Today, Johnny Erling introduces to you a hero that political Beijing would prefer to forget. Jiang Yanyong exposed the lung disease Sars before it could become a pandemic. After his criticism of the Tiananmen massacre, the brutality of which he witnessed first-hand in his clinic, the soon-to-be 90-year-old has been under house arrest for two years for one reason only: His civil courage disgraces the CCP.
Whether trade sanctions against Australian wine or pineapples from Taiwan – international conflicts are increasingly being fought out by economic means. The EU no longer wants to stand by and arm itself against economic blackmail. Amelie Richter shows why the planned “anti-coercion instrument” is primarily directed against Beijing and how it could work. The relevance of the instrument is also shown by a news item from yesterday: According to Reuters, Adidas was briefly excluded as a supplier of the half marathon in Shanghai. This is not the first company to be hit by Beijing’s ban.
Online courts, blockchain, and apps – China’s legal system is increasingly relying on IT. In the future, artificial intelligence is also expected to play a stronger role. Frank Sieren analyses: Information technology and software can speed up court proceedings and relieve overburdened legal systems. But there is also a risk that China’s dominance in the legal tech sector will lead to the export of Chinese legal opinion.
Beijing now supplies its COVID-19 vaccines to dozens of countries around the world. Not out of charity but to pursue its own diplomatic, geopolitical, and economic interests, as Michael Radunski explains.
An exciting read and have a great weekend!
European clothing manufacturers are speaking out against cotton from Xinjiang and, as a result, are facing a boycott of the Chinese market – with a loud drumbeat from the government. Canberra stands up to Beijing and refuses to interfere in national affairs, whereupon several Australian industries are hit by import duties, import boycotts, and massive negative campaigns by the Chinese government. It is becoming clear that international conflicts are increasingly being fought with economic means of pressure. The European Union now wants to arm itself against precisely such economic blackmail – with the “anti-coercion instrument”, which is intended to enable a rapid response to coercive economic measures, Brussels plans to take action against practices by non-EU countries that attempt to pressure the EU or member states into taking or withdrawing certain policy measures.
This afternoon, stakeholders will meet for the first time at a virtual stakeholder meeting as part of the public consultations and exchange views on the planned instrument. The public consultation process will continue until June 15. Until then, companies, organizations, and associations can give feedback to the EU Commission. The concrete proposal of the Brussels authority is expected for the fourth quarter. At Wednesday’s meeting of the European Parliament’s Committee on International Trade, there were calls for rapid progress on the issue. The process is still in its infancy, and what the instrument will ultimately look like is still largely open. Whether extraterritorial sanctions will play a role in the process has not yet been decided by the EU Commission, said Denis Redonnet, deputy director-general of the EU Commission’s Directorate-General for Trade, to MEPs.
The problem of economic coercion does not only affect the EU, Redonnet said. There are also a large number of actors who make use of them. However, it is clear to observers that, following the reawakening of transatlantic relations between Brussels and Washington, Beijing, in particular, has been identified as a potential aggressor. The latest attempt at intimidation from the People’s Republic is only a few weeks old: At the end of March, Beijing imposed sanctions on several European politicians, academics, and organizations in response to punitive measures from Brussels based on human rights violations.
In initial feedback on an impact assessment by the EU Commission, business associations and organizations welcome the introduction of a corresponding instrument. In it, the association of Germany’s engineering industry (VDMA) stresses that the EU must “act clearly and cautiously” when using the new instrument, as the “boundaries between anti-coercion and protectionism are fluid.” VDMA also suggests that the option of “personal sanctions” against companies, entities, and individuals should be discussed as a priority for the mechanism. “Black-listing versus black-listing” is the association’s feedback. Whether the EU Commission will go down this route is not yet certain.
As vague as the details are, it is clear what the EU primarily wants to achieve with the instrument: “Deterrence counts,” says Jonathan Hackenbroich, head of the task force of the think tank European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), which deals with the EU’s options against economic coercion. The EU could use an appropriate instrument to signal in advance that economic coercion will have a cost, Hackenbroich says. “And that is not in the interest of the EU or any third country.” The task force, which is supported by Germany and France, plans to present a report with concrete ideas for the instrument in June after consultations with stakeholders from business and politics.
