For a long time, sinologists in Germany have not been a homogeneous group, collectively and somewhat intellectually researching the People’s Republic of China and its history. Current politics and the associated geopolitical conflicts have long since caught up with German sinology and China researchers from other disciplines. Since Xi Jinping took office as head of state and party, the debate about the stance towards the Chinese government has become increasingly heated. Now, a recent article on the situation in Xinjiang by two of Germany’s longstanding Sinologists adds new fuel to the debate, as Marcel Grzanna analyzes.
According to accusations, the article by the two researchers published in the Neue Zuercher Zeitung trivialized human rights violations in Xinjiang and fell into line with the narratives of the Communist Party. Some were appalled. Sinology has long been accused of lacking distance to Beijing and of glossing over reality. This makes it difficult for Germany’s plan to strengthen its China expertise, as called for in the German government’s new China strategy. As the dispute over the Xinjiang text shows, two experts can come up with two completely different assessments.
Meanwhile, the European Union is preoccupied with strategically important raw materials. The Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) aims to secure access to these raw materials and reduce dependencies on countries like China. Leonie Duengefeld and Amelie Richter spoke with Nicola Beer (FDP), Vice-President of the European Parliament, about how the EU should proceed from the parliament’s perspective. Beer considers the potential for conflict between China and the EU on the issue of raw materials to be “particularly high.” She wants to make eye-level offers to alternative raw material partners that help the people on the ground.
Sinology in Germany has faced intense public criticism for some time now. This debate has now been given new fuel. With their article on the situation of the Uyghurs in the autonomous province of Xinjiang for the Neue Zuercher Zeitung (NZZ), two veterans of German sinology, Thomas Heberer from the University of Duisburg and Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer, Director of the China Centrum Tuebingen (CCT), have not only outraged their critics outside the field of sinology, but also sparked incomprehension among their colleagues.
Both authors claim to have traveled to Xinjiang “on their own initiative” in May, together with two other sinologists and an expert on international law. The region is hermetically monitored by Chinese security forces. Like journalists, foreign academics can hardly move around freely. Nevertheless, Heberer and Schmidt-Glintzer concluded: “There are now clear signs of a return to ‘normality.’“
Some China experts were appalled by the text. Heberer and Schmidt-Glintzer are accused of relativizing and justifying the Communist Party’s human rights crimes against ethnic minorities in the autonomous province of Xinjiang. Normality is nowhere to be seen, they say.
The criticism mainly concerns the lack of classification of the research situation within the essay. “The text is a negligent handling of information. The authors do not contextualize this information and do not critically question it,” says Xinjiang researcher Bjoern Alpermann, who has published papers on China together with Heberer in the past. Between 2010 and 2016, the two worked in a competence network for regional studies funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research.
He does not understand “what the colleagues were thinking,” says Alpermann. He considers phrases like “successful campaign against terrorism and Islamism” as cynical. In his book “Xinjiang – China and the Uyghurs,” Alpermann describes the CP’s minority policy in Xinjiang as “cultural genocide.”
The article is “full of Chinese propaganda terms and views,” complains business ethicist Alicia Hennig. Sinologist Marina Rudyak from the University of Heidelberg laments the lack of transparency regarding how the trip was financed. Political scientist Andreas Fulda, one of the fiercest critics of German sinology, considers the contribution “unworthy of scientists.”
Much to the anger of their critics, Heberer and Schmidt-Glintzer refrain in their article from going into detail about the visit of party leader Xi Jinping to Urumqi a few weeks ago, which could shed light on Xinjiang’s future outlook. In a speech, Xi stressed, among other things, that the Communist Party’s “completely correct” Xinjiang policy must be continued and completed. “So there is no change in the direction of Xinjiang policy,” Alpermann concluded afterward.
The instigators of this uproar, both of whom are currently in China, defend their article. The aim was to “point out that something has started to change,” a statement by Heberer and Schmidt-Glintzer to Table.Media reads, “Surely a trend towards ‘normality,’ towards educational support and economic recovery, and towards an ‘opening up’ of Xinjiang should be welcomed – so that Xinjiang turns from a potentially contested part of China into a peaceful and prosperous part with autonomous status.” They had by no means given up “critical observation of conditions,” “but had noted signs of dissolution of earlier repressive measures.”
