China remained largely quiet over the weekend. Only isolated protests were reported. It is unclear whether this was due to the massive police presence, controls on communications in social networks, or simply the cold in northern China. However, the first effects of the protests are obvious: Many cities have relaxed mandatory testing and quarantine rules since Friday, as we summarize in our News section. The party leadership is aware that the situation is more fragile than usual. This is one reason the memorial service for the late state and party leader Jiang Zemin will be held in the easily guarded Great Hall of the People.
Our interview with the German Electro and Digital Industry Association (ZVEI) once again shows, from a German perspective, that it is tricky to find the right level of economic engagement with China. The People’s Republic is more important for the German electronics industry than ever before. Nevertheless, Oliver Blank, responsible for global affairs at ZVEI, argues in an interview with Felix Lee for a tougher position on the People’s Republic, preferably in cooperation with France and the EU. Blank currently works on the German government’s China strategy and believes that what is known about it so far is a good basis for discussion.
However, China can also develop new technologies on its own, as the modern logistics of the Port of Tianjin shows. The port is a pioneer in digitalization in China, as Frank Sieren notes. Many vehicles at the container terminals are autonomous. The port is ahead of Hamburg, for example, in this respect and is also set to become a model port in the People’s Republic.
Mr. Blank, the first draft of a China strategy from the Green-led Foreign Ministry has surfaced. The Ministry of Economics, also led by the Green Party, has contributed to it. What do you think of the draft?
Oliver Blank: I have read through the 60 pages by the Foreign Ministry, and I have to say that it is a remarkable paper. At the same time, I know that many experts worked on it, and we also had the opportunity to make a contribution. I would have set one or two priorities differently. But basically, I think it is a solid basis for discussion. Of course, it is important that the German government ultimately comes up with a coherent strategy. After all, geopolitics, security interests, human rights, climate, and the economy must be considered simultaneously when dealing with China. European coordination is also important. We are not alone in Europe.
Are there disagreements between Brussels and Berlin? The Foreign Ministry seems to have adopted the triad of partnership, competition, and rivalry toward China.
Yes, that is true. But other than that, the EU Commission has not further specified its China strategy since 2019. That was all before the pandemic. But a lot has happened since. China’s relationship with the West has once again deteriorated significantly; due to the restrictions in China, there was virtually no direct contact at all during the pandemic period. At the same time, China’s technology has once again advanced considerably. The 27 EU states must come together on China issues.
That could be difficult. After all, the interests of individual members are very different. Greece and Hungary want to cooperate with China in almost every respect, while the Baltic States and others are much more skeptical. Well, and Germany …
Yes, we have a strong interest in China in Germany. Not every EU country has that. We repeatedly point out how important a common axis between Germany and France is in the China strategy. Other European partners will also show more commitment if the two largest EU economies have a clear understanding of the matter and take the initiative accordingly. At the moment, many countries are waiting. At the same time, I believe that Germany should not go alone with China.
France has even more of a geostrategic and security-motivated perspective on the relationship with China and the Asia-Pacific region. And that is important. We recommend that the German government should quickly discuss what it has worked out with the French government and then see how alliances at the European level can be created for a joint EU-China strategy.
What else has changed for your industry, i.e. the electrical and digital industry, since 2019?
On the one hand, the Chinese market has become even larger and thus more important for our industry. On the other hand, however, the problems have also become more visible. Even before the pandemic, our industry had to contend with very state-regulated market access in China. Security policy issues also came up more and more. The cyber security law in China, which obliges our industry to provide data to the state, has made us realize that we can no longer negotiate many aspects with the Chinese side without the support of our governments.
And, of course, we have also realized that Chinese policy is often very self-confident and aggressive – and that we need to develop a realistic view of China. The companies are not naive. They put a lot of money into their hands. In 2020, the electrical and digital industry invested 7.3 billion Euros in China. Medium-sized companies in particular do not assume that the German government will bail them out if something goes wrong. They bear the entrepreneurial risk and conduct an intensive risk analysis of their China business.
Does this mean we will also have to take a tougher line in our dealings with China?
Our companies respect the primacy of politics. If policymakers say that there are geopolitical and security limits, our companies will comply with them. At the same time, the German government and the EU Commission should not impose too tight a corset prematurely. Many companies are also saying: ‘We should not go too far’. Despite all the problems, China is still an important market for us. And quite honestly: Despite the diversification of international supply chains, the Chinese market cannot be replaced so easily. Turning away from China would come at a very high price.
