Ironically, Viktor Orbán, known for his friendly stance towards China, relaxed the conditions for Chinese investors seeking to buy residency permits for the Schengen area this spring. One might suspect ulterior motives, as the EU aims to make visa conditions for Chinese citizens more stringent. Orbán’s actions counteract this goal.
However, to defend the Hungarian Prime Minister, it’s worth noting that Hungary is not the only EU country enticing Chinese citizens to invest in its territory. Malta, Greece and Portugal are doing the same, as Fabian Peltsch reports.
The EU’s approach to regulate these practices more strictly would be a sensible move. The case of Chinese spy Jian G. demonstrated that the Chinese intelligence service exploits European citizenships to provide nearly foolproof cover for their spies.
Meanwhile, Finn Mayer-Kuckuk takes us to South Korea today. Our China.Table section head is accompanying Robert Habeck on his five-day East Asia trip. In Seoul, the German Vice Chancellor and Minister of Economic Affairs will meet not only Trade Minister Ahn Dukgeun but also South Korean Prime Minister Han Duck-soo. These discussions could be very interesting for the German Vice Chancellor.
While Habeck aims to reduce dependencies on China, South Korea has already been actively pursuing this goal. Since China punished the country with a trade boycott in 2017 for allowing a US missile defense system on its territory, South Koreans have been alarmed and have implemented a de-risking strategy that steers away from China. With considerable success, South Korea is now much more self-reliant from its large neighbor and thus politically less susceptible to coercion. A model for Germany and Europe?
The first stop on Economy Minister Robert Habeck’s Asian trip is the South Korean capital, Seoul, on Thursday. From there, he will travel to China. Although the sequence of the trip has no significant meaning – an earlier plan had him visiting China first, then South Korea – South Korea is a fitting partner in light of Germany’s China strategy, deserving special attention. “South Korea faces similar challenges, both economically and in terms of security risks,” said Habeck on the flight to Seoul.
It is a declared goal of the German government to reduce dependencies on suppliers from China. “South Korea plays a key role in Berlin’s and Brussels’ Indo-Pacific strategies,” says Korea expert Eric Ballbach of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin. South Korea is a particularly valuable partner in several ways:
While South Korea is an interesting market, it cannot replace China as it has only 51 million inhabitants and Koreans prefer buying Korean goods, especially cars from Hyundai.
South Korea’s achievements in semiconductor technology are impressive. Germany has largely outsourced this field to Asia, except for a few exceptions. In contrast, South Korea has developed one of the world’s most advanced chip industries. While Taiwan’s TSMC is often cited as the market leader, Samsung‘s chip division is a strong competitor. Samsung produces a significant portion of the processors for its advanced smartphones at facilities in South Korea and Texas. Europe can only dream of reaching the level of Samsung’s factories. Additionally, Samsung is a well-known name for smartphones, tablets, and smartwatches.
Despite having significant disadvantages compared to Germany, such as not being part of the EU single market and having unfriendly neighbors, South Korea has succeeded. The country began its high-tech journey in the late 1980s and is now one of the highest spenders on new technologies. South Korea’s funding for future technologies like AI and quantum computing is substantial.
Germany believed it couldn’t profitably manufacture cameras, smartphones and network technology, but Samsung produces 5G networks, which Germany bought from Huawei, claiming it had no other options.
South Korea experienced its “China shock” in 2017. The military installed the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) missile defense system, which officially serves to protect against North Korean attacks. However, Beijing saw it as a threat against China.
The consequences were felt within days. Chinese state media fueled nationalism, leading to protests against South Korean brands. The tourism board advised against traveling to South Korea, causing a significant drop in Chinese visitors. Retail giant Lotte faced hacker attacks and blocked store entrances, with some stores being forced to close. One of Lotte’s new projects couldn’t open due to sudden fire safety concerns.
Since then, South Korea has sought to reduce its dependence on China. “The strategy was essentially a de-risking strategy long before Ursula von der Leyen used the term,” says Ballbach. Lotte’s withdrawal from the South Korean market is a prime example. “China lost a key influence channel,” says Ballbach.
South Korea has since shifted its trade relations to friendly countries and increased trade with Southeast Asia and the USA. Hyundai and Samsung have invested more in America. These preparations proved beneficial when trade with China significantly dropped in 2023 due to US sanctions, which South Korea supported. The impacts were manageable.
