Just a few years ago, Germany was one of the top destinations for Chinese students and specialists. Many cited excellent and affordable study conditions and a high standard of living as reasons for coming to Germany. More than a few stayed to pursue a career in Germany. This has changed since Covid at the latest, writes our author Liu Yi, who interviewed students in China and Germany for his analysis. The conclusion he draws from these conversations is sobering: Political tensions between China and Western countries also take their toll here.
But that is not the only reason Germany is no longer the number one country to immigrate to. In light of the slow growth forecasts in Germany, its economic prospects are also no longer perceived as rosy. Consequently, the motivation to overcome the high language barrier and cultural challenges continues to wane. Chinese students are increasingly being replaced by students from India, whose percentage in Germany rose to 19.2 percent in 2023, while the share of Chinese students fell to 7.7 percent.
In February 2025, China is supposed to submit a new climate target (NDC) to the UN. So far, however, the People’s Republic has been relatively quiet. Due to the US election, experts believe that Beijing will wait and see what course Trump takes before they make any big climate promises. However, one thing is clear: China’s climate policy is on a decisive course, with progress being made on expanding renewable energies and electric cars. Nevertheless, coal consumption remains high in several sectors, and emissions from the building sector and the chemical industry slow down progress.
A survey conducted by our colleagues at Climate.Table among several professors and members of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) shows that decarbonization continues to enjoy a high priority, at least in China’s scientific community. In our second analysis, they reveal their strategies for decarbonizing China.
The changes in international relations and different perspectives between countries increasingly influence the decisions of Chinese emigrants and their country of choice. As a result, the importance of Germany for Chinese students and skilled workers is changing.
Since 2019, the number of new Chinese students and specialists coming to Germany from all countries has been shrinking. Although a recovery was expected in 2023 following the lifting of Covid-related travel restrictions in early 2022, this did not materialize. In the meantime, India has become the most important source in both categories.
Chinese students used to top the rankings of non-EU international students at German universities. In 2019, they accounted for 10.4 percent of all students, while Indian students followed with 8.8 percent, according to statistics from the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. However, the share of Chinese students fell sharply to 7.7 percent last year, while the Indian share rose to 19.2 percent.
Even before the pandemic, Indians were well ahead of other nationalities in terms of the number of skilled workers moving to Germany. In 2019, Indians in Germany received 30 percent of all EU Blue Cards, a work visa for highly qualified skilled workers; Chinese received five percent. Last year, Indians accounted for 25.2 percent of new Blue Cards and thus remained in first place, while the Chinese were in fifth place with 2.8 percent.
This development might be partly due to changing international relations. Since the pandemic, India’s relations with Western countries have intensified, while relations with China have grown more complicated. The impact is most noticeable in the US, where the number of Indian students overtook Chinese students for the first time in the 2023/2024 academic year.
Having significantly lowered the requirements for the immigration of skilled workers in recent years, Germany is now “one of the most liberal countries in the OECD world from a legal perspective,” says Holger Kolb, Head of the Annual Report Unit of the Expert Council on Integration and Migration in Berlin. Against this backdrop, Germany signed an agreement with India in 2022 to facilitate the transfer of skilled workers from the South Asian country.
Complex international relations affect the migration of skilled workers in many ways. The share of Chinese students in engineering and technology-related fields in Germany has remained constant at around half of all Chinese students. However, the increasing rivalry between China and the US has greatly affected Chinese students in these fields.
The USA has openly announced plans to refuse visas to Chinese citizens who specialize in sensitive technologies or have ties to institutions with a military background. Last month, the renowned ETH Zurich announced that it will also restrict the admission of Chinese students.
Cheng Hao is a graduate of Southeast University in Nanjing, Jiangsu. He believes “all universities and institutions in Western and Northern European countries will crack down on Chinese students in certain technology fields, even if they don’t say so publicly.” Cheng, who graduated in 2023 with a degree in artificial intelligence, decided to stay in China for the time being after searching for opportunities overseas. He took a job at IT giant Alibaba.
