Anyone who critically examines China must expect a headwind. Even more so if they have no experience writing public papers about the People’s Republic. Markus Frenzel is currently experiencing this first-hand. With a book on the activities of the United Front in Germany, he has sparked resistance, accusing him of hating China and pursuing sensationalism.
Fabian Peltsch has confronted Frenzel with the concrete accusations raised against him. Frenzel describes the criticism of his work as a “classic defense reflex to drag unpleasant revelations into the mud.” He says the Chinese authorities had apparently targeted him during his research. German security authorities had confirmed this to him.
Meanwhile, Jörn Petring presents Huawei’s new operating system. The interesting thing is that the company is exclusively using its own architecture and a proprietary programming language. This step illustrates how serious Huawei is about becoming independent of American technology.
Huawei is consistently working on building a closed ecosystem that aims to offer advantages similar to Apple’s iOS: A controlled, uniform environment in which Huawei fully controls both hardware and software.
Mr. Frenzel, your book “China Leaks” sheds light on “Beijing’s secret network in Germany.” Your research was based on a document from the dark net that lists representatives of the so-called United Front who are involved in influence operations in Germany on behalf of China. How could you be sure that the list was genuine?
Journalists in several countries discovered the list. A colleague from Sweden, for example, had received it from security circles in Stockholm, where it had already been checked. In the end, a research network from ten countries spent two years verifying all the names on it, and as investigative journalists, we also confronted the people on the list directly. This revealed a network consisting of officials from friendship associations, the people behind illegal police stations, but also employees of Chinese consulates and the embassy, who regularly exchange information. In order to paint a complete picture, I have also focused on German politics and business. The regime’s supporters include people like Rudolf Scharping or former Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich, as well as the AfD or left-wing politicians like Sevim Dağdelen, who are stirring up public opinion in favor of China.
You are not a sinologist yourself and you never dealt with China before. How did you handle the language barriers and cultural peculiarities?
For the research cooperation, we had three recognized China experts with us who are familiar with the power structure. Mareike Ohlberg from the German Marshall Fund in Berlin, Laura Harth from Madrid-based Safeguard Defenders and Peter Mattis from the Jamestown Foundation in Washington, D.C. Mattis worked for the CIA on China for many years. Some native speakers helped us clearly identify the names, for example.
Your book sparked controversy shortly after it was published. You were accused of hating China.
That didn’t come as a surprise to me, it’s the classic defense reflex to drag unpleasant revelations through the mud. Personally, I can say that I truly appreciate Chinese culture. I have traveled to China several times and have been fascinated by its speed of development. The country has achieved enormous things, including the fight against poverty. I also find it impressive what German companies like VW have built up in China. These are great success stories. But the regime has become increasingly ruthless in recent years. And here you have to consider whether economic success justifies all means. Many people who benefit from cooperation with China or do well with it deliberately turn a blind eye to the bad aspects. I have put a lot of energy into this book because I really do see our democracy and our free way of life threatened by this criminal Chinese regime.
You have also been accused of placing Chinese citizens under general suspicion in the search for agents of influence.
This, too, is a well-known knock-down argument to discredit research. The people on the list who are playing into the hands of the Chinese regime represent only a fraction of the over 200,000 people of Chinese descent in Germany. The vast majority are not Chinese submarines 2. I never claimed that. It is important to understand that the people on the list are not spies in the traditional sense, who were officially employed for this purpose. That’s the insidious thing about the Chinese approach, that it’s easy to say, well, they’re just telling their story, and we don’t have to believe them. But it’s not that simple. The communists call the United Front their magic weapon for good reason. It’s about bringing everything that’s anybody outside the Communist Party into line. And during my investigations, I noticed this again and again: Even supposed political rivals of the CCP only speak highly of the Communists. For me, this is the pure form of conformity we can observe in the heart of Europe today.
What specific dangers do you see for us?
Take a look at Australia. You can see where infiltration can lead. There, the Chinese side apparently had planned to operate directly within the national government. An intermediary had tried to virtually control an important minister by acting as a financially strong donor. The plot was uncovered and the politician resigned. For this reason, Australia has introduced the criminal offense of ‘foreign interference’ – an admittedly still somewhat vague term that covers various forms of influencing operations. Anyone convicted of foreign interference can now be jailed for several years.
So what characterizes an agent of influence?
