Implementing the China strategy is undoubtedly hard work. Many different interests, views and ideas have to be coordinated while the world continues to turn at a breathtaking pace and demands decisions on a daily basis. You can certainly give the German government credit for this.
However, there is also a darker side, which suggests that there is a lot wrong with the implementation. For example, the German government has no overview of the recruitment of specialist staff with China expertise, as can be seen from its response to a minor question from the CDU parliamentary group on the implementation of the China strategy, which Table.Briefings reported on last week.
This admission raises questions about the importance attached to the issue by the federal government. There are gaps, especially in the field of science. Germany is still a long way from achieving comprehensive research security in its cooperation with Chinese players.
Meanwhile, our Taiwan correspondent David Demes describes the Taiwanese government’s efforts to avert punitive tariffs imposed by the Americans on its chip industry. The island republic’s arguments are perhaps also convincing for the White House. After all, they go straight to the wallets of US consumers.
The German government has no overview of new hires of specialist staff with China expertise. This is the result of its response to a minor question from the CDU parliamentary group on the implementation of the China strategy, which Table.Briefings first reported on last week.
“Since the adoption of the China strategy, the federal ministries and highest federal authorities have generally paid more attention to recruiting personnel with China expertise, i.e. personnel with relevant linguistic, intercultural, and/or cultural competence. The federal government does not keep statistics on personnel in this
respect,” the paper states.
This admission raises questions about how effectively and purposefully China expertise is being developed – and about the importance attached to developing China expertise. “If you want to build up China-competent personnel in a government apparatus, you should also document this in order to be able to measure performance,” says Alicia Hennig from TU Dresden/IHI Zittau, who herself lived and taught in China for many years.
“Well-founded, up-to-date and independent China expertise is essential for mutual understanding and for successfully representing and asserting German interests in the long term,” the China strategy states. Language and intercultural competence, knowledge of China’s goals and practical experience in bilateral cooperation should help to minimize risks.
Economic dependencies on China and conflicting interests have become increasingly apparent since the coronavirus pandemic and the war in Ukraine. Companies have been working intensively on the topics of risk minimization and diversification for some time now. However, in the field of science and research, the debate on de-risking is only making slow progress. This is also due to the difficulty of perceiving and correctly assessing risks.
Business ethicist Hennig was recently invited by NATO to inform the member states about the dangers of scientific cooperation with Chinese partners. In her opinion, the response to the minor interpellation shows that the German government is “only scratching the surface” when it comes to scientific cooperation and research security.
According to reports, politicians are already finding it difficult to develop a uniform line together with the scientific community, according to which universities and research institutions decide for themselves which projects they classify as risky and which not. Ministries, federal states and stakeholders from the scientific community are still working on defining terms in such concrete terms that they can be used as universal guidelines for risk management.
This is one reason why the stakeholder coordination process involving ministries, federal states and players from the scientific community under the leadership of the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) cannot be completed until the end of the year.
Another reason is that collaboration with Chinese partners has a positive connotation among many scientists. It is often associated with lavish funding and creates opportunities for many scientists that they can only dream of under normal conditions. Under these circumstances, bringing the risks to the fore is a lengthy process.
“Most recently, an intensive discussion on research security in the implementation of the China strategy took place between the Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry of Education and Research with the Alliance of German Science Institutions in February 2025,” the government announced – one and a half years after the China strategy was presented.
The BMBF wants to counter the lack of China expertise in research and science with a “new edition of the so-called initial legal consultation.” In five steps from establishing contact to a virtual consultation, the tool is intended to provide assistance in the legal structuring of “cooperation with Chinese partners in the non-economic sector.” It is aimed at state universities as well as the Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft, Helmholtz Association, Leibniz Association and Max Planck Society. The aim is to “strengthen China expertise independent of China’s influence.” The service has been available since January. The initial legal advice service was already tried out in July 2022 – reportedly with great success. Nevertheless, it took 18 months for the new edition to be established.
Demand for existing services shows that there is a great need for advice. Example: Competence Center for International Academic Cooperation (KIWi) of the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). It advises German universities on security-related issues. To provide support, KIWi draws on the regional expertise of the DAAD, its offices around the world, and the knowledge of its member universities.