South Korea’s successes can only be partially replicated in Germany. The economic structures differ: Germany’s economy is characterized by a strong middle class, while South Korea is dominated by large conglomerates (chaebols). Suppliers in South Korea act more as parts of a larger entity led by companies like Samsung, LG or Hyundai, rather than independent entities. These conglomerates closely coordinate with the government on industrial strategy.
Nevertheless, Germany can learn a lot, particularly regarding the targeted promotion of key sectors. “Germany can learn much about the targeted promotion of key sectors,” says Ballbach. South Korea’s current industrial policy focuses on supporting future technologies like AI, biomedicine, semiconductors and e-mobility. “Traditional key industries like steel, shipbuilding, and household appliances are increasingly left to market developments.”
The COVID-19 pandemic and strict lockdowns have disillusioned many Chinese citizens. The struggling economy remains a concern. Many seek a fresh start in another country or at least a safe haven to turn to in emergencies. One option is “golden visas”: residence permits obtained through investments or donations, which can eventually lead to citizenship.
The most common way to obtain a “golden visa” is through real estate purchases, a practice that has led many European countries to distance themselves from it in recent years. Golden visa programs have caused property prices to skyrocket in some areas. The buyers, often from China and Russia, typically do not live in these properties but rent them out as vacation homes. The European Commission already in 2022 warned that such visa grants increase “risks regarding security, money laundering, tax evasion and corruption,” calling for an EU-wide ban. However, the issuance of these visas remains at the discretion of individual countries.
There is also growing concern about the potential infiltration of Chinese spies. In the case of exposed intelligence officer Jian G., a German citizenship helped conceal the true identity of the spy for many years. With visas and citizenships for any investor, the EU currently gives the Chinese state an effective tool to hide intelligence operations.
China has the second-largest millionaire population globally, after the United States. Simultaneously, it has the highest net outflow of wealthy individuals. According to British migration consultancy Henley & Partners, 15,200 individuals with investable assets of one million US dollars or more could leave China this year – 13,800 did so in 2023. Many still head for Europe as they cannot adequately diversify their wealth due to strict capital controls in China. Once they arrive, they are no longer bound to one country thanks to the travel and residence freedom within the Schengen Area. The healthcare system in European countries is also attractive, as are the universities for their offspring, Henley & Partners explains, which also operates an office in Shanghai.
Worldwide, there are now real estate and law firms specializing in immigration and investment consulting for Chinese clients. After Spain announced in April that it would abolish its golden visa programs, demand surged. According to the Spanish daily El País, Chinese buyers purchased several cheaper apartments to reach the 500,000-euro threshold. Wealthier individuals invested in commercial and luxury properties – the article cites a chalet in Madrid purchased by a Chinese buyer for 975,000 euros.
After Cyprus in 2020, the United Kingdom in 2022, and Ireland and Portugal in 2023 terminated their visa programs entirely or partially, the focus has shifted to less affluent European countries. Malta is currently the only state where one can obtain full citizenship within 12 months relatively quickly. The minimum investment sum is 750,000 euros. Another important destination for wealthy migrants remains Greece. In 2023, authorities doubled the minimum investment sum to 500,000 euros. The five-year residence permit can be extended indefinitely – provided the properties are not sold.
Golden visas were particularly welcomed in Greece during the 2013 sovereign debt crisis as an investment source. Since then, the country has issued over 22,300 residence permits – two-thirds of them to Chinese property buyers. However, corruption cases have also arisen, with local developers specifically purchasing properties to resell them at a markup to Chinese investment migrants. Rents and prices for owner-occupied apartments rose so sharply that affordable housing for average earners in central areas became increasingly scarce.
Prices also increased on some Greek islands and other tourist hotspots. The Athenian coastal suburb of Alimos is now referred to by locals as “Chinatown”. To ease the situation, Athens plans to introduce stricter rules for short-term rentals. Further increases in minimum investment sums are also being discussed.
While countries like Greece tighten their rules, Hungary launched a new program last month, which will take effect on July 1. Non-EU and non-EEA citizens can obtain a ten-year residence permit in exchange for acquiring residential property, investing in local real estate funds or donating to a university. The minimum investment amount is 250,000 euros. Chinese nationals were already the strongest foreign property buyers in Hungary in 2023, purchasing 647 properties, followed by Russians with 223.
