“It’s cold at the top” is the Chinese equivalent of the English saying “It’s lonely at the top”. This is also true for China’s head of state Xi Jinping. In recent years, the 68-year-old has gradually transformed the People’s Republic into a “Xi state”. Be it economy or diplomacy, the leader wants to make all the big decisions himself.
His “Xi Jinping Thought” has long been part of the CP constitution. But anyone who focuses such a claim to power on themselves runs the risk of making serious mistakes, writes Christiane Kuehl. Especially since Xi considers himself a “tool of history”. This has rarely worked out well in human history, especially in China.
On Friday, China and the EU will meet for the first time in two years for a bilateral summit at the highest level. The Ukraine war will be at the top of the agenda for the video meeting, which has been postponed several times by now. That Xi Jinping will finally relent and exert pressure on Russia after this very meeting is highly unlikely, writes Amelie Richter, who spoke with Tim Ruehlig, Research Fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), among others, for her analysis. Nevertheless, the summit will set the course for EU-China relations. In its wake, the lines will be drawn clearer than ever before.
The patriotic hip-hop crew CD Rev from Chengdu, which is supposed to bring China’s youth into line with the party, has long since drawn such a clear line. In their songs, the four rappers mock foreign journalists and spread viral conspiracy theories. China’s government is so pleased that the group was even allowed to perform in an Olympic anthem. Fortunately, this doesn’t bring them into international charts.
Xi Jinping faces several tough decisions: Does he abandon the zero-covid policy or not? Or, more importantly, what role does China want to play in the Ukraine war? Tough decisions for any government – but even tougher when you have to make them all by yourself. But Xi has put himself in this position. For years, the head of state has made himself indispensable by declaring virtually every topic a matter of the highest order, from economic issues to diplomacy.
At the coming party congress in October, Xi wants to be appointed General Secretary of the CP for a third time so that he will remain in office past 2023. To this end, he had the constitution amended in 2018. The One-party state of China has become the Xi state. Xi smiles from propaganda posters, his slogans are stamped everywhere. He shapes the image of the country and the Party like no Chinese Party leader since Mao.
Experts believe the transformation from a One-party state to personal rule is already well underway. “Nothing important happens in China without Xi’s approval. And everything Xi wants to happen is happening more or less exactly as he wants it,” says Richard McGregor, an Asia-Pacific expert at the Lowy Institute in Sydney. Xi, he said, sees himself as a “tool of history” who has been tasked with returning the Chinese nation to the world stage as an equal. “That is his mission, and he carries it out in line with his convictions.”
When Xi rose to power in 2012, the Party was bogged down by infighting and at risk of breaking up into factions. The economy was growing at a record pace, but at the same time, the system was riddled with corruption. There were concerns that the civilian leadership would lose control over the military, which had built a vast economic shadow empire.
Xi Jinping immediately launched an anti-corruption campaign that also helped him eliminate political opponents. A measure that is still popular among the population today. He got rid of powerful factions and brought the military under his control. His “Xi Jinping Thought” was incorporated into the CP constitution.
After the outbreak of the coronavirus in Wuhan, the government managed to contain the virus with strict rules and to counter the discontent of some citizens with a narrative of success. In February 2021, Xi announced that China had successfully eradicated absolute poverty. In parallel, he continuously restricted room for non-Party thoughts and words. China is governed even more authoritarian under Xi than under his predecessors. The well-being of the Party takes precedence over everything else.
In a 2019 study, Merics experts Katja Drienhausen and Nis Gruenberg already recognized the ever-increasing centralization and dangers posed by the Party’s growing role and focus on Xi. “Top-down decision making is at the core of the new governance model. A cluster of powerful central commissions headed by “core leader” Xi and his deputies steer the institutional restructuring of the governance system,” the authors wrote. This cluster would issue all directives.
Added to this are more ideology, more mobilization of cadres, and a wider reach of party cells. “Discussions on institutional separation of party and state (党政分开) belong to the past,” Drienhausen and Grünberg noted. However, centralization of power “risks over-reliance on key players.”
But Xi is no Vladimir Putin, who sits isolated at his long table, afraid of the pandemic and likely also of assassination attempts. “If Putin were removed from Russia, there would be nothing left, no functioning government. But China would still have a functioning government without Xi,” McGregor says. But there would still be a government and a bureaucracy with great depth, skills, and experience. The problem, McGregor believes, is more the fact that Xi does not utilize these skills. “There’s a lot of evidence that advisers are shaping their proposals the way they think he wants to see them.” Xi would take advice mainly on technical matters such as interest rate policy. They might not all be yes-men, but genuine opposition has become rare even in the Politburo, according to McGregor.