Heberer and Schmidt-Glintzer argue that the Chinese government “felt compelled” to react due to “massive Islamist terror.” The authors acknowledge that this was done with “undoubtedly overly harsh measures” and under “state arbitrariness.” But nothing less than the “internal security of all of China” was at stake. And “the fact that the Uyghur population itself suffered under the terror” should not be overlooked.
Over the past ten years, at least one million Muslims, the vast majority of them Uyghurs, have been detained in internment camps for ideological re-education – this is hardly denied anymore. In a special report, the United Nations Human Rights Office spoke of “crimes against humanity” and made very specific accusations of forced labor, forced sterilization, rape and torture.
Recent findings such as those by Xinjiang expert Rune Steenberg indeed suggest that only a few ten thousand inmates remain in the internment camps. But experts say there can hardly be talk of normalization. The declining numbers go “hand-in-hand with the erection of a pervasive ‘security state’ throughout the region,” wrote Australian Xinjiang researcher Michael Clarke just a few days ago in his article “Social reengineering in the name of security in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.”
Criticism against German sinology will continue for the time being. In essence, it claims that sinology in Germany is partly driven by self-interest, overly embraces the perspectives of the Chinese party-state and has become caught up in old-Maoist romanticism.
Instead of naming the contradictions of Chinese propaganda and clearly defining threat scenarios for democratic societies, too many German China researchers would distort reality. Heberer and Schmidt-Glintzer have now provided fresh fuel for the proponents of this view.
The EU is dependent on China for a lot of materials, for instance, we currently obtain 98 percent of magnesium – in other words, almost everything – from the People’s Republic. The EU Parliament’s draft stipulates that the share of processed raw materials from third countries is to be reduced to 65 percent by 2030. How is that supposed to happen?
The overall package envisages more domestic mining, more economical processing, recycling and the development of alternative materials and production methods that allow to do without the hitherto critical or strategic raw materials. All of this, both in the EU and with reliable partners in third countries.
What role do these third countries, which are precisely not China, play in the CRMA – in the European Critical Raw Materials Act?
We need partners in other third countries. And this is an area we, as Europeans, have not targeted so far. As the European Parliament, we have invested a lot of thought in how we can make such partnerships attractive for both sides. I believe that we, as the European Parliament, are putting together a better package than the one proposed by the European Commission. It must contribute to value creation on the ground, to improve environmental and social standards, and thus also a more honestly lived partnership – unlike the partnerships of some third countries with China.
What do these currently look like from your perspective?
China is usually swift and unbureaucratic on the ground. For example, roads are only built to the mine, not the school or hospital. Raw materials are cleared out and shipped off. They often bring their own workers with them and leave them there later. This is because they also include prisoners who can choose whether they sit in prison in China or work in the mines on the ground. There is hardly any added value on site, but the loan for the road has to be paid off. These are circumstances that many partner countries of China are now becoming aware of. This is precisely where we want to make a better, more honest offer at eye level. I hope we can make this clearer in countries where we seek partnerships.
Your proposal also has a human rights component: Countries that share the values of the EU are to be preferred. Why was that important to you?
We try to build a framework that helps the people on the ground. We don’t expect countries to meet our standards everywhere from the get-go. However, that was the EU Commission’s proposal. We, on the other hand, say: We want to work hand in hand with the countries to raise these standards. If we focus only on countries that, for instance, already apply our labor rights standards, then that would be very few. That means we would also be helping very few people. To us, the aspect of development cooperation based on respect for human and civil rights also plays a big role. We want to find reliable partners and not cooperate with authoritarian regimes.
China’s developments often happen very quickly. Many of the EU’s goals are supposed to be achieved by 2030. That’s almost seven years away. Don’t we need to act faster? Is Brussels aware of the urgency?