To reach Europe, one can also invest in non-EU third countries. Chinese citizens can, for example, acquire citizenship of the South Pacific island nation of Vanuatu for 250,000 euros. This citizenship grants visa-free access to Schengen countries – for now. The European Commission proposed suspending the visa waiver agreement for Vanuatu two years ago. The relevant committee will address this once the new Parliament and committees are constituted, according to the EU Parliament.
In Vanuatu, the sale of citizenships contributes more than a tenth to the GDP. The Caribbean island of Dominica also receives more revenue from selling citizenships for approximately 91,600 euros per person than from taxes, as Bloomberg reported. With a Dominican passport, one can currently travel visa-free to the EU for 90 days.
Robert Habeck will arrive in China on Friday for his first visit as Minister for Climate Action. His presence is especially significant because China is undoubtedly the key player for successful global climate action in multiple ways:
It is, therefore, high time for the German government to prioritize climate policy relations with China. Important foundations have been laid since the beginning of this legislative term with the climate foreign policy strategy, the China strategy and the transformation dialogue agreed upon a year ago between Germany and China.
Now it is crucial to implement a realistic and strategic China climate policy. The guiding principle should be “pragmatic cooperation.” This means cooperation in areas where it is still sensible and possible, but also clearly defined expectations and a different approach to third countries.
Robert Habeck can set priorities in Beijing in the coming days in six areas: First, he should acknowledge that we will continue to need large-scale imports from China for the necessary transformation but also explain why Europe wants to diversify its supply chains in future technologies like renewable energy and electromobility. This includes building its own production capacities, but not closing the market.
Second, he should demand that the ecological and social conditions in the supply chain – for example, for solar cells – improve. The use of forced labor or exclusive reliance on dirty coal power is unacceptable. German and European supply chain laws are the best tools to achieve actual improvements because they are binding for all large companies. Habeck’s public consideration of “suspending” the German law did not strengthen this position’s credibility. It is, therefore, important that he clarifies that binding due diligence obligations are coming and how China can create the necessary transparency for this.
Third, the high share of coal-fired power generation remains China’s biggest climate policy problem. The minister should set clear expectations: China must finally adhere to its 2021 commitment to strictly limit the increase in coal power plants and initiate a coal phase-out in the next five-year plan. Simultaneously, Robert Habeck can offer enhanced exchanges between experts from both countries.
Fourth, cooperation with Germany can help strengthen a diversity of actors in Chinese climate policy beyond the central government. For example, the transformation dialogue includes cooperation with provinces – a sensible approach. Additionally, the German side should push for the inclusion of experts from research institutes and civil society from both countries in exchange and cooperation formats.
Fifth, it is no exaggeration to say that future global warming largely depends on China’s new climate target for 2035, which China – like all countries – must submit to the UN by February 2025 at the latest. So far, signs indicate that China intends to meet this deadline but does not plan an adequately ambitious target. This must be addressed in all high-level discussions – it helps if the Vice Chancellor of the largest EU member state emphasizes the importance of this issue. This will only be effective if Habeck can also commit to the EU presenting an ambitious target for 2035 and 2040 aligned with the 1.5-degree limit as early as possible.
Sixth, Robert Habeck should propose that China and Germany jointly do more to support other countries in their energy transitions. An accelerated global energy transition can alleviate trade tensions over green technologies. Even if the EU wants to reduce the share of Chinese imports, this does not have to mean a decline in demand for Chinese products if coal-dependent countries like Indonesia, India, or South Africa accelerate their energy transitions and rely largely on technology from China.
Lutz Weischer heads the Berlin office of the environmental and development organization Germanwatch. Martin Voss is a policy advisor for climate diplomacy and cooperation with Asia/China at Germanwatch.
Marina Rudyak – University of Heidelberg, Sinologist
Marina Rudyak is a research associate at the Institute of Sinology at Heidelberg University. She lectures on Chinese economic policy and international relations and completed her Ph.D. on Chinese development aid and China’s role in international development cooperation. Rudyak has also worked as an economic policy advisor for the German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ) in Beijing for several years.
