The first leak of Germany’s China strategy is now followed by a second one. After the Foreign Ministry, now the Ministry of Economics has also leaked a hefty paper on its plans to the media. The business community is not pleased with such indiscretions: China is far too important an issue to be pulverized in a power play.
Habeck’s paper is certainly an interesting read, even if it does not present any new ideas in the current debate. Clearly, Germany is to reduce its dependencies. Its scope becomes clear when compared to the economic policy of the previous government. Here, the document marks a clear turnaround. In foreign policy terms, Habeck also provides a prognosis of a possible assault on Taiwan. It is definitely alarming, but Michael Radunski and Finn Mayer-Kuckuk analyze how realistic it is.
EU Council President Charles Michel and Xi Jinping had much to discuss during their meeting in Beijing. But Xi’s time was limited – no wonder since he had to receive Jiang Zemin’s body in its glass coffin with bows at the airport on the same day. Amelie Richter summarizes where Xi and Michel see common ground and where China and the EU are at odds.
Robert Habeck apparently does not want to wait any longer, neither on the Foreign Office and certainly not on the Chancellery. So he prepared his own China strategy in his ministry. The 100-page document is marked as classified: Classified. In other words, it is not intended for the public eye. Nevertheless, the media service “Pioneer” obtained a copy and reports on a highly China-critical concept. Habeck wants to reduce the German economy’s dependence on China as quickly as possible.
When the Chinese shipping company Cosco acquired a stake in the Port of Hamburg, Robert Habeck had to grudgingly stand by and watch (China.Table reported). However, Habeck was able to prevent the takeover of the Dortmund chip manufacturer Elmos (China.Table reported). He fears that such deals could give China too much influence over Germany’s critical infrastructure and important industries. Therefore, he pushes ahead with his own draft.
The paper corresponds in all mentioned points to the draft China strategy from the Foreign Office (China.Table reported). It could either serve as a sub-strategy for the economic sector or be integrated into the overall strategy as a contribution from the Ministry of Economics. The green-led ministries apparently seem to be pulling in the same direction here.
The Habeck paper says: “While China reduces its dependence, its economic importance for the EU and Germany continues to grow.” With its “Made in China 2025” strategy, Beijing is pursuing the goal of becoming independent of the world and at the same time the market leader in the ten important industrial sectors. President Xi Jinping also wants to decisively strengthen the domestic economy with the concept of “dual circulation”. Independent primarily of Western technology, i.e. self-sufficient, but making the rest of the world as dependent as possible on China – that is, in short, Xi Jinping’s aggressive economic policy.
For Germany, on the other hand, Habeck’s employees have to acknowledge in the first chapters of their paper: From no other country in the world does Germany import more goods, in 2021 alone goods with a total value of around 142 billion euros. And while Germany exports 2.7 percent of its total value added to China, China imports only 0.8 percent of its value-added from Germany.
The paper identifies several sectors where Germany’s dependence on China is alarming, including the automotive industry and areas such as hydrogen technology, electromobility and renewable energies. “Chinese companies already produce more than 70 percent of the world’s solar panels and about half of its wind turbines and electric cars.”
This dependence is to be urgently reduced – and Habeck’s paper also lists concrete proposals to achieve this: For instance, new mandatory reporting requirements for German companies with strong business in China. This could affect German carmakers such as VW, but also the chemical group BASF, which recently announced plans to invest ten billion euros in a new plant in the southern Chinese province of Guangdong.
Furthermore, politicians should provide less support for German-Chinese economic projects. And free trade agreements with other countries from the Asia-Pacific region should also help Germany to detach itself from China. The Ministry of Economics also apparently wants to end China’s classification as a developing country. A similar discussion recently emerged at the climate conference in Egypt, where China prevailed, however.
This paper thus represents a clear departure from the previous course of former German economy ministers: China is no longer a desired economic partner, but rather a menacing rival.
According to “Pioneer,” Habeck reportedly praised his officials’ draft internally and promised to swiftly put the recommendations into action. However, it seems that the paper was not coordinated with the other ministries. And this is precisely where the problem is. It seems as if everybody in the German government is doing their own thing.
Not only the discussion about Cosco’s investment in the Port of Hamburg revealed that the Chancellery follows a much more pro-China line. Olaf Scholz ultimately used his power to make Cosco’s entry possible. Accordingly, Habeck is said to have spoken of “challenging” negotiations.
Germany’s business associations reacted with unease to the rivalry between the ministries over the China strategy. They are particularly disturbed by the constant indiscretions. Decision-making turns into a game of public opinion and is increasingly subject to political mechanisms. “The business community is very upset about this multi-pronged communication on the China strategy, given the importance that China has for our economy,” Volker Treier, Head of Foreign Trade at the German Chambers of Industry and Commerce (DIHK), told Reuters on Thursday.
Equally controversial are the foreign policy forecasts in Habeck’s paper. For example, officials apparently expect that China could annex Taiwan by 2027 at the latest – coinciding with the 100th anniversary of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. This particular detail in the report received much more attention in popular media than the economic policy concept, although it is presumably only a scenario that officials believe the economy should be prepared for.
Admittedly, tensions around Taiwan have indeed risen recently: After the visit of US Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan, Beijing deployed more fighter jets to the island’s air defense zone and test-fired missiles. At the same time, US President Joe Biden assured Taiwan full US support – including from the military – should China indeed attack.