I am glad that we are now taking action at all. Reaching a political consensus in parliament in three months is fast. Regarding the perspective up to 2030, we must, of course, also build trust in our economy and administration for our plan. This is the only way to achieve real collective will. Society, which will also be affected in many places or which will have to go along, must also be involved.
You visited Taiwan last year. How can Taiwan play a role in securing raw materials?
It’s decidedly large and reflected, after all, in intensifying confrontation lines in the Pacific. Not only when it comes to Taiwan. We are certainly late in getting started on this issue, but we are not too late. However, we must hurry up while making it clear to China, with a unified foreign policy, where our red lines are. Ensuring we become credibly resilient on raw materials and less dependent on China’s resources will also contribute to this.
You were in Taiwan last year. How can Taiwan play a role in the secure supply of raw materials?
Taiwan’s role is based, among other things, on the fact that we are promoting more and more reciprocal investments. Especially from the Taiwanese side in Europe, for example, in semiconductors. The European Parliament wants to further expand relations with Taiwan through an investment agreement, for example, and will also pressure the EU Commission to act faster. Such investments, in addition to the exchange of know-how, are also part of risk management for the Taiwanese, in that not all production facilities are located in Taiwan, but some are untouchable in the European Union.
How do you think China will react?
What we are ultimately pursuing here is risk management. But it is the Chinese who have the power to decide through their behavior whether it is only a matter of risk management or whether it will ultimately be a decoupling. We will not allow China to unilaterally, aggressively or even militarily shift the rules-based international order. But that decision is in the hands of the Chinese, and they should consider that very carefully.
Nicola Beer (FDP) is a Member of the European Parliament in the Renew Group and Vice President of the European Parliament. Last year, she visited Taiwan, making it the EU Parliament’s highest-ranking visit to date.
The EU Parliament will vote on its position on the CRMA on Thursday. This will then be used in negotiations with other EU institutions, the so-called trilogue.
This part of the interview with Nicola Beer focuses on China. If you want to know even more about other aspects of the Critical Raw Materials Act and the processes it still has to go through in the EU decision-making process, please take a look at the second part of the interview over at Europe.Table.
Sinolytics is a European consulting and analysis company specializing in China. It advises European companies on their strategic orientation and concrete business activities in the People’s Republic.
Myanmar’s military junta recently issued a partial amnesty for ousted former government leader and Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi and former President Win Myint. As part of a mass pardon of more than 7,000 detainees on the occasion of a Buddhist holiday, the former government leader’s prison sentence was reduced from 33 years to 27 years. The 12-year sentence of former President Win Myint was reduced to four years. Shortly before, reports circulated that Aung San Suu Kyi was transferred from prison to house arrest in the capital Naypyidaw.
However, these gestures are not a sign of a policy change by the military regime or the beginning of reconciliation. Instead, they are a resort to symbolic politics in the face of a lack of domestic political support and widespread isolation on the international stage.
Few countries still support the coup generals. Above all, China, India and Russia support the junta. While Russia provides fighter jets to combat the poorly equipped fighters of the People’s Defense Forces (PDF), resulting in high civilian casualties, China and India have far-reaching economic interests in Myanmar, which are endangered by the escalating civil war.
China has invested more than 113 million US dollars in projects in Myanmar since the coup. The so-called China-Myanmar Economic Corridor is intended to link the two countries more closely. As a result, China has a vested interest in a settlement of the fighting and economic stability. Recently, however, there has been an increase in attacks and protests against Chinese facilities in Myanmar. In February 2023, the PDF launched an attack against the 770-km Chinese oil pipeline from Rakhine State to Yunnan in China. In June 2023, a Chinese military transport truck was attacked in the state of Kachin. China appointed a special envoy to negotiate with the ethnic groups in the border region about the civil war. Chinese representatives have also spoken with former leaders Than Shwe and Thein Sein to seek a solution.
