Germany’s highest diplomatic post in China stood vacant for around ten months. Now, there is once again a representative in Beijing: Ambassador Patricia Flor handed over her accreditation papers at the Foreign Ministry on Friday. On social media, the diplomat presented herself for the first time in Mandarin and English in an introduction video. What issues Flor plans to tackle, you can find out in today’s News section. One thing is already clear: The 60-year-old is taking up her new job in politically highly tense times – geopolitically, but also in the People’s Republic itself.
This is because the leadership will reorganize itself at the CCP National Congress this fall. But the hot phase has already begun. Michael Radunski spoke with political scientist Eberhard Sandschneider, who stressed that the decisions about who will get which post have long been made before the National Congress. Sandschneider explains which problems Xi Jinping faces before the big political showdown and which goals he is pursuing: “Xi is the great moderator, not the great autocrat.” The growing discontent among the population over the ongoing strict Covid measures is not leaving Xi unfazed, either, believes Sandschneider.
The harsh Covid lockdown in Shanghai is partly the reason why the Chinese manufacturer BYD has now overtaken Tesla. BYD builds the majority of its vehicles in Shenzhen in southern China, which was less affected by the Covid measures than Shanghai, where Tesla operates. But that’s not the only reason for the overtaking maneuver from Shenzhen, as our author team in China notes: BYD has also caught up technologically.
Mr. Sandschneider, are you already eagerly awaiting the fall?
No. Why should I?
The grand party congress of the CCP is coming up.
That is true. But when the party congress meets this fall, everything will already be decided. The exciting time is now, now the decisions will be made. In Zhongnanhai, in Beidaihe, or wherever these gentlemen meet. What happens in the fall is pure acclamation.
And what do you hear?
I hear rumors that the party congress may be brought forward. However, that is not very likely.
If it were brought forward now, would that be good or bad for Xi Jinping?
That would be good for Xi, economically and politically. Economically, because the economic consequences of the many lockdowns have not yet fully impacted the economy. The current economic figures are currently even better than they will be in the fall and…
… and you believe that China’s leadership would also publish bad figures in the fall?
No, most certainly not. Bad is relative. All published economic data were, are, and will always be politically controlled. You shouldn’t read anything into it. If Xi believes he needs a five before the decimal point, he will get it. But the strict COVID policy has enormously increased the pressure of reality on the leadership in Beijing.
And politically?
Politically, an earlier party congress would be good for Xi because it would mean that the change of government would be executed relatively smoothly.
What change of government? Xi Jinping has already secured himself a third term as President, which has been constitutionally prohibited since Deng Xiaoping.
That is true. There is hardly any doubt about Xi’s third term in office. Anything else would be tantamount to a revolution. But the big question is whether he will manage to lift his confidants into leadership positions the way he needs them to. That will be difficult, and that is why I do not believe in an early party congress.
You doubt that Xi, as the strong man at the top, will put his confidants in position?
Well, considering the economic situation, considering the great discontent within the population about how the COVID Pandemic is being handled, that is anything but certain. You have to see, many of his confidants are going to retire, from Liu He to Yang Jiechi to Li Keqiang. But Xi needs a network around him again that will carry him.
Yet, Xi likes to be portrayed as China’s almost almighty leader.
This is a misconception that is often made, especially in the West. No matter who is at the head of the CP, many different factions, clans, and groupings must be balanced out. The old communists, the reformers, and whoever else there is. They may have been less visible in recent years, but they still exist. Xi is the great moderator, not the great autocrat.
But we hear and see loud solidarity declarations from the provinces almost every day. They all swear allegiance to Xi Jinping and vow support.
This is the usual game. I’m not sure whether they’re demonstrating solidarity or just pretending. One thing is certain, though: This is just the kind of show that is part and parcel of a party congress.
So is everything going as usual?
Not necessarily. The problems are huge and at the same time, there is a partial paralysis of the Communist Party, especially at the middle and lower levels. There, everyone waits to see what happens at the top. No one dares to stick his head out. The last one who dared to do that was Bo Xilai…
… and he has been behind bars ever since. So who is Xi now? At first, people thought he was a great reformer. But then came the progressive isolation of the country, ideologization, and re-nationalization.
