Taiwan is currently testing its defensive capabilities during the so-called Han Kuang large-scale exercises in case of a military invasion from mainland China. The most recent test was the “victorious” defense of the Taipei airport. In a real situation, however, things would be very different, says retired Admiral Lee Hsi-min, who served as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Taiwan from 2017 to 2019. In an interview conducted by David Demes, he explains that he believes Taiwan invests far too much in conventional warfare and spends too much of its defense budget on heavy ships and fighter jets. These could be taken out immediately in the event of an attack.
Also, in light of the experiences in Ukraine, Lee instead advocates small weapon systems and a new defense strategy that involves combat-ready citizens. Their purpose would be to spread fear and terror among the invaders through asymmetric guerrilla attacks. “This would severely complicate China’s war planning.” One reason why Taiwan’s government has so far relied on large weaponry as a deterrent is because it is easier to win elections with them, says Lee.
There is a lot of mistrust in the international scientific cooperation between China and Germany. Especially young Chinese scientists with a scholarship from the Chinese Scholarship Council (CSC) have been viewed critically for some time. Investigations have shown that they must swear allegiance to and work for the Chinese government.
According to information from the German Rectors’ Conference (HRK), several German universities now consider refusing to admit them. Tim Gabel explains in his analysis which loopholes remain and how to balance the risks of cooperation better.
Admiral Lee, during your tenure as chief of the general staff, you advocated for a reform of Taiwan’s defense strategy, which ruffled quite a few feathers in the defense establishment. After your departure from active service, you once again laid out your “Overall Defense Concept” in a book last year. What is this so-called ODC about?
The “Overall Defense Concept” is based on a theory known as “Deterrence by Denial”. A strategic approach that is implemented practically through asymmetric warfare. In conventional warfare, we often use symmetric measures-meaning aircraft are countered with aircraft, warships with warships, and tanks with tanks. Asymmetric warfare, however, is a strategy that relies more on weapon systems such as mobile air defense systems or coastal-based anti-ship missiles, and the like. The idea is to apply unconventional methods to effectively leverage our resources and successfully defend Taiwan.
What makes this strategy so appealing from a Taiwanese perspective?
Taiwan’s resources are limited. Furthermore, our nation is relatively small and offers little room for retreat in case of war. Hence, when acquiring weapons, high survivability must always be our foremost priority. We need to prevent the enemy from being able to destroy our defense capabilities from afar using just missiles. Airports, radar installations, and naval bases could easily be destroyed in a wartime scenario. Similarly, a large warship could be easily sunk by an adversary as it leaves port.
In the past, you’ve repeatedly criticized the government’s tendency to invest significant funds into large-scale defense projects without considering their survivability.
Indeed, warships and fighter aircraft are expensive and consume the lion’s share of our defense budget. If we were to instead focus on land-based, mobile anti-ship missiles, such as Ukraine’s Neptune missiles, and deploy small missile-equipped speedboats in Taiwan’s more than 200 fishing ports, China might hesitate to get too close. For us, this would translate into greater security. Because as soon as China’s troops have to cross the Taiwan Strait to attack us, they expose themselves to counterattacks and thereby make themselves more vulnerable.
Your approach seems logical. Why was there so much resistance to your efforts?
Politically, this strategy isn’t particularly appealing because it’s not likely to win elections. At the same time, it’s difficult for the military to discard conventional thinking ingrained over decades. Many believe that we still need large aircraft, large ships, and large tanks to compete with China.
Why?
Imagine being a proud F-16 pilot and suddenly someone tells you we need fewer fighter jets and more air defense systems because our airports and radar installations would likely be destroyed in the event of war, rendering combat aircraft useless. If you have conservative leanings, you can’t just accept such an argument overnight. That’s why Adm. Huang Shu-kuang, the successor to Chief of the General Staff Shen Yi-ming [Editor’s note: Shen was Lee’s successor in the role of Chief of the General Staff and supported Lee’s asymmetric approach. He tragically died in a helicopter crash in 2020] insisted on returning to the original defense doctrine of conventional warfare.
In your book, you also advocate for the creation of a volunteer-based so-called “Territorial Defense Force.” What exactly would such a force look like?