After the military coup in February 2021, the peaceful resistance movement faced massive repression, which radicalized the resistance in the country. The armed forces of Myanmar, called the Tatmandaw or Sit Tat, are fought by several ethnic armies alongside the exiled National Unity Government, composed of a group of ousted former parliamentarians (Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, CRPH), and its armed wing, the PDF, coordinated by some 65,000 fighters. While the armed resistance of the NUG/PDF is relatively young, the armed resistance of the ethnic groups has lasted for several decades and received new impetus from the coup.
There has long been talk of a revolution that seeks a new beginning without Burma’s dominant military. The military, which has ruled directly or indirectly for over 60 years, has now lost control over large parts of the country. The latest BTI Country Report Myanmar 2022 states, “Large parts in the west (Rakhine and Chin States) and the northeast (Kachin, Shan) are contested terrain. Approximately 15 major and several dozen smaller ethnic armed organizations fight for autonomy or secession from the union.”
According to foreign experts, the military has lost control of over half of Myanmar’s 330 districts. It now controls only the larger cities in the Buddhist heartland, while civil war has reignited in the northwest (in the Rakhine and Chin ethnic areas) as well as in the northeast (Kachin) and east (Karen).
In keeping with the difficult situation for the military junta, the state of emergency was extended a fourth time for six months on July 31, 2023 – in violation of the constitution – and the elections initially set for 2023, which were supposed to have given the junta legitimacy, were canceled.
Since the return to direct military rule in 2021, much of the political, economic and social progress made since 2012 has been reversed. The country’s numerous problems have worsened. There has long been talk of a humanitarian crisis. The renewed civil war has left thousands dead and more than 1.5 million displaced in the country. In addition, there is massive repression. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, more than 24,000 people have been arrested for political reasons since the coup. Of these, 19,733 were still detained at the end of July 2023. 3,857 people have been killed by the military.
China’s special envoy has urged ethnic groups on the Chinese border to meet with the military junta and end cooperation with the NUG. The ethnic groups welcomed China’s attempts at mediation and promised to continue the dialogue. However, this is unlikely to resolve the civil war, as the ethnic groups also reiterated their goal of establishing a federal state. China again sides with the Burmese military and attempts to counter the influence of the NUG.
The military tries to legitimize itself through Buddhism. State media portray the Tatmadaw as the protective force of Theravada Buddhism. An analysis by the US Institute for Peace concludes that military chief Min Aung Hlaing sees himself in the tradition of Burmese god-kings and presents himself as the patron saint of Buddhism. It is fitting that the military government recently unveiled the world’s largest Buddha statue in Naypyidaw, at 19 meters.
The partial amnesties of Aung San Suu Kyi and former President Win Myint are supposed to show the “goodwill” of the military. However, they remain mere hollow gestures with no real political consequences. The transfer of Aung San Suu Kyi to house arrest could, above all, be a signal to foreign countries aimed at counteracting Myanmar’s international isolation.
It appears that the transfer to house arrest has brought diplomatic exchanges with Suu Kyi, the leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD), back into the realm of possibility. Just last week, Thailand’s Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai reported that he had met with Suu Kyi to discuss her stance on the civil war. This first confirmed contact between a foreign diplomat and the Nobel laureate was used by the military government for propaganda purposes, with the aim of discrediting the resistance.
Whether this will succeed is doubtful. The West has imposed sanctions against the military and companies associated with the military. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN for short, has largely suspended cooperation with Myanmar and called on the junta to open a dialogue with the resistance movement and ethnic groups – so far without success.
Without the military’s genuine willingness to change, Myanmar will not change, and the civil war between the conflicting parties will continue. To win the civil war, the many fighters of the PDF and ethnic armies would have to take the capital or join forces. But they are just as far away from doing so as the Burmese military.
Marco Buente is Professor of Asian Politics and Society at the Friedrich Alexander University of Erlangen-Nuremberg. He is one of 250 country experts who worked on the Bertelsmann Transformation Index.