An agent of influence is not a classic spy who uses espionage methods to gather information. Instead, he deliberately fuels sentiments that are in the interests of the Chinese Communist Party. It’s not about bribery in the traditional sense, which would already be illegal in our country. It is about narratives that are used and thus find their way into our politics and provoke consequences that are not in our interests. This type of interference is also a new challenge for Germany, and German courts and legislation must adapt to this phenomenon.
Is it even legitimate to speak of a United Front strategy?
There are several strategies. One is to get as close as possible to foreign politicians and even bring their own people into politics. Another is to promote China’s history abroad – through cultural associations, for example. These people are also door-openers who may not realize how crucial their work is for the regime. They say they are not surveilling anyone. At the same time, these people usually have a close relationship with the embassy or one of the four consulates general. And then, of course, there are more concrete things like the overseas police stations, which the Chinese government downplays as service stations that are only supposed to help the Chinese abroad with everyday life and small bureaucratic chores. But they spread enormous fear among regime opponents. Even here in Germany.
You have also taken a closer look at the Confucius Institutes: Do they really do anything different from the Goethe Institutes, which aim to promote Germany and German culture?
The German government is not a dictatorial regime. It does not tell the directors of the Goethe-Instituts which topics they may and may not cover. Anything that strengthens the coexistence of cultures and countries is a good thing. Nor do I criticize when someone presents a millennia-old culture in a positive light. It only becomes problematic when you talk up a criminal regime and make pacts with it, a regime that has gone to extremes again under Xi Jinping. There are certainly people on the list who are less involved with the regime than others. But they all play a role in Chinese propaganda and influence operations. They all contribute to the infiltration of Germany, either because they believe in it or hope to gain a personal advantage from it.
A woman from Mannheim accused you of witch-hunting her mother because she was shown in a photo with Winfried Kretschmann at a public event. And that you had contacted her under the pretext of filming an article about her TCM health center.
The woman you mentioned not only posted a photo with Minister President Kretschmann, but also some with Cem Özdemir and with Danyal Bayaz, the Finance Minister of Baden-Württemberg. I also have other pictures of her with other Green Party members from the state parliamentary group, taken in the state parliament. That shows me that she has exchanged ideas with them; she is well-connected, and makes an effort to build relationships, including as chairwoman of a cultural center in the Rhine-Neckar region. There is also a photo of her from China, where she sits at a table with regime representatives. She admitted in conversation that she cooperates with the consulate general in Frankfurt. And there are scientific publications that state that the Communist regime deliberately uses TCM, traditional Chinese medicine, to open doors to foreign societies.
You say you were under surveillance while working on your book. By whom?
Photos with information about a high-ranking Chinese officer disappeared from my cell phone. Later, my private laptop – and another computer from my personal environment – was suddenly switched to Chinese, although I had never done this and don’t normally use it for my research. In the early stages of my research, I also noticed that I was constantly surrounded by Asian-looking people on public transport. In one subway, a woman wearing a face mask held her cell phone directly at me for several minutes, apparently filming me. There is also a video of this in my documentary for RTL. German security authorities have confirmed to me that the Chinese security services have apparently targeted me.
What did these people want from you?
I have the feeling that this was mainly about intimidation. The message was: ‘We know exactly what you’re doing, we’re in your devices and image files’. This is another reason why we in Germany need to build up a targeted cyber defense against China, as our security is at significant risk.
What do you say to people who argue that the US is also spying on us?
The USA also pursues a clear power policy. However, it still remains a liberal constitutional country. And the massive and quite justified criticism of the USA often voiced in Germany is based on information that comes to light through outstanding American investigative journalists. This shows that a functioning democracy exists there – at least so far – where critical media coverage is possible.
Markus Frenzel is an investigative reporter for the German TV channel RTL. After studying politics in Berlin, Aix-en-Provence and Paris, he worked for Deutsche Welle and the ARD magazine FAKT for many years. He has received several journalism awards for his research, including the Marler Media Prize for Human Rights, the German-Polish Journalist Award, and the European Parliament Journalism Prize.
Huawei is not only making progress with its in-house developed microchips, the tech giant from Shenzhen also has big software plans. Similar to Apple with iOS, Huawei is working on a closed operating system for its devices. HarmonyOS NEXT was unveiled in October.
While the previous versions of HarmonyOS allowed developers to port their Android apps relatively easily, the new version relies exclusively on its own architecture and the company’s own ArkTS programming language. This step illustrates how serious Huawei is about becoming independent of American technology.