The Territorial Defense Force would fit into the gap between regular forces, the reserves, and civil society. Unlike our regular reservists who grumble when we summon them once every seven or eight years for refresher training, these volunteers would be highly motivated. Our special forces could train them on how to operate in a mobile and decentralized manner, and how to survive in a warzone. During peacetime, their weapons could be stored in police stations, with the coast guard, or at fire departments.
What role would these citizens’ brigades have?
If we were able to build this Territorial Defense Force into a force to be reckoned with, then after a potential destruction of our navy and air force and a successful landing, Chinese troops would not only have to fight our regular ground forces, but would also face guerilla attacks in the streets. This would severely complicate their war planning. And if China is unable to formulate an effective war plan, they won’t attack us. In other words, we would have achieved our goal of deterrence.
In 2027, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army will celebrate its 100th anniversary, a date that’s often speculated as a possible time for a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Do you believe China will be capable of taking Taiwan by 2027?
Due to China’s opacity, this is almost impossible to predict. However, I tend to trust the official analysis of the United States. In March 2021, former head of the US Indo-Pacific Command, Adm. Philip Davidson, stated in a US Senate hearing that the PLA would be capable of assaulting Taiwan by 2027.
Would Taiwan be sufficiently prepared if Xi Jinping decided to attack Taiwan tomorrow?
No, we’re not adequately prepared yet. And if we continue to stick to conventional warfare, we’ll never be sufficiently prepared. China’s military resources are 20 times greater than ours, which means we can’t possibly defend ourselves using conventional means. Therefore, we need a quick change in our approach. The United States too hopes that Taiwan will adopt asymmetric warfare and has consistently encouraged the Taiwanese government to move in this direction. However, you can’t build asymmetric capabilities with just slogans and a few small weapons.
You mentioned the role of the United States. Do you believe the US would come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of war?
President Biden has already promised four times to intervene in a potential military conflict over Taiwan. Of course, we believe Biden is serious when he says that. The question is whether he’ll be re-elected next year, which no one can predict. So, from Taiwan’s perspective, such a promise is nice to have, but we must primarily rely on ourselves and continue to enhance our defensive capabilities.
Lee Hsi-min 李喜明 is the author of the book “The Overall Defense Concept: An Asymmetric Approach to Taiwan’s Defense” (臺灣的勝算). Lee served in Taiwan’s armed forces for over 40 years, rising to the rank of admiral. He was Commander of the Navy from 2015 to 2016, and Chief of the General Staff from 2017 to 2019. In these roles, he advanced the implementation of his overall defense concept. Before that, he served as a captain on submarines.
According to information from the German Rectors’ Conference (HRK), several German universities are considering refusing to accept young Chinese academics with a scholarship from the Chinese Scholarship Council (CSC). These are government scholarships awarded by the Chinese Ministry of Education. “There are currently concrete considerations at other universities to exclude CSC scholarship holders, at least in certain fields,” HRK press spokesperson Christoph Hilgert told Table.Media. He added that there is an ongoing discussion and that awareness was being raised, which the HRK was actively supporting within the framework of its exchange formats on issues of academic cooperation.
According to investigations by “Correctiv” and “University World News” (UWN), the CSC scholarships are criticized, among other things, because they require scholarship holders to pledge loyalty and obedience to the People’s Republic of China under threat of prosecution. Furthermore, there are concerns that security-relevant knowledge could reach China in this way.
The Friedrich Alexander University of Erlangen-Nuremberg (FAU) was the first German university to suspend cooperation with selected Chinese doctoral students. According to “Correctiv,” the university administration has not admitted any new scholarship holders via the Chinese Scholarship Council (CSC) since the beginning of June. A spokeswoman for FAU confirmed this to Table.Media. Universities in other European countries have also suspended cooperation.
When asked about the reasons, the university referred to the requirements of the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA), which is part of the German economy ministry. During an audit by BAFA, the university administration had once again been alerted to the fact “that we at FAU have to create the framework conditions to be in line with BAFA’s requirements.”
As a result, only scholarship holders who can present “co-funding via institutions with a reputation and anchoring in the democratic system” will now be accepted. FAU also anticipates that other universities will take these steps.
