Just over 20 years ago, the government in Hong Kong once again wanted to enact its own National Security Law. Even back then, Hong Kong citizens feared that Beijing might unreasonably expand its grip on the freedoms of the special administrative region. 500,000 people took to the streets.
Hong Kong in 2024 is a different city. Beijing has long curtailed press and assembly freedoms. Fear of repression and arrests is omnipresent in the once politically open financial metropolis. So, it’s the perfect moment for Chief Executive John Lee Ka-chiu to enact his own National Security Law “as soon as possible”, which could further intensify the criminal consequences of the National Security Laws passed by Beijing in 2020.
This not only endangers Hong Kong’s people but also foreign companies. And the outlook for religious freedom in the city is bleak, as analyzed by Fabian Peltsch. Churches have remained among the few places of freedom, although self-censorship is increasingly prevalent here too.
A brief look back into the past is also worthwhile for the second topic: It has been ten years since Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the Belt and Road Initiative during a visit to Kazakhstan. The foreign trade agency Germany Trade & Invest (GTAI) has examined the initiative on its tenth anniversary and identified two interesting trends that distinguish the current Belt and Road Initiative from its early years: The focus is shifting towards Central and Southeast Asia and towards smaller projects.
Hong Kong’s Chief Executive John Lee Ka-chiu wants to pass his own national security law for the special administrative region. Consultations on this could be completed by the predominantly Beijing-friendly parliament as early as the end of February.
The existing security law was enacted by Beijing in 2020 in response to the so-called “umbrella” protests in Hong Kong. Around 290 people have been arrested under its provisions so far, including many democracy activists, journalists, human rights lawyers and union representatives. Recently, bounties were even placed on dissidents living abroad.
The idea of Hong Kong having its own security law is enshrined as Article 23 in Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, the Basic Law, which came into effect in 1997. It stipulates that Hong Kong “shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People’s Government”. However, a previous attempt by the government to actually pass such a law was abandoned in 2003 after massive protests by the population. At that time, around 500,000 people took to the streets in peaceful protests. The then-chief executive, Tung Chee-hwa, eventually resigned – with a delay.
Today, the situation in the city is different. After waves of arrests, there is an atmosphere of fear. Many dissidents are silent or have fled abroad. Censorship is omnipresent. Most recently, the Amazon series “Expats”, set in Hong Kong and starring Nicole Kidman, was blocked, presumably because a scene briefly alludes to the umbrella protests.
For Lee, a former policeman who took office as chief executive in 2022, now seems like the perfect time to make another attempt after 20 years. He wants to implement the local security law “as soon as possible”, as he stated at a press conference. Certain areas, such as treason or theft of state secrets, are not yet comprehensively covered by the existing security law.
The 110-page consultation paper explicitly mentions offenses such as treason, rioting, espionage, destructive activities and foreign interference. At the same time, the document largely remains silent on the exact definitions and proposed sanctions. However, the wording alone already sets off alarm bells.
“This is potentially the most dangerous moment for human rights in Hong Kong since the introduction of the National Security Law in 2020,” writes Amnesty International. The NGO left Hong Kong in 2021 following the security law. A spokesperson for the EU expressed similar concerns to the news agency AFP: “The EU is concerned that some definitions and provisions in the (proposed law) correspond to or even exceed the scope and draconian measures of the National Security Law, further weakening Hong Kong’s remaining freedoms.”
The Democratic Party (DP), one of the last remaining pro-democracy groups in Hong Kong, called on the government on Tuesday to extend the period for public consultation to three months. Party chairman Lo Kin-hei said the consultation paper was “quite complicated” and its content might not be easy for the general public to understand.
Core questions, such as what exactly constitutes a threat to public safety, need to be clarified further, such as whether criminal behavior begins with mere criticism of the government, Lo said. Johannes Hack, president of the German Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong, also said he hoped the authorities would define terms like “state secrets” more precisely, as the term “could potentially cover many areas”.
In a joint statement released on Tuesday, the General Chamber of Commerce of Hong Kong, the Chinese Manufacturers’ Association of Hong Kong, the Federation of Hong Kong Industries, and the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce said that implementing Article 23 would provide a solid framework for protecting national businesses and improving the overall business environment. Such a law is necessary because investment sentiment in Hong Kong has been “seriously affected” by the unrest in 2019, according to business representatives.