Beyond the Foreign Minister’s draft, what would you like to see in the China strategy?
We should clarify that we are not afraid of competition, including China. We should see this politically, i.e., with a view to our Western value system. We don’t have to hide economically, either. The EU is highly innovative. And our large domestic market is a very strong asset. China’s government knows that. We need to use this asset much more and more confidently in the negotiations. We should also continue to sharpen our trade policy instruments. The EU’s investment screening – an overview of how extensively state investors are active and where – is already delivering good results but could be expanded significantly. If we have a few more facts and figures on the table, we can make much more rational decisions based on them.
Particularly in China, which has its economy under very centralized control, it is important to look at the overall program, such as the Belt and Road Initiative – and not just the individual investment, as was recently the case with the port of Hamburg.
In 2018, Peter Altmaier of the conservative CDU, as Minister of Economics, called for more industrial policy regarding China – and received much criticism for it.
Yes, in Germany in particular, we find it difficult when the state interferes too much in economic activity. We certainly need a coordinated industrial, trade, and raw materials policy between all EU states and a focus on technologies that are strategically important for Europe, offering companies opportunities with political support, for example in the search for new resources and markets. Some tools exist already, such as trade and investment protection. In addition, our governments should work to ensure that the same rules apply in international trade and demand strict adherence to reciprocity.
But will that be enough? How will the German chip industry keep up, for example, if there is always a powerful and financially strong state behind the Chinese competition?
Microchips are particularly important for us strategically. And we should also invest more in Europe. Europe needs high-performance ecosystems in microelectronics. This has been neglected too much in recent years. I think it is good that we are now investing more strongly again, also with government aid in Europe (IPCEIs). If we succeed in creating an appropriate ecosystem, we will become more attractive for international investment again. In this way, we will strengthen technologies ‘Made in Europe’.
This is by no means related to the desire to become self-sufficient from the rest of the world. We are far too strongly networked globally for that, especially in microelectronics. But we should strengthen certain strategically important technologies in Europe again. In the field of microelectronics, not only China invests a lot. South Korea, Japan, and the USA are also doing so.
Oliver Blank, 54, is Head of Global Affairs at the German Electrical and Digital Industry Association (ZVEI). He lives in Brussels.
The transfer of knowledge quickly became the central topic of a talk show on Germany’s public broadcaster. By acquiring a terminal in Hamburg, China also wanted to gain access to data and know-how – Hamburg’s First Mayor Peter Tschentscher had to respond to this accusation repeatedly in various ways. But at least regarding the knowledge about the organization of ports, China has long since ceased to be the student. No one has as much experience with this as the Chinese operators. Most innovations in port logistics now come from the People’s Republic.
Of the ten world’s largest ports, seven are located in China. As of 2022, no European port is in the top ten. Hamburg, the largest German port, is in 19th – one place lower than a year ago.
The port of Tianjin on the coast near Beijing is on rank 8th. It beats Hamburg because it is easier to reach since the shipping channel there is deeper – while Hamburg is always struggling with the difficult deepening of the Elbe river. Currently, the largest container ships can only call at Hamburg at high tide.
Today, more than twice as many containers are handled in Tianjin as in Hamburg. Large shipyards that have migrated from Hamburg are now located there. Business is also going well in Tianjin. Even though Chinese export growth has stagnated recently, the Port of Tianjin managed to grow by 4.5 percent from January to September.
Above all, the port in Tianjin is highly digitized and automated. Unlike in Hamburg, the cranes operate unmanned, as do the electric trucks. The whole thing works with the help of the Beidou satellite navigation system (China.Table reported). This means no queues when unloading. The trucks always arrive at the exact moment when their cargo is needed.
Automatic container handling is based on Huawei’s centralized logistics system, which makes the port much more efficient. The system was built by the Tianjin Port Group (TPG), one of the 50 largest Chinese companies listed on the Shanghai stock market. Like Hamburg, the port is a state-owned enterprise.