“University management, international offices and academics are confronted with the need to evaluate long-established contacts and relationships and realign them if necessary,” says Joybrato Mukherjee, President of the DAAD, in an interview with Table.Briefings. Geopolitical and foreign policy developments have an impact on international cooperation between German universities. “KIWi could easily carry out twice as many consultations, the demand is great. But this would require more funding and staff.”
However, the financial resources are limited. “In view of the considerable current demands on our public budgets, we are striving to accomplish the tasks of this strategy without placing an additional burden on the federal budget as a whole,” reads the introduction to the China strategy.
Mukherjee predicts a difficult balancing act for science. “We will no longer be able to shape our relations with China on a purely bilateral basis. The USA is likely to make demands of us with regard to China, for example when it comes to issues such as data security or dual use. We will have to respond to this and this requires far-sighted preparation now.”
At the same time, openness and exchange remain important alongside the risks, says Mukherjee, particularly with regard to skilled workers. China is developing into an attractive competitor in the field of science. “In the coming years, China will increasingly become one of the main destinations worldwide for international students, and possibly not only for students from the so-called Global South. For Germany, this means that we need to strengthen our strengths. We are strong in the academic field, with around 405,000 international students and 75,000 academics in the country. We need to consolidate and expand this leading position.”
Taiwan is resisting the introduction of possible punitive tariffs by the US government. President Lai Ching-te went on the offensive last week to forestall such a development. Following a meeting of the National Security Council, Lai announced that Taiwan would expand its investments in the US and strengthen bilateral cooperation in the fields of artificial intelligence and semiconductor development.
“Given the concerns President Trump has raised about our semiconductor industry, we will intensify communication between Taiwan and the US and deepen mutual understanding,” Lai promised last Friday. He added that Trump’s team must recognize that Taiwan is an indispensable partner in rebuilding the US manufacturing industry and consolidating America’s leadership in the high-tech sector.
Due to Taiwan’s high trade surplus in bilateral relations and the island republic’s leading position in the semiconductor industry, the country has become a target for Donald Trump. The new US president had already threatened to impose punitive tariffs on Taiwanese semiconductors several times during the election campaign, most recently at the end of January.
Trump’s goal: He wants to bring chip production back to the USA by making chip imports massively more expensive with tariffs of up to 100%. Trump himself had brought Feb. 18 into play as a possible start date for punitive measures. But the deadline passed. In any case, it is still unclear how such tariffs would be implemented and what exactly could be taxed.
Trump accuses the island republic of stealing chip production from the Americans. Taiwan’s Minister of Economic Affairs Kuo Jyh-huei rejects the accusations. The country had acquired the chip know-how legally. He refers to an agreement between Taiwan and the American semiconductor manufacturer RCA from 1976 on a corresponding technology transfer. “Taiwan is not the one who stole the semiconductor technology,” he said. On the contrary: The Taiwanese chip industry is the USA’s best partner.
Kuo sent Vice Minister Cynthia Kiang, who is responsible for trade, to Washington last week to represent Taiwan’s position on the ground. Taiwan is also puzzled as to how serious Trump really is. Does he really want to tax the most advanced logic chips, which are indispensable for the future of AI applications? Or the semiconductors from mature manufacturing technology that are installed in almost all household appliances today?
According to Chiang Min-yen, semiconductor expert at the state technology think tank DSET, the taxation of mature semiconductors could become extremely complicated from a technical point of view. For example, when importing a refrigerator in which Taiwanese chips are installed, the proportion of the total price accounted for by the chip costs would first have to be calculated. “Each import would have to be analyzed to determine whether the refrigerator was manufactured in China or Vietnam and how much of it is attributable to chips from older manufacturing processes,” Chiang told Table Briefings. This re-export issue makes the implementation of tariffs even more difficult.
For the most advanced chips, the increased import costs are likely to be borne by importers, such as Nvidia and Apple, and consumers, explains Kristy Hsu of the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research. “US manufacturers have no alternative sources for the most advanced chips,” Hsu said. “Therefore, we believe the impact of such tariffs would be far greater for the US than for Taiwan.”
TSMC, the world’s leading advanced semiconductor manufacturing company, has significant pricing power. “Although the price increases may not be directly borne by TSMC, the company still needs to consider these cost and supply chain impacts,” argues Chiang Min-yen. For companies like TSMC, managing political relationships is crucial to ensure a stable supply chain.