China’s most famous livestreaming influencer Li Jiaqi has caused a shitstorm that shines a spotlight on urgent problems in society. On Sunday, the “lipstick king,” who specializes in selling cosmetics online, had lectured his viewers about how they just had to work more to afford certain products – instead of constantly complaining about increased prices. The backlash from unemployed and poorly paid customers quickly followed. Within 24 hours, Li lost a million followers on Weibo alone. On Monday, the influencer tearfully apologized: “As a livestream host I should send out positive energy, and learn to control my emotions.”
For a long time, sinologists in Germany have not been a homogeneous group, collectively and somewhat intellectually researching the People’s Republic of China and its history. Current politics and the associated geopolitical conflicts have long since caught up with German sinology and China researchers from other disciplines. Since Xi Jinping took office as head of state and party, the debate about the stance towards the Chinese government has become increasingly heated. Now, a recent article on the situation in Xinjiang by two of Germany’s longstanding Sinologists adds new fuel to the debate, as Marcel Grzanna analyzes.
According to accusations, the article by the two researchers published in the Neue Zuercher Zeitung trivialized human rights violations in Xinjiang and fell into line with the narratives of the Communist Party. Some were appalled. Sinology has long been accused of lacking distance to Beijing and of glossing over reality. This makes it difficult for Germany’s plan to strengthen its China expertise, as called for in the German government’s new China strategy. As the dispute over the Xinjiang text shows, two experts can come up with two completely different assessments.
Meanwhile, the European Union is preoccupied with strategically important raw materials. The Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) aims to secure access to these raw materials and reduce dependencies on countries like China. Leonie Duengefeld and Amelie Richter spoke with Nicola Beer (FDP), Vice-President of the European Parliament, about how the EU should proceed from the parliament’s perspective. Beer considers the potential for conflict between China and the EU on the issue of raw materials to be “particularly high.” She wants to make eye-level offers to alternative raw material partners that help the people on the ground.
Sinology in Germany has faced intense public criticism for some time now. This debate has now been given new fuel. With their article on the situation of the Uyghurs in the autonomous province of Xinjiang for the Neue Zuercher Zeitung (NZZ), two veterans of German sinology, Thomas Heberer from the University of Duisburg and Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer, Director of the China Centrum Tuebingen (CCT), have not only outraged their critics outside the field of sinology, but also sparked incomprehension among their colleagues.
Both authors claim to have traveled to Xinjiang “on their own initiative” in May, together with two other sinologists and an expert on international law. The region is hermetically monitored by Chinese security forces. Like journalists, foreign academics can hardly move around freely. Nevertheless, Heberer and Schmidt-Glintzer concluded: “There are now clear signs of a return to ‘normality.’“
Some China experts were appalled by the text. Heberer and Schmidt-Glintzer are accused of relativizing and justifying the Communist Party’s human rights crimes against ethnic minorities in the autonomous province of Xinjiang. Normality is nowhere to be seen, they say.
The criticism mainly concerns the lack of classification of the research situation within the essay. “The text is a negligent handling of information. The authors do not contextualize this information and do not critically question it,” says Xinjiang researcher Bjoern Alpermann, who has published papers on China together with Heberer in the past. Between 2010 and 2016, the two worked in a competence network for regional studies funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research.
He does not understand “what the colleagues were thinking,” says Alpermann. He considers phrases like “successful campaign against terrorism and Islamism” as cynical. In his book “Xinjiang – China and the Uyghurs,” Alpermann describes the CP’s minority policy in Xinjiang as “cultural genocide.”
The article is “full of Chinese propaganda terms and views,” complains business ethicist Alicia Hennig. Sinologist Marina Rudyak from the University of Heidelberg laments the lack of transparency regarding how the trip was financed. Political scientist Andreas Fulda, one of the fiercest critics of German sinology, considers the contribution “unworthy of scientists.”
Much to the anger of their critics, Heberer and Schmidt-Glintzer refrain in their article from going into detail about the visit of party leader Xi Jinping to Urumqi a few weeks ago, which could shed light on Xinjiang’s future outlook. In a speech, Xi stressed, among other things, that the Communist Party’s “completely correct” Xinjiang policy must be continued and completed. “So there is no change in the direction of Xinjiang policy,” Alpermann concluded afterward.