That is all correct. But I do not see any aspirations for absolute power in all of this. Everything that Xi Jinping has done in his responsibility – including the steps backward and the narrowing of the movement as well as the thematic scope – I see all of this as a clear indication of his perception of risk in Chinese society. What happened in China in the years 2000 to 2012 was obviously too liberal and also too dangerous for him.
In what way?
A key moment was certainly the loss of the information monopoly through social media. This was once the core element of rule for the CP – and it was lost to them in 2007 through the iPhone until 2012. But since then, they’ve been doing everything they can to regain that control. Even strengthen it through technology.
You mean the crackdown on tech corporations?
Yes, that too. You see, Xi Jinping isn’t doing this because he thinks Chinese tech companies are too good or make too much money. Nor is he going after squawking entrepreneurs like Jack Ma because of personal spite. Xi sees all of this as dangerous. Loss of control is his biggest fear.
Seriously, dangerous for the People’s Republic of China?
No, dangerous to the Communist Party’s grip on power. That is the central factor. The Chinese Communist Party always stands above the country. We in the West make this mistake all the time: We always see China’s politicians as government officials, but that’s not so important. What matters are their party functions. Xi Jinping is, of course, China’s President, but the most important office is his role as Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Xi is primarily concerned with stability and maintaining power.
This brings us full circle: Deng Xiaoping wanted to ensure stability by setting term limits for the President so that excesses like those under Mao would be prevented. Xi has now abolished this, and the National Congress will approve his third term in office.
Yes, but allow me to point out: When they talk about stability – even for us on a global scale – I’m not worried about China. I’m much more concerned about the United States of America. We will shiver in November at the midterms. And we will shiver even more in 2024, when there is reason to fear that Donald Trump will move back into the White House. Then the big uncertainty factor in international politics will not be Beijing, but Washington. Paradoxically, compared to the situation in the US, China almost seems like a haven of stability.
Eberhard Sandschneider was a professor of Chinese politics and international relations at the Free University of Berlin from 1998 to 2020. From 2003 to 2016, he was also Otto Wolff Director of the Research Institute of the German Council on Foreign Relations. He is currently a partner at the consulting firm Berlin Global Advisors.
Tesla had to struggle with significant problems in China in recent months. Because the factory in Shanghai was affected by the major lockdown, the US automaker sold 80,000 to 100,000 fewer cars than originally planned, according to estimates.
This was also the key reason why global sales of Elon Musk’s company have fallen behind those of Chinese EV manufacturing giant BYD for the first time in three years. While Tesla sold 564,000 cars worldwide in the first half of the year, the Shenzhen-based group sold 641,000 vehicles – 300 percent more than in the same period last year.
Of course, the comparison between Tesla and BYD is not entirely fair. While Tesla only produces premium electric cars, around half of the vehicles produced by BYD are still plug-in hybrids. In addition to a large battery, they also have an internal combustion engine. This is compounded by geographic luck. BYD builds the majority of its vehicles in Shenzhen in southern China, which was less affected by harsh Covid measures than Shanghai.
Nevertheless, there is little doubt among car experts that BYD will maintain its steep success story and will probably pose the greatest challenge for both Tesla and the German premium manufacturers, even outside China. US investor Warren Buffett apparently had the right instinct when he took an eight percent stake in BYD back in 2008. Since then, the stock price of the company, which is listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange, has increased more than twenty-fold. At the end of June, the shares reached a new all-time high.
Founded in the mid-1990s by former university professor Wang Chuanfu, BYD began as a manufacturer of rechargeable batteries before expanding into the automotive industry in the early 2000s. The company benefits more and more noticeably from the fact that BYD manufactures its own batteries and has invested heavily in research.
“BYD has significantly developed and positioned itself upwards in the last five years,” said German automotive expert Ferdinand Dudenhoeffer. The cars are modern, “state of the art” and thus also clear competitors for the German premium manufacturers in China.