Exemptions from the CSC ban thus are made once a formally trustworthy institution is involved in the selection process of Chinese scholarship holders. For example, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) offers such co-funding for Chinese students.
Under the “Sino-German Postdoc Scholarship” program introduced in 2013, the DAAD and the CSC award around 40 to 50 scholarships annually for young Chinese researchers across Germany. These are also exempt from the exclusion at FAU, a spokesperson confirmed. Figures on the number of CSC scholarship holders currently residing in Germany are not centrally registered.
However, the DAAD is finding it difficult to cooperate with the CSC. “In the generally collaborative cooperation with the CSC, negotiation processes have already taken place in the past to adequately represent the DAAD’s ideas for the selection of scholarship holders,” a spokesperson for the DAAD told Table.Media. One of these “negotiation processes” was the DAAD’s rejection of the CSC’s demand to fully record the selection interviews with Chinese applicants.
Since then, the selection interviews for the program have been held consecutively, the DAAD announced: “First the CSC makes its selection, then the DAAD. Financial support can only be granted if both votes for candidates match.” The central selection criterion is academic qualification. However, since the selection process is very time-consuming, the DAAD does not currently see the prospect of expanding the program.
At the same time, however, the DAAD advises German universities on the supervision of CSC grantees and cooperation with Chinese universities in general, said the spokesperson. This is where the DAAD Competence Centre for International Academic Cooperation (KIWi) plays an important role. “The DAAD is currently expanding the counseling services at KIWi and received additional funding from the Federal Ministry of Education and Research for this purpose in April,” said a DAAD spokesperson.
This is said to be a response to the growing demand for counseling among German universities and scientific institutions in times of increasing uncertainty in international scientific cooperation.
Is this a simple photograph – or is it art? Engineering art, in any case. The photograph of the blue-green ball, which could certainly be framed and used to decorate walls, shows the Earth and the FAST spherical radio telescope in Guizhou, also known as China’s heavenly eye. It has a diameter of an incredible five hundred meters. FAST is the world’s largest single-dish radio telescope and has already discovered 800 new pulsars since it began operations.
Taiwan is currently testing its defensive capabilities during the so-called Han Kuang large-scale exercises in case of a military invasion from mainland China. The most recent test was the “victorious” defense of the Taipei airport. In a real situation, however, things would be very different, says retired Admiral Lee Hsi-min, who served as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Taiwan from 2017 to 2019. In an interview conducted by David Demes, he explains that he believes Taiwan invests far too much in conventional warfare and spends too much of its defense budget on heavy ships and fighter jets. These could be taken out immediately in the event of an attack.
Also, in light of the experiences in Ukraine, Lee instead advocates small weapon systems and a new defense strategy that involves combat-ready citizens. Their purpose would be to spread fear and terror among the invaders through asymmetric guerrilla attacks. “This would severely complicate China’s war planning.” One reason why Taiwan’s government has so far relied on large weaponry as a deterrent is because it is easier to win elections with them, says Lee.
There is a lot of mistrust in the international scientific cooperation between China and Germany. Especially young Chinese scientists with a scholarship from the Chinese Scholarship Council (CSC) have been viewed critically for some time. Investigations have shown that they must swear allegiance to and work for the Chinese government.
According to information from the German Rectors’ Conference (HRK), several German universities now consider refusing to admit them. Tim Gabel explains in his analysis which loopholes remain and how to balance the risks of cooperation better.
Admiral Lee, during your tenure as chief of the general staff, you advocated for a reform of Taiwan’s defense strategy, which ruffled quite a few feathers in the defense establishment. After your departure from active service, you once again laid out your “Overall Defense Concept” in a book last year. What is this so-called ODC about?
The “Overall Defense Concept” is based on a theory known as “Deterrence by Denial”. A strategic approach that is implemented practically through asymmetric warfare. In conventional warfare, we often use symmetric measures-meaning aircraft are countered with aircraft, warships with warships, and tanks with tanks. Asymmetric warfare, however, is a strategy that relies more on weapon systems such as mobile air defense systems or coastal-based anti-ship missiles, and the like. The idea is to apply unconventional methods to effectively leverage our resources and successfully defend Taiwan.