Thomas Heberer – University of Duisburg-Essen, Professor
Thomas Heberer is a political scientist and East Asia specialist. Until 2013, he held the chair of East Asian Politics at the University of Duisburg-Essen, where he now serves as a senior professor for Chinese politics and society. From 1977 to 1981, Heberer worked as a lecturer and translator at the Foreign Languages Press in Beijing. Currently, he researches social discipline and civilization processes in China’s modernization. He recently sparked a lively debate with his commentary on the situation of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang.
Sarah Kirchberger – Director of the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University
Since July 2023, Sarah Kirchberger has been the academic director and head of strategic development in the Asia-Pacific region at the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University. Her research focuses on transatlantic responses to China’s rise, the development of the People’s Liberation Army, and the Taiwan conflict. She is also a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council, and vice president of the German Maritime Institute (DMI).
Gunter Schubert – University of Tuebingen, Professor
Gunter Schubert conducts regular field research in mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong and maintains a close network with scholars and academic institutions in East Asia. He has published extensively in German, English, French and Chinese in leading international journals. Schubert is a member of the executive editorial board of the International Journal of Taiwan Studies, co-editor of Issues & Studies, and serves on the editorial boards of various academic journals in the USA, Europe, China and Taiwan.
Kristin Shi-Kupfer – University of Trier, Professor
Kristin Shi-Kupfer is a professor of sinology at the University of Trier and a senior associate fellow at Merics. She is an expert on China’s digital policy, ideology, media policy, civil society and human rights. Shi-Kupfer earned her Ph.D. at Ruhr University Bochum on the topic “Emergence and Development of Spiritual-Religious Groups in China after 1978”. From 2007 to 2011, she worked as a journalist in China, reporting for Zeit Online, taz, epd and Südwest Presse.
Björn Alpermann – University of Würzburg, Professor
Björn Alpermann is one of Germany’s leading researchers on Xinjiang, contributing to uncovering the state suppression of the Uyghurs. He studied Modern Chinese Studies, Political Science, and Economics in Cologne and Tianjin. From 1999 to 2008, he was a research associate at the East Asian Seminar of the University of Cologne. He earned his Ph.D. in Modern Chinese Studies in 2006. From 2008 to 2013, he was a junior professor for Contemporary Chinese Studies at the University of Würzburg and temporarily held the newly established chair of China Business and Economics.
Markus Taube – University of Duisburg-Essen, Professor
Markus Taube holds the chair of East Asian Economics and China at the Mercator School of Management and is the director of the In-East School of Advanced Studies at the University of Duisburg-Essen. Taube is also co-director of the Confucius Institute Metropole Ruhr and serves as the current president of the Euro-Asia Management Studies Association (EAMSA). He holds various visiting professorships in China.
Adrian Zenz – Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, Senior Fellow and Director China Studies
Adrian Zenz has raised global awareness about the establishment of re-education camps by the Chinese state and the state-enforced labor system. He earned his Ph.D. in Social Anthropology from the University of Cambridge and has conducted ethnographic field research in Western China in Chinese. Zenz regularly analyzes original Chinese source material and has testified as an expert before the governments of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States.
Doris Fischer – University of Wuerzburg, Professor
Doris Fischer holds the chair of China Business and Economics at the University of Würzburg. Fischer studied Business Administration and Sinology in Hamburg and Wuhan and earned her Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Giessen. Her extensive research focuses on competition, regulation and industrial policy, emphasizing China’s economic policy and related incentive structures for economic actors.
Klaus Muehlhahn – Zeppelin University Friedrichshafen, President
Klaus Muehlhahn is the president of Zeppelin University and holds the chair of Modern China Studies. Muehlhahn is regarded as one of Germany’s most renowned sinologists. He studied and earned his Ph.D. in Sinology at FU Berlin. His research has taken him to Berkeley, Turku and Indiana before he returned to FU Berlin as a professor of Chinese history and culture. In 2020, he was appointed to Zeppelin University.
In Shenyang, amidst temperatures exceeding 40 degrees Celsius, people are clad entirely in white, well-covered to shield themselves from the heat and sun rays. While temperatures soar, this woman relies on the reflective properties of the color white for protection. The outlook for the coming days: scorching heat persists.