A significant factor is BYD’s extensive battery expertise, which is expressed, for example, in the so-called blade battery. These are large-format prismatic cells that allow significantly higher energy densities for the same volume. “BYD is at the forefront of development in this area,” says Dudenhoeffer.
BYD is apparently very innovative when it comes to integrating batteries into the car, and already uses cell-to-chassis technology. This involves integrating the batteries directly into the chassis, which, in turn, reduces the weight of the car (China.Table reported). Tesla also uses cell-to-chassis technology, but BYD is clearly ahead of Mercedes and BMW.
The growing sales numbers, according to Dudenhoeffer, are therefore not a mere flash in the pan. “BYD will soon attract attention in Europe as well,” concludes the automotive expert, who also believes that other Chinese manufacturers have good chances. SAIC, FAW, XPeng, Nio, Geely, Lynck & Co, Polestar showed how strong the Chinese are, moving up the Western car markets bit by bit. “We are entering the phase where the Teslas are learning from China,” Dudenhoeffer is convinced.
BYD already sells electric buses in Europe, Japan and India and is taking steps to launch passenger cars in Europe, Australia, Latin America and the Philippines as well. Just earlier this month, they signed a deal with Dutch car dealer Louwman. BYD is also currently exploring its options in Southeast Asia. Joern Petring/Gregor Koppenburg
Her career as a China expert begins with a kung fu course. Antonia Hmaidi is just fifteen years old, but already earned her high school diploma in Schwaebisch-Hall. The highly gifted student has skipped four grades. She doesn’t want to study yet. Despite her rapid school career, she has had enough of numbers and letters for the time being. “I’m an adventurous type,” says the 29-year-old today.
She has practiced martial arts since her early childhood. Then she is tempted to visit a kung fu school in China for three months after school. The local community foundation and companies help with the financing. Upon her return, she begins her studies of East Asian economics and politics in Bochum. “I’m not an avid follower of Chinese culture,” she says. “But the economic and political context has interested me since my first visit to China in kung fu school.”
In Bochum, she completed her bachelor’s degree, studied for a year in Beijing and earned her master’s degree in international relations in Geneva, including a study visit to New Delhi. She enjoys the experience abroad. She finds Beijing exciting. ” There was the impression that the country was opening up.” But that didn’t turn out to be true. “Back then, Chinese were still allowed to deviate from the official Party line. You hardly find that anymore,” says Hmaidi.
She conducts research after her academic career, including for the Bertelsmann Foundation, and teaches at the University of Duisburg-Essen. One of her main areas: China’s repressive Social Credit Systems. In 2018, she had to experience that China’s government also exerts pressure on foreigners. During a lecture to the Chaos Computer Club (CCC), she criticized the government’s actions against the Uyghur minority. “Acquaintances from the Ministry of Culture subsequently made me understand that I should now better not enter China,” she recounts. “That surprised me. I thought I was too unimportant.”
Since then, her work has changed. “My research is exclusively data-driven,” she says. Exchanges with colleagues in China are too risky. Things don’t work even via videoconference. “I would never know if my interlocutor was telling the truth, and if they did, they might put themselves in danger. I don’t want to be responsible for that,” she says.
Since June of this year, Hmaidi has been employed in Berlin at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (Merics). Here, her research includes China’s quest for technological independence, especially the country’s semiconductor production. “Semiconductors are a key to power, for example, because of their use in weapons systems,” she says.
She also researches China’s disinformation and hacking campaigns. She taught herself the necessary technical know-how. She has been a member of the CCC for years. She can set up servers, install databases and knows how to code.
After her many travels, she now associates her new job with settling down. She wants to stay in Berlin. “This is my home for now.” Andreas Schulte
Seven years after construction began, a section of the Bar-Boljare highway in Montenegro has been opened. The 41-kilometer Smokovac-Matesevo section is part of the New Silk Road. The highway is extremely controversial in the small state south of Croatia: Montenegro had borrowed money from China for the construction project. NGOs are now demanding that the government disclose the costs and accused those responsible of corruption.