The instigators of this uproar, both of whom are currently in China, defend their article. The aim was to “point out that something has started to change,” a statement by Heberer and Schmidt-Glintzer to Table.Media reads, “Surely a trend towards ‘normality,’ towards educational support and economic recovery, and towards an ‘opening up’ of Xinjiang should be welcomed – so that Xinjiang turns from a potentially contested part of China into a peaceful and prosperous part with autonomous status.” They had by no means given up “critical observation of conditions,” “but had noted signs of dissolution of earlier repressive measures.”
Heberer and Schmidt-Glintzer argue that the Chinese government “felt compelled” to react due to “massive Islamist terror.” The authors acknowledge that this was done with “undoubtedly overly harsh measures” and under “state arbitrariness.” But nothing less than the “internal security of all of China” was at stake. And “the fact that the Uyghur population itself suffered under the terror” should not be overlooked.
Over the past ten years, at least one million Muslims, the vast majority of them Uyghurs, have been detained in internment camps for ideological re-education – this is hardly denied anymore. In a special report, the United Nations Human Rights Office spoke of “crimes against humanity” and made very specific accusations of forced labor, forced sterilization, rape and torture.
Recent findings such as those by Xinjiang expert Rune Steenberg indeed suggest that only a few ten thousand inmates remain in the internment camps. But experts say there can hardly be talk of normalization. The declining numbers go “hand-in-hand with the erection of a pervasive ‘security state’ throughout the region,” wrote Australian Xinjiang researcher Michael Clarke just a few days ago in his article “Social reengineering in the name of security in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.”
Criticism against German sinology will continue for the time being. In essence, it claims that sinology in Germany is partly driven by self-interest, overly embraces the perspectives of the Chinese party-state and has become caught up in old-Maoist romanticism.
Instead of naming the contradictions of Chinese propaganda and clearly defining threat scenarios for democratic societies, too many German China researchers would distort reality. Heberer and Schmidt-Glintzer have now provided fresh fuel for the proponents of this view.
The EU is dependent on China for a lot of materials, for instance, we currently obtain 98 percent of magnesium – in other words, almost everything – from the People’s Republic. The EU Parliament’s draft stipulates that the share of processed raw materials from third countries is to be reduced to 65 percent by 2030. How is that supposed to happen?
The overall package envisages more domestic mining, more economical processing, recycling and the development of alternative materials and production methods that allow to do without the hitherto critical or strategic raw materials. All of this, both in the EU and with reliable partners in third countries.
What role do these third countries, which are precisely not China, play in the CRMA – in the European Critical Raw Materials Act?
We need partners in other third countries. And this is an area we, as Europeans, have not targeted so far. As the European Parliament, we have invested a lot of thought in how we can make such partnerships attractive for both sides. I believe that we, as the European Parliament, are putting together a better package than the one proposed by the European Commission. It must contribute to value creation on the ground, to improve environmental and social standards, and thus also a more honestly lived partnership – unlike the partnerships of some third countries with China.
What do these currently look like from your perspective?
China is usually swift and unbureaucratic on the ground. For example, roads are only built to the mine, not the school or hospital. Raw materials are cleared out and shipped off. They often bring their own workers with them and leave them there later. This is because they also include prisoners who can choose whether they sit in prison in China or work in the mines on the ground. There is hardly any added value on site, but the loan for the road has to be paid off. These are circumstances that many partner countries of China are now becoming aware of. This is precisely where we want to make a better, more honest offer at eye level. I hope we can make this clearer in countries where we seek partnerships.
Your proposal also has a human rights component: Countries that share the values of the EU are to be preferred. Why was that important to you?
We try to build a framework that helps the people on the ground. We don’t expect countries to meet our standards everywhere from the get-go. However, that was the EU Commission’s proposal. We, on the other hand, say: We want to work hand in hand with the countries to raise these standards. If we focus only on countries that, for instance, already apply our labor rights standards, then that would be very few. That means we would also be helping very few people. To us, the aspect of development cooperation based on respect for human and civil rights also plays a big role. We want to find reliable partners and not cooperate with authoritarian regimes.