The head of state has suspended all painstakingly established rules of an institutionalized transfer of power at the top of the Party and state. “The more a ruler erodes the norms, the greater the risk for himself,” warns Jude Blanchette of the US Center of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Because others would then no longer necessarily abide by rules either. “Rivals could think about how they can accelerate Xi’s exit – in a non-constitutional way.”
Xi’s autocracy is likely to anger those in the 55-plus generation. According to the old norms, Xi would have had to make one of them his crown prince as early as October 2017 to assume the CP helm this year. An eternal Xi has now eliminated this cohort’s chance to rise to the top for the time being.
Party cadres, China observers and the world public all now consider the appointment of another Party leader to be extremely unlikely to happen this year. After all, why would Xi abolish term limits if he was not planning to serve a particularly long term? “It is conceivable that Xi will name a successor in 2022, which he can then build,” Blanchette said at a recent webinar. Then, Xi’s resignation could be possible at one of the following party congresses in 2027 or 2032.
Another scenario could be a coup against Xi. “Those in power are often pushed aside by the elite,” says Blanchette. But the logistical challenges of organizing a coup should not be underestimated – especially since Xi has been practicing “coup prevention” for years, for example by keeping the military under control. Otherwise, there would only be a death in office. Xi is 68 years old. Mao died in office at 82.
Many observers believe that the head of state wants to be the one to resolve the “Taiwan issue”. Thus, some say Xi is closely watching how the Ukraine crisis unfolds and how the West responds, all with an eye toward a possible invasion of the island. “They don’t want to invade Taiwan, they just want to create enough pressure for it to fall into their hands,” McGregor believes. But at some point, he says, the situation is bound to come to a head. “And to be honest: We all don’t know how this is going to end.”
It has been almost two years since representatives of the European Union and China gathered for a summit meeting. In 2021, the meeting, which was actually scheduled annually, was canceled, and possible dates were repeatedly postponed. The online conference on Friday, however, now comes at an inopportune time for both sides. The 27 EU member states are “reconsidering” their relations with Beijing in a “new global context”. The reason is China’s reluctance to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Ukraine war will thus dominate the meeting.
Participants will be:
and on the Chinese side
The focus will be on Ukraine, the commitment of the international community to support Ukraine, the humanitarian crisis caused by Russian aggression and the global impact of the crisis, the EU Commission announced on Tuesday. Also on the agenda: climate change, biodiversity, health – which refers to the Covid pandemic in most cases – and “ways to ensure a more balanced and reciprocal trade relationship.”
The last, rather vaguely worded topic may include talks on the stalled CAI investment agreement. Of equal importance here are reciprocal sanctions. Then there are the EU’s two requests to the World Trade Organization against China. One of them concerns the unprecedented trade embargo against an EU state, namely Lithuania (China.Table reported). Brussels also wants to encourage a resumption of the human rights dialogue between the EU and China.
According to the agenda of the 23rd EU-China Summit, the three EU representatives will first meet Premier Li in the morning, and President Xi in the afternoon. It is expected that EU-China trade issues will rather be discussed with Premier Li, so that the discussion time with President Xi can be fully dedicated to the Ukraine crisis. Brussels wants to keep up the pressure on Beijing to engage in concrete mediation between Russia and Ukraine.
China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi and EU Foreign Affairs Commissioner Borrell already discussed the chances of a ceasefire and humanitarian corridors on Tuesday. They had “agreed on the urgency of returning to peace in the European continent as quickly as possible,” an EU statement released after the talks read.
Last week, the heads of state and government of the EU, NATO and the G7 had already sent a clear message to China at a marathon summit: side with the West and take action. Beijing, however, was not swayed by this (China.Table reported).
Accordingly, expectations that the EU-China summit will move the People’s Republic to act are modest. So far, China has been very reserved and passive, says Tim Ruehlig, Research Fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). “I don’t see any signs that this will change now for the summit.” Especially since the meeting will be only held virtual, the crucial element of interpersonal dynamics that sometimes sparks decisive change will be missing.