Germany’s highest diplomatic post in China stood vacant for around ten months. Now, there is once again a representative in Beijing: Ambassador Patricia Flor handed over her accreditation papers at the Foreign Ministry on Friday. On social media, the diplomat presented herself for the first time in Mandarin and English in an introduction video. What issues Flor plans to tackle, you can find out in today’s News section. One thing is already clear: The 60-year-old is taking up her new job in politically highly tense times – geopolitically, but also in the People’s Republic itself.
This is because the leadership will reorganize itself at the CCP National Congress this fall. But the hot phase has already begun. Michael Radunski spoke with political scientist Eberhard Sandschneider, who stressed that the decisions about who will get which post have long been made before the National Congress. Sandschneider explains which problems Xi Jinping faces before the big political showdown and which goals he is pursuing: “Xi is the great moderator, not the great autocrat.” The growing discontent among the population over the ongoing strict Covid measures is not leaving Xi unfazed, either, believes Sandschneider.
The harsh Covid lockdown in Shanghai is partly the reason why the Chinese manufacturer BYD has now overtaken Tesla. BYD builds the majority of its vehicles in Shenzhen in southern China, which was less affected by the Covid measures than Shanghai, where Tesla operates. But that’s not the only reason for the overtaking maneuver from Shenzhen, as our author team in China notes: BYD has also caught up technologically.
Mr. Sandschneider, are you already eagerly awaiting the fall?
No. Why should I?
The grand party congress of the CCP is coming up.
That is true. But when the party congress meets this fall, everything will already be decided. The exciting time is now, now the decisions will be made. In Zhongnanhai, in Beidaihe, or wherever these gentlemen meet. What happens in the fall is pure acclamation.
And what do you hear?
I hear rumors that the party congress may be brought forward. However, that is not very likely.
If it were brought forward now, would that be good or bad for Xi Jinping?
That would be good for Xi, economically and politically. Economically, because the economic consequences of the many lockdowns have not yet fully impacted the economy. The current economic figures are currently even better than they will be in the fall and…
… and you believe that China’s leadership would also publish bad figures in the fall?
No, most certainly not. Bad is relative. All published economic data were, are, and will always be politically controlled. You shouldn’t read anything into it. If Xi believes he needs a five before the decimal point, he will get it. But the strict COVID policy has enormously increased the pressure of reality on the leadership in Beijing.
And politically?
Politically, an earlier party congress would be good for Xi because it would mean that the change of government would be executed relatively smoothly.
What change of government? Xi Jinping has already secured himself a third term as President, which has been constitutionally prohibited since Deng Xiaoping.
That is true. There is hardly any doubt about Xi’s third term in office. Anything else would be tantamount to a revolution. But the big question is whether he will manage to lift his confidants into leadership positions the way he needs them to. That will be difficult, and that is why I do not believe in an early party congress.
You doubt that Xi, as the strong man at the top, will put his confidants in position?
Well, considering the economic situation, considering the great discontent within the population about how the COVID Pandemic is being handled, that is anything but certain. You have to see, many of his confidants are going to retire, from Liu He to Yang Jiechi to Li Keqiang. But Xi needs a network around him again that will carry him.
Yet, Xi likes to be portrayed as China’s almost almighty leader.
This is a misconception that is often made, especially in the West. No matter who is at the head of the CP, many different factions, clans, and groupings must be balanced out. The old communists, the reformers, and whoever else there is. They may have been less visible in recent years, but they still exist. Xi is the great moderator, not the great autocrat.
But we hear and see loud solidarity declarations from the provinces almost every day. They all swear allegiance to Xi Jinping and vow support.
This is the usual game. I’m not sure whether they’re demonstrating solidarity or just pretending. One thing is certain, though: This is just the kind of show that is part and parcel of a party congress.
So is everything going as usual?
Not necessarily. The problems are huge and at the same time, there is a partial paralysis of the Communist Party, especially at the middle and lower levels. There, everyone waits to see what happens at the top. No one dares to stick his head out. The last one who dared to do that was Bo Xilai…
… and he has been behind bars ever since. So who is Xi now? At first, people thought he was a great reformer. But then came the progressive isolation of the country, ideologization, and re-nationalization.