Trade countermeasures or restrictions on investments are options for the instrument, says Hackenbroich. However, restrictions on access to data are also a possibility, according to the report. Because: “Europe is an interesting data market for others,” says Hackenbroich. It is also conceivable, he says, to suspend protective provisions for intellectual property Europe as a reaction to economic pressure from third countries. Hackenbroich stresses that the planned instrument is primarily intended to have a reactive character. The possible steps, as a result, are not to be taken actively but can only be considered a reaction to a serious breach of international law.
Because so far, the EU cannot always respond to economic coercion or can only do so slowly – via the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism, which can only judge unfair trade practices. However, this usually also takes a long time. WTO rulings can take up to a year. “A lot of time is lost in the process,” Hackenbroich said. With the planned instrument, it would be possible to react more quickly: “In many situations, the threat of a coercive economic measure is enough, and within a week, you have a different relationship with the addressee.” All diplomatic options to prevent a conflict should, of course, be pursued first.
However, the introduction of an anti-coercion instrument for the EU is not enough, stresses the head of the task force. “It is much more important to ensure the EU’s own innovative capacity. Hackenbroich and a group of experts have analyzed that, in addition, a “Resilience Office” could bundle analytical capabilities to be able to systematically fully understand and evaluate cases of coercive measures against the EU in the first place.
In the case of China’s most recent sanctions against several European politicians and organizations, there is still uncertainty as to what they mean exactly, what their real scope is and what costs they entail – and economic pressure is often exerted much more subtly. According to the task force, a “Resilience Office” staffed with experts could help with the classification.
She hopes that the EU Commission will present its proposal as early as September or October, says French MEP and co-chair of the Trade Committee, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, China.Table. The instrument is a necessary follow-up to the EU’s revised regulation on the enforcement of international trade rules, stresses Vedrenne, who was the lead rapporteur for the committee. The EU urgently needs to strengthen its trade defense capabilities, she said. “It is now a matter of working on the enforcement aspect of EU trade policy,” Vedrenne said. Brussels had unveiled the new direction of its international trade policy in February. “Open, sustainable and assertive” is what it is supposed to be, were the buzzwords used by Trade Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis. “We are open, but we have to protect our interests,” says the Renew MEP.
When the eagerly awaited plane finally lands at the airport in Santiago de Chile on January 28, Sebastián Piñera can no longer contain himself. Still on the tarmac, Chile’s president addresses the public and exuberantly proclaims: “Today is a day of joy, enthusiasm, and hope.” It is hope that comes from China.
Until then, Chile’s battle against the COVID-19 pandemic seemed lost: In July, it had the world’s highest infection rate per 100,000 people. Help was supposed to come from the USA. The US company Pfizer wanted to deliver ten million vaccine doses, but only 150,000 had arrived. Then China helped: Two million doses of Sinovac arrived in the country by plane; three days later, Beijing delivered another two million doses. Chile was able to launch its nationwide vaccination campaign.
In the meantime, several more containers with the Chinese vaccine have arrived – and Chile has the third highest vaccination rate in the world after Israel and Great Britain.
China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently summarized the efforts of the People’s Republic as follows: The People’s Republic is doing its utmost and is supporting all countries in the world in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. The People’s Republic had donated vaccine doses to 69 developing countries, and the urgently needed vaccines were being exported to 43 countries.
It is estimated that the People’s Republic has now promised half a billion vaccine doses to the countries of the world. That is almost ten times more than has so far been distributed in the country itself. China is vaccinating the world – is the corresponding package insert. Although Russia and India also supply vaccines to developing and emerging countries around the world, no other country goes to such lengths as the People’s Republic to market its own aid in a way that attracts public attention.
Beijing never tires of emphasizing that the deliveries were made without any ulterior motives. But a closer look reveals a different picture.
In Asia, Beijing was initially keen to supply its immediate neighbors: Nine of the ten ASEAN states – all except Vietnam – now use Chinese vaccines. Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar have received donations. The Philippines received a donation that subsequently translated into a purchase of the Chinese vaccines, while Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand purchased Beijing’s vaccine directly.
However, China’s supplies are often not quite as generous as they might seem. The Philippine Senate found that they were paying significantly more for the vaccine than neighboring countries. There are also indications of a connection between the vaccine deliveries and the behavior of the recipients in the South China Sea, which is largely claimed by Beijing. Vietnam’s no to the Chinese vaccine must probably be seen against this backdrop. The government in Hanoi has so far firmly rejected China’s territorial claims.
