The Jian G. espionage case continues to unfold. Do you remember? G. had been snooping around the European Parliament as a German citizen for the Chinese secret service. His gateway was the office door of AfD politician Maximilian Krah. On Tuesday, the Federal Public Prosecutor General’s Office reported that a Chinese citizen residing in Leipzig had allegedly assisted G.
The person is a woman named Yaqi X., who used a different gateway than the alleged contact agent. As an employee of a logistics service provider at Leipzig/Halle Airport, she is said to have gained access to sensitive information. She is now in custody and gives us plenty of reason to think about how well German airports and container ports protect themselves against foreign espionage.
Our second main topic today is of an industrial nature. China’s leading solar companies suffered dramatic losses in the first half of the year despite continued high demand, writes Christiane Kühl. Now the financial flow is also threatening to dry up. A new direction for the companies is urgently needed. One or two German solar companies may be smiling gleefully at such news from China – provided, of course, that they have survived the hostile market takeover by Chinese competitors over the past 20 years.
The arrest of a Chinese citizen in Leipzig raises the question of the extent of Chinese espionage operations in Germany. On Tuesday, the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office reported on the Yaqi X. case and established a connection to a suspected espionage case involving AfD MEP Maximilian Krah.
X. is urgently suspected of secret service agent activities for a Chinese secret service, the Office of the Attorney General announced. An arrest warrant was issued for her. The woman had worked for a logistics service provider at Leipzig/Halle Airport, among other places. Specifically, she is accused of working for a Chinese secret service employee – the German citizen Jian G., who is already in custody – between August last year and February this year.
She is said to have informed G. several times about the transportation of armaments and people with connections to a German arms company. At the time, G. was still an employee of AfD politician Krah. The Chinese embassy did not respond to an inquiry from Table.Briefings about the new arrest.
For experts in the field of intelligence gathering, however, it comes as little surprise since the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the Military Counterintelligence Service have repeatedly warned of Chinese espionage in Germany. If intelligence services are already publicly pointing out possible espionage activities, “then there are a large number of cases behind it”, the former director of the Intelligence Analysis Center of the European Union, Gerhard Conrad, had already said to the news channel ntv after G.’s arrest. Anything else would be dubious. The arrests would validate these warnings.
It is reasonable to assume that the Chinese secret service is also interested in information about the possible transportation of armaments at other German airports or shipping hubs such as the Port of Hamburg and is trying to position informants at such neuralgic points. And the question arises as to how well airports and ports are prepared for these challenges.
“Working in the security area of the airport – whether for airport employees or third-party companies – generally requires a comprehensive check. This ensures protection“, the Hamburg Senate’s Department of Economics and Innovation (BWI) announced. As the responsible aviation security authority, BWI is responsible for background checks “within the scope of the legal requirements”.
With regard to the persons to be checked, it obtains information from the police, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the courts as a standard. Such checks also include so-called “secure senders”, i.e. logistics companies that are allowed to deliver directly to the security sector. “We do not carry out our own investigations in this regard, but rely on existing findings“, it says. If there are doubts about reliability, the corresponding confirmation will be refused, “for example, if suspicions cannot be dispelled after a hearing”.
It is still unclear what access X. was granted in the security area. The Attorney General’s Office only refers to a “company that provides logistics services, including at the airport”. This can mean two things. While a logistics company that is located near the airport or delivers goods for shipping purposes, for example, is subject to fewer security precautions, the corresponding regulations at the airport itself are much more extensive.
The Port of Hamburg also refers to the authorities. Last year, a subsidiary of the Chinese state-owned company Cosco acquired 24.99 percent of the Tollerort terminal, sparking a discussion about the security of critical infrastructure in Germany. However, the city’s Port Authority asks for your understanding that it does not wish to comment on its own security concept.
However, as Table.Briefings has learned from circles, the major players at the Port of Hamburg have sufficient China expertise to be aware of the risks. Yet, there is no central control system for checking service providers with only a few employees. It could therefore not be ruled out that there are starting points for potential espionage activities.