Ruehlig also sees a solution to the Ukraine conflict through negotiations as Beijing’s preferred route. So why doesn’t China step up to the plate and finally get involved? “What is considered an acceptable outcome differs greatly in Europe and China,” Ruehlig explains. How Russian President Vladimir Putin emerges from the negotiations is also very important to Beijing and Xi, according to the DGAP researcher. And here, uncertainties are still too great at the moment. Another problem for the People’s Republic is that peace negotiations are currently somewhat deadlocked.
Lithuania, WTO, sanctions, CAI – all other issues are complex and will hardly be able to make much headway in just one summit. Ruehlig has low expectations: “Basically, there will be no results. But the mere fact that this summit meeting is finally taking place is already a success,” says Ruehlig.
MEP Reinhard Buetikofer believes that Friday’s summit – even in the absence of much progress, if any – will set the tone for future EU-China relations. “I hope EU representatives will work hard to make China understand that the EU expects them to refrain from supporting Russia,” Buetikofer said on Tuesday.
However, he believes that the chance to detach China from Russia has already been lost and calls for a completely new political approach toward the People’s Republic. At the summit, Brussels should make it clear that the People’s Republic is now and in the future dealing with a more united European Union than in the past, Buetikofer said.
And the Chinese side? It could enter the meeting with completely different intentions than the EU. There is an “asymmetry of expectations and priorities,” says Mathieu Duchâtel, Director of the Asia Program at French think tank Institut Montaigne. He assumes that China has no particular expectations – except for the main “hurdles” that have to be overcome from the Chinese perspective and that have been known for some time anyway.
One of them, he believes, is the “Taiwan Office” in Lithuania’s capital, Vilnius. “They need a win against Lithuania when it comes to its designation,” Duchâtel cites as an example. Vilnius and Beijing have been fighting over the name of the “Taiwan Office” in the Lithuanian capital since last year. Ratification of the CAI and a reversal of sanctions are also priorities for the Chinese. “But this is clearly not on the agenda,” Duchâtel said.
Change of name in Vilnius in exchange for pressure on Moscow? Beijing is well aware that there is a high interest on the European part to get a “certain diplomatic message” on the Ukraine war out of Beijing, says Duchâtel. However, Duchâtel does not believe that China could now use the power it has been granted in the Ukraine war to comply with, or at least come close to, the wishes of others. Surely it is impossible to predict what kind of deals will be proposed. But this approach would not look good for China and the EU and is more likely to be fruitless. If Beijing changes its position and tone, it will be for different reasons, Duchâtel is certain.
China’s ambassador to France, Lu Shaye, said last weekend that Beijing does not have high expectations for breakthroughs in relations with Europe. “We had very high hopes for the development of China-EU relations when France took over the EU presidency early this year. But sometimes, hopes cannot keep up with changes,” Chinese state media quoted Lu as saying.
Sinolytics is a European consulting and analysis company specializing in China. It advises European companies on their strategic orientation and concrete business activities in the People’s Republic.
“Join Us In Winter” was the name of one of the official anthems of this year’s Winter Olympics, presented by Chinese news agency Xinhua at the end of January. The song, performed in English and Chinese, was – like all the other Olympic songs – extremely cheesy. Brilliant lyrics like “side by side touch the sky” were performed by 24-year-old pop star Zeng Shunxi and influencer and Xinhua reporter Lu Binqi. The rap part middle part was performed by the “red” rap crew CD Rev from Sichuan, also known as “Chengdu Revolution” 成都事变.
The group members all have aptly named rapper-like aliases: Wang “Chuckie” Zixin, Li “Pissy” Yijie, Tan “N.O.G.” Yunwen and Luo “Roy” Jinhui. Their style is borrowed from American gangsta rap. Although “government rap” would be more appropriate in this case: CD Rev is known for presenting political topics that are currently at the top of the national agenda with a patriotic spin for the youth. Their first single “The Force Of Red” was released in January 2016 shortly after the presidential election in Taiwan. In it, election winner Tsai Ing-wen was attacked as a “bitch”. “Taiwan is not a country! The island is ours!” the group chants in the first verse. Western journalists, who emphasize that Taiwan is de facto independent, are mocked in the song as “media white trash, punk-ass fuckers”.