China’s prestigious “New Silk Road” project also plays an important role in vaccine diplomacy: In Myanmar, the delivery of the Chinese vaccine came just one day after the two governments agreed on the first steps of a 650-kilometer railway project. The link between Mandalay and Kyaukphyu is crucial for China’s direct access to the Indian Ocean, a deep-sea port, and a pipeline project to Yunnan.
Beijing pulled off a real masterstroke in Brazil. Just a few months ago, President Jair Bolsonaro was taking a tough anti-China line. He regularly railed against vaccines that came from the very country he believed was responsible for the pandemic in the first place. In October, he again made clear that Brazil would never use Chinese vaccines. But as the death toll in the country rose rapidly and vaccine alternatives from the US and Europe failed to materialize due to domestic demand, Bolsonaro did a U-turn: Since then, not only has Chinese vaccine been imported, but a factory for the production of Sinovac is even being built in São Paulo. It is planned that 100 million doses will be produced there annually.
However, Beijing had by no means forgotten Bolsonaro’s tirades – and the price for the vaccination aid was accordingly high: China expects Huawei’s unrestricted access in the tender for the 5G mobile network. Here, too, Bolsonaro once had a clear position: Brazil’s 5G network would be built “without Chinese spy software”, he promised then US President Donald Trump. Brazil’s foreign ministry flanked that they supported US principles for a clean network. But when the first shipment of vaccines arrived in February, the state telecommunications agency Anatel also suddenly stated that there were no longer any objections to Huawei’s involvement.
And so Beijing achieved the almost unbelievable in the world’s fifth-largest country: Within a few weeks to move from the defensive to a position where it can dictate the terms.
In addition, the success in Brazil plays an important role in the acceptance of Chinese vaccines on the entire continent. Paraguay also showed interest in China’s vaccines. As compensation, Beijing is said to be targeting not the 5G network but the country’s diplomacy. As soon as the government in Asunción breaks off diplomatic relations with Taiwan, it will receive Chinese vaccines – at least that’s what Taiwan’s “foreign minister” Joseph Wu claims. Paraguay is one of 15 countries worldwide that recognizes Taiwan as an independent state.
In the meantime, the People’s Republic has managed to distribute its vaccines to almost all South American countries – only Suriname and French Guiana are still left out.
China has also succeeded in Europe. Serbia is already vaccinating with Sinopharm, while a number of other countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Ukraine, and Belarus are also leaning towards Chinese vaccines, have already received initial donations, or have even placed orders.
In Turkey, people are being vaccinated vigorously with Sinovac – 600,000 people in the first two days alone after the start of the vaccination campaign in mid-January. Yet the political price seems to be high: Since the first delivery date in December was postponed three times, China is believed to have exerted diplomatic pressure to gain concessions on the Uyghur issue. This impression was reinforced when Beijing announced the ratification of an extradition treaty with Turkey two days before the delivery of the first three million doses. Turkey is home to tens of thousands of Uyghur refugees, many of whom Beijing considers separatists and terrorists, and is demanding their extradition. For a long time, Turkey was the main advocate for the Muslim Turkic people. But since the rapprochement between Ankara and Beijing, criticism of China’s treatment of the Uyghurs has practically fallen silent.
Even in the EU, Beijing’s vaccination diplomacy is celebrating successes – and this despite the fact that no producer has yet submitted an application to the European Medicines Agency (EMA). In Hungary, Sinopharm is inoculated, and the Czech Republic has inquired about a possible supply in China. In Poland, such a move is being considered after Xi Jinping offered the vaccine over the phone – and suggested importing more Polish agricultural goods in the future. It would be another major success in the effort to drive a wedge between EU members.
In essence, China’s vaccination diplomacy could be positive for all concerned. The image of the People’s Republic would be enhanced by its medical assistance in the fight against the COVID pandemic, and China could present itself as a responsible power. Recipients could also benefit from this competition for influence, as China’s aid would give poorer countries access to much-needed vaccines. But a closer look shows that instead of charity, China’s vaccine diplomacy often turns out to be calculating power politics.
During the Spring Festival, I received a sign of life from the highly respected surgeon Jiang Yanyong. (蒋彦永). The world has his courageous actions and medical ethos to thank for the early disclosure and stopping of Sars (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome), the lung disease precursor to COVID-19, in 2003 before it could develop into a pandemic. Because Jiang was also no longer willing to keep quiet about what he saw as chief medical officer during the Tiananmen massacre on June 4, 1989, he was imprisoned for the first time. Jiang is one of the heroes Beijing wants to make people forget existed.