China’s solar industry has suffered dramatic losses this year. Overcapacity and lower demand abroad have triggered a price war that is now taking its toll. Several industry leaders had to announce severe half-year losses at the beginning of September. Longi Green Energy Technology reported a net loss of 5.2 billion yuan (733 million US dollars) for the first six months of 2024. Competitors Tongwei and TCL Zhonghuan Renewable Energy Technology each lost around three billion yuan.
The consequences are not yet foreseeable, as companies are facing a force that for decades they had only been able to confront with state support: the free market. However, state subsidies were discontinued in 2022. Supply and demand are now completely determined by market signals, which is unsettling for companies. “This is the first time that the sector has bottomed out in a completely market-driven environment”, Han Xue, an energy policy expert at the Development Research Center of the State Council, told the business magazine Caixin.
In the past, local governments were still able to promote the industry through land use rights, tax breaks and favorable credit conditions. However, many municipalities are now bankrupt themselves. China’s banks have not yet withdrawn their credit lines and commitments on a large scale: “But many expect this to happen soon”, writes Caixin.
“Massive overcapacity has disrupted the solar industry’s supply chains since the beginning of 2023 and pushed prices for all key components below production costs“, say the climate analysts at consulting agency Trivium China. Manufacturers of upstream products have also been caught up in the downward trend.
The absurd thing is that the more the solar companies sold, the more money they lost. The companies’ operating cash flow also collapsed, as Caixin has calculated. Only a few companies remained profitable at all in the first half of the year. However, not without a significant drop in profits of up to 85 percent – as in the case of solar module giants Jinko Solar and Trina Solar. According to Trivium, this is a scenario that manufacturers should first get used to: The extreme pressure on margins due to overcapacity will continue in the future.
In the previous year, some solar companies had announced gigantic expansion plans, driven by a large inflow of capital. The companies raised large amounts of money through IPOs, private placements or convertible bonds. Their aim was to secure a large market share as quickly as possible – as is so often the case in China’s booming industries. The inflow quickly gave rise to several industry giants such as Longi, Jinko, JA Solar & Co.
The desolate situation is now making the solar industry unattractive for investors; they are turning off the money tap. Longi’s market valuation is now almost 80 percent below its 2021 peak. While 15 photovoltaic companies went public in 2022, only five did so in 2023. More than a dozen solar companies have already withdrawn their IPO plans for 2024.
However, a lack of demand on its own doorstep is not the problem. Beijing is having huge solar and wind parks built in the deserts of western China in order to achieve its climate targets. There is also a campaign for solar cells on roofs in rural regions. The installed capacity of solar systems in China in the first half of the year was 27 percent higher than in the previous year – a whopping 123.5 gigawatts (GW). The Chinese Photovoltaic Industry Association (CPIA) has forecast new capacities of up to 220 GW for 2024 – similar to last year.
However, international trade collapsed. Solar exports fell significantly by more than a third due to weaker demand in the target markets. Exports to Europe, China’s largest market, even fell by half, mainly due to surplus stocks from previous years and the increasing trade conflicts.
And there is still no real exit strategy from the overcapacity. “It could take several years for the industry to overcome its massive imbalance between supply and demand and recover”, write the Trivium analysts.
According to all experts, prices will only stabilize when solar companies shift their focus from market share to profitability. What is needed is the closure of obsolete capacities or consolidation through mergers.
At the beginning of September, Tongwei, one of the industry leaders, announced the acquisition of a majority stake in its ailing competitor Runergy. The companies that survive the crisis will be even bigger than the current industry leaders, as the Trivium analysts believe: “They will be even more dominant as soon as the market returns to equilibrium.”
For us Uyghurs and Tibetans, the Chinese National Day is a day of mourning: The founding of the People’s Republic of China ended the existence of the independent Republic of East Turkestan and the independent state of Tibet. The People’s Liberation Army invaded both countries in 1949 and took away the independence of Tibetans and Uyghurs. For us, therefore, the year primarily marks the beginning of decades of oppression.
Although autonomy was promised, assimilation was the true goal of the Communist Party. Uyghurs have now become a minority in their own homeland through the targeted settlement of Han Chinese. The Communist Party has tried to do the same in Tibet, but has so far largely failed due to Tibet’s geographically unfavorable location. It is now focusing on other measures.