Band member Wang Zixin thinks the song is “a bit extreme” from today’s perspective. Swearing has become rarer since the group’s early days, but the four twenty-somethings still stick to controversial themes. In 2017, the crew expressed outrage over the construction of a US missile defense system in South Korea in their music video “No Thaad” in front of the backdrop of the Forbidden City. In “South China Sea,” the group, accompanied by images of Chinese aircraft carriers and tanks, profess, “China is my religion – if they want to take our sea, go to hell now.” Naturally, the red rappers also took on the Hong Kong protests. In the chorus of “Hong Kong’s Fall,” the patriots even borrow Donald Trump’s voice, as he explains in a sampled interview snippet that Hong Kong is part of China, and the Chinese must “deal with that themselves.”
Now and then, CD Rev also voices mild social criticism, for example when they address the milk powder scandal of 2008 or the environmental pollution of recent years in the song “This is China“. However, these problems are all blamed on spies, traitors, dollar-hungry businessmen and corrupt politicians, all of whom, as it is well-known, Xi got rid of. “We love our country,” CD Rev sing in the chorus. China would still be a developing country, after all. But only a few meters remain to make the Chinese dream come true.
CD Rev allegedly formed on October 1, 2015 – the 66th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic. One of their main sponsors is tech entrepreneur Rao Jin, who founded China’s first private media in 2008 with the goal of establishing a counterweight to Western coverage of China. Initially provocatively named “Anti-CNN,” his project now operates under the name April Media. CD Rev also works closely with the Communist Youth League and state media. Sometimes the group even receives direct support from senior officials. Last August, Zhao Lijian, the spokesman for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, shared a music video on Twitter reinforcing the conspiracy theory that the Coronavirus originated at US Fort Detrick, a research facility of the US m biological weapons program in Maryland.
Despite all their party affiliation, CD Rev claim not to be members of the Communist Party. In a feature on Weixin, however, group leader Wang declared to “follow Mao Zedong forever” because, “The more you know about him, the more you must love him.” That a group with such a nationalistic message was part of the official Olympic narrative speaks volumes. Or as CR Rev rap in their song “The Force Of Red”: “Just explain one thing to Uncle Sam – the red king is back.” Fabian Peltsch
The water quality continues to be excellent. But Shek-O Beach in Hong Kong is closed once again. The risk of Covid infections appears too great in the opinion of the city administration. Previously, pictures of full beaches had circulated on social media. Apparently, the approach is different than in Germany, where outdoor activities are considered part of the solution rather than part of the problem.
“It’s cold at the top” is the Chinese equivalent of the English saying “It’s lonely at the top”. This is also true for China’s head of state Xi Jinping. In recent years, the 68-year-old has gradually transformed the People’s Republic into a “Xi state”. Be it economy or diplomacy, the leader wants to make all the big decisions himself.
His “Xi Jinping Thought” has long been part of the CP constitution. But anyone who focuses such a claim to power on themselves runs the risk of making serious mistakes, writes Christiane Kuehl. Especially since Xi considers himself a “tool of history”. This has rarely worked out well in human history, especially in China.
On Friday, China and the EU will meet for the first time in two years for a bilateral summit at the highest level. The Ukraine war will be at the top of the agenda for the video meeting, which has been postponed several times by now. That Xi Jinping will finally relent and exert pressure on Russia after this very meeting is highly unlikely, writes Amelie Richter, who spoke with Tim Ruehlig, Research Fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), among others, for her analysis. Nevertheless, the summit will set the course for EU-China relations. In its wake, the lines will be drawn clearer than ever before.
The patriotic hip-hop crew CD Rev from Chengdu, which is supposed to bring China’s youth into line with the party, has long since drawn such a clear line. In their songs, the four rappers mock foreign journalists and spread viral conspiracy theories. China’s government is so pleased that the group was even allowed to perform in an Olympic anthem. Fortunately, this doesn’t bring them into international charts.
Xi Jinping faces several tough decisions: Does he abandon the zero-covid policy or not? Or, more importantly, what role does China want to play in the Ukraine war? Tough decisions for any government – but even tougher when you have to make them all by yourself. But Xi has put himself in this position. For years, the head of state has made himself indispensable by declaring virtually every topic a matter of the highest order, from economic issues to diplomacy.
At the coming party congress in October, Xi wants to be appointed General Secretary of the CP for a third time so that he will remain in office past 2023. To this end, he had the constitution amended in 2018. The One-party state of China has become the Xi state. Xi smiles from propaganda posters, his slogans are stamped everywhere. He shapes the image of the country and the Party like no Chinese Party leader since Mao.