For the first time, there is a recent photo from the house arrest where he has been living locked up since April 2019. It shows Jiang and his wife Hua Zhongwei in their Beijing apartment, with the doctor holding a stuffed animal ox, the animal symbol of the Chinese New Year that began in February. His face looks puffy. He is said, I learned from one of his closest friends last year, to have been “sedated” with “medication” in Beijing’s Army Hospital 301 and to have suffered from “memory loss” ever since. Jiang worked from 1957, most recently as head of surgery for the celebrity hospital, which also treats China’s top party officials.
The recording was shared on Chinese WeChat. It seems authentic. I know his apartment, where I met him several times in the spring of 2019. On the last visit, the then 87-year-old biked to meet me, picked me up at the entrance to the gated apartment block and passed me off as his patient. In late March, he still came to see me in the Sanlitun diplomatic quarter. On the way, he could have shaken off his tail. He said he was not afraid because “I don’t break laws,” but he would no longer remain silent when people were arbitrarily killed, as he witnessed on the night of June 4, 1989. “As a doctor, I know how precious every single life is.” The day before authorities locked him in political lockdown, he texted, “Now it’s impossible for me to go out. Let’s wait and see. I hope you are doing well! Doctor Jiang.”
Then it became quiet about him. But in 2021, on the first anniversary of the death of the courageous Wuhan doctor Li Wenliang (李文亮) , who warned of the covered-up new COVID epidemic in early 2020 and died of it on February 7, bloggers suddenly recalled his “great” predecessor Jiang, who did the same 18 years ago. Li’s protest cry: A healthy society needs more than one voice. (一个健康的社会，不该只有一种声音) had also been Jiang Yanyong’s credo. The censors quickly deleted such posts.
Unlike in the case of 34-year-old Li, China and the world listened to what Jiang had to say to them in 2003. Horrified, he had watched on television on April 3, 2003, as then Health Minister Zhang Wenkang downplayed the Sars epidemic that had spread from Guangdong to Beijing. Everything was under control. Only 12 people had fallen ill, and three had died.
Jiang knew then of at least seven dead and 207 infected people being treated in secret in Beijing. He informed state broadcaster CCTV and Phoenix TV on April 5 how dangerous the infection really was. But his warning call was ignored. On April 8, Jiang relayed the news to the correspondent of the US Time magazine. That put the World Health Organization (WHO) on notice and forced China’s leaders to act. On April 20, it fired the health minister and another official and mobilized the entire country to fight Sars. Beijing halted the epidemic until August before it became a pandemic. Worldwide, Sars claimed 8422 infected people and 919 lives, mostly in the People’s Republic, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.
China’s public celebrated Jiang for his moral courage to the displeasure of the party, which did not forgive him for its loss of face. Authorities cracked down on him when he first reported on the night of June 4, 1989, in February 2004. Jiang’s 301 Military Hospital was on the invasion route of the rampaging troops to the student-occupied Tiananmen Square of Tiananmen, and between 10 p.m. and midnight, 89 wounded people were brought in with horrible gunshot wounds. As chief surgeon, Jiang operated with three groups of doctors until morning. He was unable to save seven people.
In June 2004, the authorities detained the veteran party member, who joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1952, for six weeks before placing him under house arrest for a further eight months. Jiang remained unbending. In 2019, he wrote to Party leader Xi Jinping that he saw the 1989 army deployment as the “worst mistake” and the “worst crime” committed by the state leadership. He said the Party must overcome its fear that chaos will erupt in China if it allows events to be reassessed. “This is my fifth letter to Xi,” Jiang told me at the time. “I have never received a reply.”
He was again placed under house arrest. Jiang’s name is taboo, as is the June 4 massacre. Writer Yan Lianke calls the constant distortion of what really happened and the party’s attempts to make it forgotten “state-sponsored amnesia”. It “trumps memory in today’s China”.
With massive propaganda campaigns, Beijing has declared itself the victor not only over Sars 2003 but also over COVID. It has learned nothing from its mistakes. Otherwise China’s leadership would probably have been able to stop the Corona epidemic early enough, before it became a pandemic. And the soon to be 90-year-old Jiang would not be sitting under house arrest today.