The turquoise-colored vehicles of the “Ultra L4” system look like semitrailer trucks without a cab. They charge their batteries when time losses are lowest. They can travel in both directions, so they don’t have to turn around. And even if the 5G network and satellite navigation were to fail, the vehicles can continue driving autonomously. So far, driverless vehicles have proven reliable during the first year of operations. A human had to intervene only 0.1 percent of the time.
Previously, 74 traditional trucks were needed, for which 210 drivers were employed in shifts. These drivers are now obsolete, making container logistics more cost-effective and, ultimately, products as well.
The autonomous terminal vehicles coordinate with the traditional trucks outside. This goes as far as calculating the traffic light phases in the city so that the software can calculate exactly how much time the vehicles will need.
Tianjin is also the pioneer of all these technologies in China. Now, other ports in China are to be similarly automated. The next step will be to roll out the technology internationally via Chinese port operators.
Around 300 people protested on Saturday on the Jannowitz Bridge in front of the Chinese Embassy in Berlin under the slogan “China’s white sheet for freedom.” On their placards, they demanded an end to the lockdowns but also freedom of speech and press, as well as the release of demonstrators detained in China. Some signs featured caricatures, including Xi Jinping as Pooh the Bear and “Xitler” with a Hitler mustache. The crowd – which also included Taiwanese, Hong Kongers, and Uyghurs – was flanked by two police buses.
Many participants hid their faces for fear of persecution, wearing masks and sunglasses. In the afternoon, when a man approached the window on the top floor of the embassy building and filmed the crowd with a smartphone, protesters chanted “下来做核酸” – “come down and take a Covid test.” Shouts calling for Xi Jinping’s resignation and the end of the one-party rule also rang out, as they did during the Shanghai protests.
During the afternoon, several participants gave speeches in German, English, and Chinese, including a young Uyghur and two exchange students who explained that “dictatorship is the shackle of the people” and that “a healthy society needs many different voices.”
Among the speakers was Luo Shengchun, wife of imprisoned human rights lawyer Ding Jiaxi, who spontaneously decided to attend the meeting during a visit to Berlin. Luo read from a letter her husband had dictated to his lawyer in April. On the sidelines of the protest, Luo expressed her hope for change to China.Table. “I think the white-paper revolution will succeed. But it will take time. We have to keep fighting until all political prisoners are free.” fpe
Scor (real name: Tim Oelrich) maneuvers through the narrow streets of Shenzhen on his bicycle. He is looking for a testing station to take the mandatory daily PCR test. The waiting lines are long, so he has to drive from one test station to the next. The red walls that will soon close off entire neighborhoods still lie in piles on the street. In TikTok videos like this one, the German rapper Scor has been regularly showing his everyday life in Shenzhen to more than 300,000 followers since March 2022. The 32-year-old’s love for this city is plain to see: Its skyline is tattooed on his forearm.
The Bremerhaven native has been making rap since he was 13. While studying business communications, he learns Chinese – during the lectures on his iPad. In 2017, he lands a job in the marketing department of a company in Shenzhen. But after about a year, he has to admit to himself that office work doesn’t make him happy. To realize his dream – being a full-time rapper – he gives up his stable job. As 奥熙 (Àoxī) he starts to rap in Chinese.
In the Chinese rap scene, his music is often met with prejudice at first. The pressure to prove himself is enormous. Month after month, Scor lives on just one meal a day while he produces music non-stop in his tiny Shenzhen room. In 2020, he releases the diss track “Fortune Code” about another foreign musician who, in Scor’s eyes, panders too calculated and shallow to the Chinese audience. On the video platform Bilibili, this track is clicked over five million times within a short time. Other songs also go viral, and Scor takes part in a casting show in which 40 rappers live together in Big Brother style. The show makes him famous in China.
About ten years ago, Chinese rap was still unfiltered, says Scor. He still maintains this style today – in a way that is accepted in China, but that will never become part of the “mainstream”. “If you want to be successful as a rapper in China, you depend on support from the top, that is just the way it is,” Scor says. He says rap in China has not developed organically but has become known primarily through casting shows. In these shows, however, a certain style is “pushed,” so there is hardly any stylistic diversity in China’s mainstream rap. Scor does not want to “smooth out” his style to become even more successful in China.
When the Covid measures in Shenzhen are once again tightened, he can no longer play live gigs. During this time, he started his TikTok channel, where he shows life during the lockdown in China. He often receives messages from people who tell him that their perception of China has improved thanks to his videos and that they have even started learning Chinese themselves.