That is all correct. But I do not see any aspirations for absolute power in all of this. Everything that Xi Jinping has done in his responsibility – including the steps backward and the narrowing of the movement as well as the thematic scope – I see all of this as a clear indication of his perception of risk in Chinese society. What happened in China in the years 2000 to 2012 was obviously too liberal and also too dangerous for him.
In what way?
A key moment was certainly the loss of the information monopoly through social media. This was once the core element of rule for the CP – and it was lost to them in 2007 through the iPhone until 2012. But since then, they’ve been doing everything they can to regain that control. Even strengthen it through technology.
You mean the crackdown on tech corporations?
Yes, that too. You see, Xi Jinping isn’t doing this because he thinks Chinese tech companies are too good or make too much money. Nor is he going after squawking entrepreneurs like Jack Ma because of personal spite. Xi sees all of this as dangerous. Loss of control is his biggest fear.
Seriously, dangerous for the People’s Republic of China?
No, dangerous to the Communist Party’s grip on power. That is the central factor. The Chinese Communist Party always stands above the country. We in the West make this mistake all the time: We always see China’s politicians as government officials, but that’s not so important. What matters are their party functions. Xi Jinping is, of course, China’s President, but the most important office is his role as Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Xi is primarily concerned with stability and maintaining power.
This brings us full circle: Deng Xiaoping wanted to ensure stability by setting term limits for the President so that excesses like those under Mao would be prevented. Xi has now abolished this, and the National Congress will approve his third term in office.
Yes, but allow me to point out: When they talk about stability – even for us on a global scale – I’m not worried about China. I’m much more concerned about the United States of America. We will shiver in November at the midterms. And we will shiver even more in 2024, when there is reason to fear that Donald Trump will move back into the White House. Then the big uncertainty factor in international politics will not be Beijing, but Washington. Paradoxically, compared to the situation in the US, China almost seems like a haven of stability.
Eberhard Sandschneider was a professor of Chinese politics and international relations at the Free University of Berlin from 1998 to 2020. From 2003 to 2016, he was also Otto Wolff Director of the Research Institute of the German Council on Foreign Relations. He is currently a partner at the consulting firm Berlin Global Advisors.
Tesla had to struggle with significant problems in China in recent months. Because the factory in Shanghai was affected by the major lockdown, the US automaker sold 80,000 to 100,000 fewer cars than originally planned, according to estimates.
This was also the key reason why global sales of Elon Musk’s company have fallen behind those of Chinese EV manufacturing giant BYD for the first time in three years. While Tesla sold 564,000 cars worldwide in the first half of the year, the Shenzhen-based group sold 641,000 vehicles – 300 percent more than in the same period last year.
Of course, the comparison between Tesla and BYD is not entirely fair. While Tesla only produces premium electric cars, around half of the vehicles produced by BYD are still plug-in hybrids. In addition to a large battery, they also have an internal combustion engine. This is compounded by geographic luck. BYD builds the majority of its vehicles in Shenzhen in southern China, which was less affected by harsh Covid measures than Shanghai.
Nevertheless, there is little doubt among car experts that BYD will maintain its steep success story and will probably pose the greatest challenge for both Tesla and the German premium manufacturers, even outside China. US investor Warren Buffett apparently had the right instinct when he took an eight percent stake in BYD back in 2008. Since then, the stock price of the company, which is listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange, has increased more than twenty-fold. At the end of June, the shares reached a new all-time high.
Founded in the mid-1990s by former university professor Wang Chuanfu, BYD began as a manufacturer of rechargeable batteries before expanding into the automotive industry in the early 2000s. The company benefits more and more noticeably from the fact that BYD manufactures its own batteries and has invested heavily in research.
“BYD has significantly developed and positioned itself upwards in the last five years,” said German automotive expert Ferdinand Dudenhoeffer. The cars are modern, “state of the art” and thus also clear competitors for the German premium manufacturers in China.