Under President Xi Jinping, repression has intensified dramatically in both Tibet and East Turkestan. In recent years, between 1.8 to 3 million Uyghurs and members of other Turkic peoples have been subjected to the system of internment camps. There they were and are subjected to forced indoctrination and violence, and women are forcibly sterilized. In Tibet, it is estimated that around one million children between the ages of four and 18 are forced to attend state boarding schools. The young Tibetans are ideologically indoctrinated and re-educated to become patriotic Chinese. The aim is that children no longer speak their own language and become alienated from their families and their culture. Resistance is thus eradicated in childhood.
Our culture and religion are being systematically suppressed. Over 16,000 mosques and holy sites have been destroyed in East Turkestan, including some of the oldest Islamic places of worship in the world. The Uyghur language has virtually disappeared from public life and our traditional culture has been degraded to folklore for tourists. In Tibet, too, Tibetan monasteries have degenerated into photo opportunities for Chinese tourists: In some monasteries, opening hours for Buddhists have been cut back and extended for tourists. Time and again, centuries-old monasteries are being destroyed – most recently increasingly for the construction of Chinese dams.
In East Turkestan, a piece of forced labor machinery is added to the camp and prison system. Uyghurs are often sent directly from the camps to factories, where they are forced to work under harsh conditions and usually without adequate pay. International companies also benefit from this. Recent revelations have shown that products from forced labor end up in global supply chains. Volkswagen also produces cars in Xinjiang despite massive criticism.
In Tibet, Tibetan nature and culture are being destroyed for dams and raw material mines. The Chinese government is building huge dams, some in UNESCO-protected areas, without the Tibetans having a say. Before a dam was built in eastern Tibet at the beginning of the year, around a thousand citizens and monks were arrested for trying to defend their villages and monasteries from the masses of water. Even after 70 years of occupation, Tibetans still have no voice.
But the oppression does not end at China’s borders. Tibetans and Uyghurs who leave their homeland must fear the long arm of the Communist Party. This also applies to the Uyghur co-author of this text. The Chinese regime repeatedly tried to exert pressure on his mother and sister. He was pressured to stop his criticism – the psychological pressure was so great that he had to abandon his studies in Germany. The Chinese embassy refused to issue important documents – his newborn child remained undocumented for years and his wife was unable to provide proof of her academic qualifications. In 2017, contact with the family in East Turkestan broke off completely. In the few moments he was able to speak to his mother, she begged him to stop his human rights work. The fear for her safety is omnipresent.
Thousands of Uyghurs, Tibetans, Hong Kongers and critical Chinese in Germany feel the same way. Every public act, every participation in a demonstration, and every statement against the Chinese government can have consequences – for them personally, but also for their family in China. Traveling home is impossible or involves interrogation and intimidation at the border and in the country – even for people who are now German citizens.
In Germany, too, Uyghurs and Tibetans are intimidated by stalking or telephone terror. For decades, the Communist Party has been building up a system of control and punishment that spans generations. So far, the German state has hardly reacted to this. Many Tibetans and Uyghurs in Germany have experienced a massive loss of trust in the German security authorities. There is no de facto protection from repression and persecution in Germany.
While the Communist Party celebrates its Chinese dream, Uyghurs and Tibetans are living a nightmare. Our culture, identity and basic rights continue to be systematically erased. It is time for German actors to finally act. Companies must ensure that they do not profit from forced labor. The German government must put pressure on China to stop human rights violations in China and Germany. China’s weakening economy and access to the European market offer leverage for this. What is needed now is the courage to stand up for human rights. Not just with words – but with action.
Tenzyn Zöchbauer is Managing Director of the Tibet Initiative Germany. Gheyyur Kuerban is the Berlin Director of the World Uyghur Congress.
Do you recognize the two gentlemen in the center of the picture? That’s former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Egon Krenz, the last head of state and party leader of the GDR. The two ex-politicians ran into each other – knowingly or not – at the Chinese embassy on Tuesday. The envoy of the People’s Republic celebrated the 75th birthday of the People’s Republic of China there together with Putin confidant Schröder and former SED leader Krenz.