The “extraterritorial effect” mentioned in Article 23 would actually massively unsettle foreigners and foreign companies in Hong Kong, explains international human rights lawyer Caoilfhionn Gallagher KC to Table.Media. “Foreign companies doing business in Hong Kong under such circumstances should be aware that they are exposing their employees to potential risks. Any employee who likes a tweet from Amnesty International or reads the wrong newspaper or speaks out in a certain way about China’s or Hong Kong’s leadership could soon find themselves under surveillance or attacked. Asset seizures and arrests could also occur.” The head of the international legal team for imprisoned Hong Kong publisher Jimmy Lai herself has been the target of coordinated anonymous threats and harassment by Chinese state media.
The pro-democracy foundation Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong (CFHK) also points out in a new report that the new law could have far-reaching consequences for religious freedom. Christian churches, in particular, still play an important role in social life in the former British colony. Some leaders of the protest movement, such as Joshua Wong, have publicly admitted that their Christian faith was an inspiration for their political commitment.
Moreover, at least 60 percent of publicly funded schools in Hong Kong are run by the church. Beijing directly associates religions in Hong Kong with “violent protests” and cooperation with foreign organizations, CFHK writes. For example, the then 90-year-old Hong Kong Cardinal Joseph Zen was arrested in May 2022 on charges of conspiring with foreign forces.
Many believers now fear that they will only be able to practice their faith in the future in a similarly restricted manner as those on the Chinese mainland. There, the church is officially subject to the state and must follow the party. However, many underground churches still view the Pope as the supreme authority in their spiritual lives. Other religious communities, such as Falun Gong, fear that they will soon have to go underground in Hong Kong as well.
Already, most sermons are self-censored, writes Benedict Rogers, human rights activist and CEO of the British NGO Hong Kong Watch. Memorial services for the victims of the Tiananmen protests or terms like human rights have given way to demands for “patriotism”, “dialogue” and “reconciliation”. Political and religious freedoms are inseparable.
Ten years ago, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the Silk Road Initiative during a visit to Kazakhstan, which was later renamed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The German federal agency Germany Trade & Invest (GTAI) has identified two interesting trends on the occasion of its tenth anniversary, which differ from the early years:
In Western countries, the prevailing impression is that China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) brings mainly suffering. There is talk of African countries now heavily indebted to China. Of coal-fired power plants and pipelines for oil and gas, financed by the People’s Republic in Indonesia or Myanmar, which further bind these states to fossil fuels.
These problems cannot be ignored. Zambia has defaulted on repayments of loans to China. Nigeria, Kenya and Egypt face a high risk of insolvency. Each of these countries must allocate more than 30 percent of state revenues to interest payments on debt. However, the leadership in Beijing is well aware of this: Apparently, a course correction has now become necessary.
According to the annual report of GTAI, the number of BRI projects in Central Asia increased by 2.6 times in the entire year 2023 compared to 2022. The report considers several solar power plants in Uzbekistan and a contract for the production of green hydrogen particularly noteworthy. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is also said to be involved in this project.
The growing importance of Saudi Arabian investments in Chinese energy projects in Central Asia is also evident in the expansion of renewable energies in the region. In addition, China intends to participate in the expansion of the so-called Middle Corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian Route. This avoids Russia via Kazakhstan. “China wants to keep alternatives to transport through Russia open,” the report says. Apparently, resilience for trade flows also plays a role for the BRI.
Central Asia and the Middle Corridor are also becoming increasingly important for the EU. States from Central Asia are currently raising funds from investors to improve transportation links to Europe. On Monday, government representatives from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan signed a memorandum of understanding with the European Investment Bank (EIB) for loans totaling 1.47 billion euros. The EU Commission supports the deal through guarantees under its Global Gateway Initiative. At an investor conference organized by the EU in Brussels, Kazakhstan also signed an MoU with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) for investments of 1.5 billion euros in transportation projects in Central Asia.
However, the BRI also has another region in its focus: The ASEAN countries, i.e., the countries of Southeast Asia, also saw a significant increase in BRI projects in 2023 – an increase of about a quarter compared to the previous year. What stands out in this region, in particular, is that there are many small projects with an investment volume of less than ten million US dollars.