Experts believe the transformation from a One-party state to personal rule is already well underway. “Nothing important happens in China without Xi’s approval. And everything Xi wants to happen is happening more or less exactly as he wants it,” says Richard McGregor, an Asia-Pacific expert at the Lowy Institute in Sydney. Xi, he said, sees himself as a “tool of history” who has been tasked with returning the Chinese nation to the world stage as an equal. “That is his mission, and he carries it out in line with his convictions.”
When Xi rose to power in 2012, the Party was bogged down by infighting and at risk of breaking up into factions. The economy was growing at a record pace, but at the same time, the system was riddled with corruption. There were concerns that the civilian leadership would lose control over the military, which had built a vast economic shadow empire.
Xi Jinping immediately launched an anti-corruption campaign that also helped him eliminate political opponents. A measure that is still popular among the population today. He got rid of powerful factions and brought the military under his control. His “Xi Jinping Thought” was incorporated into the CP constitution.
After the outbreak of the coronavirus in Wuhan, the government managed to contain the virus with strict rules and to counter the discontent of some citizens with a narrative of success. In February 2021, Xi announced that China had successfully eradicated absolute poverty. In parallel, he continuously restricted room for non-Party thoughts and words. China is governed even more authoritarian under Xi than under his predecessors. The well-being of the Party takes precedence over everything else.
In a 2019 study, Merics experts Katja Drienhausen and Nis Gruenberg already recognized the ever-increasing centralization and dangers posed by the Party’s growing role and focus on Xi. “Top-down decision making is at the core of the new governance model. A cluster of powerful central commissions headed by “core leader” Xi and his deputies steer the institutional restructuring of the governance system,” the authors wrote. This cluster would issue all directives.
Added to this are more ideology, more mobilization of cadres, and a wider reach of party cells. “Discussions on institutional separation of party and state (党政分开) belong to the past,” Drienhausen and Grünberg noted. However, centralization of power “risks over-reliance on key players.”
But Xi is no Vladimir Putin, who sits isolated at his long table, afraid of the pandemic and likely also of assassination attempts. “If Putin were removed from Russia, there would be nothing left, no functioning government. But China would still have a functioning government without Xi,” McGregor says. But there would still be a government and a bureaucracy with great depth, skills, and experience. The problem, McGregor believes, is more the fact that Xi does not utilize these skills. “There’s a lot of evidence that advisers are shaping their proposals the way they think he wants to see them.” Xi would take advice mainly on technical matters such as interest rate policy. They might not all be yes-men, but genuine opposition has become rare even in the Politburo, according to McGregor.
The head of state has suspended all painstakingly established rules of an institutionalized transfer of power at the top of the Party and state. “The more a ruler erodes the norms, the greater the risk for himself,” warns Jude Blanchette of the US Center of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Because others would then no longer necessarily abide by rules either. “Rivals could think about how they can accelerate Xi’s exit – in a non-constitutional way.”
Xi’s autocracy is likely to anger those in the 55-plus generation. According to the old norms, Xi would have had to make one of them his crown prince as early as October 2017 to assume the CP helm this year. An eternal Xi has now eliminated this cohort’s chance to rise to the top for the time being.
Party cadres, China observers and the world public all now consider the appointment of another Party leader to be extremely unlikely to happen this year. After all, why would Xi abolish term limits if he was not planning to serve a particularly long term? “It is conceivable that Xi will name a successor in 2022, which he can then build,” Blanchette said at a recent webinar. Then, Xi’s resignation could be possible at one of the following party congresses in 2027 or 2032.
Another scenario could be a coup against Xi. “Those in power are often pushed aside by the elite,” says Blanchette. But the logistical challenges of organizing a coup should not be underestimated – especially since Xi has been practicing “coup prevention” for years, for example by keeping the military under control. Otherwise, there would only be a death in office. Xi is 68 years old. Mao died in office at 82.
Many observers believe that the head of state wants to be the one to resolve the “Taiwan issue”. Thus, some say Xi is closely watching how the Ukraine crisis unfolds and how the West responds, all with an eye toward a possible invasion of the island. “They don’t want to invade Taiwan, they just want to create enough pressure for it to fall into their hands,” McGregor believes. But at some point, he says, the situation is bound to come to a head. “And to be honest: We all don’t know how this is going to end.”
It has been almost two years since representatives of the European Union and China gathered for a summit meeting. In 2021, the meeting, which was actually scheduled annually, was canceled, and possible dates were repeatedly postponed. The online conference on Friday, however, now comes at an inopportune time for both sides. The 27 EU member states are “reconsidering” their relations with Beijing in a “new global context”. The reason is China’s reluctance to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Ukraine war will thus dominate the meeting.
