How vulnerable is Taiwan? This is what we talked about with Eberhard Sandschneider. The former professor at the Free University of Berlin is one of the most renowned experts on security policy – and on the Chinese military. Sandschneider does not expect an invasion of the island in the near future: The risk of clashing with the United States is too high, he tells Michael Radunski. But in the years and decades to come, a war between the US and China is quite possible. Since the People’s Liberation Army is also growing stronger both internally and externally, a disaster might be at hand after all.
The lockdown in Shanghai has now lasted for far too long. Since it was originally intended to last only a few days, many city residents start to run out of food – and patience. This also affects foreigners living in the city. Many of them, despite all their approval for the pandemic response, are particularly frustrated that it is extremely difficult for them to leave the city. Instead, the fear of being sent to a quarantine center is growing, writes Christiane Kuehl. And these centers seem more like military hospitals. Omicron, meanwhile, lives up to its reputation and continues to find new infection victims even in the closed-down city.
Have a pleasant week!
Mr. Sandschneider, the war in Ukraine is not even over yet, and many experts already see the next conflict on the horizon: China will take advantage of the West’s distraction with Russia and finally bring Taiwan back to the motherland. Do you share this concern?
No, as tempting as this comparison and the parallels may be for some, the situation in Asia is completely different. Taiwan commands the best-equipped and best-trained army in the Western Pacific. China would end up with a very bloody nose. Then there is the Taiwan Relations Act, which binds the USA closely to Taiwan. There is a pledge of support. China’s President Xi Jinping is aware of this risk. In this respect, the current speculation about a possible attack by China on Taiwan is really unfounded. I cannot imagine this happening.
Cannot imagine? The same would probably have been said a few weeks ago about a possible Russian attack on Ukraine. The reality is different.
Yes, it’s true that you should never say never. And you really do have to be careful with statements like that, but the way I see the situation, I’m not too worried about Taiwan’s security at the moment.
As for Putin, people are now saying: If we had listened to him carefully, we would not have been so surprised. He has made it clear what he thinks of Ukraine. And Xi Jinping also leaves no doubt about his intentions: Taiwan belongs to China and must return to the motherland.
Absolutely correct. That’s why I’m only talking about the present. Anyone who looks at China’s plans knows that the critical phase for Taiwan extends to the year 2049. And there is no question that Xi Jinping has the ambition to achieve great things like Mao or Deng Xiaoping.
So a risk after all?
The risk is there. That is why we must do what we failed to with Ukraine: Make it unmistakably clear that the West would respond decisively and unitedly. In this context, US President Joe Biden rightly discarded the strategic ambiguity of his predecessors and made it clear that in the event of a Chinese attack, Taiwan would receive military support.
Let’s put aside the political component for a moment and look at the military: What would an attack on Taiwan look like?
There are countless simulations showing what a Chinese attack on Taiwan might look like. Everything is on the table down to the smallest detail, from an Internet blockade to a naval blockade. And in all these scenarios, China would at present be the loser.
Really? What is the condition of the Chinese military?
It’s catching up dramatically. We were all surprised this year to see only a moderate increase in the military budget. In previous years, the budget has grown at times by 11 percent, at other times by 17 percent. If you convert that into US dollars, that’s officially about $230 billion – a year.
That sounds like a lot. Compared to the US, however, with its military spending of around 770 billion US dollars, it is considerably less.
True. But the development is clear and fast. At the beginning of the reform process, the military was put on the back burner, but with the promise: If economic power permits, you’ll get money and attention. That is now the case, as demonstrated by the Liaoning, for example. China’s first aircraft carrier, originally a Russian asset, the second is from China’s own production. Six more are to be built.
Still, many consider the People’s Liberation Army to be weak and outdated in its structure. What are the problems?
The People’s Liberation Army has a huge water head, namely the oversized land army, which, on top of that, is not even particularly well-equipped. But make no mistake. The time for China’s military has come. Restructuring is underway, and the focus is now on the navy, air force, space armament and cyberwar. In other words, areas where they can do major damage to US forces relatively quickly.
That is the big goal?
Yes, China is measuring itself against only one country, the USA. Currently, China has one overseas military base, in Djibouti. The figures for US bases vary, depending on the standards you apply to a military facility. A modest count puts the total at 163 bases, spread around the world. To China, that must seem like being surrounded. And that is why China will build new military bases overseas.