Projects worldwide are also becoming more diverse. While energy projects still dominate, especially the construction and expansion of power plants, projects in the transport and transportation sector continue to rank second. However, the strongest growth is in the industrial sector across various industries: According to the GTAI annual report, more and more manufacturing projects are being registered under the BRI brand, from the textile industry to optics and electronics, to the important chemical industry.
Two tenders for the construction of methanol plants in Russia are among the largest projects worldwide under the BRI. The total value is more than ten billion US dollars that China wants to invest in the large neighboring country. In the early days, Russia was not at all the focus of the Belt and Road Initiative; rather, China’s leadership focused more on infrastructure development in Eastern European countries, including Ukraine.
Even today, Serbia plays a key role in the few BRI projects in Europe. Old rivalries between Beijing and Moscow certainly played a role. However, this has completely changed since Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Russia has definitively become China’s energy supplier.
The only world region with a significant decrease in BRI projects is Latin America. There, the number of projects decreased by 11.4 percent. Projects in Europe recorded only a slight increase.
Andrea Hideg has just returned from a trip to Shanghai. “Finally, it was possible again,” says the 42-year-old. She is happy that she can visit China again after the comprehensive travel ban during the COVID-19 period. As the head of the East Asia department for the German Chamber of Industry and Commerce (DIHK), local exchange is particularly important to her. Many German companies are unsure how to deal with the People’s Republic of China in the future, explains Hideg.
During her last trip, Hideg gathered reconciliatory impressions: “We received a clear message that there is still a strong interest in cooperation.” According to the East Asia expert, Chinese and German counterparts want to engage more with each other instead of talking about each other.
Since June 2022, Hideg has been working for the DIHK, representing the interests of German companies. For her, it’s a dream job: “I feel like a fish in water.” There is no specific routine in her work. “One day, I’m in contact with ministries, another day with entrepreneurs from China.” She advises German politicians, organizes internal association events and accompanies delegations from China when they visit. In Shanghai, she recently accompanied the German delegation on the occasion of the German-Chinese Environmental Forum.
She never imagined feeling like a fish in water in her profession during her studies. “There, I was often asked what I wanted to do later,” says Hideg, who began her studies in Japanology with a minor in Southeast Asian studies and economics at the Free University of Berlin (FU) in 2000. “For a long time, I didn’t have a concrete answer to that.” After an internship at the Federation of German Industries (BDI), she got a taste for it. She liked the interface between politics, economy and her specialized region.
After her studies, Hideg worked for the BDI from 2010 to 2013, then moved to Duesseldorf to the wholesale company Metro. There she was responsible for the Asia region. At that time, Metro still had markets in China. It was one of her first professional encounters with the country. She enjoyed working with her Chinese colleagues so much that she became fascinated by the country.
She now works in Berlin for the DIHK. According to her, one thing is particularly important in dealing with China: differentiation. “There are clearly points that can be criticized about China, there is no doubt about that,” says the East Asia expert. “But countries are similar to people.” In both cases, it’s difficult to say that someone is only good or bad. China is an important market that politics cannot ignore for German companies. “That would be anything but realistic,” she says. And sweeping judgments have never been good for humanity, says Hideg.
Outside of work, Hideg is an enthusiastic dancer – whether it’s ballet, street dance or jazz. She has tried many styles. Recently, the Berliner has taken up a special hobby – knitting. “But I always hesitate to mention that,” says Hideg, “because it always has such a grandma image.” Dayan Djajadisastra
As the Chinese New Year approaches, fireworks companies in Dayao, Hunan Province, have ramped up their production. The history of fireworks in China dates back over 2,000 years; it is traditionally a staple of the Chinese New Year celebration.
However, in recent years, many major cities have banned fireworks and firecrackers – a ban that continues to be hotly debated among the people. In a Weibo poll of 15,200 users, 1,600 recently advocated for a complete ban, 3,600 supported permitting them only in designated areas and 10,000 favored a complete lifting of the bans. Even the state broadcaster CCTV echoed similar sentiments, stating in an article that it is the right of the Chinese people to “admire magnificent fireworks after a year of hard work”.