Obstacles also come from within China. The Chinese youth have been exposed to increased xenophobic and nationalistic propaganda over the past decade, which affects students’ decision to study abroad. Many parents, whose opinions carry great weight for young Chinese, are concerned that their children may encounter a hostile environment in Western countries. For this reason, they reject plans to study abroad, writes Chen Zhiwen, a researcher at the major education information platform Education Online. Moreover, China’s slow economic growth means fewer families can afford to send their children to study abroad.
Zhao Kangyan, a computational engineering science student at the Technical University of Berlin, says that Chinese students and young specialists must weigh many factors when deciding which country to go to.
“The work pressure in China is simply too high, which is one of the reasons why some young Chinese people want to try out other countries,” says Zhao from Shanghai, who has been studying in Germany for seven years and has witnessed the decisions of his Chinese peers both in China and in Germany.
The economic outlook also plays a role: “The Chinese economy is not doing really well. But if you look at Germany, the prospects are not so rosy either. The US used to be an option for those who wanted to move on from Germany, but the political situation in the US and relations between China and the US have deteriorated,” he explains. “You have to factor all that into your calculations.”
Young specialists have even more to consider when thinking about leaving. Despite Germany’s generally positive perception in the minds of the Chinese, learning a new language as hard as German is a daunting task for many Chinese who have already left school.
The situation becomes even more complicated for those with families, as the needs of each family member have to be taken into account. However, many young parents choose to leave China precisely because of their children, as they dislike the high-pressure atmosphere in Chinese schools and the omnipresent indoctrination in the curriculum. Liu Yi
More and more experts expect China’s emissions to peak this year or next. The world’s largest CO2 emitter is in the midst of decarbonizing its economy. While some indicators point in the right direction, the pace needs to be stepped up in other areas, as a new study by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) shows. At the end of October, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and the German Leopoldina highlighted the importance of decarbonization. In response to a question from Table.Briefings, CAS scientists have now formulated the country’s priorities on this path.
However, assessing the country’s climate course clearly remains difficult at present. Actually, China is supposed to submit a new climate target (NDC) to the UN in February 2025. So far, however, the People’s Republic has been rather reserved. Experts believe that Donald Trump’s election will delay the NDC. Like other major emitters, China will first wait and see what course Trump takes before making any big climate policy promises.
China continues to record high growth in the expansion of renewable energies and the electrification of the transportation sector:
This progress is partly negated by high energy consumption and rising emissions in other sectors:
Decarbonization is an important topic, at least in China’s scientific community. This became clear in a joint declaration by the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and the German Academy of Sciences Leopoldina. Professors and members of the CAS, Pu Wang (Institute of Science and Development), Buxing Han (Institute of Chemistry) and Shuhing Yu (University of Science and Technology of China) answered written questions from Table.Briefings about China’s decarbonization strategy. The answers are documented here.
China has pledged to achieve net-zero emissions by 2060. “The order in which sectors will achieve net zero is uncertain. Some studies suggest that the power generation sector is likely to make a large contribution sooner due to the rapid and large-scale deployment of renewable energy and the maturity of existing technologies,” the three CAS scientists write. They praise the “impressive progress” in renewables and the advances “in the development and manufacture of battery technologies.”
The main challenges in the energy sector “include the problems of the intermittency of renewable energies and the challenges of grid infrastructure.” China invests massively in the expansion of electricity grids and in battery storage systems to bridge dark doldrums. However, there is no functioning business model for battery storage operators yet. And electricity trading between provinces is still in its infancy, slowing down the energy transition.
The CAS researchers confirm the expansion of emissions trading to the “steel, cement and aluminum sectors.” In addition, China has “emphasized the importance of controlling non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions and adopted a series of measures to reduce non-CO2 greenhouse gases in the energy, agriculture and waste sectors.”