The Jian G. espionage case continues to unfold. Do you remember? G. had been snooping around the European Parliament as a German citizen for the Chinese secret service. His gateway was the office door of AfD politician Maximilian Krah. On Tuesday, the Federal Public Prosecutor General’s Office reported that a Chinese citizen residing in Leipzig had allegedly assisted G.
The person is a woman named Yaqi X., who used a different gateway than the alleged contact agent. As an employee of a logistics service provider at Leipzig/Halle Airport, she is said to have gained access to sensitive information. She is now in custody and gives us plenty of reason to think about how well German airports and container ports protect themselves against foreign espionage.
Our second main topic today is of an industrial nature. China’s leading solar companies suffered dramatic losses in the first half of the year despite continued high demand, writes Christiane Kühl. Now the financial flow is also threatening to dry up. A new direction for the companies is urgently needed. One or two German solar companies may be smiling gleefully at such news from China – provided, of course, that they have survived the hostile market takeover by Chinese competitors over the past 20 years.
The arrest of a Chinese citizen in Leipzig raises the question of the extent of Chinese espionage operations in Germany. On Tuesday, the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office reported on the Yaqi X. case and established a connection to a suspected espionage case involving AfD MEP Maximilian Krah.
X. is urgently suspected of secret service agent activities for a Chinese secret service, the Office of the Attorney General announced. An arrest warrant was issued for her. The woman had worked for a logistics service provider at Leipzig/Halle Airport, among other places. Specifically, she is accused of working for a Chinese secret service employee – the German citizen Jian G., who is already in custody – between August last year and February this year.
She is said to have informed G. several times about the transportation of armaments and people with connections to a German arms company. At the time, G. was still an employee of AfD politician Krah. The Chinese embassy did not respond to an inquiry from Table.Briefings about the new arrest.
For experts in the field of intelligence gathering, however, it comes as little surprise since the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the Military Counterintelligence Service have repeatedly warned of Chinese espionage in Germany. If intelligence services are already publicly pointing out possible espionage activities, “then there are a large number of cases behind it”, the former director of the Intelligence Analysis Center of the European Union, Gerhard Conrad, had already said to the news channel ntv after G.’s arrest. Anything else would be dubious. The arrests would validate these warnings.
It is reasonable to assume that the Chinese secret service is also interested in information about the possible transportation of armaments at other German airports or shipping hubs such as the Port of Hamburg and is trying to position informants at such neuralgic points. And the question arises as to how well airports and ports are prepared for these challenges.
“Working in the security area of the airport – whether for airport employees or third-party companies – generally requires a comprehensive check. This ensures protection“, the Hamburg Senate’s Department of Economics and Innovation (BWI) announced. As the responsible aviation security authority, BWI is responsible for background checks “within the scope of the legal requirements”.
With regard to the persons to be checked, it obtains information from the police, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the courts as a standard. Such checks also include so-called “secure senders”, i.e. logistics companies that are allowed to deliver directly to the security sector. “We do not carry out our own investigations in this regard, but rely on existing findings“, it says. If there are doubts about reliability, the corresponding confirmation will be refused, “for example, if suspicions cannot be dispelled after a hearing”.
It is still unclear what access X. was granted in the security area. The Attorney General’s Office only refers to a “company that provides logistics services, including at the airport”. This can mean two things. While a logistics company that is located near the airport or delivers goods for shipping purposes, for example, is subject to fewer security precautions, the corresponding regulations at the airport itself are much more extensive.
The Port of Hamburg also refers to the authorities. Last year, a subsidiary of the Chinese state-owned company Cosco acquired 24.99 percent of the Tollerort terminal, sparking a discussion about the security of critical infrastructure in Germany. However, the city’s Port Authority asks for your understanding that it does not wish to comment on its own security concept.
However, as Table.Briefings has learned from circles, the major players at the Port of Hamburg have sufficient China expertise to be aware of the risks. Yet, there is no central control system for checking service providers with only a few employees. It could therefore not be ruled out that there are starting points for potential espionage activities.