Just over 20 years ago, the government in Hong Kong once again wanted to enact its own National Security Law. Even back then, Hong Kong citizens feared that Beijing might unreasonably expand its grip on the freedoms of the special administrative region. 500,000 people took to the streets.
Hong Kong in 2024 is a different city. Beijing has long curtailed press and assembly freedoms. Fear of repression and arrests is omnipresent in the once politically open financial metropolis. So, it’s the perfect moment for Chief Executive John Lee Ka-chiu to enact his own National Security Law “as soon as possible”, which could further intensify the criminal consequences of the National Security Laws passed by Beijing in 2020.
This not only endangers Hong Kong’s people but also foreign companies. And the outlook for religious freedom in the city is bleak, as analyzed by Fabian Peltsch. Churches have remained among the few places of freedom, although self-censorship is increasingly prevalent here too.
A brief look back into the past is also worthwhile for the second topic: It has been ten years since Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the Belt and Road Initiative during a visit to Kazakhstan. The foreign trade agency Germany Trade & Invest (GTAI) has examined the initiative on its tenth anniversary and identified two interesting trends that distinguish the current Belt and Road Initiative from its early years: The focus is shifting towards Central and Southeast Asia and towards smaller projects.
Hong Kong’s Chief Executive John Lee Ka-chiu wants to pass his own national security law for the special administrative region. Consultations on this could be completed by the predominantly Beijing-friendly parliament as early as the end of February.
The existing security law was enacted by Beijing in 2020 in response to the so-called “umbrella” protests in Hong Kong. Around 290 people have been arrested under its provisions so far, including many democracy activists, journalists, human rights lawyers and union representatives. Recently, bounties were even placed on dissidents living abroad.
The idea of Hong Kong having its own security law is enshrined as Article 23 in Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, the Basic Law, which came into effect in 1997. It stipulates that Hong Kong “shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People’s Government”. However, a previous attempt by the government to actually pass such a law was abandoned in 2003 after massive protests by the population. At that time, around 500,000 people took to the streets in peaceful protests. The then-chief executive, Tung Chee-hwa, eventually resigned – with a delay.
Today, the situation in the city is different. After waves of arrests, there is an atmosphere of fear. Many dissidents are silent or have fled abroad. Censorship is omnipresent. Most recently, the Amazon series “Expats”, set in Hong Kong and starring Nicole Kidman, was blocked, presumably because a scene briefly alludes to the umbrella protests.
For Lee, a former policeman who took office as chief executive in 2022, now seems like the perfect time to make another attempt after 20 years. He wants to implement the local security law “as soon as possible”, as he stated at a press conference. Certain areas, such as treason or theft of state secrets, are not yet comprehensively covered by the existing security law.
The 110-page consultation paper explicitly mentions offenses such as treason, rioting, espionage, destructive activities and foreign interference. At the same time, the document largely remains silent on the exact definitions and proposed sanctions. However, the wording alone already sets off alarm bells.
“This is potentially the most dangerous moment for human rights in Hong Kong since the introduction of the National Security Law in 2020,” writes Amnesty International. The NGO left Hong Kong in 2021 following the security law. A spokesperson for the EU expressed similar concerns to the news agency AFP: “The EU is concerned that some definitions and provisions in the (proposed law) correspond to or even exceed the scope and draconian measures of the National Security Law, further weakening Hong Kong’s remaining freedoms.”
The Democratic Party (DP), one of the last remaining pro-democracy groups in Hong Kong, called on the government on Tuesday to extend the period for public consultation to three months. Party chairman Lo Kin-hei said the consultation paper was “quite complicated” and its content might not be easy for the general public to understand.
Core questions, such as what exactly constitutes a threat to public safety, need to be clarified further, such as whether criminal behavior begins with mere criticism of the government, Lo said. Johannes Hack, president of the German Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong, also said he hoped the authorities would define terms like “state secrets” more precisely, as the term “could potentially cover many areas”.
In a joint statement released on Tuesday, the General Chamber of Commerce of Hong Kong, the Chinese Manufacturers’ Association of Hong Kong, the Federation of Hong Kong Industries, and the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce said that implementing Article 23 would provide a solid framework for protecting national businesses and improving the overall business environment. Such a law is necessary because investment sentiment in Hong Kong has been “seriously affected” by the unrest in 2019, according to business representatives.