Where do you think that will be?
There are numerous potential fully developed deep-sea ports, for example Hambantota in Sri Lanka. The Chinese construction of the deep-sea port there is ludicrous. Before China appeared, some five ships a year docked there. But the port lies geostrategically ideal for Chinese warships. Oh, I see. Now you are going to criticize this again.
Alright, let me do that then. Militarization of the sea lanes cannot be in the interest of international free trade.
True, but this is about China’s interests. Look at it from a world-historical perspective: A country of this size, with this economic success over many years, will inevitably translate economic strength into military power at some point. The promise that Deng Xiaoping once made to the Chinese generals is now being realized.
This will inevitably lead to friction with the world power USA.
It won’t lead to that; that’s already the case. What is currently happening in the South China Sea is just a harmless prelude. Conflicts will increase, just as China will increasingly project its increased self-confidence to the outside world.
Some fear that an incident in the South China Sea could lead to an unforeseen war between the USA and China.
At present, it would not be wise for China to enter into a conflict with the USA. And they won’t. But you are right. Ben Hodges, the former commander-in-chief of the US armed forces, never tires of pointing out that he expects a war between China and the USA within the next ten years. That would be World War III.
Are you more relaxed about it?
Well. In my view, there are two main dangers: The risk of chance and the risk of misperception, when you misjudge the other side and then make mistakes. As is currently the case with Putin. But I stand by my position that Xi Jinping is currently assessing the risk correctly. But I don’t know whether that will still be the case in ten years.
The problem here is that there are two sides to a potential conflict.
Yes, and that’s what worries me a bit. The China debate in the US has become enormously heated. There is hardly a politician who doesn’t see China as the greatest challenge of our time. And unlike in Germany and Europe, this always includes the military component. I attended a panel discussion at the Dirkson Senate Building in Washington, D.C., where a US colleague said: War is not the worst option. I couldn’t believe my ears. I was totally speechless. But no one around me even flinched.
Eberhard Sandschneider was a Professor of Chinese Politics and International Relations at Free University Berlin from 1998 to 2020. From 2003 to 2016, he was also Otto Wolff Director of the Research Institute of the German Council on Foreign Relations. He is now a partner at the consulting firm Berlin Global Advisors.
There is no end in sight to the tough Covid measures in Shanghai. On Saturday, authorities indicated that they would partially reopen the first city districts. On one condition: Not a single resident was allowed to be tested Covid for corona in the past 14 days. But for the time being, nothing came of it. The number of cases continues to rise unabated. On Sunday, 24,943 new infections were registered. A week ago, there were fewer than 10,000 a day. Meanwhile, the number of cases with symptoms is also rising. On Sunday, there were over a thousand, three times as many as on Thursday.
Another problem is the still deficient food distribution. Authorities were forced to admit that there were problems with food deliveries in the “last 100 meters”. The food situation has now become critical for many citizens. Germans on the ground also report that they no longer have rice or vegetables in their homes.
Foreigners are visibly growing nervous in Shanghai because of being locked up – in their homes, in the city, in China. Cabs and subways are not running at the moment. Travel from Shanghai to other regions of China is virtually impossible because of various quarantine rules: There is either no way to get out of Shanghai, or no way to enter other cities. For example, it is not possible to travel from Shanghai to the neighboring town of Taicang, where many German companies have factories, some of whose employees commute there from Shanghai – normally.
Operations at its two airports have been reduced to a minimum. Most international flights have to divert to neighboring cities. In addition, many of the already few scheduled flights from Shanghai have been canceled in recent days, as the ground staff was unable to get to the airports due to the lockdown. Lufthansa also had to cancel several flights to Germany as a result.
The Consulate General of the Federal Republic organized two online forums on Thursday, according to information from German in Shanghai, in which diplomats addressed the concerns of people who want to leave the country: lack of access to airlines and the consulate, no means of transportation to the airport, or problems receiving the results of the required PCR tests in time. The German Chamber of Commerce in China (AHK) continues to organize charter flights from Frankfurt to Qingdao and back twice a month. However, similar flights to Shanghai are currently not planned, the AHK announced at a webinar on Friday.