What makes this strategy so appealing from a Taiwanese perspective?
Taiwan’s resources are limited. Furthermore, our nation is relatively small and offers little room for retreat in case of war. Hence, when acquiring weapons, high survivability must always be our foremost priority. We need to prevent the enemy from being able to destroy our defense capabilities from afar using just missiles. Airports, radar installations, and naval bases could easily be destroyed in a wartime scenario. Similarly, a large warship could be easily sunk by an adversary as it leaves port.
In the past, you’ve repeatedly criticized the government’s tendency to invest significant funds into large-scale defense projects without considering their survivability.
Indeed, warships and fighter aircraft are expensive and consume the lion’s share of our defense budget. If we were to instead focus on land-based, mobile anti-ship missiles, such as Ukraine’s Neptune missiles, and deploy small missile-equipped speedboats in Taiwan’s more than 200 fishing ports, China might hesitate to get too close. For us, this would translate into greater security. Because as soon as China’s troops have to cross the Taiwan Strait to attack us, they expose themselves to counterattacks and thereby make themselves more vulnerable.
Your approach seems logical. Why was there so much resistance to your efforts?
Politically, this strategy isn’t particularly appealing because it’s not likely to win elections. At the same time, it’s difficult for the military to discard conventional thinking ingrained over decades. Many believe that we still need large aircraft, large ships, and large tanks to compete with China.
Why?
Imagine being a proud F-16 pilot and suddenly someone tells you we need fewer fighter jets and more air defense systems because our airports and radar installations would likely be destroyed in the event of war, rendering combat aircraft useless. If you have conservative leanings, you can’t just accept such an argument overnight. That’s why Adm. Huang Shu-kuang, the successor to Chief of the General Staff Shen Yi-ming [Editor’s note: Shen was Lee’s successor in the role of Chief of the General Staff and supported Lee’s asymmetric approach. He tragically died in a helicopter crash in 2020] insisted on returning to the original defense doctrine of conventional warfare.
In your book, you also advocate for the creation of a volunteer-based so-called “Territorial Defense Force.” What exactly would such a force look like?
The Territorial Defense Force would fit into the gap between regular forces, the reserves, and civil society. Unlike our regular reservists who grumble when we summon them once every seven or eight years for refresher training, these volunteers would be highly motivated. Our special forces could train them on how to operate in a mobile and decentralized manner, and how to survive in a warzone. During peacetime, their weapons could be stored in police stations, with the coast guard, or at fire departments.
What role would these citizens’ brigades have?
If we were able to build this Territorial Defense Force into a force to be reckoned with, then after a potential destruction of our navy and air force and a successful landing, Chinese troops would not only have to fight our regular ground forces, but would also face guerilla attacks in the streets. This would severely complicate their war planning. And if China is unable to formulate an effective war plan, they won’t attack us. In other words, we would have achieved our goal of deterrence.
In 2027, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army will celebrate its 100th anniversary, a date that’s often speculated as a possible time for a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Do you believe China will be capable of taking Taiwan by 2027?
Due to China’s opacity, this is almost impossible to predict. However, I tend to trust the official analysis of the United States. In March 2021, former head of the US Indo-Pacific Command, Adm. Philip Davidson, stated in a US Senate hearing that the PLA would be capable of assaulting Taiwan by 2027.
Would Taiwan be sufficiently prepared if Xi Jinping decided to attack Taiwan tomorrow?
No, we’re not adequately prepared yet. And if we continue to stick to conventional warfare, we’ll never be sufficiently prepared. China’s military resources are 20 times greater than ours, which means we can’t possibly defend ourselves using conventional means. Therefore, we need a quick change in our approach. The United States too hopes that Taiwan will adopt asymmetric warfare and has consistently encouraged the Taiwanese government to move in this direction. However, you can’t build asymmetric capabilities with just slogans and a few small weapons.
You mentioned the role of the United States. Do you believe the US would come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of war?
President Biden has already promised four times to intervene in a potential military conflict over Taiwan. Of course, we believe Biden is serious when he says that. The question is whether he’ll be re-elected next year, which no one can predict. So, from Taiwan’s perspective, such a promise is nice to have, but we must primarily rely on ourselves and continue to enhance our defensive capabilities.