Participants will be:
and on the Chinese side
The focus will be on Ukraine, the commitment of the international community to support Ukraine, the humanitarian crisis caused by Russian aggression and the global impact of the crisis, the EU Commission announced on Tuesday. Also on the agenda: climate change, biodiversity, health – which refers to the Covid pandemic in most cases – and “ways to ensure a more balanced and reciprocal trade relationship.”
The last, rather vaguely worded topic may include talks on the stalled CAI investment agreement. Of equal importance here are reciprocal sanctions. Then there are the EU’s two requests to the World Trade Organization against China. One of them concerns the unprecedented trade embargo against an EU state, namely Lithuania (China.Table reported). Brussels also wants to encourage a resumption of the human rights dialogue between the EU and China.
According to the agenda of the 23rd EU-China Summit, the three EU representatives will first meet Premier Li in the morning, and President Xi in the afternoon. It is expected that EU-China trade issues will rather be discussed with Premier Li, so that the discussion time with President Xi can be fully dedicated to the Ukraine crisis. Brussels wants to keep up the pressure on Beijing to engage in concrete mediation between Russia and Ukraine.
China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi and EU Foreign Affairs Commissioner Borrell already discussed the chances of a ceasefire and humanitarian corridors on Tuesday. They had “agreed on the urgency of returning to peace in the European continent as quickly as possible,” an EU statement released after the talks read.
Last week, the heads of state and government of the EU, NATO and the G7 had already sent a clear message to China at a marathon summit: side with the West and take action. Beijing, however, was not swayed by this (China.Table reported).
Accordingly, expectations that the EU-China summit will move the People’s Republic to act are modest. So far, China has been very reserved and passive, says Tim Ruehlig, Research Fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). “I don’t see any signs that this will change now for the summit.” Especially since the meeting will be only held virtual, the crucial element of interpersonal dynamics that sometimes sparks decisive change will be missing.
Ruehlig also sees a solution to the Ukraine conflict through negotiations as Beijing’s preferred route. So why doesn’t China step up to the plate and finally get involved? “What is considered an acceptable outcome differs greatly in Europe and China,” Ruehlig explains. How Russian President Vladimir Putin emerges from the negotiations is also very important to Beijing and Xi, according to the DGAP researcher. And here, uncertainties are still too great at the moment. Another problem for the People’s Republic is that peace negotiations are currently somewhat deadlocked.
Lithuania, WTO, sanctions, CAI – all other issues are complex and will hardly be able to make much headway in just one summit. Ruehlig has low expectations: “Basically, there will be no results. But the mere fact that this summit meeting is finally taking place is already a success,” says Ruehlig.
MEP Reinhard Buetikofer believes that Friday’s summit – even in the absence of much progress, if any – will set the tone for future EU-China relations. “I hope EU representatives will work hard to make China understand that the EU expects them to refrain from supporting Russia,” Buetikofer said on Tuesday.
However, he believes that the chance to detach China from Russia has already been lost and calls for a completely new political approach toward the People’s Republic. At the summit, Brussels should make it clear that the People’s Republic is now and in the future dealing with a more united European Union than in the past, Buetikofer said.
And the Chinese side? It could enter the meeting with completely different intentions than the EU. There is an “asymmetry of expectations and priorities,” says Mathieu Duchâtel, Director of the Asia Program at French think tank Institut Montaigne. He assumes that China has no particular expectations – except for the main “hurdles” that have to be overcome from the Chinese perspective and that have been known for some time anyway.
One of them, he believes, is the “Taiwan Office” in Lithuania’s capital, Vilnius. “They need a win against Lithuania when it comes to its designation,” Duchâtel cites as an example. Vilnius and Beijing have been fighting over the name of the “Taiwan Office” in the Lithuanian capital since last year. Ratification of the CAI and a reversal of sanctions are also priorities for the Chinese. “But this is clearly not on the agenda,” Duchâtel said.
Change of name in Vilnius in exchange for pressure on Moscow? Beijing is well aware that there is a high interest on the European part to get a “certain diplomatic message” on the Ukraine war out of Beijing, says Duchâtel. However, Duchâtel does not believe that China could now use the power it has been granted in the Ukraine war to comply with, or at least come close to, the wishes of others. Surely it is impossible to predict what kind of deals will be proposed. But this approach would not look good for China and the EU and is more likely to be fruitless. If Beijing changes its position and tone, it will be for different reasons, Duchâtel is certain.