Whether China will further accelerate its climate policy regarding climate targets (NDC) remains unclear. China’s government has left the door open to increasing emissions by 2030. Analysts hope that the new NDC for 2035 will provide more clarity. It can be assumed that the new NDC will, for the first time, include lower CO2 emissions. However, “setting an absolute target is not progress per se. It depends on the level of the target,” says Lauri Myllyvirta from CREA. He is concerned that the “current deliberations on emissions targets for the next decade are very conservative.”
China would have to submit this NDC to the UN by February 2025. At the climate conference (COP29) in Baku, however, experts doubted that this deadline would be met. According to one China expert, many large emitters would wait until the USA under Donald Trump has set its course before submitting overly ambitious NDCs. Another observer from Beijing said that China could also soon present a major economic stimulus program that could further increase emissions. What is clear, however, is that China has assured the US in bilateral talks that the new NDC will include all greenhouse gases for the first time.
The origins of China’s nationalist ideology can be traced back to the political developments in the wake of the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). After Japan defeated China, the Qing government was forced to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki, pay a huge war indemnity, and cede Taiwan and the Penghu Islands. This event triggered an awakening of “national consciousness” among a new generation of intellectuals, represented by figures such as Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao.
From the late 19th century to the outbreak of the 1911 Republic Revolution, the development of Chinese nationalism manifested in two main trends. The first is anti-Manchu nationalism, which advocated the expulsion of the “foreign” Manchu rulers and the restoration of Han Chinese governance. This form of nationalism has a nature close to the Western understanding of ethnic nationalism. The second is a pan-ethnic nationalism advocated by Liang Qichao and others, which emphasized the “great unity of the five ethnic groups” (五族大同)-Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui (Muslims), and Tibetan-and introduced the concept of the “Chinese Nation” (中华民族). This form of nationalism was closer to the Western understanding of civic nationalism.
The May Fourth Movement of 1919 marked a significant milestone in the development of Chinese nationalism. Prior to this, nationalist thought was primarily confined to a subset of literati and political elites. Afterward, nationalism took root among urban merchants and residents. Another critical turning point in the development of Chinese nationalism occurred during World War II, as Japan launched a full-scale invasion of China. One outcome was the spread of nationalist sentiment from urban areas to rural China.
While China had no notion of a nation state it had a long history of identity building and at the core of this was Confucianism. The development of Confucianism in China can be roughly divided into the following phases. The first phase spans from the emergence of Confucianism to the reign of Emperor Wu of Han dynasty. During this period, Confucianism was still primarily a “folk” philosophy. The concept of “Confucian” (ru) was eclectic and broad, even encompassing people such as fangshi (practitioners of esoteric arts) and ritual masters.
The second phase extends from Emperor Wu era to the period before the Northern Song dynasty, when Confucianism eventually evolved into a state ideology, which I term “imperial Confucianism.” Until the Northern Song Dynasty, it had a dominant position in politics but had not yet penetrated deep into the grassroots of society and was constantly challenged by Buddhism, indigenous Taoism, folk religions and new religious movements.
The third phase begins with the Northern Song and continues into the late Qing dynasty, when the influence of Confucianism (more precisely neo-Concucianism), began to penetrate deeply into different aspects of Chinese society. This was made possible by two interconnected developments. First, the significant expansion of the civil service examination system, which relied on mastering Confucian texts, served as the primary avenue for official recruitment. As a result, individuals aspiring to political careers were compelled to study Confucianism.
Second, the proliferation of village-level patrilineal organizations rooted in neo-Confucian principles across China. Together, they enabled Confucianism to permeate nearly every aspect of social life, extending its influence down to the grassroots. For instance, population religion across China became highly Confucianized. Buddhism, Taoism, and Islam also underwent varying degrees of Confucianization. The dominance of Confucian values extended into drama, literature, and even the moral frameworks of secret societies and rebels. China thus transformed into a Confucian society.