Today, Johnny Erling introduces to you a hero that political Beijing would prefer to forget. Jiang Yanyong exposed the lung disease Sars before it could become a pandemic. After his criticism of the Tiananmen massacre, the brutality of which he witnessed first-hand in his clinic, the soon-to-be 90-year-old has been under house arrest for two years for one reason only: His civil courage disgraces the CCP.
Whether trade sanctions against Australian wine or pineapples from Taiwan – international conflicts are increasingly being fought out by economic means. The EU no longer wants to stand by and arm itself against economic blackmail. Amelie Richter shows why the planned “anti-coercion instrument” is primarily directed against Beijing and how it could work. The relevance of the instrument is also shown by a news item from yesterday: According to Reuters, Adidas was briefly excluded as a supplier of the half marathon in Shanghai. This is not the first company to be hit by Beijing’s ban.
Online courts, blockchain, and apps – China’s legal system is increasingly relying on IT. In the future, artificial intelligence is also expected to play a stronger role. Frank Sieren analyses: Information technology and software can speed up court proceedings and relieve overburdened legal systems. But there is also a risk that China’s dominance in the legal tech sector will lead to the export of Chinese legal opinion.
Beijing now supplies its COVID-19 vaccines to dozens of countries around the world. Not out of charity but to pursue its own diplomatic, geopolitical, and economic interests, as Michael Radunski explains.
An exciting read and have a great weekend!
European clothing manufacturers are speaking out against cotton from Xinjiang and, as a result, are facing a boycott of the Chinese market – with a loud drumbeat from the government. Canberra stands up to Beijing and refuses to interfere in national affairs, whereupon several Australian industries are hit by import duties, import boycotts, and massive negative campaigns by the Chinese government. It is becoming clear that international conflicts are increasingly being fought with economic means of pressure. The European Union now wants to arm itself against precisely such economic blackmail – with the “anti-coercion instrument”, which is intended to enable a rapid response to coercive economic measures, Brussels plans to take action against practices by non-EU countries that attempt to pressure the EU or member states into taking or withdrawing certain policy measures.
This afternoon, stakeholders will meet for the first time at a virtual stakeholder meeting as part of the public consultations and exchange views on the planned instrument. The public consultation process will continue until June 15. Until then, companies, organizations, and associations can give feedback to the EU Commission. The concrete proposal of the Brussels authority is expected for the fourth quarter. At Wednesday’s meeting of the European Parliament’s Committee on International Trade, there were calls for rapid progress on the issue. The process is still in its infancy, and what the instrument will ultimately look like is still largely open. Whether extraterritorial sanctions will play a role in the process has not yet been decided by the EU Commission, said Denis Redonnet, deputy director-general of the EU Commission’s Directorate-General for Trade, to MEPs.
The problem of economic coercion does not only affect the EU, Redonnet said. There are also a large number of actors who make use of them. However, it is clear to observers that, following the reawakening of transatlantic relations between Brussels and Washington, Beijing, in particular, has been identified as a potential aggressor. The latest attempt at intimidation from the People’s Republic is only a few weeks old: At the end of March, Beijing imposed sanctions on several European politicians, academics, and organizations in response to punitive measures from Brussels based on human rights violations.
In initial feedback on an impact assessment by the EU Commission, business associations and organizations welcome the introduction of a corresponding instrument. In it, the association of Germany’s engineering industry (VDMA) stresses that the EU must “act clearly and cautiously” when using the new instrument, as the “boundaries between anti-coercion and protectionism are fluid.” VDMA also suggests that the option of “personal sanctions” against companies, entities, and individuals should be discussed as a priority for the mechanism. “Black-listing versus black-listing” is the association’s feedback. Whether the EU Commission will go down this route is not yet certain.
As vague as the details are, it is clear what the EU primarily wants to achieve with the instrument: “Deterrence counts,” says Jonathan Hackenbroich, head of the task force of the think tank European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), which deals with the EU’s options against economic coercion. The EU could use an appropriate instrument to signal in advance that economic coercion will have a cost, Hackenbroich says. “And that is not in the interest of the EU or any third country.” The task force, which is supported by Germany and France, plans to present a report with concrete ideas for the instrument in June after consultations with stakeholders from business and politics.