The company aims to build its own ecosystem that offers advantages similar to Apple’s iOS: A controlled, standardized environment that allows Huawei to control both hardware and software. Like Apple, Huawei could also charge developers a commission for selling their apps and thus open up a new revenue stream.
Huawei introduced the first version of HarmonyOS years ago in response to US trade restrictions. Until 2019, all Huawei smartphones relied heavily on Android and used Google services such as the Play Store and Maps. However, when Huawei was placed on the so-called “Entity List” due to tensions between the US and China, the company lost access to these services. HarmonyOS was designed in response to this pressure and to make Huawei more independent – albeit with a bit of help from Android.
On the one hand, it is a logical consequence that the company is now trying to completely move away from Android. However, there are also risks, as already evident days after the release of HarmonyOS NEXT. Huawei approached the launch with caution. The company initially only rolled it out on selected devices. This approach allows the system to be tested under real conditions and to gather user feedback.
However, the feedback has been mixed. Shortly after launch, Chinese tech blogger Lu Songsong warned users not to make the switch. At least one-third to one-half of the 15,000 apps Huawei promised at launch had not been fully adapted. He added that there were many “early adopter versions” with limited functionality.
Of all things, reports about a very limited WeChat test version caused some uproar. Although the first Huawei implementation of WeChat offers basic functions such as chat and the Moments feed, it lacks important features such as the short video format “Channels,” the search engine, financial services and AI translation. WeChat is, without a doubt, by far the most essential app on Chinese smartphones. So Huawei cannot afford to make any mistakes here.
However, many observers believe these are teething troubles that can be overcome quickly. At the same time, very positive reports on the new “domestic” operating system in Chinese state media have provided momentum. Huawei is already planning the next step. HarmonyOS Next will reportedly be used on mobile devices and PCs as early as next year. However, this transition could happen later than initially thought.
Chinese President Xi Jinping signaled his willingness to cooperate with Donald Trump’s upcoming US administration on Saturday. On the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in the Peruvian capital Lima, he said at what is likely to be his last meeting with outgoing US President Joe Biden: “China’s goal of a stable, healthy and sustainable China-US relationship remains unchanged,” acknowledging the “ups and downs” between the two countries. Xi went on to say that his country was prepared to work together on contentious issues such as cybercrime, trade, Taiwan, the South China Sea and Russia.
The two-hour talks in Lima took place two months before the change of power in the USA. Trump has already announced a tougher stance against China and nominated hardliners for key cabinet posts. Since then, Biden has been seen as a lame duck. According to a statement from the Chinese government, Xi emphasized China’s “four red lines” that the US must respect:
Xi also warned against a Cold War between the countries and once again rejected accusations of Chinese cyberattacks on the US. In recent months, reports surfaced of attacks on US telecommunications networks allegedly carried out by Chinese hackers. According to National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, Biden also called on China to exert pressure on North Korea not to escalate the war in Ukraine through its troop presence. According to both governments, the heads of state unanimously agreed that humans and not artificial intelligence should decide on the use of nuclear weapons. mcl/rtr
For over a decade, China has been using an increasingly aggressive hybridwarfare strategy to increase its power and influence in the strategically important South China Sea. Countering it will be one of the defining challenges for US President-elect Donald Trump’s incoming administration.
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “Chinese dream” of global preeminence depends significantly on achieving dominance in the South China Sea and ending America’s primacy in the Indo-Pacific region, an emerging global economic and geopolitical hub. And China has not hesitated to use coercive tactics in service of these objectives.
In recent years, boats belonging to countries whose territorial claims China disregards, such as the Philippines and Vietnam, have faced blockades, ramming, water-cannon attacks, and even bladed-weapon assaults by Chinese vessels. Offshore energy operations endure regular harassment. Such violent confrontations have heightened regional tensions and undermined stability in a crucial corridor linking the Pacific and Indian Ocean.
One might have expected the United States to take action to rein in China’s behavior, especially given its mutual defense treaty with the Philippines. And yet, three successive presidents – Barack Obama, Trump, and Joe Biden – have failed to offer anything beyond statements of support and symbolic action. In 2012, Obama allowed China’s brazen seizure of the disputed Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines to go unpunished.
This was hardly the first time the US failed to live up to its defense commitments to the Philippines. In 1995, the Philippines requested US help to block Chinese forces from capturing Mischief Reef, located just 129 nautical miles from the Philippine island of Palawan. US President Bill Clinton, smarting over the termination three years earlier of America’s right to maintain military bases in the Philippines, refused. Mischief Reef is now an important Chinese military base.