With the rise of Confucian society, Confucianism became a shared foundation of morality and identity among officials, scholars, local gentry, and even elites of many ethnic minorities. It served as an integrative force across various aspects of society, shaping China into what Charles Tilly described as a “national state” and laying a solid foundation for future nation-building in China. However, this development also brought about numerous unintended consequences. First, when nationalist ideologies began to rise in China, ethnic groups with a clear “national” identity accounted for only a very small proportion of the total Chinese population -roughly around 3 percent.
Second, although Confucianism had an unprecedented influence on Chinese society after the Song dynasty, its institutional foundation – namely the imperial examination system – was almost entirely intertwined with secular institutions. As a result, when Neo-Confucianism was dominant, its integrative capacity within a state arguably exceeded that of transcendental religions like Christianity or Islam. However, once modern revolutions and coerced modernization waves dismantled its institutional foundation, Confucianism struggled to regain its influence. Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism, by contrast, have maintained their presence in modern society due to the existence of independent institutions, such as churches and other religious organizations, allowing them to resurge in times of social crisis. Confucianism, on the other hand, is like Chinese porcelain: hard and enduring, but almost impossible to recover once broken.
Thus, if the rise of industrial capitalism and nation-states brought about “unprecedented changes in millennia” (千年未有之巨变) for non-Western civilizations, the impact on Chinese civilization has been far greater than on others. In a nutshell, many of China’s contemporary issues stem from this fact. For example, compared to other countries and regions, China has much bigger potential for the growth of new religions because the niche left by the declining importance of Confucianism is huge. Similarly, unlike India, Russia, Turkey, or many other nonwestern nations, China particularly lacks soft power. Not only are Western audiences often unable to comprehend the rhetoric of Chinese government officials, but even the voices of Chinese scholars are not well received abroad. While this situation has many causes, a key reason is that other civilizations have, to varying degrees, preserved their roots under the impact of coerced modernization, whereas China was almost completely uprooted.
With regard to the direction in which Chinese nationalism would develop, I would argue that its mainstream, especially in its crystallized form, would be shaped by the following conditions. First, it will be largely secular, as no religion currently holds an overwhelmingly dominant position in China. Second, it cannot afford to be too exclusive because China has always been multi-ethnic, and none of China’s philosophical or religious traditions are inherently zero-sum or exclusionary. Third, it will remain somewhat vacuous so long as China is unable to establish a durable and dominant ideology that is widely shared by its people. Finally, it will remain persistently sensitive on the issue of Taiwan, primarily because Taiwan was ceded to Japan after China’s defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War, and Chinese nationalism largely emerged as a response to this defeat. As a result, the Taiwan issue occupies a central position in China’s nationalism discourse.
Zhao Dingxin is a Chinese sociologist and Max Palevsky Professor Emeritus at the Department of Sociology at Chicago University.
Editorial note: Now more than ever, discussing China means controversial debates. At China.Table we aim to reflect the diversity of opinions to give you an insight into the breadth of the debate. Opinions do not reflect the views of the editorial team.
The thought of gingerbread and coconut macaroons or cinnamon stars is sure to make many people’s hearts sing. And the Chinese also have pleasant associations with cakes, pastries, and other small snacks – at least, that’s what the Chinese name for them suggests. They are called 点心 diǎnxīn, literally “little something for the heart.”
This term is said to be derived from the saying 一点点心意 yīdiǎndiǎn xīnyì, which Chinese people like to use when giving friends or acquaintances a small gift such as sweets. This saying literally means “a little bit of friendly solidarity” (一点点 yīdiǎndiǎn = “a little bit,” 心意 xīnyì = “friendly solidarity, confidential courtesy, mutual appreciation”). In English, we say in such situations: “Just a little something!”
Since the character 点 diǎn also appears in the word 糕点 gāodiǎn “cakes, pastries” (e.g., 圣诞糕点 shèngdàn gāodiǎn “Christmas pastries,” 中式糕点 zhōngshì gāodiǎn “Chinese pastries”), the term 点心 diǎnxīn has probably become established for such appetizers and snacks.