As the Financial Times reports, the TSMC Management Board recently held its first symbolic board meeting in Arizona, where the company has built a production facility with the help of US subsidies. Two-nanometer process chips were not actually due to be manufactured there until 2028 – two years after the start of production in Taiwan. According to the FT, TSMC could now accelerate this process. “There are now also discussions about whether advanced packaging could be moved from Taiwan to Texas so that the entire production chain can be represented in the US,” says analyst Chiang.
“If the US demands that Taiwan moves production of the most advanced semiconductors to the US, this could have a major impact on Taiwan’s economy,” warns economist Hsu. However, punitive tariffs alone would not be enough to force TSMC to take this step, as a large part of the tariffs would have to be shouldered by customers and end consumers anyway. In addition, extremely high investment costs are slowing down the willingness to relocate.
Whether President Lai’s investment announcements can appease Trump remains to be seen. In any case, Lai’s statements are already being celebrated as a success for the Trump administration on the White House website.
When FDP leader Christian Lindner greeted the delegates at the 2019 national party conference in Chinese, it was simply a recognition of global realities. Six years ago, it should have been clear in every European capital how China’s quest for power is manifesting itself at all levels. And that Europe must develop an equal level of discussion and an appropriate strategy in its dialog with Beijing. Even if the global hype surrounding the Chinese AI model Deepseek has subsided for the time being, it is finally becoming clear what kind of challenger the world is up against. The social penetration and explosive power of the video app TikTok should not go unmentioned.
China is a dilemma for the entire free world – especially for Germany. Dependence, especially on China, endangers our country and even makes it vulnerable to political blackmail. German and European companies have made excellent profits in China over the past few years, have entered into obligatory joint ventures and have ignored many things in return. Above all, the metamorphosis of the Communist Party under President Xi Jinping since 2012.
Of course, de-risking is playing an increasingly important role for the German and European economy, especially after the experiences of the coronavirus pandemic. But in many areas – keyword rare earths – Chinese companies and state-owned enterprises enjoy an unrestricted monopoly. With the return of Donald Trump to the White House and his rigorous punitive tariff policy, China will further expand its supremacy in global trade and channel even more highly subsidized exports to Europe. The same applies to its geostrategic efforts – observers are already assuming that the global suspension of US development aid (USAID) will be used strategically by China and Russia in particular.
The fundamental deficits were already apparent in the summer of 2024, one year after the German government’s first joint China strategy came into force: no clear responsibilities, delayed response times, diverging opinions between those responsible. Mistakes that an authoritarian system naturally knows how to counter immediately. “Due to its own weaknesses and lack of consistency, Berlin is sitting like a rabbit in front of a snake,” summarizes Jürgen Matthes, China observer at the German Economic Institute (IW).
It is only logical that the future of German China policy in the Chancellery, the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Economic Affairs must finally be based on a common understanding. Fortunately, some German companies have been more forward-looking. For example, the continuing weakness of the Chinese market alone has recently led to a change of strategy in some German boardrooms towards India and other Asian countries, but not the China strategy.
China has never been a democracy, but under Xi, the Middle Kingdom has become even more authoritarian and aggressive. China is striving for a different world order in which our values of freedom play no role. The way out of this dilemma can only be a common strategic China policy based on European, transatlantic and international partnership – including a military dimension.
Europe and Germany by no means want to think in terms of a systemic rivalry, but we must respond to provocations and confrontations with self-confidence and decisiveness. No one has a greater interest in peaceful and friendly relations with the Chinese people than the people on the European continent. Of course we want and must maintain our economic relations. But only to the extent that it makes sense.
We are aware of the desire for peace in Ukraine, which Russia continues to deny, even with the support of Beijing. The increasing hybrid attacks by authoritarian states through espionage, sabotage, disinformation and cyber attacks are endangering our democracy. Not only must we finally defend against these attacks much more consistently in order to prevent fundamental damage to the private sector and our state institutions, but we must also address these attacks publicly.
A new China policy also includes domestic political reforms to reorganize responsibilities, particularly in the area of cyber security, and to establish the principle of security by design. The political response to the great dependence on Chinese IT solutions can only be de-risking here too – preferably Made in Europe.