Ironically, Viktor Orbán, known for his friendly stance towards China, relaxed the conditions for Chinese investors seeking to buy residency permits for the Schengen area this spring. One might suspect ulterior motives, as the EU aims to make visa conditions for Chinese citizens more stringent. Orbán’s actions counteract this goal.
However, to defend the Hungarian Prime Minister, it’s worth noting that Hungary is not the only EU country enticing Chinese citizens to invest in its territory. Malta, Greece and Portugal are doing the same, as Fabian Peltsch reports.
The EU’s approach to regulate these practices more strictly would be a sensible move. The case of Chinese spy Jian G. demonstrated that the Chinese intelligence service exploits European citizenships to provide nearly foolproof cover for their spies.
Meanwhile, Finn Mayer-Kuckuk takes us to South Korea today. Our China.Table section head is accompanying Robert Habeck on his five-day East Asia trip. In Seoul, the German Vice Chancellor and Minister of Economic Affairs will meet not only Trade Minister Ahn Dukgeun but also South Korean Prime Minister Han Duck-soo. These discussions could be very interesting for the German Vice Chancellor.
While Habeck aims to reduce dependencies on China, South Korea has already been actively pursuing this goal. Since China punished the country with a trade boycott in 2017 for allowing a US missile defense system on its territory, South Koreans have been alarmed and have implemented a de-risking strategy that steers away from China. With considerable success, South Korea is now much more self-reliant from its large neighbor and thus politically less susceptible to coercion. A model for Germany and Europe?
The first stop on Economy Minister Robert Habeck’s Asian trip is the South Korean capital, Seoul, on Thursday. From there, he will travel to China. Although the sequence of the trip has no significant meaning – an earlier plan had him visiting China first, then South Korea – South Korea is a fitting partner in light of Germany’s China strategy, deserving special attention. “South Korea faces similar challenges, both economically and in terms of security risks,” said Habeck on the flight to Seoul.
It is a declared goal of the German government to reduce dependencies on suppliers from China. “South Korea plays a key role in Berlin’s and Brussels’ Indo-Pacific strategies,” says Korea expert Eric Ballbach of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin. South Korea is a particularly valuable partner in several ways:
While South Korea is an interesting market, it cannot replace China as it has only 51 million inhabitants and Koreans prefer buying Korean goods, especially cars from Hyundai.
South Korea’s achievements in semiconductor technology are impressive. Germany has largely outsourced this field to Asia, except for a few exceptions. In contrast, South Korea has developed one of the world’s most advanced chip industries. While Taiwan’s TSMC is often cited as the market leader, Samsung‘s chip division is a strong competitor. Samsung produces a significant portion of the processors for its advanced smartphones at facilities in South Korea and Texas. Europe can only dream of reaching the level of Samsung’s factories. Additionally, Samsung is a well-known name for smartphones, tablets, and smartwatches.
Despite having significant disadvantages compared to Germany, such as not being part of the EU single market and having unfriendly neighbors, South Korea has succeeded. The country began its high-tech journey in the late 1980s and is now one of the highest spenders on new technologies. South Korea’s funding for future technologies like AI and quantum computing is substantial.
Germany believed it couldn’t profitably manufacture cameras, smartphones and network technology, but Samsung produces 5G networks, which Germany bought from Huawei, claiming it had no other options.
South Korea experienced its “China shock” in 2017. The military installed the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) missile defense system, which officially serves to protect against North Korean attacks. However, Beijing saw it as a threat against China.
The consequences were felt within days. Chinese state media fueled nationalism, leading to protests against South Korean brands. The tourism board advised against traveling to South Korea, causing a significant drop in Chinese visitors. Retail giant Lotte faced hacker attacks and blocked store entrances, with some stores being forced to close. One of Lotte’s new projects couldn’t open due to sudden fire safety concerns.
Since then, South Korea has sought to reduce its dependence on China. “The strategy was essentially a de-risking strategy long before Ursula von der Leyen used the term,” says Ballbach. Lotte’s withdrawal from the South Korean market is a prime example. “China lost a key influence channel,” says Ballbach.
South Korea has since shifted its trade relations to friendly countries and increased trade with Southeast Asia and the USA. Hyundai and Samsung have invested more in America. These preparations proved beneficial when trade with China significantly dropped in 2023 due to US sanctions, which South Korea supported. The impacts were manageable.