After two years without a vacation home, the feeling of being trapped and the prospect of another summer in China is straining the nerves of many expatriates and their families. Covid-related restrictions are now back in effect in more than 70 cities across the country, according to EUCCC data. As a result, China is becoming less and less attractive as a workplace for foreigners. According to rough estimates, the number of foreign managers and experts has already halved by the summer of 2021 compared to pre-Covid times, says EUCCC President Joerg Wuttke. “The number could halve again this summer.” The situation in Shanghai is likely to accelerate the trend considerably.
The municipal government announced on Friday that 130,000 beds are available or will be made available for people infected with Covid. Work is underway to convert the National Exhibition and Convention Center in Hongqiao into what will be Shanghai’s largest isolation ward – with a capacity for at least 40,000 people who tested positive without symptoms. The neighboring provinces of Zhejiang and Jiangsu provided another 60,000 beds for people transferred from Shanghai for quarantine. This indicates that authorities expect the situation to deteriorate further.
Shocking reports and videos on social media already circulate from the largest quarantine center to date, with 15,000 beds. These show huge rooms with sleeping cubicles, long queues in front of sinks or rows of porta-potties in less than welcoming halls. “There is a great fear of being sent to one of the central quarantine centers,” Bettina Schoen-Behanzin, Chair of the EU Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, said last week at an EU Chamber in China (EUCCC) webinar. Some centers are reportedly understaffed. “That’s where they recruit patients to distribute food, for instance.” The constant PCR testing in residential facilities sometimes takes place in the earliest hours of the morning, residents report. That, too, is stressful, especially since the anxious wait for the results follows.
One of the few who were able to make it out of Shanghai during the lockdown is Ingo Matter. His originally booked flight to Paris was canceled, says the German, who runs an international motorsport racing team headquartered in Shanghai. Instead, he was able to get a ticket to Singapore, from where he was able to travel on to Paris.
Aside from his flight to Singapore, there was only one other international flight displayed in the international terminal of Pudong Airport on Thursday, and the terminal was deserted. In fact, there are actually supposed to be no more international flights at Pudong. “On the way to Pudong Airport, we were the only car on the road,” Matter says. Only through acquaintances, he learned about a ride-hailing company that had one of the few special permits for rides to the airport. “It’s kind of surreal,” Matter recalls. When he had to take the PCR test required for entry into Singapore, the German drove his own car to the clinic. He needed a special permit for this, and twice he had to stop at roadblocks. Among other things, the police check the health app and the permit for the trip.
Matter lives with his wife and son in a relatively small apartment complex. There, food deliveries by the neighborhood committee have so far functioned well, he says. So he and his family have been relaxed. However, he knows people in larger neighborhoods where supply distribution does not have enough staff to cater to the large number of residents. Shanghai society begins to divide, Matter has noticed. “Younger people are now more doubtful about the severity of the measures, while older people tend to remain more faithful to the line.” True to the line means they support the zero-covid policy.
The majority of China’s population seems to accept the government’s course. But many Shanghainese complained on social media about the sudden and poorly communicated measures. The city government had to at least partially reverse the separation of positively tested children from their parents due to protests from furious residents. Some Shanghai citizens even yelled suicide threats out their windows recently.
Some observers already speculate that there is enormous unrest within the CP as a result. Three cadres have already been removed from their posts. One speculation is that Beijing could remove Shanghai CP leader Li Qiang over the chaos in the city. Li, however, has until now been considered a confidant of President Xi Jinping and a candidate for promotion to the powerful Politburo Standing Committee. Whether Xi will sacrifice a loyalist, is questionable.
On Friday, the president again defended the country’s strict zero covid policy. At a tribute to Olympic participants, Xi said that China’s Covid policy had “once again passed the test” at the Beijing Winter Olympics. Just last week, official news agency Xinhua stressed that Xi personally drafted the zero-covid policy. A relaxation of this strategy is therefore not to be expected.
“In China, it is frowned upon to speak positively about yourself,” says Christoph Schmitt. So he tells what others say about him: He is an unusual business lawyer. That’s because he’s not just interested in paragraphs, he is also a good listener, and he finds solutions. These are all important qualities when, for example, he draws up joint venture agreements between German and Chinese companies. “After Xi Jinping’s monetary policy made foreign investments more difficult, they have been replaced by a large number of cooperations that have to be negotiated,” says the 58-year-old. Such negotiations define his everyday work.