Let us not be naive. We will only be able to counter the Communist Party’s geopolitically aggressive course with determination. Under US President Trump, the United States will find its own way of dealing with Beijing and will not take Europe into consideration. Let us stand up for our values and convictions: Targeted EU sanctions against Chinese officials for their complicity in human rights abuses are a testament to our own credibility.
China will also continue to try to draw countries in the Global South in particular into its own sphere of influence and expand the BRICS group of states. Germany’s China strategy must therefore include a foreign and development component that makes emerging medium-sized economies in Africa, Latin America and Asia more attractive offers of cooperation, while Beijing pushes them into dependencies.
For us Free Democrats, a level playing field is not negotiable. There is no alternative to new trade agreements with other partners and a consistent strategic approach by the EU to the subsidized overproduction of the Chinese economy. Temu and Shein are instruments of Chinese geopolitics and not harmless suppliers, which is why the whole of Europe must declare war on them and rely on strict enforcement of applicable law with the Digital Services Act and by the market surveillance and customs authorities in Europe and Germany.
Of course, diplomacy is also part of a new realism in foreign policy. Realpolitik and a commitment to freedom and human rights are not mutually exclusive. This is all the more true with regard to Taiwan. We cannot talk to Beijing and forget about Taiwan. In the coming legislative period, democracies will need to continue to stand shoulder to shoulder.
Gyde Jensen is deputy leader of the FDP parliamentary group in the German Bundestag.
Editor’s note: Today more than ever, discussing China means debating controversially. We want to reflect the diversity of viewpoints so that you can gain an insight into the breadth of the debate. Opinion articles do not reflect the opinion of the editorial team.
Silk weaving is still a special feature of the city of Hangzhou in western China today. In ancient times, the capital of Zhejiang province was a strategic hub along the Silk Road, which got its name not least because fabrics and textiles were exported from Hangzhou to the west. Hangzhou gained a reputation as the “House of Silk” that still resonates today. Silk fabrics were once discovered in the region that are several thousand years old and are said to date back to the Liangzhu culture (3400-2250 BC).
Implementing the China strategy is undoubtedly hard work. Many different interests, views and ideas have to be coordinated while the world continues to turn at a breathtaking pace and demands decisions on a daily basis. You can certainly give the German government credit for this.
However, there is also a darker side, which suggests that there is a lot wrong with the implementation. For example, the German government has no overview of the recruitment of specialist staff with China expertise, as can be seen from its response to a minor question from the CDU parliamentary group on the implementation of the China strategy, which Table.Briefings reported on last week.
This admission raises questions about the importance attached to the issue by the federal government. There are gaps, especially in the field of science. Germany is still a long way from achieving comprehensive research security in its cooperation with Chinese players.
Meanwhile, our Taiwan correspondent David Demes describes the Taiwanese government’s efforts to avert punitive tariffs imposed by the Americans on its chip industry. The island republic’s arguments are perhaps also convincing for the White House. After all, they go straight to the wallets of US consumers.
The German government has no overview of new hires of specialist staff with China expertise. This is the result of its response to a minor question from the CDU parliamentary group on the implementation of the China strategy, which Table.Briefings first reported on last week.
“Since the adoption of the China strategy, the federal ministries and highest federal authorities have generally paid more attention to recruiting personnel with China expertise, i.e. personnel with relevant linguistic, intercultural, and/or cultural competence. The federal government does not keep statistics on personnel in this
respect,” the paper states.
This admission raises questions about how effectively and purposefully China expertise is being developed – and about the importance attached to developing China expertise. “If you want to build up China-competent personnel in a government apparatus, you should also document this in order to be able to measure performance,” says Alicia Hennig from TU Dresden/IHI Zittau, who herself lived and taught in China for many years.
“Well-founded, up-to-date and independent China expertise is essential for mutual understanding and for successfully representing and asserting German interests in the long term,” the China strategy states. Language and intercultural competence, knowledge of China’s goals and practical experience in bilateral cooperation should help to minimize risks.
Economic dependencies on China and conflicting interests have become increasingly apparent since the coronavirus pandemic and the war in Ukraine. Companies have been working intensively on the topics of risk minimization and diversification for some time now. However, in the field of science and research, the debate on de-risking is only making slow progress. This is also due to the difficulty of perceiving and correctly assessing risks.