South Korea’s successes can only be partially replicated in Germany. The economic structures differ: Germany’s economy is characterized by a strong middle class, while South Korea is dominated by large conglomerates (chaebols). Suppliers in South Korea act more as parts of a larger entity led by companies like Samsung, LG or Hyundai, rather than independent entities. These conglomerates closely coordinate with the government on industrial strategy.
Nevertheless, Germany can learn a lot, particularly regarding the targeted promotion of key sectors. “Germany can learn much about the targeted promotion of key sectors,” says Ballbach. South Korea’s current industrial policy focuses on supporting future technologies like AI, biomedicine, semiconductors and e-mobility. “Traditional key industries like steel, shipbuilding, and household appliances are increasingly left to market developments.”
The COVID-19 pandemic and strict lockdowns have disillusioned many Chinese citizens. The struggling economy remains a concern. Many seek a fresh start in another country or at least a safe haven to turn to in emergencies. One option is “golden visas”: residence permits obtained through investments or donations, which can eventually lead to citizenship.
The most common way to obtain a “golden visa” is through real estate purchases, a practice that has led many European countries to distance themselves from it in recent years. Golden visa programs have caused property prices to skyrocket in some areas. The buyers, often from China and Russia, typically do not live in these properties but rent them out as vacation homes. The European Commission already in 2022 warned that such visa grants increase “risks regarding security, money laundering, tax evasion and corruption,” calling for an EU-wide ban. However, the issuance of these visas remains at the discretion of individual countries.
There is also growing concern about the potential infiltration of Chinese spies. In the case of exposed intelligence officer Jian G., a German citizenship helped conceal the true identity of the spy for many years. With visas and citizenships for any investor, the EU currently gives the Chinese state an effective tool to hide intelligence operations.
China has the second-largest millionaire population globally, after the United States. Simultaneously, it has the highest net outflow of wealthy individuals. According to British migration consultancy Henley & Partners, 15,200 individuals with investable assets of one million US dollars or more could leave China this year – 13,800 did so in 2023. Many still head for Europe as they cannot adequately diversify their wealth due to strict capital controls in China. Once they arrive, they are no longer bound to one country thanks to the travel and residence freedom within the Schengen Area. The healthcare system in European countries is also attractive, as are the universities for their offspring, Henley & Partners explains, which also operates an office in Shanghai.
Worldwide, there are now real estate and law firms specializing in immigration and investment consulting for Chinese clients. After Spain announced in April that it would abolish its golden visa programs, demand surged. According to the Spanish daily El País, Chinese buyers purchased several cheaper apartments to reach the 500,000-euro threshold. Wealthier individuals invested in commercial and luxury properties – the article cites a chalet in Madrid purchased by a Chinese buyer for 975,000 euros.
After Cyprus in 2020, the United Kingdom in 2022, and Ireland and Portugal in 2023 terminated their visa programs entirely or partially, the focus has shifted to less affluent European countries. Malta is currently the only state where one can obtain full citizenship within 12 months relatively quickly. The minimum investment sum is 750,000 euros. Another important destination for wealthy migrants remains Greece. In 2023, authorities doubled the minimum investment sum to 500,000 euros. The five-year residence permit can be extended indefinitely – provided the properties are not sold.
Golden visas were particularly welcomed in Greece during the 2013 sovereign debt crisis as an investment source. Since then, the country has issued over 22,300 residence permits – two-thirds of them to Chinese property buyers. However, corruption cases have also arisen, with local developers specifically purchasing properties to resell them at a markup to Chinese investment migrants. Rents and prices for owner-occupied apartments rose so sharply that affordable housing for average earners in central areas became increasingly scarce.
Prices also increased on some Greek islands and other tourist hotspots. The Athenian coastal suburb of Alimos is now referred to by locals as “Chinatown”. To ease the situation, Athens plans to introduce stricter rules for short-term rentals. Further increases in minimum investment sums are also being discussed.
While countries like Greece tighten their rules, Hungary launched a new program last month, which will take effect on July 1. Non-EU and non-EEA citizens can obtain a ten-year residence permit in exchange for acquiring residential property, investing in local real estate funds or donating to a university. The minimum investment amount is 250,000 euros. Chinese nationals were already the strongest foreign property buyers in Hungary in 2023, purchasing 647 properties, followed by Russians with 223.