But these are precisely the kind of clear announcements that are most likely to influence China’s behavior. It is the kind of clarity the German government should also show to China. Robert Habeck apparently no longer wants to wait for it. Michael Radunski/Finn Mayer-Kuckuk
The relationship between the EU and China is considered rather poor. So all eyes were fixed eagerly on the meeting between EU Council President Charles Michel and China’s President Xi Jinping in Beijing on Thursday. The meeting took only three hours. That alone said something about the quality of relations.
The EU Council leader credibly assured to have addressed the recent protests against China’s repressive Covid policy. As expected, the Chinese statement made no mention of the protests. Members of the EU Parliament in particular called for a clear signal from the EU Council chief to the Chinese leadership prior to Michel’s trip (China.Table reported).
Michel also openly urged the leadership in Beijing to push Moscow to end the war in Ukraine. “We are counting on China to use its influence,” Michel said after talks with President Xi Jinping. “President Xi and I agreed that nuclear threats are not acceptable and highly dangerous.” And, Xi had clearly assured him that the People’s Republic was not supplying Russia with weapons. Both positions, however, are well-known. There was no joint press statement; both sides issued their own statements.
Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU has called on the Chinese leadership to put pressure on Russia’s President Vladimir Putin. So far, however, with limited success. Faith in Beijing’s influence collapsed, especially after the unsuccessful EU-China dialogue in early April. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell had subsequently dubbed the video summit a “dialogue of the deaf“. A recorded video message by Michel himself, intended for the opening of the export fair in Shanghai, was not shown there (China.Table reported).
The Chinese side admitted in a statement after the meeting that Ukraine was discussed. However, the word “war” was still not used in the statement, only “crisis” was mentioned. Xi Jinping insisted on a political solution through negotiations, state broadcaster CCTV reported. Under the current conditions, he said, a further escalation of the crisis must be avoided.
“Resolving the Ukraine crisis by political means is in the best interests of Europe and in the common interests of all countries in Eurasia,” Xi said. He continues to deliberately ignore the fact that the war has been going on for months and that negotiations with Vladimir Putin seem futile at present.
The devil is in the details, and tracking him down requires knowledge of China’s use of political language: China “supported the EU in strengthening its mediation,” the Chinese statement does say. The People’s Republic proposed its own European security architecture. What is usually meant by this, however, is a breakaway from the United States. After all, from the Chinese perspective, the aggressor is clearly the West.
Remarkable is another formulation in the Chinese statement, finds Justyna Szczudlik, China analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) in Warsaw. China will always stand on the side of peace and will “continue to play a constructive role in its own way.” What is ultimately meant is: Xi will continue to support Russia.
The first meeting was conflict-laden, but there was a lack of clear focus. Nevertheless, Michel’s visit was a first step toward the resumption of personal exchange. The agreement on trade issues, which was emphasized above all by Xi – and subsequently also by the state media – was certainly also intended to send a signal to Washington. EU and US representatives met there on Thursday for a dialogue on China and the Indo-Pacific.
Following the historic protests over the weekend, several Chinese cities have begun to relax their strict Covid measures a little. Without directly addressing the protests, local governments across the country lifted a whole range of restrictions over the past two days. The southern Chinese metropolis of Guangzhou, which was hit by a particularly severe Covid outbreak, ended lockdowns in some areas of the city (China.Table reported). Chongqing authorities in the southwest announced that contacts of infected people would now be allowed to undergo quarantine in their own homes.
Zhengzhou, where riots broke out last week at the plant of Apple supplier Foxconn, announced an “orderly resumption” of all business activities. Chengdu and the northern Chinese city of Shijiazhuang also loosened measures. This was in response to directives from the Beijing Health Commission. The commission already issued a strong warning to “all levels” on Tuesday in response to the protests. The Covid measures, the commission said, should finally be implemented “precisely” in accordance with the revised guidelines issued a few weeks earlier.
The message behind this is clear. After the unrest over the weekend, the central government does not see itself at fault. Rather, it is the fault of the cities and municipalities, which, after the recent surge in infection numbers, have tightened restrictions instead of reducing the public burden by following the adjusted regulations.
A push in the same direction was made by China’s Vice Premier Sun Chunlan on Wednesday, who spoke of a “new stage of the pandemic.” “As the Omicron variant becomes less pathogenic, more people get vaccinated and our experience in Covid prevention accumulates, our fight against the pandemic is at a new stage and it comes with new tasks.” Sun said this at a meeting with representatives of the National Health Commission and other health experts.
On Thursday, state news agency Xinhua offered an interpretive commentary on Sun’s remarks. According to Xinhua, Sun did not mean to imply that China would immediately “fully open up” or “sit back.” Rather, the idea was to optimize current restrictions. “The goal is still to save people’s lives and health while reducing the epidemic’s negative effects on daily life in both the public and private spheres,” Xinhua added. Local authorities across the country are “introducing detailed measures to better implement the central government’s policies”.
However, Xinhua stressed that a rapid departure from the current policy was not imminent. For example, studies had shown that more than 1.5 million people in China could die from an uncontrolled spread of Omicron. ICU capacity would be exceeded by a factor of 15.6. Therefore, the “dynamic zero-Covid policy” could not be abandoned.