Business ethicist Hennig was recently invited by NATO to inform the member states about the dangers of scientific cooperation with Chinese partners. In her opinion, the response to the minor interpellation shows that the German government is “only scratching the surface” when it comes to scientific cooperation and research security.
According to reports, politicians are already finding it difficult to develop a uniform line together with the scientific community, according to which universities and research institutions decide for themselves which projects they classify as risky and which not. Ministries, federal states and stakeholders from the scientific community are still working on defining terms in such concrete terms that they can be used as universal guidelines for risk management.
This is one reason why the stakeholder coordination process involving ministries, federal states and players from the scientific community under the leadership of the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) cannot be completed until the end of the year.
Another reason is that collaboration with Chinese partners has a positive connotation among many scientists. It is often associated with lavish funding and creates opportunities for many scientists that they can only dream of under normal conditions. Under these circumstances, bringing the risks to the fore is a lengthy process.
“Most recently, an intensive discussion on research security in the implementation of the China strategy took place between the Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry of Education and Research with the Alliance of German Science Institutions in February 2025,” the government announced – one and a half years after the China strategy was presented.
The BMBF wants to counter the lack of China expertise in research and science with a “new edition of the so-called initial legal consultation.” In five steps from establishing contact to a virtual consultation, the tool is intended to provide assistance in the legal structuring of “cooperation with Chinese partners in the non-economic sector.” It is aimed at state universities as well as the Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft, Helmholtz Association, Leibniz Association and Max Planck Society. The aim is to “strengthen China expertise independent of China’s influence.” The service has been available since January. The initial legal advice service was already tried out in July 2022 – reportedly with great success. Nevertheless, it took 18 months for the new edition to be established.
Demand for existing services shows that there is a great need for advice. Example: Competence Center for International Academic Cooperation (KIWi) of the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). It advises German universities on security-related issues. To provide support, KIWi draws on the regional expertise of the DAAD, its offices around the world, and the knowledge of its member universities.
“University management, international offices and academics are confronted with the need to evaluate long-established contacts and relationships and realign them if necessary,” says Joybrato Mukherjee, President of the DAAD, in an interview with Table.Briefings. Geopolitical and foreign policy developments have an impact on international cooperation between German universities. “KIWi could easily carry out twice as many consultations, the demand is great. But this would require more funding and staff.”
However, the financial resources are limited. “In view of the considerable current demands on our public budgets, we are striving to accomplish the tasks of this strategy without placing an additional burden on the federal budget as a whole,” reads the introduction to the China strategy.
Mukherjee predicts a difficult balancing act for science. “We will no longer be able to shape our relations with China on a purely bilateral basis. The USA is likely to make demands of us with regard to China, for example when it comes to issues such as data security or dual use. We will have to respond to this and this requires far-sighted preparation now.”
At the same time, openness and exchange remain important alongside the risks, says Mukherjee, particularly with regard to skilled workers. China is developing into an attractive competitor in the field of science. “In the coming years, China will increasingly become one of the main destinations worldwide for international students, and possibly not only for students from the so-called Global South. For Germany, this means that we need to strengthen our strengths. We are strong in the academic field, with around 405,000 international students and 75,000 academics in the country. We need to consolidate and expand this leading position.”
Taiwan is resisting the introduction of possible punitive tariffs by the US government. President Lai Ching-te went on the offensive last week to forestall such a development. Following a meeting of the National Security Council, Lai announced that Taiwan would expand its investments in the US and strengthen bilateral cooperation in the fields of artificial intelligence and semiconductor development.
“Given the concerns President Trump has raised about our semiconductor industry, we will intensify communication between Taiwan and the US and deepen mutual understanding,” Lai promised last Friday. He added that Trump’s team must recognize that Taiwan is an indispensable partner in rebuilding the US manufacturing industry and consolidating America’s leadership in the high-tech sector.
Due to Taiwan’s high trade surplus in bilateral relations and the island republic’s leading position in the semiconductor industry, the country has become a target for Donald Trump. The new US president had already threatened to impose punitive tariffs on Taiwanese semiconductors several times during the election campaign, most recently at the end of January.