Lee Hsi-min 李喜明 is the author of the book “The Overall Defense Concept: An Asymmetric Approach to Taiwan’s Defense” (臺灣的勝算). Lee served in Taiwan’s armed forces for over 40 years, rising to the rank of admiral. He was Commander of the Navy from 2015 to 2016, and Chief of the General Staff from 2017 to 2019. In these roles, he advanced the implementation of his overall defense concept. Before that, he served as a captain on submarines.
According to information from the German Rectors’ Conference (HRK), several German universities are considering refusing to accept young Chinese academics with a scholarship from the Chinese Scholarship Council (CSC). These are government scholarships awarded by the Chinese Ministry of Education. “There are currently concrete considerations at other universities to exclude CSC scholarship holders, at least in certain fields,” HRK press spokesperson Christoph Hilgert told Table.Media. He added that there is an ongoing discussion and that awareness was being raised, which the HRK was actively supporting within the framework of its exchange formats on issues of academic cooperation.
According to investigations by “Correctiv” and “University World News” (UWN), the CSC scholarships are criticized, among other things, because they require scholarship holders to pledge loyalty and obedience to the People’s Republic of China under threat of prosecution. Furthermore, there are concerns that security-relevant knowledge could reach China in this way.
The Friedrich Alexander University of Erlangen-Nuremberg (FAU) was the first German university to suspend cooperation with selected Chinese doctoral students. According to “Correctiv,” the university administration has not admitted any new scholarship holders via the Chinese Scholarship Council (CSC) since the beginning of June. A spokeswoman for FAU confirmed this to Table.Media. Universities in other European countries have also suspended cooperation.
When asked about the reasons, the university referred to the requirements of the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA), which is part of the German economy ministry. During an audit by BAFA, the university administration had once again been alerted to the fact “that we at FAU have to create the framework conditions to be in line with BAFA’s requirements.”
As a result, only scholarship holders who can present “co-funding via institutions with a reputation and anchoring in the democratic system” will now be accepted. FAU also anticipates that other universities will take these steps.
Exemptions from the CSC ban thus are made once a formally trustworthy institution is involved in the selection process of Chinese scholarship holders. For example, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) offers such co-funding for Chinese students.
Under the “Sino-German Postdoc Scholarship” program introduced in 2013, the DAAD and the CSC award around 40 to 50 scholarships annually for young Chinese researchers across Germany. These are also exempt from the exclusion at FAU, a spokesperson confirmed. Figures on the number of CSC scholarship holders currently residing in Germany are not centrally registered.
However, the DAAD is finding it difficult to cooperate with the CSC. “In the generally collaborative cooperation with the CSC, negotiation processes have already taken place in the past to adequately represent the DAAD’s ideas for the selection of scholarship holders,” a spokesperson for the DAAD told Table.Media. One of these “negotiation processes” was the DAAD’s rejection of the CSC’s demand to fully record the selection interviews with Chinese applicants.
Since then, the selection interviews for the program have been held consecutively, the DAAD announced: “First the CSC makes its selection, then the DAAD. Financial support can only be granted if both votes for candidates match.” The central selection criterion is academic qualification. However, since the selection process is very time-consuming, the DAAD does not currently see the prospect of expanding the program.
At the same time, however, the DAAD advises German universities on the supervision of CSC grantees and cooperation with Chinese universities in general, said the spokesperson. This is where the DAAD Competence Centre for International Academic Cooperation (KIWi) plays an important role. “The DAAD is currently expanding the counseling services at KIWi and received additional funding from the Federal Ministry of Education and Research for this purpose in April,” said a DAAD spokesperson.
This is said to be a response to the growing demand for counseling among German universities and scientific institutions in times of increasing uncertainty in international scientific cooperation.
Is this a simple photograph – or is it art? Engineering art, in any case. The photograph of the blue-green ball, which could certainly be framed and used to decorate walls, shows the Earth and the FAST spherical radio telescope in Guizhou, also known as China’s heavenly eye. It has a diameter of an incredible five hundred meters. FAST is the world’s largest single-dish radio telescope and has already discovered 800 new pulsars since it began operations.