Trade countermeasures or restrictions on investments are options for the instrument, says Hackenbroich. However, restrictions on access to data are also a possibility, according to the report. Because: “Europe is an interesting data market for others,” says Hackenbroich. It is also conceivable, he says, to suspend protective provisions for intellectual property Europe as a reaction to economic pressure from third countries. Hackenbroich stresses that the planned instrument is primarily intended to have a reactive character. The possible steps, as a result, are not to be taken actively but can only be considered a reaction to a serious breach of international law.
Because so far, the EU cannot always respond to economic coercion or can only do so slowly – via the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism, which can only judge unfair trade practices. However, this usually also takes a long time. WTO rulings can take up to a year. “A lot of time is lost in the process,” Hackenbroich said. With the planned instrument, it would be possible to react more quickly: “In many situations, the threat of a coercive economic measure is enough, and within a week, you have a different relationship with the addressee.” All diplomatic options to prevent a conflict should, of course, be pursued first.
However, the introduction of an anti-coercion instrument for the EU is not enough, stresses the head of the task force. “It is much more important to ensure the EU’s own innovative capacity. Hackenbroich and a group of experts have analyzed that, in addition, a “Resilience Office” could bundle analytical capabilities to be able to systematically fully understand and evaluate cases of coercive measures against the EU in the first place.
In the case of China’s most recent sanctions against several European politicians and organizations, there is still uncertainty as to what they mean exactly, what their real scope is and what costs they entail – and economic pressure is often exerted much more subtly. According to the task force, a “Resilience Office” staffed with experts could help with the classification.
She hopes that the EU Commission will present its proposal as early as September or October, says French MEP and co-chair of the Trade Committee, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, China.Table. The instrument is a necessary follow-up to the EU’s revised regulation on the enforcement of international trade rules, stresses Vedrenne, who was the lead rapporteur for the committee. The EU urgently needs to strengthen its trade defense capabilities, she said. “It is now a matter of working on the enforcement aspect of EU trade policy,” Vedrenne said. Brussels had unveiled the new direction of its international trade policy in February. “Open, sustainable and assertive” is what it is supposed to be, were the buzzwords used by Trade Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis. “We are open, but we have to protect our interests,” says the Renew MEP.
When the eagerly awaited plane finally lands at the airport in Santiago de Chile on January 28, Sebastián Piñera can no longer contain himself. Still on the tarmac, Chile’s president addresses the public and exuberantly proclaims: “Today is a day of joy, enthusiasm, and hope.” It is hope that comes from China.
Until then, Chile’s battle against the COVID-19 pandemic seemed lost: In July, it had the world’s highest infection rate per 100,000 people. Help was supposed to come from the USA. The US company Pfizer wanted to deliver ten million vaccine doses, but only 150,000 had arrived. Then China helped: Two million doses of Sinovac arrived in the country by plane; three days later, Beijing delivered another two million doses. Chile was able to launch its nationwide vaccination campaign.
In the meantime, several more containers with the Chinese vaccine have arrived – and Chile has the third highest vaccination rate in the world after Israel and Great Britain.
China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently summarized the efforts of the People’s Republic as follows: The People’s Republic is doing its utmost and is supporting all countries in the world in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. The People’s Republic had donated vaccine doses to 69 developing countries, and the urgently needed vaccines were being exported to 43 countries.
It is estimated that the People’s Republic has now promised half a billion vaccine doses to the countries of the world. That is almost ten times more than has so far been distributed in the country itself. China is vaccinating the world – is the corresponding package insert. Although Russia and India also supply vaccines to developing and emerging countries around the world, no other country goes to such lengths as the People’s Republic to market its own aid in a way that attracts public attention.
Beijing never tires of emphasizing that the deliveries were made without any ulterior motives. But a closer look reveals a different picture.
In Asia, Beijing was initially keen to supply its immediate neighbors: Nine of the ten ASEAN states – all except Vietnam – now use Chinese vaccines. Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar have received donations. The Philippines received a donation that subsequently translated into a purchase of the Chinese vaccines, while Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand purchased Beijing’s vaccine directly.
However, China’s supplies are often not quite as generous as they might seem. The Philippine Senate found that they were paying significantly more for the vaccine than neighboring countries. There are also indications of a connection between the vaccine deliveries and the behavior of the recipients in the South China Sea, which is largely claimed by Beijing. Vietnam’s no to the Chinese vaccine must probably be seen against this backdrop. The government in Hanoi has so far firmly rejected China’s territorial claims.