China’s developments often happen very quickly. Many of the EU’s goals are supposed to be achieved by 2030. That’s almost seven years away. Don’t we need to act faster? Is Brussels aware of the urgency?
I am glad that we are now taking action at all. Reaching a political consensus in parliament in three months is fast. Regarding the perspective up to 2030, we must, of course, also build trust in our economy and administration for our plan. This is the only way to achieve real collective will. Society, which will also be affected in many places or which will have to go along, must also be involved.
You visited Taiwan last year. How can Taiwan play a role in securing raw materials?
It’s decidedly large and reflected, after all, in intensifying confrontation lines in the Pacific. Not only when it comes to Taiwan. We are certainly late in getting started on this issue, but we are not too late. However, we must hurry up while making it clear to China, with a unified foreign policy, where our red lines are. Ensuring we become credibly resilient on raw materials and less dependent on China’s resources will also contribute to this.
You were in Taiwan last year. How can Taiwan play a role in the secure supply of raw materials?
Taiwan’s role is based, among other things, on the fact that we are promoting more and more reciprocal investments. Especially from the Taiwanese side in Europe, for example, in semiconductors. The European Parliament wants to further expand relations with Taiwan through an investment agreement, for example, and will also pressure the EU Commission to act faster. Such investments, in addition to the exchange of know-how, are also part of risk management for the Taiwanese, in that not all production facilities are located in Taiwan, but some are untouchable in the European Union.
How do you think China will react?
What we are ultimately pursuing here is risk management. But it is the Chinese who have the power to decide through their behavior whether it is only a matter of risk management or whether it will ultimately be a decoupling. We will not allow China to unilaterally, aggressively or even militarily shift the rules-based international order. But that decision is in the hands of the Chinese, and they should consider that very carefully.
Nicola Beer (FDP) is a Member of the European Parliament in the Renew Group and Vice President of the European Parliament. Last year, she visited Taiwan, making it the EU Parliament’s highest-ranking visit to date.
The EU Parliament will vote on its position on the CRMA on Thursday. This will then be used in negotiations with other EU institutions, the so-called trilogue.
This part of the interview with Nicola Beer focuses on China. If you want to know even more about other aspects of the Critical Raw Materials Act and the processes it still has to go through in the EU decision-making process, please take a look at the second part of the interview over at Europe.Table.
Sinolytics is a European consulting and analysis company specializing in China. It advises European companies on their strategic orientation and concrete business activities in the People’s Republic.
Myanmar’s military junta recently issued a partial amnesty for ousted former government leader and Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi and former President Win Myint. As part of a mass pardon of more than 7,000 detainees on the occasion of a Buddhist holiday, the former government leader’s prison sentence was reduced from 33 years to 27 years. The 12-year sentence of former President Win Myint was reduced to four years. Shortly before, reports circulated that Aung San Suu Kyi was transferred from prison to house arrest in the capital Naypyidaw.
However, these gestures are not a sign of a policy change by the military regime or the beginning of reconciliation. Instead, they are a resort to symbolic politics in the face of a lack of domestic political support and widespread isolation on the international stage.
Few countries still support the coup generals. Above all, China, India and Russia support the junta. While Russia provides fighter jets to combat the poorly equipped fighters of the People’s Defense Forces (PDF), resulting in high civilian casualties, China and India have far-reaching economic interests in Myanmar, which are endangered by the escalating civil war.
China has invested more than 113 million US dollars in projects in Myanmar since the coup. The so-called China-Myanmar Economic Corridor is intended to link the two countries more closely. As a result, China has a vested interest in a settlement of the fighting and economic stability. Recently, however, there has been an increase in attacks and protests against Chinese facilities in Myanmar. In February 2023, the PDF launched an attack against the 770-km Chinese oil pipeline from Rakhine State to Yunnan in China. In June 2023, a Chinese military transport truck was attacked in the state of Kachin. China appointed a special envoy to negotiate with the ethnic groups in the border region about the civil war. Chinese representatives have also spoken with former leaders Than Shwe and Thein Sein to seek a solution.