The “extraterritorial effect” mentioned in Article 23 would actually massively unsettle foreigners and foreign companies in Hong Kong, explains international human rights lawyer Caoilfhionn Gallagher KC to Table.Media. “Foreign companies doing business in Hong Kong under such circumstances should be aware that they are exposing their employees to potential risks. Any employee who likes a tweet from Amnesty International or reads the wrong newspaper or speaks out in a certain way about China’s or Hong Kong’s leadership could soon find themselves under surveillance or attacked. Asset seizures and arrests could also occur.” The head of the international legal team for imprisoned Hong Kong publisher Jimmy Lai herself has been the target of coordinated anonymous threats and harassment by Chinese state media.
The pro-democracy foundation Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong (CFHK) also points out in a new report that the new law could have far-reaching consequences for religious freedom. Christian churches, in particular, still play an important role in social life in the former British colony. Some leaders of the protest movement, such as Joshua Wong, have publicly admitted that their Christian faith was an inspiration for their political commitment.
Moreover, at least 60 percent of publicly funded schools in Hong Kong are run by the church. Beijing directly associates religions in Hong Kong with “violent protests” and cooperation with foreign organizations, CFHK writes. For example, the then 90-year-old Hong Kong Cardinal Joseph Zen was arrested in May 2022 on charges of conspiring with foreign forces.
Many believers now fear that they will only be able to practice their faith in the future in a similarly restricted manner as those on the Chinese mainland. There, the church is officially subject to the state and must follow the party. However, many underground churches still view the Pope as the supreme authority in their spiritual lives. Other religious communities, such as Falun Gong, fear that they will soon have to go underground in Hong Kong as well.
Already, most sermons are self-censored, writes Benedict Rogers, human rights activist and CEO of the British NGO Hong Kong Watch. Memorial services for the victims of the Tiananmen protests or terms like human rights have given way to demands for “patriotism”, “dialogue” and “reconciliation”. Political and religious freedoms are inseparable.
Ten years ago, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the Silk Road Initiative during a visit to Kazakhstan, which was later renamed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The German federal agency Germany Trade & Invest (GTAI) has identified two interesting trends on the occasion of its tenth anniversary, which differ from the early years:
In Western countries, the prevailing impression is that China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) brings mainly suffering. There is talk of African countries now heavily indebted to China. Of coal-fired power plants and pipelines for oil and gas, financed by the People’s Republic in Indonesia or Myanmar, which further bind these states to fossil fuels.
These problems cannot be ignored. Zambia has defaulted on repayments of loans to China. Nigeria, Kenya and Egypt face a high risk of insolvency. Each of these countries must allocate more than 30 percent of state revenues to interest payments on debt. However, the leadership in Beijing is well aware of this: Apparently, a course correction has now become necessary.
According to the annual report of GTAI, the number of BRI projects in Central Asia increased by 2.6 times in the entire year 2023 compared to 2022. The report considers several solar power plants in Uzbekistan and a contract for the production of green hydrogen particularly noteworthy. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is also said to be involved in this project.
The growing importance of Saudi Arabian investments in Chinese energy projects in Central Asia is also evident in the expansion of renewable energies in the region. In addition, China intends to participate in the expansion of the so-called Middle Corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian Route. This avoids Russia via Kazakhstan. “China wants to keep alternatives to transport through Russia open,” the report says. Apparently, resilience for trade flows also plays a role for the BRI.
Central Asia and the Middle Corridor are also becoming increasingly important for the EU. States from Central Asia are currently raising funds from investors to improve transportation links to Europe. On Monday, government representatives from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan signed a memorandum of understanding with the European Investment Bank (EIB) for loans totaling 1.47 billion euros. The EU Commission supports the deal through guarantees under its Global Gateway Initiative. At an investor conference organized by the EU in Brussels, Kazakhstan also signed an MoU with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) for investments of 1.5 billion euros in transportation projects in Central Asia.
However, the BRI also has another region in its focus: The ASEAN countries, i.e., the countries of Southeast Asia, also saw a significant increase in BRI projects in 2023 – an increase of about a quarter compared to the previous year. What stands out in this region, in particular, is that there are many small projects with an investment volume of less than ten million US dollars.