“With my videos, I want to achieve that people get to know China, independent of politics,” says the rapper. With his work in youth culture, which new media transport once around the globe, he achieves exactly that. Hundreds of thousands of people follow his unique kind of cultural exchange. Maya-Katharina Schulz
Hearing the word “taxes” can quickly raise the hairs on the back of your neck. Income tax, value-added tax, car tax … words that will quickly trigger people. But did you know there is even an IQ tax in China?
Fortunately, this so-called 智商税 zhìshāngshuì (from 智商 zhìshāng “intelligence quotient” and 税 shuì “tax”) is not collected by the tax authorities. You could say this “tax” – which can also be jokingly called a consumer tax – is calculated, as the name suggests, based on the cleverness of the consumer.
It is a charming Chinese neologism for learning the hard way when you make bad, unwise, or even foolish buying decisions. For example, if you fall for clever advertising promises and throw your money out the window. Here, the Internet jargon mocks that one has “paid IQ tax” (交智商税 jiāo zhìshāngshuì).
The Chinese web language knows as subcategories of this “dummy tax” for example the “diet tax” (减肥税 jiǎnféishuì) – meaning spending money on useless weight loss products, the “beauty tax” (美容税 měiróngshuì) – unnecessarily expensive beauty investments, or the “body growth tax” (增高税 zēnggāoshuì) – money spent on gimmicks, tricks and miracle drugs that promise a tall appearance.
But let’s be honest: Haven’t we all paid tribute to the tricks of the advertising industry? If you are now reminded of your own embarrassing shopping mistakes, take a look at some friendly Chinese swear words as a consolation. In Mandarin, “dummies” and “chumps” can be lovingly scolded using cute expressions such as “stupid cucumber” (傻瓜 shǎguā), “stupid egg” (笨蛋 bèndàn), “papaya” (木瓜 mùguā) or “pig head” (猪头 zhūtóu). With so much cute cussing, you really cannot be mad at yourself (and others) anymore.
Verena Menzel runs the online language school New Chinese in Beijing.
China remained largely quiet over the weekend. Only isolated protests were reported. It is unclear whether this was due to the massive police presence, controls on communications in social networks, or simply the cold in northern China. However, the first effects of the protests are obvious: Many cities have relaxed mandatory testing and quarantine rules since Friday, as we summarize in our News section. The party leadership is aware that the situation is more fragile than usual. This is one reason the memorial service for the late state and party leader Jiang Zemin will be held in the easily guarded Great Hall of the People.
Our interview with the German Electro and Digital Industry Association (ZVEI) once again shows, from a German perspective, that it is tricky to find the right level of economic engagement with China. The People’s Republic is more important for the German electronics industry than ever before. Nevertheless, Oliver Blank, responsible for global affairs at ZVEI, argues in an interview with Felix Lee for a tougher position on the People’s Republic, preferably in cooperation with France and the EU. Blank currently works on the German government’s China strategy and believes that what is known about it so far is a good basis for discussion.
However, China can also develop new technologies on its own, as the modern logistics of the Port of Tianjin shows. The port is a pioneer in digitalization in China, as Frank Sieren notes. Many vehicles at the container terminals are autonomous. The port is ahead of Hamburg, for example, in this respect and is also set to become a model port in the People’s Republic.
Mr. Blank, the first draft of a China strategy from the Green-led Foreign Ministry has surfaced. The Ministry of Economics, also led by the Green Party, has contributed to it. What do you think of the draft?
Oliver Blank: I have read through the 60 pages by the Foreign Ministry, and I have to say that it is a remarkable paper. At the same time, I know that many experts worked on it, and we also had the opportunity to make a contribution. I would have set one or two priorities differently. But basically, I think it is a solid basis for discussion. Of course, it is important that the German government ultimately comes up with a coherent strategy. After all, geopolitics, security interests, human rights, climate, and the economy must be considered simultaneously when dealing with China. European coordination is also important. We are not alone in Europe.
Are there disagreements between Brussels and Berlin? The Foreign Ministry seems to have adopted the triad of partnership, competition, and rivalry toward China.