Nevertheless, many analysts and international investors believe that an opening is only a matter of time. On Wednesday, the Chinese business magazine Caixin provided an indication of how long it could still take. In a prominent place on its website, it published quotes from Hu Yifan, the China chief economist at UBS Global Wealth Management. According to her assessment, China will fully lift Covid restrictions by the third quarter of 2023, which will then lead to a “dramatic economic recovery.”
According to Hu, the opening could be initiated by a significant adjustment to the current Covid policy at the People’s Congress in March. The tone of Chinese media these days is clear: The country is not at a dead-end. The leadership has a plan. But please be patient. Jörn Petring
Dec. 05, 2022; 4 p.m.-6 p.m. (CST)
Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Webinar: China Humanities Seminar featuring Lu Kuo – The Temporary Recluse: The Discourse of Not Working in Early Medieval Chinese Poetry More
Dec. 5, 2022; 3:30 p.m.-4:30 p.m. CST
China Network Baden-Wuerttemberg, Webinar: CNBW Young Leaders Career Talk: How to be successful in a Sino-German working environment? More
Dec. 5, 2022; 4 p.m.-5:40 p.m. (CST)
EU SME Centre, Online & Tianjin European Chamber Office: Grow Green: Energy Efficiency. EU-China Cooperation and Opportunities for European SMEs More
Dec. 6, 2022; 4 p.m. (CST)
stars – for Leaders of the Next Generation, Webinar: Geopolitical Disruptions All Over – What Companies should Prepare for More
Dec. 6, 2022; 11:30 p.m. (CST)
Center for Strategic & International Studies, Webinar: Responding to Egregious Abuses in Xinjiang: Latest State of Play More
Dec. 6, 2022; 10 p.m. (CST)
Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Webinar: Taiwan Studies Workshop – Taiwan Elections 2022: Examining the Results More
Dec. 7, 2022; 04:30 p.m. (CST)
EU SME Centre, Webinar: Business Intelligence: Sustainability Due Diligence for European SMEs in China More
Dec. 7, 2022; 11 p.m. (CST)
Center for Strategic & International Studies, Webinar: Have US-China Tensions Hurt American Innovation?: A Big Data China Event More
The police apparently use facial recognition software and cell phone data to track down and arrest protesters at last weekend’s protests against Covid measures. This is what human rights lawyer Wang Shengsheng from the city of Zhengzhou told the AFP news agency. She offers free legal advice to protesters.
In Beijing, police may have used phone location data either picked up by scanners on the ground or while checking the Covid app, the lawyer suspects. Many of her Beijing clients were confused about the police allegations: They had only walked past a demo but not participated. As AFP reports, more than 20 people have sought advice from the lawyer in recent days. flee
Twitter and Telegram download numbers have skyrocketed in China in recent days. This was reported by the South China Morning Post. Twitter was the eighth most popular free iOS app on Monday. Usually, the app is not even ranked in the top 100. Telegram even jumped to rank 6 of social networks on Sunday and managed to hold this position for a couple of days.
The apps’ popularity is linked to the nationwide protests against the strict Covid measures, which gained momentum over the weekend. While videos and images of the protests were quickly deleted on the most widely used Chinese services WeChat and Weibo, they were still available on Twitter and Telegram. In China, Twitter and Telegram can only be used via a VPN client. jul
The relevant commission scheduled next Tuesday (Dec. 6) as the day for the funeral of President Jiang Zemin. His body arrived at Beijing airport on Thursday on a special flight in a glass coffin. Xi Jinping and other top leaders bowed three times before the coffin, which was carried by 12 soldiers. The potential future Premier Li Qiang was also present.
The particularly grand effort for Jiang is expected to continue next week. It is seen as a sign that the leadership wants to maintain precise control over how Jiang will be remembered, especially in times of visible popular discontent.
Meanwhile, the National Radio and Television Administration decreed a mourning period to last from Nov. 30 to Dec. 7, according to a report by China Digital Times. Until then, websites of state-run media in China will appear in black and white. Jiang Zemin passed away on Wednesday at the age of 96.
All streaming of entertainment content will be halted during the mourning period. Instead, historical and revolutionary formats will be available. Articles and other media content related to the World Cup are not to be promoted, but the matches will still be live-streamed. Advertising will also be restricted; no commercials may be shown on the day of the funeral.
Most government agencies and university websites joined in the mourning look. In China, websites are switched to black and white during extraordinary tragedies or on certain historical anniversaries, such as last year’s anniversary of the 1937 Nanjing Massacre. In 2020, websites of state media and social media sites were displayed in black and white in memory of the first Covid deaths. Entertainment shows on television were prohibited. jul/fin
Nobody knows how a politician’s popular image will evolve after their retirement. The outbreak of the Ukraine War abruptly brought Angela Merkel down from the pedestal. George W. Bush is remembered more favorably after Donald Trump started to wreak havoc in US politics and beyond. Likewise, the image of Jiang Zemin, for years a laughingstock to many, improved a lot lately.
Jiang Zemin was mocked for years. But now, after his death, his image appears much better than before.