The more China has gotten away with, the bolder it has become. Following the capture of the Scarborough Shoal, Xi embarked on a land-reclamation frenzy, creating 1,300 hectares (3,200 acres) of new land in the South China Sea, including seven artificial islands that now serve as forward operating bases. China has built 27 military outposts on disputed islands, which now bristle with short-range missiles, reconnaissance gear, radar systems, and laser and jamming equipment. Its larger islands also feature aircraft hangars, runways, and deep-water harbors. By unilaterally redrawing South China Sea’s geopolitical map, China is ensuring that it is uniquely positioned to project power in the region.
While China is gradually undermining the Philippines’ security, the US continues to emphasize its “ironclad” defense commitment to its ally. Late last year, the Biden administration reiterated that any violent attack by a third party is covered by the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. Nevertheless, China remains unpunished – and unperturbed.
Even as China has gradually eroded the Philippines’ security – including Philippine control of areas within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) – the US has continued to underscore its “ironclad” defense commitment to its ally. Late last year, the Biden administration affirmed that any armed third-party attack against the Philippine military, coast guard, aircraft, or public vessels “anywhere in the South China Sea” is covered by the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. Yet China remains unpunished – and undeterred.
What explains this yawning gap between rhetoric and action? First and foremost, the US fears escalation, especially when its resources and attention are being consumed by the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. Moreover, the US prefers not to weigh in on sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea, where it has no territorial claims of its own. It has not even taken a position on the sovereignty of the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands, which China also claims.
The US has, however, made clear that its security treaty with Japan covers those islands and cautioned against “any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administration.” It should do the same for the Philippines, stating unequivocally that its treaty commitment to the country covers any efforts to compel a change in areas currently under Philippine administrative control, including Second Thomas Shoal, which China has been attempting to besiege.
In support of this stance, the US could cite the 2016 ruling by an international arbitration tribunal that China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea have “no legal basis” and that Chinese actions within the Philippine EEZ violated the Philippines’ sovereignty. But China’s open contempt for that ruling should dispel any hope that the South China Sea’s future will be decided by international law, which is why the US must be prepared to back up such a statement with action.
If the US does stand up for its treaty ally, it can take advantage of the nine Philippine naval and air bases to which it has gained access within the last decade, two of which are located just across from Taiwan and southern China. If it does not, China will continue to solidify its dominance over the South China Sea, thereby cornering the region’s rich energy and fishery resources and gaining the ability to disrupt supply chains and punish countries for acts it deems unfriendly.
China will not stop at the South China Sea. Under Xi’s leadership, China has used a similar combination of deception, bullying, coercion, and surprise to expand its territorial control elsewhere, from the East China Sea to the Himalayas, sparing not even the tiny country of Bhutan. As with any bully, the only way to stop China is to confront it with a credible challenger. The US must be that challenger, and it should start by defending the Philippines.
Brahma Chellaney, Professor Emeritus of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of Water, Peace, and War: Confronting the Global Water Crisis (Rowman & Littlefield, 2013).
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2024.
www.project-syndicate.org
Editorial note: Now more than ever, discussing China means controversial debates. At China.Table we want to reflect the diversity of opinions to give you an insight into the breadth of the debate. Opinions do not reflect the views of the editorial team.
Thousands of electric vehicles are ready for delivery at the Chang’an Automobile Distribution Center in Chongqing. Up to and including October, the number of electric cars sold in the People’s Republic was almost ten million. The 12 million mark is expected to be broken by the end of the year. Chang’an is one of the big state-owned manufacturers that has played a key role in making Chongqing a manufacturing hub in China. The company cooperates with Huawei and is partly owned by battery manufacturer CATL.
Anyone who critically examines China must expect a headwind. Even more so if they have no experience writing public papers about the People’s Republic. Markus Frenzel is currently experiencing this first-hand. With a book on the activities of the United Front in Germany, he has sparked resistance, accusing him of hating China and pursuing sensationalism.
Fabian Peltsch has confronted Frenzel with the concrete accusations raised against him. Frenzel describes the criticism of his work as a “classic defense reflex to drag unpleasant revelations into the mud.” He says the Chinese authorities had apparently targeted him during his research. German security authorities had confirmed this to him.
Meanwhile, Jörn Petring presents Huawei’s new operating system. The interesting thing is that the company is exclusively using its own architecture and a proprietary programming language. This step illustrates how serious Huawei is about becoming independent of American technology.