After the military coup in February 2021, the peaceful resistance movement faced massive repression, which radicalized the resistance in the country. The armed forces of Myanmar, called the Tatmandaw or Sit Tat, are fought by several ethnic armies alongside the exiled National Unity Government, composed of a group of ousted former parliamentarians (Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, CRPH), and its armed wing, the PDF, coordinated by some 65,000 fighters. While the armed resistance of the NUG/PDF is relatively young, the armed resistance of the ethnic groups has lasted for several decades and received new impetus from the coup.
There has long been talk of a revolution that seeks a new beginning without Burma’s dominant military. The military, which has ruled directly or indirectly for over 60 years, has now lost control over large parts of the country. The latest BTI Country Report Myanmar 2022 states, “Large parts in the west (Rakhine and Chin States) and the northeast (Kachin, Shan) are contested terrain. Approximately 15 major and several dozen smaller ethnic armed organizations fight for autonomy or secession from the union.”
According to foreign experts, the military has lost control of over half of Myanmar’s 330 districts. It now controls only the larger cities in the Buddhist heartland, while civil war has reignited in the northwest (in the Rakhine and Chin ethnic areas) as well as in the northeast (Kachin) and east (Karen).
In keeping with the difficult situation for the military junta, the state of emergency was extended a fourth time for six months on July 31, 2023 – in violation of the constitution – and the elections initially set for 2023, which were supposed to have given the junta legitimacy, were canceled.
Since the return to direct military rule in 2021, much of the political, economic and social progress made since 2012 has been reversed. The country’s numerous problems have worsened. There has long been talk of a humanitarian crisis. The renewed civil war has left thousands dead and more than 1.5 million displaced in the country. In addition, there is massive repression. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, more than 24,000 people have been arrested for political reasons since the coup. Of these, 19,733 were still detained at the end of July 2023. 3,857 people have been killed by the military.
China’s special envoy has urged ethnic groups on the Chinese border to meet with the military junta and end cooperation with the NUG. The ethnic groups welcomed China’s attempts at mediation and promised to continue the dialogue. However, this is unlikely to resolve the civil war, as the ethnic groups also reiterated their goal of establishing a federal state. China again sides with the Burmese military and attempts to counter the influence of the NUG.
The military tries to legitimize itself through Buddhism. State media portray the Tatmadaw as the protective force of Theravada Buddhism. An analysis by the US Institute for Peace concludes that military chief Min Aung Hlaing sees himself in the tradition of Burmese god-kings and presents himself as the patron saint of Buddhism. It is fitting that the military government recently unveiled the world’s largest Buddha statue in Naypyidaw, at 19 meters.
The partial amnesties of Aung San Suu Kyi and former President Win Myint are supposed to show the “goodwill” of the military. However, they remain mere hollow gestures with no real political consequences. The transfer of Aung San Suu Kyi to house arrest could, above all, be a signal to foreign countries aimed at counteracting Myanmar’s international isolation.
It appears that the transfer to house arrest has brought diplomatic exchanges with Suu Kyi, the leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD), back into the realm of possibility. Just last week, Thailand’s Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai reported that he had met with Suu Kyi to discuss her stance on the civil war. This first confirmed contact between a foreign diplomat and the Nobel laureate was used by the military government for propaganda purposes, with the aim of discrediting the resistance.
Whether this will succeed is doubtful. The West has imposed sanctions against the military and companies associated with the military. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN for short, has largely suspended cooperation with Myanmar and called on the junta to open a dialogue with the resistance movement and ethnic groups – so far without success.
Without the military’s genuine willingness to change, Myanmar will not change, and the civil war between the conflicting parties will continue. To win the civil war, the many fighters of the PDF and ethnic armies would have to take the capital or join forces. But they are just as far away from doing so as the Burmese military.
Marco Buente is Professor of Asian Politics and Society at the Friedrich Alexander University of Erlangen-Nuremberg. He is one of 250 country experts who worked on the Bertelsmann Transformation Index.
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