When he was in power, he was not liked, particularly because of his flamboyant style. He spoke with rich gestures and dramatic facial expressions. He wrote poems; he played the piano; he conducted impromptu chorus and orchestra; he sang Peking Opera, Elvis Presley’s Love Me Tender, the Italian O sole mio and folk songs of ethnic groups in China; and he spoke words and sentences in many dialects and languages, including Cantonese, English, Russian, Japanese, Romanian, French, German, Spanish and Urdu. The list goes on.
Was he good at it? Sadly not. In a few of these, probably between beginner and intermediate levels. For the rest, beginner level or icebreaker level.
Then there was his rant to a Hong Kong journalist in 2000 when he felt cornered by a question hinting at the central government pre-deciding the result of the territory’s election of chief executive. His tantrum was arguably still the editor’s pick for the best in political theater in China, much more entertaining than Hu Jintao at the 20th Party Congress being led away.
Because of these peculiarities, Jiang was considered a buffoon at diplomatic events. Some found him simply embarrassing.
What made him more despicable was that he showed a clear desire to cling to power after his official showtime was over. People were fed up with retired old men pulling strings behind curtains. After he retired from the offices of Party General Secretary (2002) and President (2003), he managed to hang on as the chairman of the crucial central military committee, only relinquishing it two years later than in due course.
After that, he still exerted influence, mainly through his Shanghai Faction. He was also one of the key figures who eventually lifted Xi Jinping to the top in the battle for Hu Jintao’s successor in 2012.
However, after Hu Jintao’s robot-like performance and particularly after Xi Jinping’s hardline policies and determination to be the absolute supreme leader became blatantly obvious, people started to feel that after all, Jiang Zemin was not that bad.
Jiang came to power in 1989 in the aftermath of the bloody crackdown of the student movement. After a few years of appeasement to the elderly conservatives in the party, he responded positively to Deng Xiaoping’s galvanizing for more open-up and market-oriented economic reforms. He is the final decision-maker thrusting China into the global economic system by securing membership in the World Trade Organization.
He was not belligerent towards foreign countries and was keen to maintain good relationships with the United States and Europe. During his years in office, China increasingly opened to the outside world.
Domestically, society became more tolerant. Calls for social justice could be voiced. Liberal media organizations began to mushroom in big cities. A rudimentary civil society seemed to be emerging.
In his final years as the party secretary, he introduced the theory of Three Represents, which paved the way for the communist party’s potentially far-reaching transformation into representing not only the working class but also entrepreneurs and other social elites.
When he left the front political stage in 2002-2005, everything looked hopeful in China, despite rampant cronyism and corruption.
All these make a sharp contrast to Xi, under whom China back-pedaled on all fronts, triggering fears of another Cultural Revolution and a war for Taiwan.
In terms of personal inclination, Jiang has some traits that distinguished him from the vast majority of Chinese leaders: Although Jiang himself was a lousy art performer and not great with foreign languages, he had a genuine love for art, literature, culture and knowledge, the good things. His taste was not bad. (Aside from his love for the movie Titanic, no one is perfect.) He had some real respect for writers, artists and intellectuals. And he was genuinely curious about the world.
In addition, he spoke and behaved like a real person: His style of talking was quirkily expressive, he laughed heartily, he showed his anger, he scratched his itchy ear in big strokes on the central stage in the Great Hall of People, and he dozed off when Hu Jintao delivered a lengthy, boring speech.
While Jiang received both traditional old-school education and four-year western style university education, the highest proper schooling Xi Jinping completed was elementary school. Schools were all suspended due to the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 when Xi was 13. He did go to Tsinghua University in the middle of the 1970s but Chinese universities back then were still in a state of half-paralysis.
It was not his fault, but all that has most likely taken a toll on Xi’s worldview. He has no interest in art and culture, although he famously presented stunningly long lists of great books he claimed to have read in formal speeches on foreign visits. Some super modern architectural works in Beijing were approved under Jiang, including the National Center for Performing Arts next to Tiananmen Square. When Xi rose to the top, he said China should stop allowing “bizarre buildings” to be built.
Xi’s speech style goes back to the dry style and lofty attitude typical for Chinese bureaucrats. His speeches are often interspersed by grassroots idioms as well as marred by the wrong pronunciation of characters.
When the difference between Xi and Jiang gradually became obvious, some people said they started to appreciate the latter. The affection is not exactly genuine. It is still pretty much a mockery, but that Jiang is more human, more open, and much funnier, this is something people can agree on.
However, they still have one striking thing in common: Both defended the rule of the Communist Party by any means. Whether Jiang was unhappy about what Xi did in the past decade is unknown. At least he did not seem to stand in the way. When needed, Jiang would show up at functions presided by Xi to show solidarity. Their relationship seemed to have been on good terms until the death of Jiang. So after all the real or fake nostalgia, Jiang was just the lesser of two evils.
Lim Sim Yee is the new CEO of EP Manufacturing Berhad, a manufacturer of plastic parts for the automotive industry. Lim joins from Mercedes-Benz Sales Services in Beijing.
Carl Gao will head the new China South regional office for the Swiss logistics service provider Militzer & Muench. His colleague Jeffery Guo will take over regional management in the north.
Is something changing in your organization? Why not let us know at heads@table.media!
In the 18th century, Chinese arts and crafts were all the rage in Europe. Queen Maxima is also extremely fond of the objects from that period. She visited the Chinese room in Huis ten Bosch. The walls are covered with wallpaper and even the covers of the chairs are decorated with Chinese motifs.