China’s solar industry has suffered dramatic losses this year. Overcapacity and lower demand abroad have triggered a price war that is now taking its toll. Several industry leaders had to announce severe half-year losses at the beginning of September. Longi Green Energy Technology reported a net loss of 5.2 billion yuan (733 million US dollars) for the first six months of 2024. Competitors Tongwei and TCL Zhonghuan Renewable Energy Technology each lost around three billion yuan.
The consequences are not yet foreseeable, as companies are facing a force that for decades they had only been able to confront with state support: the free market. However, state subsidies were discontinued in 2022. Supply and demand are now completely determined by market signals, which is unsettling for companies. “This is the first time that the sector has bottomed out in a completely market-driven environment”, Han Xue, an energy policy expert at the Development Research Center of the State Council, told the business magazine Caixin.
In the past, local governments were still able to promote the industry through land use rights, tax breaks and favorable credit conditions. However, many municipalities are now bankrupt themselves. China’s banks have not yet withdrawn their credit lines and commitments on a large scale: “But many expect this to happen soon”, writes Caixin.
“Massive overcapacity has disrupted the solar industry’s supply chains since the beginning of 2023 and pushed prices for all key components below production costs“, say the climate analysts at consulting agency Trivium China. Manufacturers of upstream products have also been caught up in the downward trend.
The absurd thing is that the more the solar companies sold, the more money they lost. The companies’ operating cash flow also collapsed, as Caixin has calculated. Only a few companies remained profitable at all in the first half of the year. However, not without a significant drop in profits of up to 85 percent – as in the case of solar module giants Jinko Solar and Trina Solar. According to Trivium, this is a scenario that manufacturers should first get used to: The extreme pressure on margins due to overcapacity will continue in the future.
In the previous year, some solar companies had announced gigantic expansion plans, driven by a large inflow of capital. The companies raised large amounts of money through IPOs, private placements or convertible bonds. Their aim was to secure a large market share as quickly as possible – as is so often the case in China’s booming industries. The inflow quickly gave rise to several industry giants such as Longi, Jinko, JA Solar & Co.
The desolate situation is now making the solar industry unattractive for investors; they are turning off the money tap. Longi’s market valuation is now almost 80 percent below its 2021 peak. While 15 photovoltaic companies went public in 2022, only five did so in 2023. More than a dozen solar companies have already withdrawn their IPO plans for 2024.
However, a lack of demand on its own doorstep is not the problem. Beijing is having huge solar and wind parks built in the deserts of western China in order to achieve its climate targets. There is also a campaign for solar cells on roofs in rural regions. The installed capacity of solar systems in China in the first half of the year was 27 percent higher than in the previous year – a whopping 123.5 gigawatts (GW). The Chinese Photovoltaic Industry Association (CPIA) has forecast new capacities of up to 220 GW for 2024 – similar to last year.
However, international trade collapsed. Solar exports fell significantly by more than a third due to weaker demand in the target markets. Exports to Europe, China’s largest market, even fell by half, mainly due to surplus stocks from previous years and the increasing trade conflicts.
And there is still no real exit strategy from the overcapacity. “It could take several years for the industry to overcome its massive imbalance between supply and demand and recover”, write the Trivium analysts.
According to all experts, prices will only stabilize when solar companies shift their focus from market share to profitability. What is needed is the closure of obsolete capacities or consolidation through mergers.
At the beginning of September, Tongwei, one of the industry leaders, announced the acquisition of a majority stake in its ailing competitor Runergy. The companies that survive the crisis will be even bigger than the current industry leaders, as the Trivium analysts believe: “They will be even more dominant as soon as the market returns to equilibrium.”
For us Uyghurs and Tibetans, the Chinese National Day is a day of mourning: The founding of the People’s Republic of China ended the existence of the independent Republic of East Turkestan and the independent state of Tibet. The People’s Liberation Army invaded both countries in 1949 and took away the independence of Tibetans and Uyghurs. For us, therefore, the year primarily marks the beginning of decades of oppression.
Although autonomy was promised, assimilation was the true goal of the Communist Party. Uyghurs have now become a minority in their own homeland through the targeted settlement of Han Chinese. The Communist Party has tried to do the same in Tibet, but has so far largely failed due to Tibet’s geographically unfavorable location. It is now focusing on other measures.