Projects worldwide are also becoming more diverse. While energy projects still dominate, especially the construction and expansion of power plants, projects in the transport and transportation sector continue to rank second. However, the strongest growth is in the industrial sector across various industries: According to the GTAI annual report, more and more manufacturing projects are being registered under the BRI brand, from the textile industry to optics and electronics, to the important chemical industry.
Two tenders for the construction of methanol plants in Russia are among the largest projects worldwide under the BRI. The total value is more than ten billion US dollars that China wants to invest in the large neighboring country. In the early days, Russia was not at all the focus of the Belt and Road Initiative; rather, China’s leadership focused more on infrastructure development in Eastern European countries, including Ukraine.
Even today, Serbia plays a key role in the few BRI projects in Europe. Old rivalries between Beijing and Moscow certainly played a role. However, this has completely changed since Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Russia has definitively become China’s energy supplier.
The only world region with a significant decrease in BRI projects is Latin America. There, the number of projects decreased by 11.4 percent. Projects in Europe recorded only a slight increase.
Andrea Hideg has just returned from a trip to Shanghai. “Finally, it was possible again,” says the 42-year-old. She is happy that she can visit China again after the comprehensive travel ban during the COVID-19 period. As the head of the East Asia department for the German Chamber of Industry and Commerce (DIHK), local exchange is particularly important to her. Many German companies are unsure how to deal with the People’s Republic of China in the future, explains Hideg.
During her last trip, Hideg gathered reconciliatory impressions: “We received a clear message that there is still a strong interest in cooperation.” According to the East Asia expert, Chinese and German counterparts want to engage more with each other instead of talking about each other.
Since June 2022, Hideg has been working for the DIHK, representing the interests of German companies. For her, it’s a dream job: “I feel like a fish in water.” There is no specific routine in her work. “One day, I’m in contact with ministries, another day with entrepreneurs from China.” She advises German politicians, organizes internal association events and accompanies delegations from China when they visit. In Shanghai, she recently accompanied the German delegation on the occasion of the German-Chinese Environmental Forum.
She never imagined feeling like a fish in water in her profession during her studies. “There, I was often asked what I wanted to do later,” says Hideg, who began her studies in Japanology with a minor in Southeast Asian studies and economics at the Free University of Berlin (FU) in 2000. “For a long time, I didn’t have a concrete answer to that.” After an internship at the Federation of German Industries (BDI), she got a taste for it. She liked the interface between politics, economy and her specialized region.
After her studies, Hideg worked for the BDI from 2010 to 2013, then moved to Duesseldorf to the wholesale company Metro. There she was responsible for the Asia region. At that time, Metro still had markets in China. It was one of her first professional encounters with the country. She enjoyed working with her Chinese colleagues so much that she became fascinated by the country.
She now works in Berlin for the DIHK. According to her, one thing is particularly important in dealing with China: differentiation. “There are clearly points that can be criticized about China, there is no doubt about that,” says the East Asia expert. “But countries are similar to people.” In both cases, it’s difficult to say that someone is only good or bad. China is an important market that politics cannot ignore for German companies. “That would be anything but realistic,” she says. And sweeping judgments have never been good for humanity, says Hideg.
Outside of work, Hideg is an enthusiastic dancer – whether it’s ballet, street dance or jazz. She has tried many styles. Recently, the Berliner has taken up a special hobby – knitting. “But I always hesitate to mention that,” says Hideg, “because it always has such a grandma image.” Dayan Djajadisastra
As the Chinese New Year approaches, fireworks companies in Dayao, Hunan Province, have ramped up their production. The history of fireworks in China dates back over 2,000 years; it is traditionally a staple of the Chinese New Year celebration.
However, in recent years, many major cities have banned fireworks and firecrackers – a ban that continues to be hotly debated among the people. In a Weibo poll of 15,200 users, 1,600 recently advocated for a complete ban, 3,600 supported permitting them only in designated areas and 10,000 favored a complete lifting of the bans. Even the state broadcaster CCTV echoed similar sentiments, stating in an article that it is the right of the Chinese people to “admire magnificent fireworks after a year of hard work”.
