding over the country.
Legitimate and understandable from Japan’s point of view and desirable from the US perspective, nothing can hide the fact that the new security strategy represents a further escalation in the already very tense relations between the powers of the Western community of values and China.
In this situation, in which there is now not only talk of a cold war but fears of military attacks are also increasingly part of the discussion, Europe has a role to play as a mediator between the adversaries. It brings years of good and resilient relations in business, science and culture and would have the necessary trust on the Chinese side as well as the corresponding gravitas.
That Europe defends its own values vis-à-vis China is as self-evident as it is important. All too often in the past, this has been neglected in favor of unacceptable economic opportunism and due to excessive superficiality. This has played into China’s hands. However, despite all understanding for a tougher stance toward the country, the current offensive appearance only fuels the rhetoric on both sides and thus increases the existing tensions.
Defending our values does not mean renouncing pragmatism. Instead of ideologized approaches that are more oriented toward narratives than facts, we should advocate a policy that focuses on solving concrete problems. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger set an example: In the midst of the Cultural Revolution, they set out for China to seek new ways of cooperation with a country whose values could not have been more different. The result was 50 years of joint development that brought unprecedented prosperity not only to these two countries.
In the meantime, we have reached a point where the stakes are no less than war or peace. We can see what war looks like every day in Ukraine. It must be the top priority of our rulers to work on the stability of relations with China that spares the population a destructive and ultimately senseless confrontation. The values of the West and China are not the same and probably never will be. But we cannot renounce each other for that reason. Europe should not allow itself to be infected by the polarization that is spreading around the world. As a reliable partner within the Western community of values, it should confidently assume a role as a mediator between today’s irreconcilable powers. It would be a contribution to peace and freedom – the highest values the West can pursue.
Gerhard Hinterhaeuser is Senior Advisor of Strategic Minds Company. He lives in Asia and Germany and was a member of the management board of the investment house PICC Asset Management in Shanghai from 2006 to 2014. His professional stations in Asia included Deutsche Bank, Hypovereinsbank and Munich Re.
Internet star and beer fast drinker Hebei Pangzai has his eye on the biggest beer festival in the world. He would like to attend Oktoberfest this year and is looking for sponsors, as the Youtuber wrote on Twitter. Hebei Pangzai (meaning “Hebei fatty”) gained fame with the so-called beer tornado – a drinking technique in which a beer bottle is emptied in one go. Circular movements create a vortex in the bottle, virtually pushing the beer down the drinker’s throat. Effective. It might be more difficult with a Mass (a 1 liter mug), though.