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Just a few years ago, Germany was one of the top destinations for Chinese students and specialists. Many cited excellent and affordable study conditions and a high standard of living as reasons for coming to Germany. More than a few stayed to pursue a career in Germany. This has changed since Covid at the latest, writes our author Liu Yi, who interviewed students in China and Germany for his analysis. The conclusion he draws from these conversations is sobering: Political tensions between China and Western countries also take their toll here.
But that is not the only reason Germany is no longer the number one country to immigrate to. In light of the slow growth forecasts in Germany, its economic prospects are also no longer perceived as rosy. Consequently, the motivation to overcome the high language barrier and cultural challenges continues to wane. Chinese students are increasingly being replaced by students from India, whose percentage in Germany rose to 19.2 percent in 2023, while the share of Chinese students fell to 7.7 percent.
In February 2025, China is supposed to submit a new climate target (NDC) to the UN. So far, however, the People’s Republic has been relatively quiet. Due to the US election, experts believe that Beijing will wait and see what course Trump takes before they make any big climate promises. However, one thing is clear: China’s climate policy is on a decisive course, with progress being made on expanding renewable energies and electric cars. Nevertheless, coal consumption remains high in several sectors, and emissions from the building sector and the chemical industry slow down progress.
A survey conducted by our colleagues at Climate.Table among several professors and members of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) shows that decarbonization continues to enjoy a high priority, at least in China’s scientific community. In our second analysis, they reveal their strategies for decarbonizing China.
The changes in international relations and different perspectives between countries increasingly influence the decisions of Chinese emigrants and their country of choice. As a result, the importance of Germany for Chinese students and skilled workers is changing.
Since 2019, the number of new Chinese students and specialists coming to Germany from all countries has been shrinking. Although a recovery was expected in 2023 following the lifting of Covid-related travel restrictions in early 2022, this did not materialize. In the meantime, India has become the most important source in both categories.
Chinese students used to top the rankings of non-EU international students at German universities. In 2019, they accounted for 10.4 percent of all students, while Indian students followed with 8.8 percent, according to statistics from the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. However, the share of Chinese students fell sharply to 7.7 percent last year, while the Indian share rose to 19.2 percent.
Even before the pandemic, Indians were well ahead of other nationalities in terms of the number of skilled workers moving to Germany. In 2019, Indians in Germany received 30 percent of all EU Blue Cards, a work visa for highly qualified skilled workers; Chinese received five percent. Last year, Indians accounted for 25.2 percent of new Blue Cards and thus remained in first place, while the Chinese were in fifth place with 2.8 percent.
This development might be partly due to changing international relations. Since the pandemic, India’s relations with Western countries have intensified, while relations with China have grown more complicated. The impact is most noticeable in the US, where the number of Indian students overtook Chinese students for the first time in the 2023/2024 academic year.
Having significantly lowered the requirements for the immigration of skilled workers in recent years, Germany is now “one of the most liberal countries in the OECD world from a legal perspective,” says Holger Kolb, Head of the Annual Report Unit of the Expert Council on Integration and Migration in Berlin. Against this backdrop, Germany signed an agreement with India in 2022 to facilitate the transfer of skilled workers from the South Asian country.
Complex international relations affect the migration of skilled workers in many ways. The share of Chinese students in engineering and technology-related fields in Germany has remained constant at around half of all Chinese students. However, the increasing rivalry between China and the US has greatly affected Chinese students in these fields.
The USA has openly announced plans to refuse visas to Chinese citizens who specialize in sensitive technologies or have ties to institutions with a military background. Last month, the renowned ETH Zurich announced that it will also restrict the admission of Chinese students.
Cheng Hao is a graduate of Southeast University in Nanjing, Jiangsu. He believes “all universities and institutions in Western and Northern European countries will crack down on Chinese students in certain technology fields, even if they don’t say so publicly.” Cheng, who graduated in 2023 with a degree in artificial intelligence, decided to stay in China for the time being after searching for opportunities overseas. He took a job at IT giant Alibaba.