To reach Europe, one can also invest in non-EU third countries. Chinese citizens can, for example, acquire citizenship of the South Pacific island nation of Vanuatu for 250,000 euros. This citizenship grants visa-free access to Schengen countries – for now. The European Commission proposed suspending the visa waiver agreement for Vanuatu two years ago. The relevant committee will address this once the new Parliament and committees are constituted, according to the EU Parliament.
In Vanuatu, the sale of citizenships contributes more than a tenth to the GDP. The Caribbean island of Dominica also receives more revenue from selling citizenships for approximately 91,600 euros per person than from taxes, as Bloomberg reported. With a Dominican passport, one can currently travel visa-free to the EU for 90 days.
Robert Habeck will arrive in China on Friday for his first visit as Minister for Climate Action. His presence is especially significant because China is undoubtedly the key player for successful global climate action in multiple ways:
It is, therefore, high time for the German government to prioritize climate policy relations with China. Important foundations have been laid since the beginning of this legislative term with the climate foreign policy strategy, the China strategy and the transformation dialogue agreed upon a year ago between Germany and China.
Now it is crucial to implement a realistic and strategic China climate policy. The guiding principle should be “pragmatic cooperation.” This means cooperation in areas where it is still sensible and possible, but also clearly defined expectations and a different approach to third countries.
Robert Habeck can set priorities in Beijing in the coming days in six areas: First, he should acknowledge that we will continue to need large-scale imports from China for the necessary transformation but also explain why Europe wants to diversify its supply chains in future technologies like renewable energy and electromobility. This includes building its own production capacities, but not closing the market.
Second, he should demand that the ecological and social conditions in the supply chain – for example, for solar cells – improve. The use of forced labor or exclusive reliance on dirty coal power is unacceptable. German and European supply chain laws are the best tools to achieve actual improvements because they are binding for all large companies. Habeck’s public consideration of “suspending” the German law did not strengthen this position’s credibility. It is, therefore, important that he clarifies that binding due diligence obligations are coming and how China can create the necessary transparency for this.
Third, the high share of coal-fired power generation remains China’s biggest climate policy problem. The minister should set clear expectations: China must finally adhere to its 2021 commitment to strictly limit the increase in coal power plants and initiate a coal phase-out in the next five-year plan. Simultaneously, Robert Habeck can offer enhanced exchanges between experts from both countries.
Fourth, cooperation with Germany can help strengthen a diversity of actors in Chinese climate policy beyond the central government. For example, the transformation dialogue includes cooperation with provinces – a sensible approach. Additionally, the German side should push for the inclusion of experts from research institutes and civil society from both countries in exchange and cooperation formats.
Fifth, it is no exaggeration to say that future global warming largely depends on China’s new climate target for 2035, which China – like all countries – must submit to the UN by February 2025 at the latest. So far, signs indicate that China intends to meet this deadline but does not plan an adequately ambitious target. This must be addressed in all high-level discussions – it helps if the Vice Chancellor of the largest EU member state emphasizes the importance of this issue. This will only be effective if Habeck can also commit to the EU presenting an ambitious target for 2035 and 2040 aligned with the 1.5-degree limit as early as possible.
Sixth, Robert Habeck should propose that China and Germany jointly do more to support other countries in their energy transitions. An accelerated global energy transition can alleviate trade tensions over green technologies. Even if the EU wants to reduce the share of Chinese imports, this does not have to mean a decline in demand for Chinese products if coal-dependent countries like Indonesia, India, or South Africa accelerate their energy transitions and rely largely on technology from China.
Lutz Weischer heads the Berlin office of the environmental and development organization Germanwatch. Martin Voss is a policy advisor for climate diplomacy and cooperation with Asia/China at Germanwatch.
Marina Rudyak – University of Heidelberg, Sinologist
Marina Rudyak is a research associate at the Institute of Sinology at Heidelberg University. She lectures on Chinese economic policy and international relations and completed her Ph.D. on Chinese development aid and China’s role in international development cooperation. Rudyak has also worked as an economic policy advisor for the German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ) in Beijing for several years.