Under President Xi Jinping, repression has intensified dramatically in both Tibet and East Turkestan. In recent years, between 1.8 to 3 million Uyghurs and members of other Turkic peoples have been subjected to the system of internment camps. There they were and are subjected to forced indoctrination and violence, and women are forcibly sterilized. In Tibet, it is estimated that around one million children between the ages of four and 18 are forced to attend state boarding schools. The young Tibetans are ideologically indoctrinated and re-educated to become patriotic Chinese. The aim is that children no longer speak their own language and become alienated from their families and their culture. Resistance is thus eradicated in childhood.
Our culture and religion are being systematically suppressed. Over 16,000 mosques and holy sites have been destroyed in East Turkestan, including some of the oldest Islamic places of worship in the world. The Uyghur language has virtually disappeared from public life and our traditional culture has been degraded to folklore for tourists. In Tibet, too, Tibetan monasteries have degenerated into photo opportunities for Chinese tourists: In some monasteries, opening hours for Buddhists have been cut back and extended for tourists. Time and again, centuries-old monasteries are being destroyed – most recently increasingly for the construction of Chinese dams.
In East Turkestan, a piece of forced labor machinery is added to the camp and prison system. Uyghurs are often sent directly from the camps to factories, where they are forced to work under harsh conditions and usually without adequate pay. International companies also benefit from this. Recent revelations have shown that products from forced labor end up in global supply chains. Volkswagen also produces cars in Xinjiang despite massive criticism.
In Tibet, Tibetan nature and culture are being destroyed for dams and raw material mines. The Chinese government is building huge dams, some in UNESCO-protected areas, without the Tibetans having a say. Before a dam was built in eastern Tibet at the beginning of the year, around a thousand citizens and monks were arrested for trying to defend their villages and monasteries from the masses of water. Even after 70 years of occupation, Tibetans still have no voice.
But the oppression does not end at China’s borders. Tibetans and Uyghurs who leave their homeland must fear the long arm of the Communist Party. This also applies to the Uyghur co-author of this text. The Chinese regime repeatedly tried to exert pressure on his mother and sister. He was pressured to stop his criticism – the psychological pressure was so great that he had to abandon his studies in Germany. The Chinese embassy refused to issue important documents – his newborn child remained undocumented for years and his wife was unable to provide proof of her academic qualifications. In 2017, contact with the family in East Turkestan broke off completely. In the few moments he was able to speak to his mother, she begged him to stop his human rights work. The fear for her safety is omnipresent.
Thousands of Uyghurs, Tibetans, Hong Kongers and critical Chinese in Germany feel the same way. Every public act, every participation in a demonstration, and every statement against the Chinese government can have consequences – for them personally, but also for their family in China. Traveling home is impossible or involves interrogation and intimidation at the border and in the country – even for people who are now German citizens.
In Germany, too, Uyghurs and Tibetans are intimidated by stalking or telephone terror. For decades, the Communist Party has been building up a system of control and punishment that spans generations. So far, the German state has hardly reacted to this. Many Tibetans and Uyghurs in Germany have experienced a massive loss of trust in the German security authorities. There is no de facto protection from repression and persecution in Germany.
While the Communist Party celebrates its Chinese dream, Uyghurs and Tibetans are living a nightmare. Our culture, identity and basic rights continue to be systematically erased. It is time for German actors to finally act. Companies must ensure that they do not profit from forced labor. The German government must put pressure on China to stop human rights violations in China and Germany. China’s weakening economy and access to the European market offer leverage for this. What is needed now is the courage to stand up for human rights. Not just with words – but with action.
Tenzyn Zöchbauer is Managing Director of the Tibet Initiative Germany. Gheyyur Kuerban is the Berlin Director of the World Uyghur Congress.
Do you recognize the two gentlemen in the center of the picture? That’s former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Egon Krenz, the last head of state and party leader of the GDR. The two ex-politicians ran into each other – knowingly or not – at the Chinese embassy on Tuesday. The envoy of the People’s Republic celebrated the 75th birthday of the People’s Republic of China there together with Putin confidant Schröder and former SED leader Krenz.