Trump’s goal: He wants to bring chip production back to the USA by making chip imports massively more expensive with tariffs of up to 100%. Trump himself had brought Feb. 18 into play as a possible start date for punitive measures. But the deadline passed. In any case, it is still unclear how such tariffs would be implemented and what exactly could be taxed.
Trump accuses the island republic of stealing chip production from the Americans. Taiwan’s Minister of Economic Affairs Kuo Jyh-huei rejects the accusations. The country had acquired the chip know-how legally. He refers to an agreement between Taiwan and the American semiconductor manufacturer RCA from 1976 on a corresponding technology transfer. “Taiwan is not the one who stole the semiconductor technology,” he said. On the contrary: The Taiwanese chip industry is the USA’s best partner.
Kuo sent Vice Minister Cynthia Kiang, who is responsible for trade, to Washington last week to represent Taiwan’s position on the ground. Taiwan is also puzzled as to how serious Trump really is. Does he really want to tax the most advanced logic chips, which are indispensable for the future of AI applications? Or the semiconductors from mature manufacturing technology that are installed in almost all household appliances today?
According to Chiang Min-yen, semiconductor expert at the state technology think tank DSET, the taxation of mature semiconductors could become extremely complicated from a technical point of view. For example, when importing a refrigerator in which Taiwanese chips are installed, the proportion of the total price accounted for by the chip costs would first have to be calculated. “Each import would have to be analyzed to determine whether the refrigerator was manufactured in China or Vietnam and how much of it is attributable to chips from older manufacturing processes,” Chiang told Table Briefings. This re-export issue makes the implementation of tariffs even more difficult.
For the most advanced chips, the increased import costs are likely to be borne by importers, such as Nvidia and Apple, and consumers, explains Kristy Hsu of the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research. “US manufacturers have no alternative sources for the most advanced chips,” Hsu said. “Therefore, we believe the impact of such tariffs would be far greater for the US than for Taiwan.”
TSMC, the world’s leading advanced semiconductor manufacturing company, has significant pricing power. “Although the price increases may not be directly borne by TSMC, the company still needs to consider these cost and supply chain impacts,” argues Chiang Min-yen. For companies like TSMC, managing political relationships is crucial to ensure a stable supply chain.
As the Financial Times reports, the TSMC Management Board recently held its first symbolic board meeting in Arizona, where the company has built a production facility with the help of US subsidies. Two-nanometer process chips were not actually due to be manufactured there until 2028 – two years after the start of production in Taiwan. According to the FT, TSMC could now accelerate this process. “There are now also discussions about whether advanced packaging could be moved from Taiwan to Texas so that the entire production chain can be represented in the US,” says analyst Chiang.
“If the US demands that Taiwan moves production of the most advanced semiconductors to the US, this could have a major impact on Taiwan’s economy,” warns economist Hsu. However, punitive tariffs alone would not be enough to force TSMC to take this step, as a large part of the tariffs would have to be shouldered by customers and end consumers anyway. In addition, extremely high investment costs are slowing down the willingness to relocate.
Whether President Lai’s investment announcements can appease Trump remains to be seen. In any case, Lai’s statements are already being celebrated as a success for the Trump administration on the White House website.
When FDP leader Christian Lindner greeted the delegates at the 2019 national party conference in Chinese, it was simply a recognition of global realities. Six years ago, it should have been clear in every European capital how China’s quest for power is manifesting itself at all levels. And that Europe must develop an equal level of discussion and an appropriate strategy in its dialog with Beijing. Even if the global hype surrounding the Chinese AI model Deepseek has subsided for the time being, it is finally becoming clear what kind of challenger the world is up against. The social penetration and explosive power of the video app TikTok should not go unmentioned.
China is a dilemma for the entire free world – especially for Germany. Dependence, especially on China, endangers our country and even makes it vulnerable to political blackmail. German and European companies have made excellent profits in China over the past few years, have entered into obligatory joint ventures and have ignored many things in return. Above all, the metamorphosis of the Communist Party under President Xi Jinping since 2012.