Thomas Heberer – University of Duisburg-Essen, Professor
Thomas Heberer is a political scientist and East Asia specialist. Until 2013, he held the chair of East Asian Politics at the University of Duisburg-Essen, where he now serves as a senior professor for Chinese politics and society. From 1977 to 1981, Heberer worked as a lecturer and translator at the Foreign Languages Press in Beijing. Currently, he researches social discipline and civilization processes in China’s modernization. He recently sparked a lively debate with his commentary on the situation of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang.
Sarah Kirchberger – Director of the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University
Since July 2023, Sarah Kirchberger has been the academic director and head of strategic development in the Asia-Pacific region at the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University. Her research focuses on transatlantic responses to China’s rise, the development of the People’s Liberation Army, and the Taiwan conflict. She is also a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council, and vice president of the German Maritime Institute (DMI).
Gunter Schubert – University of Tuebingen, Professor
Gunter Schubert conducts regular field research in mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong and maintains a close network with scholars and academic institutions in East Asia. He has published extensively in German, English, French and Chinese in leading international journals. Schubert is a member of the executive editorial board of the International Journal of Taiwan Studies, co-editor of Issues & Studies, and serves on the editorial boards of various academic journals in the USA, Europe, China and Taiwan.
Kristin Shi-Kupfer – University of Trier, Professor
Kristin Shi-Kupfer is a professor of sinology at the University of Trier and a senior associate fellow at Merics. She is an expert on China’s digital policy, ideology, media policy, civil society and human rights. Shi-Kupfer earned her Ph.D. at Ruhr University Bochum on the topic “Emergence and Development of Spiritual-Religious Groups in China after 1978”. From 2007 to 2011, she worked as a journalist in China, reporting for Zeit Online, taz, epd and Südwest Presse.
Björn Alpermann – University of Würzburg, Professor
Björn Alpermann is one of Germany’s leading researchers on Xinjiang, contributing to uncovering the state suppression of the Uyghurs. He studied Modern Chinese Studies, Political Science, and Economics in Cologne and Tianjin. From 1999 to 2008, he was a research associate at the East Asian Seminar of the University of Cologne. He earned his Ph.D. in Modern Chinese Studies in 2006. From 2008 to 2013, he was a junior professor for Contemporary Chinese Studies at the University of Würzburg and temporarily held the newly established chair of China Business and Economics.
Markus Taube – University of Duisburg-Essen, Professor
Markus Taube holds the chair of East Asian Economics and China at the Mercator School of Management and is the director of the In-East School of Advanced Studies at the University of Duisburg-Essen. Taube is also co-director of the Confucius Institute Metropole Ruhr and serves as the current president of the Euro-Asia Management Studies Association (EAMSA). He holds various visiting professorships in China.
Adrian Zenz – Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, Senior Fellow and Director China Studies
Adrian Zenz has raised global awareness about the establishment of re-education camps by the Chinese state and the state-enforced labor system. He earned his Ph.D. in Social Anthropology from the University of Cambridge and has conducted ethnographic field research in Western China in Chinese. Zenz regularly analyzes original Chinese source material and has testified as an expert before the governments of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States.
Doris Fischer – University of Wuerzburg, Professor
Doris Fischer holds the chair of China Business and Economics at the University of Würzburg. Fischer studied Business Administration and Sinology in Hamburg and Wuhan and earned her Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Giessen. Her extensive research focuses on competition, regulation and industrial policy, emphasizing China’s economic policy and related incentive structures for economic actors.
Klaus Muehlhahn – Zeppelin University Friedrichshafen, President
Klaus Muehlhahn is the president of Zeppelin University and holds the chair of Modern China Studies. Muehlhahn is regarded as one of Germany’s most renowned sinologists. He studied and earned his Ph.D. in Sinology at FU Berlin. His research has taken him to Berkeley, Turku and Indiana before he returned to FU Berlin as a professor of Chinese history and culture. In 2020, he was appointed to Zeppelin University.
In Shenyang, amidst temperatures exceeding 40 degrees Celsius, people are clad entirely in white, well-covered to shield themselves from the heat and sun rays. While temperatures soar, this woman relies on the reflective properties of the color white for protection. The outlook for the coming days: scorching heat persists.