Yes, that is true. But other than that, the EU Commission has not further specified its China strategy since 2019. That was all before the pandemic. But a lot has happened since. China’s relationship with the West has once again deteriorated significantly; due to the restrictions in China, there was virtually no direct contact at all during the pandemic period. At the same time, China’s technology has once again advanced considerably. The 27 EU states must come together on China issues.
That could be difficult. After all, the interests of individual members are very different. Greece and Hungary want to cooperate with China in almost every respect, while the Baltic States and others are much more skeptical. Well, and Germany …
Yes, we have a strong interest in China in Germany. Not every EU country has that. We repeatedly point out how important a common axis between Germany and France is in the China strategy. Other European partners will also show more commitment if the two largest EU economies have a clear understanding of the matter and take the initiative accordingly. At the moment, many countries are waiting. At the same time, I believe that Germany should not go alone with China.
France has even more of a geostrategic and security-motivated perspective on the relationship with China and the Asia-Pacific region. And that is important. We recommend that the German government should quickly discuss what it has worked out with the French government and then see how alliances at the European level can be created for a joint EU-China strategy.
What else has changed for your industry, i.e. the electrical and digital industry, since 2019?
On the one hand, the Chinese market has become even larger and thus more important for our industry. On the other hand, however, the problems have also become more visible. Even before the pandemic, our industry had to contend with very state-regulated market access in China. Security policy issues also came up more and more. The cyber security law in China, which obliges our industry to provide data to the state, has made us realize that we can no longer negotiate many aspects with the Chinese side without the support of our governments.
And, of course, we have also realized that Chinese policy is often very self-confident and aggressive – and that we need to develop a realistic view of China. The companies are not naive. They put a lot of money into their hands. In 2020, the electrical and digital industry invested 7.3 billion Euros in China. Medium-sized companies in particular do not assume that the German government will bail them out if something goes wrong. They bear the entrepreneurial risk and conduct an intensive risk analysis of their China business.
Does this mean we will also have to take a tougher line in our dealings with China?
Our companies respect the primacy of politics. If policymakers say that there are geopolitical and security limits, our companies will comply with them. At the same time, the German government and the EU Commission should not impose too tight a corset prematurely. Many companies are also saying: ‘We should not go too far’. Despite all the problems, China is still an important market for us. And quite honestly: Despite the diversification of international supply chains, the Chinese market cannot be replaced so easily. Turning away from China would come at a very high price.
Beyond the Foreign Minister’s draft, what would you like to see in the China strategy?
We should clarify that we are not afraid of competition, including China. We should see this politically, i.e., with a view to our Western value system. We don’t have to hide economically, either. The EU is highly innovative. And our large domestic market is a very strong asset. China’s government knows that. We need to use this asset much more and more confidently in the negotiations. We should also continue to sharpen our trade policy instruments. The EU’s investment screening – an overview of how extensively state investors are active and where – is already delivering good results but could be expanded significantly. If we have a few more facts and figures on the table, we can make much more rational decisions based on them.
Particularly in China, which has its economy under very centralized control, it is important to look at the overall program, such as the Belt and Road Initiative – and not just the individual investment, as was recently the case with the port of Hamburg.
In 2018, Peter Altmaier of the conservative CDU, as Minister of Economics, called for more industrial policy regarding China – and received much criticism for it.
Yes, in Germany in particular, we find it difficult when the state interferes too much in economic activity. We certainly need a coordinated industrial, trade, and raw materials policy between all EU states and a focus on technologies that are strategically important for Europe, offering companies opportunities with political support, for example in the search for new resources and markets. Some tools exist already, such as trade and investment protection. In addition, our governments should work to ensure that the same rules apply in international trade and demand strict adherence to reciprocity.
But will that be enough? How will the German chip industry keep up, for example, if there is always a powerful and financially strong state behind the Chinese competition?
Microchips are particularly important for us strategically. And we should also invest more in Europe. Europe needs high-performance ecosystems in microelectronics. This has been neglected too much in recent years. I think it is good that we are now investing more strongly again, also with government aid in Europe (IPCEIs). If we succeed in creating an appropriate ecosystem, we will become more attractive for international investment again. In this way, we will strengthen technologies ‘Made in Europe’.