Together with his team of seven German-Chinese consultants, Christoph Schmitt provides consulting services to German companies that want to expand into China – as well as to Chinese companies that want to gain a foothold in Germany. This involves a wide variety of matters, such as: Can a Chinese person who does not live in Germany become the CEO of a German company? What permits does he need to do business here? What aspects of competition law and what technical requirements must he consider if he wants to launch products on the European market?
Christoph Schmitt is well acquainted with the cultural customs in China, as he has been in the China business for 25 years and traveled to China more than 80 times. “German-Chinese business doesn’t come about by inviting German business owners to Shanghai and setting them with Chinese business owners at one table in a restaurant,” he explains. Instead, it comes down to people who can carefully acquaint the two cultures. “Chinese entrepreneurs don’t talk business directly, they first ask where their counterpart’s daughter goes to school, which German entrepreneurs might find offensive,” he explains.
Another example: For German business owners, a letter of intent is a common non-binding declaration of intent without consequences, while Chinese business owners consider the paper to be much more binding and are correspondingly more cautious about signing it. Christoph Schmitt sees it as his task to explain and familiarize both sides with each other’s mindsets.
Naturally, Christoph Schmitt has to be acquainted with Chinese politics and law, because both have a strong influence on his clients’ business options. His extensive network helps him here, he explains, both with the team of Chinese lawyers and legal experts in his own firm and with cooperation partners in China: “We keep each other informed about new legislation and the latest jurisdiction. And we simply call each other when questions arise. These conversations usually take place in German or English. “It’s just incredible how quickly Chinese learn German. But learning Chinese is quite difficult,” admits the family man. In a hotel, he can communicate more or less in Mandarin, but his Chinese skills are not yet sufficient for complex negotiations.
Incidentally, it was a client who led Duesseldorf native Christoph Schmitt to China decades ago. “He wanted to sell exhaust gas disposal systems for the microchip industry, and companies in Taiwan and China were already further along at the time,” he recalls. At that time, the client founded a company in Hong Kong. Later, trade with mainland China began. This was followed by the establishment of the first local sales satellites. Through this, Christoph Schmitt made his first contacts with state-owned enterprises. Finally, from the 2000s on, a free middle class developed in China, which was also interested in Europe and learned to appreciate the work of the German lawyer. Janna Degener-Storr
Not suitable for wedding parties, but quite popular as standard equipment for marriage life – the iron rice bowl (铁饭碗 tiěfànwǎn, composed of 铁 tiě “iron” and 饭碗 fàn-wǎn – “rice bowl”). This famous Chinese synonym for job security has long been known in the West. In China, for example, this indestructible dishware clatters in kitchens and canteens of Party and government organizations, public institutions, educational and cultural institutions, and generally in state-owned enterprises and the military.
Jobs at such “danwei” (单位 dānwèi – work unit), as public employers are called in Chinese, are considered to be a crisis-proof source of income for a lifetime. Once you’re in the system (体制内 tǐzhì nèi “in the system, part of an institution”), it’s hard to be fired. So it’s no wonder that many young Chinese are drawn to these indestructible government metal bowls, especially in economically uncertain times – and shy away from cheap plastic waimai bowls that delivery services (外卖 wàimài) carry day after day to overtime slaves in offices of private companies.
By the way, there is an entire wan vocabulary surrounding the tiěfànwǎn. For example, to smash the rice bowl (砸饭碗 zá fànwǎn) is an analogy for losing one’s source of income. To snatch someone’s rice bowl (抢饭碗 qiǎng fànwǎn) is to snatch away someone’s job. And those who look for their rice bowl (找饭碗 zhǎo fànwǎn) are searching for a job. The counterpart to the tin cup, by the way, are fragile clay bowls (泥饭碗 ní fànwǎn), unstable jobs that crack at the slightest economic bump. Meanwhile, on the upper shelves of society, if you’re lucky, you can snatch the bling-bling version of bowls, namely the golden rice bowl (金饭碗 jīnfànwǎn), i.e. a highly lucrative and, what’s more, reliable job.
But after that, you should first turn your attention to your food, and please the one in your own bowl, instead of greedily eyeing what is still left in the big pot. This behavior (吃着碗里 看着锅里 chīzhe wǎn lǐ kànzhe guō lǐ “eating what’s in the bowl while looking at what’s in the pot”) is the Chinese metaphor for someone who just can’t get enough. So please, everyone stick to your own rice bowl, whatever it is made of.