China’s prestigious “New Silk Road” project also plays an important role in vaccine diplomacy: In Myanmar, the delivery of the Chinese vaccine came just one day after the two governments agreed on the first steps of a 650-kilometer railway project. The link between Mandalay and Kyaukphyu is crucial for China’s direct access to the Indian Ocean, a deep-sea port, and a pipeline project to Yunnan.
Beijing pulled off a real masterstroke in Brazil. Just a few months ago, President Jair Bolsonaro was taking a tough anti-China line. He regularly railed against vaccines that came from the very country he believed was responsible for the pandemic in the first place. In October, he again made clear that Brazil would never use Chinese vaccines. But as the death toll in the country rose rapidly and vaccine alternatives from the US and Europe failed to materialize due to domestic demand, Bolsonaro did a U-turn: Since then, not only has Chinese vaccine been imported, but a factory for the production of Sinovac is even being built in São Paulo. It is planned that 100 million doses will be produced there annually.
However, Beijing had by no means forgotten Bolsonaro’s tirades – and the price for the vaccination aid was accordingly high: China expects Huawei’s unrestricted access in the tender for the 5G mobile network. Here, too, Bolsonaro once had a clear position: Brazil’s 5G network would be built “without Chinese spy software”, he promised then US President Donald Trump. Brazil’s foreign ministry flanked that they supported US principles for a clean network. But when the first shipment of vaccines arrived in February, the state telecommunications agency Anatel also suddenly stated that there were no longer any objections to Huawei’s involvement.
And so Beijing achieved the almost unbelievable in the world’s fifth-largest country: Within a few weeks to move from the defensive to a position where it can dictate the terms.
In addition, the success in Brazil plays an important role in the acceptance of Chinese vaccines on the entire continent. Paraguay also showed interest in China’s vaccines. As compensation, Beijing is said to be targeting not the 5G network but the country’s diplomacy. As soon as the government in Asunción breaks off diplomatic relations with Taiwan, it will receive Chinese vaccines – at least that’s what Taiwan’s “foreign minister” Joseph Wu claims. Paraguay is one of 15 countries worldwide that recognizes Taiwan as an independent state.
In the meantime, the People’s Republic has managed to distribute its vaccines to almost all South American countries – only Suriname and French Guiana are still left out.
China has also succeeded in Europe. Serbia is already vaccinating with Sinopharm, while a number of other countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Ukraine, and Belarus are also leaning towards Chinese vaccines, have already received initial donations, or have even placed orders.
In Turkey, people are being vaccinated vigorously with Sinovac – 600,000 people in the first two days alone after the start of the vaccination campaign in mid-January. Yet the political price seems to be high: Since the first delivery date in December was postponed three times, China is believed to have exerted diplomatic pressure to gain concessions on the Uyghur issue. This impression was reinforced when Beijing announced the ratification of an extradition treaty with Turkey two days before the delivery of the first three million doses. Turkey is home to tens of thousands of Uyghur refugees, many of whom Beijing considers separatists and terrorists, and is demanding their extradition. For a long time, Turkey was the main advocate for the Muslim Turkic people. But since the rapprochement between Ankara and Beijing, criticism of China’s treatment of the Uyghurs has practically fallen silent.
Even in the EU, Beijing’s vaccination diplomacy is celebrating successes – and this despite the fact that no producer has yet submitted an application to the European Medicines Agency (EMA). In Hungary, Sinopharm is inoculated, and the Czech Republic has inquired about a possible supply in China. In Poland, such a move is being considered after Xi Jinping offered the vaccine over the phone – and suggested importing more Polish agricultural goods in the future. It would be another major success in the effort to drive a wedge between EU members.
In essence, China’s vaccination diplomacy could be positive for all concerned. The image of the People’s Republic would be enhanced by its medical assistance in the fight against the COVID pandemic, and China could present itself as a responsible power. Recipients could also benefit from this competition for influence, as China’s aid would give poorer countries access to much-needed vaccines. But a closer look shows that instead of charity, China’s vaccine diplomacy often turns out to be calculating power politics.
During the Spring Festival, I received a sign of life from the highly respected surgeon Jiang Yanyong. (蒋彦永). The world has his courageous actions and medical ethos to thank for the early disclosure and stopping of Sars (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome), the lung disease precursor to COVID-19, in 2003 before it could develop into a pandemic. Because Jiang was also no longer willing to keep quiet about what he saw as chief medical officer during the Tiananmen massacre on June 4, 1989, he was imprisoned for the first time. Jiang is one of the heroes Beijing wants to make people forget existed.