This is by no means related to the desire to become self-sufficient from the rest of the world. We are far too strongly networked globally for that, especially in microelectronics. But we should strengthen certain strategically important technologies in Europe again. In the field of microelectronics, not only China invests a lot. South Korea, Japan, and the USA are also doing so.
Oliver Blank, 54, is Head of Global Affairs at the German Electrical and Digital Industry Association (ZVEI). He lives in Brussels.
The transfer of knowledge quickly became the central topic of a talk show on Germany’s public broadcaster. By acquiring a terminal in Hamburg, China also wanted to gain access to data and know-how – Hamburg’s First Mayor Peter Tschentscher had to respond to this accusation repeatedly in various ways. But at least regarding the knowledge about the organization of ports, China has long since ceased to be the student. No one has as much experience with this as the Chinese operators. Most innovations in port logistics now come from the People’s Republic.
Of the ten world’s largest ports, seven are located in China. As of 2022, no European port is in the top ten. Hamburg, the largest German port, is in 19th – one place lower than a year ago.
The port of Tianjin on the coast near Beijing is on rank 8th. It beats Hamburg because it is easier to reach since the shipping channel there is deeper – while Hamburg is always struggling with the difficult deepening of the Elbe river. Currently, the largest container ships can only call at Hamburg at high tide.
Today, more than twice as many containers are handled in Tianjin as in Hamburg. Large shipyards that have migrated from Hamburg are now located there. Business is also going well in Tianjin. Even though Chinese export growth has stagnated recently, the Port of Tianjin managed to grow by 4.5 percent from January to September.
Above all, the port in Tianjin is highly digitized and automated. Unlike in Hamburg, the cranes operate unmanned, as do the electric trucks. The whole thing works with the help of the Beidou satellite navigation system (China.Table reported). This means no queues when unloading. The trucks always arrive at the exact moment when their cargo is needed.
Automatic container handling is based on Huawei’s centralized logistics system, which makes the port much more efficient. The system was built by the Tianjin Port Group (TPG), one of the 50 largest Chinese companies listed on the Shanghai stock market. Like Hamburg, the port is a state-owned enterprise.
The turquoise-colored vehicles of the “Ultra L4” system look like semitrailer trucks without a cab. They charge their batteries when time losses are lowest. They can travel in both directions, so they don’t have to turn around. And even if the 5G network and satellite navigation were to fail, the vehicles can continue driving autonomously. So far, driverless vehicles have proven reliable during the first year of operations. A human had to intervene only 0.1 percent of the time.
Previously, 74 traditional trucks were needed, for which 210 drivers were employed in shifts. These drivers are now obsolete, making container logistics more cost-effective and, ultimately, products as well.
The autonomous terminal vehicles coordinate with the traditional trucks outside. This goes as far as calculating the traffic light phases in the city so that the software can calculate exactly how much time the vehicles will need.
Tianjin is also the pioneer of all these technologies in China. Now, other ports in China are to be similarly automated. The next step will be to roll out the technology internationally via Chinese port operators.
Around 300 people protested on Saturday on the Jannowitz Bridge in front of the Chinese Embassy in Berlin under the slogan “China’s white sheet for freedom.” On their placards, they demanded an end to the lockdowns but also freedom of speech and press, as well as the release of demonstrators detained in China. Some signs featured caricatures, including Xi Jinping as Pooh the Bear and “Xitler” with a Hitler mustache. The crowd – which also included Taiwanese, Hong Kongers, and Uyghurs – was flanked by two police buses.
Many participants hid their faces for fear of persecution, wearing masks and sunglasses. In the afternoon, when a man approached the window on the top floor of the embassy building and filmed the crowd with a smartphone, protesters chanted “下来做核酸” – “come down and take a Covid test.” Shouts calling for Xi Jinping’s resignation and the end of the one-party rule also rang out, as they did during the Shanghai protests.
During the afternoon, several participants gave speeches in German, English, and Chinese, including a young Uyghur and two exchange students who explained that “dictatorship is the shackle of the people” and that “a healthy society needs many different voices.”