How vulnerable is Taiwan? This is what we talked about with Eberhard Sandschneider. The former professor at the Free University of Berlin is one of the most renowned experts on security policy – and on the Chinese military. Sandschneider does not expect an invasion of the island in the near future: The risk of clashing with the United States is too high, he tells Michael Radunski. But in the years and decades to come, a war between the US and China is quite possible. Since the People’s Liberation Army is also growing stronger both internally and externally, a disaster might be at hand after all.
The lockdown in Shanghai has now lasted for far too long. Since it was originally intended to last only a few days, many city residents start to run out of food – and patience. This also affects foreigners living in the city. Many of them, despite all their approval for the pandemic response, are particularly frustrated that it is extremely difficult for them to leave the city. Instead, the fear of being sent to a quarantine center is growing, writes Christiane Kuehl. And these centers seem more like military hospitals. Omicron, meanwhile, lives up to its reputation and continues to find new infection victims even in the closed-down city.
Have a pleasant week!
Mr. Sandschneider, the war in Ukraine is not even over yet, and many experts already see the next conflict on the horizon: China will take advantage of the West’s distraction with Russia and finally bring Taiwan back to the motherland. Do you share this concern?
No, as tempting as this comparison and the parallels may be for some, the situation in Asia is completely different. Taiwan commands the best-equipped and best-trained army in the Western Pacific. China would end up with a very bloody nose. Then there is the Taiwan Relations Act, which binds the USA closely to Taiwan. There is a pledge of support. China’s President Xi Jinping is aware of this risk. In this respect, the current speculation about a possible attack by China on Taiwan is really unfounded. I cannot imagine this happening.
Cannot imagine? The same would probably have been said a few weeks ago about a possible Russian attack on Ukraine. The reality is different.
Yes, it’s true that you should never say never. And you really do have to be careful with statements like that, but the way I see the situation, I’m not too worried about Taiwan’s security at the moment.
As for Putin, people are now saying: If we had listened to him carefully, we would not have been so surprised. He has made it clear what he thinks of Ukraine. And Xi Jinping also leaves no doubt about his intentions: Taiwan belongs to China and must return to the motherland.
Absolutely correct. That’s why I’m only talking about the present. Anyone who looks at China’s plans knows that the critical phase for Taiwan extends to the year 2049. And there is no question that Xi Jinping has the ambition to achieve great things like Mao or Deng Xiaoping.
So a risk after all?
The risk is there. That is why we must do what we failed to with Ukraine: Make it unmistakably clear that the West would respond decisively and unitedly. In this context, US President Joe Biden rightly discarded the strategic ambiguity of his predecessors and made it clear that in the event of a Chinese attack, Taiwan would receive military support.
Let’s put aside the political component for a moment and look at the military: What would an attack on Taiwan look like?
There are countless simulations showing what a Chinese attack on Taiwan might look like. Everything is on the table down to the smallest detail, from an Internet blockade to a naval blockade. And in all these scenarios, China would at present be the loser.
Really? What is the condition of the Chinese military?
It’s catching up dramatically. We were all surprised this year to see only a moderate increase in the military budget. In previous years, the budget has grown at times by 11 percent, at other times by 17 percent. If you convert that into US dollars, that’s officially about $230 billion – a year.
That sounds like a lot. Compared to the US, however, with its military spending of around 770 billion US dollars, it is considerably less.
True. But the development is clear and fast. At the beginning of the reform process, the military was put on the back burner, but with the promise: If economic power permits, you’ll get money and attention. That is now the case, as demonstrated by the Liaoning, for example. China’s first aircraft carrier, originally a Russian asset, the second is from China’s own production. Six more are to be built.
Still, many consider the People’s Liberation Army to be weak and outdated in its structure. What are the problems?
The People’s Liberation Army has a huge water head, namely the oversized land army, which, on top of that, is not even particularly well-equipped. But make no mistake. The time for China’s military has come. Restructuring is underway, and the focus is now on the navy, air force, space armament and cyberwar. In other words, areas where they can do major damage to US forces relatively quickly.
That is the big goal?
Yes, China is measuring itself against only one country, the USA. Currently, China has one overseas military base, in Djibouti. The figures for US bases vary, depending on the standards you apply to a military facility. A modest count puts the total at 163 bases, spread around the world. To China, that must seem like being surrounded. And that is why China will build new military bases overseas.