For the first time, there is a recent photo from the house arrest where he has been living locked up since April 2019. It shows Jiang and his wife Hua Zhongwei in their Beijing apartment, with the doctor holding a stuffed animal ox, the animal symbol of the Chinese New Year that began in February. His face looks puffy. He is said, I learned from one of his closest friends last year, to have been “sedated” with “medication” in Beijing’s Army Hospital 301 and to have suffered from “memory loss” ever since. Jiang worked from 1957, most recently as head of surgery for the celebrity hospital, which also treats China’s top party officials.
The recording was shared on Chinese WeChat. It seems authentic. I know his apartment, where I met him several times in the spring of 2019. On the last visit, the then 87-year-old biked to meet me, picked me up at the entrance to the gated apartment block and passed me off as his patient. In late March, he still came to see me in the Sanlitun diplomatic quarter. On the way, he could have shaken off his tail. He said he was not afraid because “I don’t break laws,” but he would no longer remain silent when people were arbitrarily killed, as he witnessed on the night of June 4, 1989. “As a doctor, I know how precious every single life is.” The day before authorities locked him in political lockdown, he texted, “Now it’s impossible for me to go out. Let’s wait and see. I hope you are doing well! Doctor Jiang.”
Then it became quiet about him. But in 2021, on the first anniversary of the death of the courageous Wuhan doctor Li Wenliang (李文亮) , who warned of the covered-up new COVID epidemic in early 2020 and died of it on February 7, bloggers suddenly recalled his “great” predecessor Jiang, who did the same 18 years ago. Li’s protest cry: A healthy society needs more than one voice. (一个健康的社会，不该只有一种声音) had also been Jiang Yanyong’s credo. The censors quickly deleted such posts.
Unlike in the case of 34-year-old Li, China and the world listened to what Jiang had to say to them in 2003. Horrified, he had watched on television on April 3, 2003, as then Health Minister Zhang Wenkang downplayed the Sars epidemic that had spread from Guangdong to Beijing. Everything was under control. Only 12 people had fallen ill, and three had died.
Jiang knew then of at least seven dead and 207 infected people being treated in secret in Beijing. He informed state broadcaster CCTV and Phoenix TV on April 5 how dangerous the infection really was. But his warning call was ignored. On April 8, Jiang relayed the news to the correspondent of the US Time magazine. That put the World Health Organization (WHO) on notice and forced China’s leaders to act. On April 20, it fired the health minister and another official and mobilized the entire country to fight Sars. Beijing halted the epidemic until August before it became a pandemic. Worldwide, Sars claimed 8422 infected people and 919 lives, mostly in the People’s Republic, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.
China’s public celebrated Jiang for his moral courage to the displeasure of the party, which did not forgive him for its loss of face. Authorities cracked down on him when he first reported on the night of June 4, 1989, in February 2004. Jiang’s 301 Military Hospital was on the invasion route of the rampaging troops to the student-occupied Tiananmen Square of Tiananmen, and between 10 p.m. and midnight, 89 wounded people were brought in with horrible gunshot wounds. As chief surgeon, Jiang operated with three groups of doctors until morning. He was unable to save seven people.
In June 2004, the authorities detained the veteran party member, who joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1952, for six weeks before placing him under house arrest for a further eight months. Jiang remained unbending. In 2019, he wrote to Party leader Xi Jinping that he saw the 1989 army deployment as the “worst mistake” and the “worst crime” committed by the state leadership. He said the Party must overcome its fear that chaos will erupt in China if it allows events to be reassessed. “This is my fifth letter to Xi,” Jiang told me at the time. “I have never received a reply.”
He was again placed under house arrest. Jiang’s name is taboo, as is the June 4 massacre. Writer Yan Lianke calls the constant distortion of what really happened and the party’s attempts to make it forgotten “state-sponsored amnesia”. It “trumps memory in today’s China”.
With massive propaganda campaigns, Beijing has declared itself the victor not only over Sars 2003 but also over COVID. It has learned nothing from its mistakes. Otherwise China’s leadership would probably have been able to stop the Corona epidemic early enough, before it became a pandemic. And the soon to be 90-year-old Jiang would not be sitting under house arrest today.