A significant factor is BYD’s extensive battery expertise, which is expressed, for example, in the so-called blade battery. These are large-format prismatic cells that allow significantly higher energy densities for the same volume. “BYD is at the forefront of development in this area,” says Dudenhoeffer.
BYD is apparently very innovative when it comes to integrating batteries into the car, and already uses cell-to-chassis technology. This involves integrating the batteries directly into the chassis, which, in turn, reduces the weight of the car (China.Table reported). Tesla also uses cell-to-chassis technology, but BYD is clearly ahead of Mercedes and BMW.
The growing sales numbers, according to Dudenhoeffer, are therefore not a mere flash in the pan. “BYD will soon attract attention in Europe as well,” concludes the automotive expert, who also believes that other Chinese manufacturers have good chances. SAIC, FAW, XPeng, Nio, Geely, Lynck & Co, Polestar showed how strong the Chinese are, moving up the Western car markets bit by bit. “We are entering the phase where the Teslas are learning from China,” Dudenhoeffer is convinced.
BYD already sells electric buses in Europe, Japan and India and is taking steps to launch passenger cars in Europe, Australia, Latin America and the Philippines as well. Just earlier this month, they signed a deal with Dutch car dealer Louwman. BYD is also currently exploring its options in Southeast Asia. Joern Petring/Gregor Koppenburg
Her career as a China expert begins with a kung fu course. Antonia Hmaidi is just fifteen years old, but already earned her high school diploma in Schwaebisch-Hall. The highly gifted student has skipped four grades. She doesn’t want to study yet. Despite her rapid school career, she has had enough of numbers and letters for the time being. “I’m an adventurous type,” says the 29-year-old today.
She has practiced martial arts since her early childhood. Then she is tempted to visit a kung fu school in China for three months after school. The local community foundation and companies help with the financing. Upon her return, she begins her studies of East Asian economics and politics in Bochum. “I’m not an avid follower of Chinese culture,” she says. “But the economic and political context has interested me since my first visit to China in kung fu school.”
In Bochum, she completed her bachelor’s degree, studied for a year in Beijing and earned her master’s degree in international relations in Geneva, including a study visit to New Delhi. She enjoys the experience abroad. She finds Beijing exciting. ” There was the impression that the country was opening up.” But that didn’t turn out to be true. “Back then, Chinese were still allowed to deviate from the official Party line. You hardly find that anymore,” says Hmaidi.
She conducts research after her academic career, including for the Bertelsmann Foundation, and teaches at the University of Duisburg-Essen. One of her main areas: China’s repressive Social Credit Systems. In 2018, she had to experience that China’s government also exerts pressure on foreigners. During a lecture to the Chaos Computer Club (CCC), she criticized the government’s actions against the Uyghur minority. “Acquaintances from the Ministry of Culture subsequently made me understand that I should now better not enter China,” she recounts. “That surprised me. I thought I was too unimportant.”
Since then, her work has changed. “My research is exclusively data-driven,” she says. Exchanges with colleagues in China are too risky. Things don’t work even via videoconference. “I would never know if my interlocutor was telling the truth, and if they did, they might put themselves in danger. I don’t want to be responsible for that,” she says.
Since June of this year, Hmaidi has been employed in Berlin at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (Merics). Here, her research includes China’s quest for technological independence, especially the country’s semiconductor production. “Semiconductors are a key to power, for example, because of their use in weapons systems,” she says.
She also researches China’s disinformation and hacking campaigns. She taught herself the necessary technical know-how. She has been a member of the CCC for years. She can set up servers, install databases and knows how to code.
After her many travels, she now associates her new job with settling down. She wants to stay in Berlin. “This is my home for now.” Andreas Schulte
Seven years after construction began, a section of the Bar-Boljare highway in Montenegro has been opened. The 41-kilometer Smokovac-Matesevo section is part of the New Silk Road. The highway is extremely controversial in the small state south of Croatia: Montenegro had borrowed money from China for the construction project. NGOs are now demanding that the government disclose the costs and accused those responsible of corruption.