Where do you think that will be?
There are numerous potential fully developed deep-sea ports, for example Hambantota in Sri Lanka. The Chinese construction of the deep-sea port there is ludicrous. Before China appeared, some five ships a year docked there. But the port lies geostrategically ideal for Chinese warships. Oh, I see. Now you are going to criticize this again.
Alright, let me do that then. Militarization of the sea lanes cannot be in the interest of international free trade.
True, but this is about China’s interests. Look at it from a world-historical perspective: A country of this size, with this economic success over many years, will inevitably translate economic strength into military power at some point. The promise that Deng Xiaoping once made to the Chinese generals is now being realized.
This will inevitably lead to friction with the world power USA.
It won’t lead to that; that’s already the case. What is currently happening in the South China Sea is just a harmless prelude. Conflicts will increase, just as China will increasingly project its increased self-confidence to the outside world.
Some fear that an incident in the South China Sea could lead to an unforeseen war between the USA and China.
At present, it would not be wise for China to enter into a conflict with the USA. And they won’t. But you are right. Ben Hodges, the former commander-in-chief of the US armed forces, never tires of pointing out that he expects a war between China and the USA within the next ten years. That would be World War III.
Are you more relaxed about it?
Well. In my view, there are two main dangers: The risk of chance and the risk of misperception, when you misjudge the other side and then make mistakes. As is currently the case with Putin. But I stand by my position that Xi Jinping is currently assessing the risk correctly. But I don’t know whether that will still be the case in ten years.
The problem here is that there are two sides to a potential conflict.
Yes, and that’s what worries me a bit. The China debate in the US has become enormously heated. There is hardly a politician who doesn’t see China as the greatest challenge of our time. And unlike in Germany and Europe, this always includes the military component. I attended a panel discussion at the Dirkson Senate Building in Washington, D.C., where a US colleague said: War is not the worst option. I couldn’t believe my ears. I was totally speechless. But no one around me even flinched.
Eberhard Sandschneider was a Professor of Chinese Politics and International Relations at Free University Berlin from 1998 to 2020. From 2003 to 2016, he was also Otto Wolff Director of the Research Institute of the German Council on Foreign Relations. He is now a partner at the consulting firm Berlin Global Advisors.
There is no end in sight to the tough Covid measures in Shanghai. On Saturday, authorities indicated that they would partially reopen the first city districts. On one condition: Not a single resident was allowed to be tested Covid for corona in the past 14 days. But for the time being, nothing came of it. The number of cases continues to rise unabated. On Sunday, 24,943 new infections were registered. A week ago, there were fewer than 10,000 a day. Meanwhile, the number of cases with symptoms is also rising. On Sunday, there were over a thousand, three times as many as on Thursday.
Another problem is the still deficient food distribution. Authorities were forced to admit that there were problems with food deliveries in the “last 100 meters”. The food situation has now become critical for many citizens. Germans on the ground also report that they no longer have rice or vegetables in their homes.
Foreigners are visibly growing nervous in Shanghai because of being locked up – in their homes, in the city, in China. Cabs and subways are not running at the moment. Travel from Shanghai to other regions of China is virtually impossible because of various quarantine rules: There is either no way to get out of Shanghai, or no way to enter other cities. For example, it is not possible to travel from Shanghai to the neighboring town of Taicang, where many German companies have factories, some of whose employees commute there from Shanghai – normally.
Operations at its two airports have been reduced to a minimum. Most international flights have to divert to neighboring cities. In addition, many of the already few scheduled flights from Shanghai have been canceled in recent days, as the ground staff was unable to get to the airports due to the lockdown. Lufthansa also had to cancel several flights to Germany as a result.
The Consulate General of the Federal Republic organized two online forums on Thursday, according to information from German in Shanghai, in which diplomats addressed the concerns of people who want to leave the country: lack of access to airlines and the consulate, no means of transportation to the airport, or problems receiving the results of the required PCR tests in time. The German Chamber of Commerce in China (AHK) continues to organize charter flights from Frankfurt to Qingdao and back twice a month. However, similar flights to Shanghai are currently not planned, the AHK announced at a webinar on Friday.