Huawei is consistently working on building a closed ecosystem that aims to offer advantages similar to Apple’s iOS: A controlled, uniform environment in which Huawei fully controls both hardware and software.
Mr. Frenzel, your book “China Leaks” sheds light on “Beijing’s secret network in Germany.” Your research was based on a document from the dark net that lists representatives of the so-called United Front who are involved in influence operations in Germany on behalf of China. How could you be sure that the list was genuine?
Journalists in several countries discovered the list. A colleague from Sweden, for example, had received it from security circles in Stockholm, where it had already been checked. In the end, a research network from ten countries spent two years verifying all the names on it, and as investigative journalists, we also confronted the people on the list directly. This revealed a network consisting of officials from friendship associations, the people behind illegal police stations, but also employees of Chinese consulates and the embassy, who regularly exchange information. In order to paint a complete picture, I have also focused on German politics and business. The regime’s supporters include people like Rudolf Scharping or former Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich, as well as the AfD or left-wing politicians like Sevim Dağdelen, who are stirring up public opinion in favor of China.
You are not a sinologist yourself and you never dealt with China before. How did you handle the language barriers and cultural peculiarities?
For the research cooperation, we had three recognized China experts with us who are familiar with the power structure. Mareike Ohlberg from the German Marshall Fund in Berlin, Laura Harth from Madrid-based Safeguard Defenders and Peter Mattis from the Jamestown Foundation in Washington, D.C. Mattis worked for the CIA on China for many years. Some native speakers helped us clearly identify the names, for example.
Your book sparked controversy shortly after it was published. You were accused of hating China.
That didn’t come as a surprise to me, it’s the classic defense reflex to drag unpleasant revelations through the mud. Personally, I can say that I truly appreciate Chinese culture. I have traveled to China several times and have been fascinated by its speed of development. The country has achieved enormous things, including the fight against poverty. I also find it impressive what German companies like VW have built up in China. These are great success stories. But the regime has become increasingly ruthless in recent years. And here you have to consider whether economic success justifies all means. Many people who benefit from cooperation with China or do well with it deliberately turn a blind eye to the bad aspects. I have put a lot of energy into this book because I really do see our democracy and our free way of life threatened by this criminal Chinese regime.
You have also been accused of placing Chinese citizens under general suspicion in the search for agents of influence.
This, too, is a well-known knock-down argument to discredit research. The people on the list who are playing into the hands of the Chinese regime represent only a fraction of the over 200,000 people of Chinese descent in Germany. The vast majority are not Chinese submarines 2. I never claimed that. It is important to understand that the people on the list are not spies in the traditional sense, who were officially employed for this purpose. That’s the insidious thing about the Chinese approach, that it’s easy to say, well, they’re just telling their story, and we don’t have to believe them. But it’s not that simple. The communists call the United Front their magic weapon for good reason. It’s about bringing everything that’s anybody outside the Communist Party into line. And during my investigations, I noticed this again and again: Even supposed political rivals of the CCP only speak highly of the Communists. For me, this is the pure form of conformity we can observe in the heart of Europe today.
What specific dangers do you see for us?
Take a look at Australia. You can see where infiltration can lead. There, the Chinese side apparently had planned to operate directly within the national government. An intermediary had tried to virtually control an important minister by acting as a financially strong donor. The plot was uncovered and the politician resigned. For this reason, Australia has introduced the criminal offense of ‘foreign interference’ – an admittedly still somewhat vague term that covers various forms of influencing operations. Anyone convicted of foreign interference can now be jailed for several years.
So what characterizes an agent of influence?
An agent of influence is not a classic spy who uses espionage methods to gather information. Instead, he deliberately fuels sentiments that are in the interests of the Chinese Communist Party. It’s not about bribery in the traditional sense, which would already be illegal in our country. It is about narratives that are used and thus find their way into our politics and provoke consequences that are not in our interests. This type of interference is also a new challenge for Germany, and German courts and legislation must adapt to this phenomenon.
Is it even legitimate to speak of a United Front strategy?
There are several strategies. One is to get as close as possible to foreign politicians and even bring their own people into politics. Another is to promote China’s history abroad – through cultural associations, for example. These people are also door-openers who may not realize how crucial their work is for the regime. They say they are not surveilling anyone. At the same time, these people usually have a close relationship with the embassy or one of the four consulates general. And then, of course, there are more concrete things like the overseas police stations, which the Chinese government downplays as service stations that are only supposed to help the Chinese abroad with everyday life and small bureaucratic chores. But they spread enormous fear among regime opponents. Even here in Germany.