The first leak of Germany’s China strategy is now followed by a second one. After the Foreign Ministry, now the Ministry of Economics has also leaked a hefty paper on its plans to the media. The business community is not pleased with such indiscretions: China is far too important an issue to be pulverized in a power play.
Habeck’s paper is certainly an interesting read, even if it does not present any new ideas in the current debate. Clearly, Germany is to reduce its dependencies. Its scope becomes clear when compared to the economic policy of the previous government. Here, the document marks a clear turnaround. In foreign policy terms, Habeck also provides a prognosis of a possible assault on Taiwan. It is definitely alarming, but Michael Radunski and Finn Mayer-Kuckuk analyze how realistic it is.
EU Council President Charles Michel and Xi Jinping had much to discuss during their meeting in Beijing. But Xi’s time was limited – no wonder since he had to receive Jiang Zemin’s body in its glass coffin with bows at the airport on the same day. Amelie Richter summarizes where Xi and Michel see common ground and where China and the EU are at odds.
Robert Habeck apparently does not want to wait any longer, neither on the Foreign Office and certainly not on the Chancellery. So he prepared his own China strategy in his ministry. The 100-page document is marked as classified: Classified. In other words, it is not intended for the public eye. Nevertheless, the media service “Pioneer” obtained a copy and reports on a highly China-critical concept. Habeck wants to reduce the German economy’s dependence on China as quickly as possible.
When the Chinese shipping company Cosco acquired a stake in the Port of Hamburg, Robert Habeck had to grudgingly stand by and watch (China.Table reported). However, Habeck was able to prevent the takeover of the Dortmund chip manufacturer Elmos (China.Table reported). He fears that such deals could give China too much influence over Germany’s critical infrastructure and important industries. Therefore, he pushes ahead with his own draft.
The paper corresponds in all mentioned points to the draft China strategy from the Foreign Office (China.Table reported). It could either serve as a sub-strategy for the economic sector or be integrated into the overall strategy as a contribution from the Ministry of Economics. The green-led ministries apparently seem to be pulling in the same direction here.
The Habeck paper says: “While China reduces its dependence, its economic importance for the EU and Germany continues to grow.” With its “Made in China 2025” strategy, Beijing is pursuing the goal of becoming independent of the world and at the same time the market leader in the ten important industrial sectors. President Xi Jinping also wants to decisively strengthen the domestic economy with the concept of “dual circulation”. Independent primarily of Western technology, i.e. self-sufficient, but making the rest of the world as dependent as possible on China – that is, in short, Xi Jinping’s aggressive economic policy.
For Germany, on the other hand, Habeck’s employees have to acknowledge in the first chapters of their paper: From no other country in the world does Germany import more goods, in 2021 alone goods with a total value of around 142 billion euros. And while Germany exports 2.7 percent of its total value added to China, China imports only 0.8 percent of its value-added from Germany.
The paper identifies several sectors where Germany’s dependence on China is alarming, including the automotive industry and areas such as hydrogen technology, electromobility and renewable energies. “Chinese companies already produce more than 70 percent of the world’s solar panels and about half of its wind turbines and electric cars.”
This dependence is to be urgently reduced – and Habeck’s paper also lists concrete proposals to achieve this: For instance, new mandatory reporting requirements for German companies with strong business in China. This could affect German carmakers such as VW, but also the chemical group BASF, which recently announced plans to invest ten billion euros in a new plant in the southern Chinese province of Guangdong.
Furthermore, politicians should provide less support for German-Chinese economic projects. And free trade agreements with other countries from the Asia-Pacific region should also help Germany to detach itself from China. The Ministry of Economics also apparently wants to end China’s classification as a developing country. A similar discussion recently emerged at the climate conference in Egypt, where China prevailed, however.
This paper thus represents a clear departure from the previous course of former German economy ministers: China is no longer a desired economic partner, but rather a menacing rival.
According to “Pioneer,” Habeck reportedly praised his officials’ draft internally and promised to swiftly put the recommendations into action. However, it seems that the paper was not coordinated with the other ministries. And this is precisely where the problem is. It seems as if everybody in the German government is doing their own thing.
Not only the discussion about Cosco’s investment in the Port of Hamburg revealed that the Chancellery follows a much more pro-China line. Olaf Scholz ultimately used his power to make Cosco’s entry possible. Accordingly, Habeck is said to have spoken of “challenging” negotiations.
Germany’s business associations reacted with unease to the rivalry between the ministries over the China strategy. They are particularly disturbed by the constant indiscretions. Decision-making turns into a game of public opinion and is increasingly subject to political mechanisms. “The business community is very upset about this multi-pronged communication on the China strategy, given the importance that China has for our economy,” Volker Treier, Head of Foreign Trade at the German Chambers of Industry and Commerce (DIHK), told Reuters on Thursday.
Equally controversial are the foreign policy forecasts in Habeck’s paper. For example, officials apparently expect that China could annex Taiwan by 2027 at the latest – coinciding with the 100th anniversary of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. This particular detail in the report received much more attention in popular media than the economic policy concept, although it is presumably only a scenario that officials believe the economy should be prepared for.
Admittedly, tensions around Taiwan have indeed risen recently: After the visit of US Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan, Beijing deployed more fighter jets to the island’s air defense zone and test-fired missiles. At the same time, US President Joe Biden assured Taiwan full US support – including from the military – should China indeed attack.