After two years without a vacation home, the feeling of being trapped and the prospect of another summer in China is straining the nerves of many expatriates and their families. Covid-related restrictions are now back in effect in more than 70 cities across the country, according to EUCCC data. As a result, China is becoming less and less attractive as a workplace for foreigners. According to rough estimates, the number of foreign managers and experts has already halved by the summer of 2021 compared to pre-Covid times, says EUCCC President Joerg Wuttke. “The number could halve again this summer.” The situation in Shanghai is likely to accelerate the trend considerably.
The municipal government announced on Friday that 130,000 beds are available or will be made available for people infected with Covid. Work is underway to convert the National Exhibition and Convention Center in Hongqiao into what will be Shanghai’s largest isolation ward – with a capacity for at least 40,000 people who tested positive without symptoms. The neighboring provinces of Zhejiang and Jiangsu provided another 60,000 beds for people transferred from Shanghai for quarantine. This indicates that authorities expect the situation to deteriorate further.
Shocking reports and videos on social media already circulate from the largest quarantine center to date, with 15,000 beds. These show huge rooms with sleeping cubicles, long queues in front of sinks or rows of porta-potties in less than welcoming halls. “There is a great fear of being sent to one of the central quarantine centers,” Bettina Schoen-Behanzin, Chair of the EU Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, said last week at an EU Chamber in China (EUCCC) webinar. Some centers are reportedly understaffed. “That’s where they recruit patients to distribute food, for instance.” The constant PCR testing in residential facilities sometimes takes place in the earliest hours of the morning, residents report. That, too, is stressful, especially since the anxious wait for the results follows.
One of the few who were able to make it out of Shanghai during the lockdown is Ingo Matter. His originally booked flight to Paris was canceled, says the German, who runs an international motorsport racing team headquartered in Shanghai. Instead, he was able to get a ticket to Singapore, from where he was able to travel on to Paris.
Aside from his flight to Singapore, there was only one other international flight displayed in the international terminal of Pudong Airport on Thursday, and the terminal was deserted. In fact, there are actually supposed to be no more international flights at Pudong. “On the way to Pudong Airport, we were the only car on the road,” Matter says. Only through acquaintances, he learned about a ride-hailing company that had one of the few special permits for rides to the airport. “It’s kind of surreal,” Matter recalls. When he had to take the PCR test required for entry into Singapore, the German drove his own car to the clinic. He needed a special permit for this, and twice he had to stop at roadblocks. Among other things, the police check the health app and the permit for the trip.
Matter lives with his wife and son in a relatively small apartment complex. There, food deliveries by the neighborhood committee have so far functioned well, he says. So he and his family have been relaxed. However, he knows people in larger neighborhoods where supply distribution does not have enough staff to cater to the large number of residents. Shanghai society begins to divide, Matter has noticed. “Younger people are now more doubtful about the severity of the measures, while older people tend to remain more faithful to the line.” True to the line means they support the zero-covid policy.
The majority of China’s population seems to accept the government’s course. But many Shanghainese complained on social media about the sudden and poorly communicated measures. The city government had to at least partially reverse the separation of positively tested children from their parents due to protests from furious residents. Some Shanghai citizens even yelled suicide threats out their windows recently.
Some observers already speculate that there is enormous unrest within the CP as a result. Three cadres have already been removed from their posts. One speculation is that Beijing could remove Shanghai CP leader Li Qiang over the chaos in the city. Li, however, has until now been considered a confidant of President Xi Jinping and a candidate for promotion to the powerful Politburo Standing Committee. Whether Xi will sacrifice a loyalist, is questionable.
On Friday, the president again defended the country’s strict zero covid policy. At a tribute to Olympic participants, Xi said that China’s Covid policy had “once again passed the test” at the Beijing Winter Olympics. Just last week, official news agency Xinhua stressed that Xi personally drafted the zero-covid policy. A relaxation of this strategy is therefore not to be expected.
“In China, it is frowned upon to speak positively about yourself,” says Christoph Schmitt. So he tells what others say about him: He is an unusual business lawyer. That’s because he’s not just interested in paragraphs, he is also a good listener, and he finds solutions. These are all important qualities when, for example, he draws up joint venture agreements between German and Chinese companies. “After Xi Jinping’s monetary policy made foreign investments more difficult, they have been replaced by a large number of cooperations that have to be negotiated,” says the 58-year-old. Such negotiations define his everyday work.