Obstacles also come from within China. The Chinese youth have been exposed to increased xenophobic and nationalistic propaganda over the past decade, which affects students’ decision to study abroad. Many parents, whose opinions carry great weight for young Chinese, are concerned that their children may encounter a hostile environment in Western countries. For this reason, they reject plans to study abroad, writes Chen Zhiwen, a researcher at the major education information platform Education Online. Moreover, China’s slow economic growth means fewer families can afford to send their children to study abroad.
Zhao Kangyan, a computational engineering science student at the Technical University of Berlin, says that Chinese students and young specialists must weigh many factors when deciding which country to go to.
“The work pressure in China is simply too high, which is one of the reasons why some young Chinese people want to try out other countries,” says Zhao from Shanghai, who has been studying in Germany for seven years and has witnessed the decisions of his Chinese peers both in China and in Germany.
The economic outlook also plays a role: “The Chinese economy is not doing really well. But if you look at Germany, the prospects are not so rosy either. The US used to be an option for those who wanted to move on from Germany, but the political situation in the US and relations between China and the US have deteriorated,” he explains. “You have to factor all that into your calculations.”
Young specialists have even more to consider when thinking about leaving. Despite Germany’s generally positive perception in the minds of the Chinese, learning a new language as hard as German is a daunting task for many Chinese who have already left school.
The situation becomes even more complicated for those with families, as the needs of each family member have to be taken into account. However, many young parents choose to leave China precisely because of their children, as they dislike the high-pressure atmosphere in Chinese schools and the omnipresent indoctrination in the curriculum. Liu Yi
More and more experts expect China’s emissions to peak this year or next. The world’s largest CO2 emitter is in the midst of decarbonizing its economy. While some indicators point in the right direction, the pace needs to be stepped up in other areas, as a new study by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) shows. At the end of October, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and the German Leopoldina highlighted the importance of decarbonization. In response to a question from Table.Briefings, CAS scientists have now formulated the country’s priorities on this path.
However, assessing the country’s climate course clearly remains difficult at present. Actually, China is supposed to submit a new climate target (NDC) to the UN in February 2025. So far, however, the People’s Republic has been rather reserved. Experts believe that Donald Trump’s election will delay the NDC. Like other major emitters, China will first wait and see what course Trump takes before making any big climate policy promises.
China continues to record high growth in the expansion of renewable energies and the electrification of the transportation sector:
This progress is partly negated by high energy consumption and rising emissions in other sectors:
Decarbonization is an important topic, at least in China’s scientific community. This became clear in a joint declaration by the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and the German Academy of Sciences Leopoldina. Professors and members of the CAS, Pu Wang (Institute of Science and Development), Buxing Han (Institute of Chemistry) and Shuhing Yu (University of Science and Technology of China) answered written questions from Table.Briefings about China’s decarbonization strategy. The answers are documented here.
China has pledged to achieve net-zero emissions by 2060. “The order in which sectors will achieve net zero is uncertain. Some studies suggest that the power generation sector is likely to make a large contribution sooner due to the rapid and large-scale deployment of renewable energy and the maturity of existing technologies,” the three CAS scientists write. They praise the “impressive progress” in renewables and the advances “in the development and manufacture of battery technologies.”
The main challenges in the energy sector “include the problems of the intermittency of renewable energies and the challenges of grid infrastructure.” China invests massively in the expansion of electricity grids and in battery storage systems to bridge dark doldrums. However, there is no functioning business model for battery storage operators yet. And electricity trading between provinces is still in its infancy, slowing down the energy transition.
The CAS researchers confirm the expansion of emissions trading to the “steel, cement and aluminum sectors.” In addition, China has “emphasized the importance of controlling non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions and adopted a series of measures to reduce non-CO2 greenhouse gases in the energy, agriculture and waste sectors.”