But these are precisely the kind of clear announcements that are most likely to influence China’s behavior. It is the kind of clarity the German government should also show to China. Robert Habeck apparently no longer wants to wait for it. Michael Radunski/Finn Mayer-Kuckuk
The relationship between the EU and China is considered rather poor. So all eyes were fixed eagerly on the meeting between EU Council President Charles Michel and China’s President Xi Jinping in Beijing on Thursday. The meeting took only three hours. That alone said something about the quality of relations.
The EU Council leader credibly assured to have addressed the recent protests against China’s repressive Covid policy. As expected, the Chinese statement made no mention of the protests. Members of the EU Parliament in particular called for a clear signal from the EU Council chief to the Chinese leadership prior to Michel’s trip (China.Table reported).
Michel also openly urged the leadership in Beijing to push Moscow to end the war in Ukraine. “We are counting on China to use its influence,” Michel said after talks with President Xi Jinping. “President Xi and I agreed that nuclear threats are not acceptable and highly dangerous.” And, Xi had clearly assured him that the People’s Republic was not supplying Russia with weapons. Both positions, however, are well-known. There was no joint press statement; both sides issued their own statements.
Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU has called on the Chinese leadership to put pressure on Russia’s President Vladimir Putin. So far, however, with limited success. Faith in Beijing’s influence collapsed, especially after the unsuccessful EU-China dialogue in early April. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell had subsequently dubbed the video summit a “dialogue of the deaf“. A recorded video message by Michel himself, intended for the opening of the export fair in Shanghai, was not shown there (China.Table reported).
The Chinese side admitted in a statement after the meeting that Ukraine was discussed. However, the word “war” was still not used in the statement, only “crisis” was mentioned. Xi Jinping insisted on a political solution through negotiations, state broadcaster CCTV reported. Under the current conditions, he said, a further escalation of the crisis must be avoided.
“Resolving the Ukraine crisis by political means is in the best interests of Europe and in the common interests of all countries in Eurasia,” Xi said. He continues to deliberately ignore the fact that the war has been going on for months and that negotiations with Vladimir Putin seem futile at present.
The devil is in the details, and tracking him down requires knowledge of China’s use of political language: China “supported the EU in strengthening its mediation,” the Chinese statement does say. The People’s Republic proposed its own European security architecture. What is usually meant by this, however, is a breakaway from the United States. After all, from the Chinese perspective, the aggressor is clearly the West.
Remarkable is another formulation in the Chinese statement, finds Justyna Szczudlik, China analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) in Warsaw. China will always stand on the side of peace and will “continue to play a constructive role in its own way.” What is ultimately meant is: Xi will continue to support Russia.
The first meeting was conflict-laden, but there was a lack of clear focus. Nevertheless, Michel’s visit was a first step toward the resumption of personal exchange. The agreement on trade issues, which was emphasized above all by Xi – and subsequently also by the state media – was certainly also intended to send a signal to Washington. EU and US representatives met there on Thursday for a dialogue on China and the Indo-Pacific.
Following the historic protests over the weekend, several Chinese cities have begun to relax their strict Covid measures a little. Without directly addressing the protests, local governments across the country lifted a whole range of restrictions over the past two days. The southern Chinese metropolis of Guangzhou, which was hit by a particularly severe Covid outbreak, ended lockdowns in some areas of the city (China.Table reported). Chongqing authorities in the southwest announced that contacts of infected people would now be allowed to undergo quarantine in their own homes.
Zhengzhou, where riots broke out last week at the plant of Apple supplier Foxconn, announced an “orderly resumption” of all business activities. Chengdu and the northern Chinese city of Shijiazhuang also loosened measures. This was in response to directives from the Beijing Health Commission. The commission already issued a strong warning to “all levels” on Tuesday in response to the protests. The Covid measures, the commission said, should finally be implemented “precisely” in accordance with the revised guidelines issued a few weeks earlier.
The message behind this is clear. After the unrest over the weekend, the central government does not see itself at fault. Rather, it is the fault of the cities and municipalities, which, after the recent surge in infection numbers, have tightened restrictions instead of reducing the public burden by following the adjusted regulations.
A push in the same direction was made by China’s Vice Premier Sun Chunlan on Wednesday, who spoke of a “new stage of the pandemic.” “As the Omicron variant becomes less pathogenic, more people get vaccinated and our experience in Covid prevention accumulates, our fight against the pandemic is at a new stage and it comes with new tasks.” Sun said this at a meeting with representatives of the National Health Commission and other health experts.
On Thursday, state news agency Xinhua offered an interpretive commentary on Sun’s remarks. According to Xinhua, Sun did not mean to imply that China would immediately “fully open up” or “sit back.” Rather, the idea was to optimize current restrictions. “The goal is still to save people’s lives and health while reducing the epidemic’s negative effects on daily life in both the public and private spheres,” Xinhua added. Local authorities across the country are “introducing detailed measures to better implement the central government’s policies”.
However, Xinhua stressed that a rapid departure from the current policy was not imminent. For example, studies had shown that more than 1.5 million people in China could die from an uncontrolled spread of Omicron. ICU capacity would be exceeded by a factor of 15.6. Therefore, the “dynamic zero-Covid policy” could not be abandoned.