Of course, de-risking is playing an increasingly important role for the German and European economy, especially after the experiences of the coronavirus pandemic. But in many areas – keyword rare earths – Chinese companies and state-owned enterprises enjoy an unrestricted monopoly. With the return of Donald Trump to the White House and his rigorous punitive tariff policy, China will further expand its supremacy in global trade and channel even more highly subsidized exports to Europe. The same applies to its geostrategic efforts – observers are already assuming that the global suspension of US development aid (USAID) will be used strategically by China and Russia in particular.
The fundamental deficits were already apparent in the summer of 2024, one year after the German government’s first joint China strategy came into force: no clear responsibilities, delayed response times, diverging opinions between those responsible. Mistakes that an authoritarian system naturally knows how to counter immediately. “Due to its own weaknesses and lack of consistency, Berlin is sitting like a rabbit in front of a snake,” summarizes Jürgen Matthes, China observer at the German Economic Institute (IW).
It is only logical that the future of German China policy in the Chancellery, the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Economic Affairs must finally be based on a common understanding. Fortunately, some German companies have been more forward-looking. For example, the continuing weakness of the Chinese market alone has recently led to a change of strategy in some German boardrooms towards India and other Asian countries, but not the China strategy.
China has never been a democracy, but under Xi, the Middle Kingdom has become even more authoritarian and aggressive. China is striving for a different world order in which our values of freedom play no role. The way out of this dilemma can only be a common strategic China policy based on European, transatlantic and international partnership – including a military dimension.
Europe and Germany by no means want to think in terms of a systemic rivalry, but we must respond to provocations and confrontations with self-confidence and decisiveness. No one has a greater interest in peaceful and friendly relations with the Chinese people than the people on the European continent. Of course we want and must maintain our economic relations. But only to the extent that it makes sense.
We are aware of the desire for peace in Ukraine, which Russia continues to deny, even with the support of Beijing. The increasing hybrid attacks by authoritarian states through espionage, sabotage, disinformation and cyber attacks are endangering our democracy. Not only must we finally defend against these attacks much more consistently in order to prevent fundamental damage to the private sector and our state institutions, but we must also address these attacks publicly.
A new China policy also includes domestic political reforms to reorganize responsibilities, particularly in the area of cyber security, and to establish the principle of security by design. The political response to the great dependence on Chinese IT solutions can only be de-risking here too – preferably Made in Europe.
Let us not be naive. We will only be able to counter the Communist Party’s geopolitically aggressive course with determination. Under US President Trump, the United States will find its own way of dealing with Beijing and will not take Europe into consideration. Let us stand up for our values and convictions: Targeted EU sanctions against Chinese officials for their complicity in human rights abuses are a testament to our own credibility.
China will also continue to try to draw countries in the Global South in particular into its own sphere of influence and expand the BRICS group of states. Germany’s China strategy must therefore include a foreign and development component that makes emerging medium-sized economies in Africa, Latin America and Asia more attractive offers of cooperation, while Beijing pushes them into dependencies.
For us Free Democrats, a level playing field is not negotiable. There is no alternative to new trade agreements with other partners and a consistent strategic approach by the EU to the subsidized overproduction of the Chinese economy. Temu and Shein are instruments of Chinese geopolitics and not harmless suppliers, which is why the whole of Europe must declare war on them and rely on strict enforcement of applicable law with the Digital Services Act and by the market surveillance and customs authorities in Europe and Germany.
Of course, diplomacy is also part of a new realism in foreign policy. Realpolitik and a commitment to freedom and human rights are not mutually exclusive. This is all the more true with regard to Taiwan. We cannot talk to Beijing and forget about Taiwan. In the coming legislative period, democracies will need to continue to stand shoulder to shoulder.
Gyde Jensen is deputy leader of the FDP parliamentary group in the German Bundestag.
Editor’s note: Today more than ever, discussing China means debating controversially. We want to reflect the diversity of viewpoints so that you can gain an insight into the breadth of the debate. Opinion articles do not reflect the opinion of the editorial team.
Silk weaving is still a special feature of the city of Hangzhou in western China today. In ancient times, the capital of Zhejiang province was a strategic hub along the Silk Road, which got its name not least because fabrics and textiles were exported from Hangzhou to the west. Hangzhou gained a reputation as the “House of Silk” that still resonates today. Silk fabrics were once discovered in the region that are several thousand years old and are said to date back to the Liangzhu culture (3400-2250 BC).