China’s ambassador to France, Lu Shaye, said last weekend that Beijing does not have high expectations for breakthroughs in relations with Europe. “We had very high hopes for the development of China-EU relations when France took over the EU presidency early this year. But sometimes, hopes cannot keep up with changes,” Chinese state media quoted Lu as saying.
Sinolytics is a European consulting and analysis company specializing in China. It advises European companies on their strategic orientation and concrete business activities in the People’s Republic.
“Join Us In Winter” was the name of one of the official anthems of this year’s Winter Olympics, presented by Chinese news agency Xinhua at the end of January. The song, performed in English and Chinese, was – like all the other Olympic songs – extremely cheesy. Brilliant lyrics like “side by side touch the sky” were performed by 24-year-old pop star Zeng Shunxi and influencer and Xinhua reporter Lu Binqi. The rap part middle part was performed by the “red” rap crew CD Rev from Sichuan, also known as “Chengdu Revolution” 成都事变.
The group members all have aptly named rapper-like aliases: Wang “Chuckie” Zixin, Li “Pissy” Yijie, Tan “N.O.G.” Yunwen and Luo “Roy” Jinhui. Their style is borrowed from American gangsta rap. Although “government rap” would be more appropriate in this case: CD Rev is known for presenting political topics that are currently at the top of the national agenda with a patriotic spin for the youth. Their first single “The Force Of Red” was released in January 2016 shortly after the presidential election in Taiwan. In it, election winner Tsai Ing-wen was attacked as a “bitch”. “Taiwan is not a country! The island is ours!” the group chants in the first verse. Western journalists, who emphasize that Taiwan is de facto independent, are mocked in the song as “media white trash, punk-ass fuckers”.
Band member Wang Zixin thinks the song is “a bit extreme” from today’s perspective. Swearing has become rarer since the group’s early days, but the four twenty-somethings still stick to controversial themes. In 2017, the crew expressed outrage over the construction of a US missile defense system in South Korea in their music video “No Thaad” in front of the backdrop of the Forbidden City. In “South China Sea,” the group, accompanied by images of Chinese aircraft carriers and tanks, profess, “China is my religion – if they want to take our sea, go to hell now.” Naturally, the red rappers also took on the Hong Kong protests. In the chorus of “Hong Kong’s Fall,” the patriots even borrow Donald Trump’s voice, as he explains in a sampled interview snippet that Hong Kong is part of China, and the Chinese must “deal with that themselves.”
Now and then, CD Rev also voices mild social criticism, for example when they address the milk powder scandal of 2008 or the environmental pollution of recent years in the song “This is China“. However, these problems are all blamed on spies, traitors, dollar-hungry businessmen and corrupt politicians, all of whom, as it is well-known, Xi got rid of. “We love our country,” CD Rev sing in the chorus. China would still be a developing country, after all. But only a few meters remain to make the Chinese dream come true.
CD Rev allegedly formed on October 1, 2015 – the 66th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic. One of their main sponsors is tech entrepreneur Rao Jin, who founded China’s first private media in 2008 with the goal of establishing a counterweight to Western coverage of China. Initially provocatively named “Anti-CNN,” his project now operates under the name April Media. CD Rev also works closely with the Communist Youth League and state media. Sometimes the group even receives direct support from senior officials. Last August, Zhao Lijian, the spokesman for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, shared a music video on Twitter reinforcing the conspiracy theory that the Coronavirus originated at US Fort Detrick, a research facility of the US m biological weapons program in Maryland.
Despite all their party affiliation, CD Rev claim not to be members of the Communist Party. In a feature on Weixin, however, group leader Wang declared to “follow Mao Zedong forever” because, “The more you know about him, the more you must love him.” That a group with such a nationalistic message was part of the official Olympic narrative speaks volumes. Or as CR Rev rap in their song “The Force Of Red”: “Just explain one thing to Uncle Sam – the red king is back.” Fabian Peltsch
The water quality continues to be excellent. But Shek-O Beach in Hong Kong is closed once again. The risk of Covid infections appears too great in the opinion of the city administration. Previously, pictures of full beaches had circulated on social media. Apparently, the approach is different than in Germany, where outdoor activities are considered part of the solution rather than part of the problem.