Whether China will further accelerate its climate policy regarding climate targets (NDC) remains unclear. China’s government has left the door open to increasing emissions by 2030. Analysts hope that the new NDC for 2035 will provide more clarity. It can be assumed that the new NDC will, for the first time, include lower CO2 emissions. However, “setting an absolute target is not progress per se. It depends on the level of the target,” says Lauri Myllyvirta from CREA. He is concerned that the “current deliberations on emissions targets for the next decade are very conservative.”
China would have to submit this NDC to the UN by February 2025. At the climate conference (COP29) in Baku, however, experts doubted that this deadline would be met. According to one China expert, many large emitters would wait until the USA under Donald Trump has set its course before submitting overly ambitious NDCs. Another observer from Beijing said that China could also soon present a major economic stimulus program that could further increase emissions. What is clear, however, is that China has assured the US in bilateral talks that the new NDC will include all greenhouse gases for the first time.
The origins of China’s nationalist ideology can be traced back to the political developments in the wake of the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). After Japan defeated China, the Qing government was forced to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki, pay a huge war indemnity, and cede Taiwan and the Penghu Islands. This event triggered an awakening of “national consciousness” among a new generation of intellectuals, represented by figures such as Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao.
From the late 19th century to the outbreak of the 1911 Republic Revolution, the development of Chinese nationalism manifested in two main trends. The first is anti-Manchu nationalism, which advocated the expulsion of the “foreign” Manchu rulers and the restoration of Han Chinese governance. This form of nationalism has a nature close to the Western understanding of ethnic nationalism. The second is a pan-ethnic nationalism advocated by Liang Qichao and others, which emphasized the “great unity of the five ethnic groups” (五族大同)-Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui (Muslims), and Tibetan-and introduced the concept of the “Chinese Nation” (中华民族). This form of nationalism was closer to the Western understanding of civic nationalism.
The May Fourth Movement of 1919 marked a significant milestone in the development of Chinese nationalism. Prior to this, nationalist thought was primarily confined to a subset of literati and political elites. Afterward, nationalism took root among urban merchants and residents. Another critical turning point in the development of Chinese nationalism occurred during World War II, as Japan launched a full-scale invasion of China. One outcome was the spread of nationalist sentiment from urban areas to rural China.
While China had no notion of a nation state it had a long history of identity building and at the core of this was Confucianism. The development of Confucianism in China can be roughly divided into the following phases. The first phase spans from the emergence of Confucianism to the reign of Emperor Wu of Han dynasty. During this period, Confucianism was still primarily a “folk” philosophy. The concept of “Confucian” (ru) was eclectic and broad, even encompassing people such as fangshi (practitioners of esoteric arts) and ritual masters.
The second phase extends from Emperor Wu era to the period before the Northern Song dynasty, when Confucianism eventually evolved into a state ideology, which I term “imperial Confucianism.” Until the Northern Song Dynasty, it had a dominant position in politics but had not yet penetrated deep into the grassroots of society and was constantly challenged by Buddhism, indigenous Taoism, folk religions and new religious movements.
The third phase begins with the Northern Song and continues into the late Qing dynasty, when the influence of Confucianism (more precisely neo-Concucianism), began to penetrate deeply into different aspects of Chinese society. This was made possible by two interconnected developments. First, the significant expansion of the civil service examination system, which relied on mastering Confucian texts, served as the primary avenue for official recruitment. As a result, individuals aspiring to political careers were compelled to study Confucianism.
Second, the proliferation of village-level patrilineal organizations rooted in neo-Confucian principles across China. Together, they enabled Confucianism to permeate nearly every aspect of social life, extending its influence down to the grassroots. For instance, population religion across China became highly Confucianized. Buddhism, Taoism, and Islam also underwent varying degrees of Confucianization. The dominance of Confucian values extended into drama, literature, and even the moral frameworks of secret societies and rebels. China thus transformed into a Confucian society.