Nevertheless, many analysts and international investors believe that an opening is only a matter of time. On Wednesday, the Chinese business magazine Caixin provided an indication of how long it could still take. In a prominent place on its website, it published quotes from Hu Yifan, the China chief economist at UBS Global Wealth Management. According to her assessment, China will fully lift Covid restrictions by the third quarter of 2023, which will then lead to a “dramatic economic recovery.”
According to Hu, the opening could be initiated by a significant adjustment to the current Covid policy at the People’s Congress in March. The tone of Chinese media these days is clear: The country is not at a dead-end. The leadership has a plan. But please be patient. Jörn Petring
Dec. 05, 2022; 4 p.m.-6 p.m. (CST)
Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Webinar: China Humanities Seminar featuring Lu Kuo – The Temporary Recluse: The Discourse of Not Working in Early Medieval Chinese Poetry More
Dec. 5, 2022; 3:30 p.m.-4:30 p.m. CST
China Network Baden-Wuerttemberg, Webinar: CNBW Young Leaders Career Talk: How to be successful in a Sino-German working environment? More
Dec. 5, 2022; 4 p.m.-5:40 p.m. (CST)
EU SME Centre, Online & Tianjin European Chamber Office: Grow Green: Energy Efficiency. EU-China Cooperation and Opportunities for European SMEs More
Dec. 6, 2022; 4 p.m. (CST)
stars – for Leaders of the Next Generation, Webinar: Geopolitical Disruptions All Over – What Companies should Prepare for More
Dec. 6, 2022; 11:30 p.m. (CST)
Center for Strategic & International Studies, Webinar: Responding to Egregious Abuses in Xinjiang: Latest State of Play More
Dec. 6, 2022; 10 p.m. (CST)
Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Webinar: Taiwan Studies Workshop – Taiwan Elections 2022: Examining the Results More
Dec. 7, 2022; 04:30 p.m. (CST)
EU SME Centre, Webinar: Business Intelligence: Sustainability Due Diligence for European SMEs in China More
Dec. 7, 2022; 11 p.m. (CST)
Center for Strategic & International Studies, Webinar: Have US-China Tensions Hurt American Innovation?: A Big Data China Event More
The police apparently use facial recognition software and cell phone data to track down and arrest protesters at last weekend’s protests against Covid measures. This is what human rights lawyer Wang Shengsheng from the city of Zhengzhou told the AFP news agency. She offers free legal advice to protesters.
In Beijing, police may have used phone location data either picked up by scanners on the ground or while checking the Covid app, the lawyer suspects. Many of her Beijing clients were confused about the police allegations: They had only walked past a demo but not participated. As AFP reports, more than 20 people have sought advice from the lawyer in recent days. flee
Twitter and Telegram download numbers have skyrocketed in China in recent days. This was reported by the South China Morning Post. Twitter was the eighth most popular free iOS app on Monday. Usually, the app is not even ranked in the top 100. Telegram even jumped to rank 6 of social networks on Sunday and managed to hold this position for a couple of days.
The apps’ popularity is linked to the nationwide protests against the strict Covid measures, which gained momentum over the weekend. While videos and images of the protests were quickly deleted on the most widely used Chinese services WeChat and Weibo, they were still available on Twitter and Telegram. In China, Twitter and Telegram can only be used via a VPN client. jul
The relevant commission scheduled next Tuesday (Dec. 6) as the day for the funeral of President Jiang Zemin. His body arrived at Beijing airport on Thursday on a special flight in a glass coffin. Xi Jinping and other top leaders bowed three times before the coffin, which was carried by 12 soldiers. The potential future Premier Li Qiang was also present.
The particularly grand effort for Jiang is expected to continue next week. It is seen as a sign that the leadership wants to maintain precise control over how Jiang will be remembered, especially in times of visible popular discontent.
Meanwhile, the National Radio and Television Administration decreed a mourning period to last from Nov. 30 to Dec. 7, according to a report by China Digital Times. Until then, websites of state-run media in China will appear in black and white. Jiang Zemin passed away on Wednesday at the age of 96.
All streaming of entertainment content will be halted during the mourning period. Instead, historical and revolutionary formats will be available. Articles and other media content related to the World Cup are not to be promoted, but the matches will still be live-streamed. Advertising will also be restricted; no commercials may be shown on the day of the funeral.
Most government agencies and university websites joined in the mourning look. In China, websites are switched to black and white during extraordinary tragedies or on certain historical anniversaries, such as last year’s anniversary of the 1937 Nanjing Massacre. In 2020, websites of state media and social media sites were displayed in black and white in memory of the first Covid deaths. Entertainment shows on television were prohibited. jul/fin
Nobody knows how a politician’s popular image will evolve after their retirement. The outbreak of the Ukraine War abruptly brought Angela Merkel down from the pedestal. George W. Bush is remembered more favorably after Donald Trump started to wreak havoc in US politics and beyond. Likewise, the image of Jiang Zemin, for years a laughingstock to many, improved a lot lately.
Jiang Zemin was mocked for years. But now, after his death, his image appears much better than before.