Together with his team of seven German-Chinese consultants, Christoph Schmitt provides consulting services to German companies that want to expand into China – as well as to Chinese companies that want to gain a foothold in Germany. This involves a wide variety of matters, such as: Can a Chinese person who does not live in Germany become the CEO of a German company? What permits does he need to do business here? What aspects of competition law and what technical requirements must he consider if he wants to launch products on the European market?
Christoph Schmitt is well acquainted with the cultural customs in China, as he has been in the China business for 25 years and traveled to China more than 80 times. “German-Chinese business doesn’t come about by inviting German business owners to Shanghai and setting them with Chinese business owners at one table in a restaurant,” he explains. Instead, it comes down to people who can carefully acquaint the two cultures. “Chinese entrepreneurs don’t talk business directly, they first ask where their counterpart’s daughter goes to school, which German entrepreneurs might find offensive,” he explains.
Another example: For German business owners, a letter of intent is a common non-binding declaration of intent without consequences, while Chinese business owners consider the paper to be much more binding and are correspondingly more cautious about signing it. Christoph Schmitt sees it as his task to explain and familiarize both sides with each other’s mindsets.
Naturally, Christoph Schmitt has to be acquainted with Chinese politics and law, because both have a strong influence on his clients’ business options. His extensive network helps him here, he explains, both with the team of Chinese lawyers and legal experts in his own firm and with cooperation partners in China: “We keep each other informed about new legislation and the latest jurisdiction. And we simply call each other when questions arise. These conversations usually take place in German or English. “It’s just incredible how quickly Chinese learn German. But learning Chinese is quite difficult,” admits the family man. In a hotel, he can communicate more or less in Mandarin, but his Chinese skills are not yet sufficient for complex negotiations.
Incidentally, it was a client who led Duesseldorf native Christoph Schmitt to China decades ago. “He wanted to sell exhaust gas disposal systems for the microchip industry, and companies in Taiwan and China were already further along at the time,” he recalls. At that time, the client founded a company in Hong Kong. Later, trade with mainland China began. This was followed by the establishment of the first local sales satellites. Through this, Christoph Schmitt made his first contacts with state-owned enterprises. Finally, from the 2000s on, a free middle class developed in China, which was also interested in Europe and learned to appreciate the work of the German lawyer. Janna Degener-Storr
Not suitable for wedding parties, but quite popular as standard equipment for marriage life – the iron rice bowl (铁饭碗 tiěfànwǎn, composed of 铁 tiě “iron” and 饭碗 fàn-wǎn – “rice bowl”). This famous Chinese synonym for job security has long been known in the West. In China, for example, this indestructible dishware clatters in kitchens and canteens of Party and government organizations, public institutions, educational and cultural institutions, and generally in state-owned enterprises and the military.
Jobs at such “danwei” (单位 dānwèi – work unit), as public employers are called in Chinese, are considered to be a crisis-proof source of income for a lifetime. Once you’re in the system (体制内 tǐzhì nèi “in the system, part of an institution”), it’s hard to be fired. So it’s no wonder that many young Chinese are drawn to these indestructible government metal bowls, especially in economically uncertain times – and shy away from cheap plastic waimai bowls that delivery services (外卖 wàimài) carry day after day to overtime slaves in offices of private companies.
By the way, there is an entire wan vocabulary surrounding the tiěfànwǎn. For example, to smash the rice bowl (砸饭碗 zá fànwǎn) is an analogy for losing one’s source of income. To snatch someone’s rice bowl (抢饭碗 qiǎng fànwǎn) is to snatch away someone’s job. And those who look for their rice bowl (找饭碗 zhǎo fànwǎn) are searching for a job. The counterpart to the tin cup, by the way, are fragile clay bowls (泥饭碗 ní fànwǎn), unstable jobs that crack at the slightest economic bump. Meanwhile, on the upper shelves of society, if you’re lucky, you can snatch the bling-bling version of bowls, namely the golden rice bowl (金饭碗 jīnfànwǎn), i.e. a highly lucrative and, what’s more, reliable job.
But after that, you should first turn your attention to your food, and please the one in your own bowl, instead of greedily eyeing what is still left in the big pot. This behavior (吃着碗里 看着锅里 chīzhe wǎn lǐ kànzhe guō lǐ “eating what’s in the bowl while looking at what’s in the pot”) is the Chinese metaphor for someone who just can’t get enough. So please, everyone stick to your own rice bowl, whatever it is made of.