With the rise of Confucian society, Confucianism became a shared foundation of morality and identity among officials, scholars, local gentry, and even elites of many ethnic minorities. It served as an integrative force across various aspects of society, shaping China into what Charles Tilly described as a “national state” and laying a solid foundation for future nation-building in China. However, this development also brought about numerous unintended consequences. First, when nationalist ideologies began to rise in China, ethnic groups with a clear “national” identity accounted for only a very small proportion of the total Chinese population -roughly around 3 percent.
Second, although Confucianism had an unprecedented influence on Chinese society after the Song dynasty, its institutional foundation – namely the imperial examination system – was almost entirely intertwined with secular institutions. As a result, when Neo-Confucianism was dominant, its integrative capacity within a state arguably exceeded that of transcendental religions like Christianity or Islam. However, once modern revolutions and coerced modernization waves dismantled its institutional foundation, Confucianism struggled to regain its influence. Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism, by contrast, have maintained their presence in modern society due to the existence of independent institutions, such as churches and other religious organizations, allowing them to resurge in times of social crisis. Confucianism, on the other hand, is like Chinese porcelain: hard and enduring, but almost impossible to recover once broken.
Thus, if the rise of industrial capitalism and nation-states brought about “unprecedented changes in millennia” (千年未有之巨变) for non-Western civilizations, the impact on Chinese civilization has been far greater than on others. In a nutshell, many of China’s contemporary issues stem from this fact. For example, compared to other countries and regions, China has much bigger potential for the growth of new religions because the niche left by the declining importance of Confucianism is huge. Similarly, unlike India, Russia, Turkey, or many other nonwestern nations, China particularly lacks soft power. Not only are Western audiences often unable to comprehend the rhetoric of Chinese government officials, but even the voices of Chinese scholars are not well received abroad. While this situation has many causes, a key reason is that other civilizations have, to varying degrees, preserved their roots under the impact of coerced modernization, whereas China was almost completely uprooted.
With regard to the direction in which Chinese nationalism would develop, I would argue that its mainstream, especially in its crystallized form, would be shaped by the following conditions. First, it will be largely secular, as no religion currently holds an overwhelmingly dominant position in China. Second, it cannot afford to be too exclusive because China has always been multi-ethnic, and none of China’s philosophical or religious traditions are inherently zero-sum or exclusionary. Third, it will remain somewhat vacuous so long as China is unable to establish a durable and dominant ideology that is widely shared by its people. Finally, it will remain persistently sensitive on the issue of Taiwan, primarily because Taiwan was ceded to Japan after China’s defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War, and Chinese nationalism largely emerged as a response to this defeat. As a result, the Taiwan issue occupies a central position in China’s nationalism discourse.
Zhao Dingxin is a Chinese sociologist and Max Palevsky Professor Emeritus at the Department of Sociology at Chicago University.
Editorial note: Now more than ever, discussing China means controversial debates. At China.Table we aim to reflect the diversity of opinions to give you an insight into the breadth of the debate. Opinions do not reflect the views of the editorial team.
The thought of gingerbread and coconut macaroons or cinnamon stars is sure to make many people’s hearts sing. And the Chinese also have pleasant associations with cakes, pastries, and other small snacks – at least, that’s what the Chinese name for them suggests. They are called 点心 diǎnxīn, literally “little something for the heart.”
This term is said to be derived from the saying 一点点心意 yīdiǎndiǎn xīnyì, which Chinese people like to use when giving friends or acquaintances a small gift such as sweets. This saying literally means “a little bit of friendly solidarity” (一点点 yīdiǎndiǎn = “a little bit,” 心意 xīnyì = “friendly solidarity, confidential courtesy, mutual appreciation”). In English, we say in such situations: “Just a little something!”
Since the character 点 diǎn also appears in the word 糕点 gāodiǎn “cakes, pastries” (e.g., 圣诞糕点 shèngdàn gāodiǎn “Christmas pastries,” 中式糕点 zhōngshì gāodiǎn “Chinese pastries”), the term 点心 diǎnxīn has probably become established for such appetizers and snacks.
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