When he was in power, he was not liked, particularly because of his flamboyant style. He spoke with rich gestures and dramatic facial expressions. He wrote poems; he played the piano; he conducted impromptu chorus and orchestra; he sang Peking Opera, Elvis Presley’s Love Me Tender, the Italian O sole mio and folk songs of ethnic groups in China; and he spoke words and sentences in many dialects and languages, including Cantonese, English, Russian, Japanese, Romanian, French, German, Spanish and Urdu. The list goes on.
Was he good at it? Sadly not. In a few of these, probably between beginner and intermediate levels. For the rest, beginner level or icebreaker level.
Then there was his rant to a Hong Kong journalist in 2000 when he felt cornered by a question hinting at the central government pre-deciding the result of the territory’s election of chief executive. His tantrum was arguably still the editor’s pick for the best in political theater in China, much more entertaining than Hu Jintao at the 20th Party Congress being led away.
Because of these peculiarities, Jiang was considered a buffoon at diplomatic events. Some found him simply embarrassing.
What made him more despicable was that he showed a clear desire to cling to power after his official showtime was over. People were fed up with retired old men pulling strings behind curtains. After he retired from the offices of Party General Secretary (2002) and President (2003), he managed to hang on as the chairman of the crucial central military committee, only relinquishing it two years later than in due course.
After that, he still exerted influence, mainly through his Shanghai Faction. He was also one of the key figures who eventually lifted Xi Jinping to the top in the battle for Hu Jintao’s successor in 2012.
However, after Hu Jintao’s robot-like performance and particularly after Xi Jinping’s hardline policies and determination to be the absolute supreme leader became blatantly obvious, people started to feel that after all, Jiang Zemin was not that bad.
Jiang came to power in 1989 in the aftermath of the bloody crackdown of the student movement. After a few years of appeasement to the elderly conservatives in the party, he responded positively to Deng Xiaoping’s galvanizing for more open-up and market-oriented economic reforms. He is the final decision-maker thrusting China into the global economic system by securing membership in the World Trade Organization.
He was not belligerent towards foreign countries and was keen to maintain good relationships with the United States and Europe. During his years in office, China increasingly opened to the outside world.
Domestically, society became more tolerant. Calls for social justice could be voiced. Liberal media organizations began to mushroom in big cities. A rudimentary civil society seemed to be emerging.
In his final years as the party secretary, he introduced the theory of Three Represents, which paved the way for the communist party’s potentially far-reaching transformation into representing not only the working class but also entrepreneurs and other social elites.
When he left the front political stage in 2002-2005, everything looked hopeful in China, despite rampant cronyism and corruption.
All these make a sharp contrast to Xi, under whom China back-pedaled on all fronts, triggering fears of another Cultural Revolution and a war for Taiwan.
In terms of personal inclination, Jiang has some traits that distinguished him from the vast majority of Chinese leaders: Although Jiang himself was a lousy art performer and not great with foreign languages, he had a genuine love for art, literature, culture and knowledge, the good things. His taste was not bad. (Aside from his love for the movie Titanic, no one is perfect.) He had some real respect for writers, artists and intellectuals. And he was genuinely curious about the world.
In addition, he spoke and behaved like a real person: His style of talking was quirkily expressive, he laughed heartily, he showed his anger, he scratched his itchy ear in big strokes on the central stage in the Great Hall of People, and he dozed off when Hu Jintao delivered a lengthy, boring speech.
While Jiang received both traditional old-school education and four-year western style university education, the highest proper schooling Xi Jinping completed was elementary school. Schools were all suspended due to the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 when Xi was 13. He did go to Tsinghua University in the middle of the 1970s but Chinese universities back then were still in a state of half-paralysis.
It was not his fault, but all that has most likely taken a toll on Xi’s worldview. He has no interest in art and culture, although he famously presented stunningly long lists of great books he claimed to have read in formal speeches on foreign visits. Some super modern architectural works in Beijing were approved under Jiang, including the National Center for Performing Arts next to Tiananmen Square. When Xi rose to the top, he said China should stop allowing “bizarre buildings” to be built.
Xi’s speech style goes back to the dry style and lofty attitude typical for Chinese bureaucrats. His speeches are often interspersed by grassroots idioms as well as marred by the wrong pronunciation of characters.
When the difference between Xi and Jiang gradually became obvious, some people said they started to appreciate the latter. The affection is not exactly genuine. It is still pretty much a mockery, but that Jiang is more human, more open, and much funnier, this is something people can agree on.
However, they still have one striking thing in common: Both defended the rule of the Communist Party by any means. Whether Jiang was unhappy about what Xi did in the past decade is unknown. At least he did not seem to stand in the way. When needed, Jiang would show up at functions presided by Xi to show solidarity. Their relationship seemed to have been on good terms until the death of Jiang. So after all the real or fake nostalgia, Jiang was just the lesser of two evils.
Lim Sim Yee is the new CEO of EP Manufacturing Berhad, a manufacturer of plastic parts for the automotive industry. Lim joins from Mercedes-Benz Sales Services in Beijing.
Carl Gao will head the new China South regional office for the Swiss logistics service provider Militzer & Muench. His colleague Jeffery Guo will take over regional management in the north.
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In the 18th century, Chinese arts and crafts were all the rage in Europe. Queen Maxima is also extremely fond of the objects from that period. She visited the Chinese room in Huis ten Bosch. The walls are covered with wallpaper and even the covers of the chairs are decorated with Chinese motifs.