Among the speakers was Luo Shengchun, wife of imprisoned human rights lawyer Ding Jiaxi, who spontaneously decided to attend the meeting during a visit to Berlin. Luo read from a letter her husband had dictated to his lawyer in April. On the sidelines of the protest, Luo expressed her hope for change to China.Table. “I think the white-paper revolution will succeed. But it will take time. We have to keep fighting until all political prisoners are free.” fpe
Scor (real name: Tim Oelrich) maneuvers through the narrow streets of Shenzhen on his bicycle. He is looking for a testing station to take the mandatory daily PCR test. The waiting lines are long, so he has to drive from one test station to the next. The red walls that will soon close off entire neighborhoods still lie in piles on the street. In TikTok videos like this one, the German rapper Scor has been regularly showing his everyday life in Shenzhen to more than 300,000 followers since March 2022. The 32-year-old’s love for this city is plain to see: Its skyline is tattooed on his forearm.
The Bremerhaven native has been making rap since he was 13. While studying business communications, he learns Chinese – during the lectures on his iPad. In 2017, he lands a job in the marketing department of a company in Shenzhen. But after about a year, he has to admit to himself that office work doesn’t make him happy. To realize his dream – being a full-time rapper – he gives up his stable job. As 奥熙 (Àoxī) he starts to rap in Chinese.
In the Chinese rap scene, his music is often met with prejudice at first. The pressure to prove himself is enormous. Month after month, Scor lives on just one meal a day while he produces music non-stop in his tiny Shenzhen room. In 2020, he releases the diss track “Fortune Code” about another foreign musician who, in Scor’s eyes, panders too calculated and shallow to the Chinese audience. On the video platform Bilibili, this track is clicked over five million times within a short time. Other songs also go viral, and Scor takes part in a casting show in which 40 rappers live together in Big Brother style. The show makes him famous in China.
About ten years ago, Chinese rap was still unfiltered, says Scor. He still maintains this style today – in a way that is accepted in China, but that will never become part of the “mainstream”. “If you want to be successful as a rapper in China, you depend on support from the top, that is just the way it is,” Scor says. He says rap in China has not developed organically but has become known primarily through casting shows. In these shows, however, a certain style is “pushed,” so there is hardly any stylistic diversity in China’s mainstream rap. Scor does not want to “smooth out” his style to become even more successful in China.
When the Covid measures in Shenzhen are once again tightened, he can no longer play live gigs. During this time, he started his TikTok channel, where he shows life during the lockdown in China. He often receives messages from people who tell him that their perception of China has improved thanks to his videos and that they have even started learning Chinese themselves.
“With my videos, I want to achieve that people get to know China, independent of politics,” says the rapper. With his work in youth culture, which new media transport once around the globe, he achieves exactly that. Hundreds of thousands of people follow his unique kind of cultural exchange. Maya-Katharina Schulz
Hearing the word “taxes” can quickly raise the hairs on the back of your neck. Income tax, value-added tax, car tax … words that will quickly trigger people. But did you know there is even an IQ tax in China?
Fortunately, this so-called 智商税 zhìshāngshuì (from 智商 zhìshāng “intelligence quotient” and 税 shuì “tax”) is not collected by the tax authorities. You could say this “tax” – which can also be jokingly called a consumer tax – is calculated, as the name suggests, based on the cleverness of the consumer.
It is a charming Chinese neologism for learning the hard way when you make bad, unwise, or even foolish buying decisions. For example, if you fall for clever advertising promises and throw your money out the window. Here, the Internet jargon mocks that one has “paid IQ tax” (交智商税 jiāo zhìshāngshuì).
The Chinese web language knows as subcategories of this “dummy tax” for example the “diet tax” (减肥税 jiǎnféishuì) – meaning spending money on useless weight loss products, the “beauty tax” (美容税 měiróngshuì) – unnecessarily expensive beauty investments, or the “body growth tax” (增高税 zēnggāoshuì) – money spent on gimmicks, tricks and miracle drugs that promise a tall appearance.
But let’s be honest: Haven’t we all paid tribute to the tricks of the advertising industry? If you are now reminded of your own embarrassing shopping mistakes, take a look at some friendly Chinese swear words as a consolation. In Mandarin, “dummies” and “chumps” can be lovingly scolded using cute expressions such as “stupid cucumber” (傻瓜 shǎguā), “stupid egg” (笨蛋 bèndàn), “papaya” (木瓜 mùguā) or “pig head” (猪头 zhūtóu). With so much cute cussing, you really cannot be mad at yourself (and others) anymore.
Verena Menzel runs the online language school New Chinese in Beijing.