You have also taken a closer look at the Confucius Institutes: Do they really do anything different from the Goethe Institutes, which aim to promote Germany and German culture?
The German government is not a dictatorial regime. It does not tell the directors of the Goethe-Instituts which topics they may and may not cover. Anything that strengthens the coexistence of cultures and countries is a good thing. Nor do I criticize when someone presents a millennia-old culture in a positive light. It only becomes problematic when you talk up a criminal regime and make pacts with it, a regime that has gone to extremes again under Xi Jinping. There are certainly people on the list who are less involved with the regime than others. But they all play a role in Chinese propaganda and influence operations. They all contribute to the infiltration of Germany, either because they believe in it or hope to gain a personal advantage from it.
A woman from Mannheim accused you of witch-hunting her mother because she was shown in a photo with Winfried Kretschmann at a public event. And that you had contacted her under the pretext of filming an article about her TCM health center.
The woman you mentioned not only posted a photo with Minister President Kretschmann, but also some with Cem Özdemir and with Danyal Bayaz, the Finance Minister of Baden-Württemberg. I also have other pictures of her with other Green Party members from the state parliamentary group, taken in the state parliament. That shows me that she has exchanged ideas with them; she is well-connected, and makes an effort to build relationships, including as chairwoman of a cultural center in the Rhine-Neckar region. There is also a photo of her from China, where she sits at a table with regime representatives. She admitted in conversation that she cooperates with the consulate general in Frankfurt. And there are scientific publications that state that the Communist regime deliberately uses TCM, traditional Chinese medicine, to open doors to foreign societies.
You say you were under surveillance while working on your book. By whom?
Photos with information about a high-ranking Chinese officer disappeared from my cell phone. Later, my private laptop – and another computer from my personal environment – was suddenly switched to Chinese, although I had never done this and don’t normally use it for my research. In the early stages of my research, I also noticed that I was constantly surrounded by Asian-looking people on public transport. In one subway, a woman wearing a face mask held her cell phone directly at me for several minutes, apparently filming me. There is also a video of this in my documentary for RTL. German security authorities have confirmed to me that the Chinese security services have apparently targeted me.
What did these people want from you?
I have the feeling that this was mainly about intimidation. The message was: ‘We know exactly what you’re doing, we’re in your devices and image files’. This is another reason why we in Germany need to build up a targeted cyber defense against China, as our security is at significant risk.
What do you say to people who argue that the US is also spying on us?
The USA also pursues a clear power policy. However, it still remains a liberal constitutional country. And the massive and quite justified criticism of the USA often voiced in Germany is based on information that comes to light through outstanding American investigative journalists. This shows that a functioning democracy exists there – at least so far – where critical media coverage is possible.
Markus Frenzel is an investigative reporter for the German TV channel RTL. After studying politics in Berlin, Aix-en-Provence and Paris, he worked for Deutsche Welle and the ARD magazine FAKT for many years. He has received several journalism awards for his research, including the Marler Media Prize for Human Rights, the German-Polish Journalist Award, and the European Parliament Journalism Prize.
Huawei is not only making progress with its in-house developed microchips, the tech giant from Shenzhen also has big software plans. Similar to Apple with iOS, Huawei is working on a closed operating system for its devices. HarmonyOS NEXT was unveiled in October.
While the previous versions of HarmonyOS allowed developers to port their Android apps relatively easily, the new version relies exclusively on its own architecture and the company’s own ArkTS programming language. This step illustrates how serious Huawei is about becoming independent of American technology.
The company aims to build its own ecosystem that offers advantages similar to Apple’s iOS: A controlled, standardized environment that allows Huawei to control both hardware and software. Like Apple, Huawei could also charge developers a commission for selling their apps and thus open up a new revenue stream.
Huawei introduced the first version of HarmonyOS years ago in response to US trade restrictions. Until 2019, all Huawei smartphones relied heavily on Android and used Google services such as the Play Store and Maps. However, when Huawei was placed on the so-called “Entity List” due to tensions between the US and China, the company lost access to these services. HarmonyOS was designed in response to this pressure and to make Huawei more independent – albeit with a bit of help from Android.
On the one hand, it is a logical consequence that the company is now trying to completely move away from Android. However, there are also risks, as already evident days after the release of HarmonyOS NEXT. Huawei approached the launch with caution. The company initially only rolled it out on selected devices. This approach allows the system to be tested under real conditions and to gather user feedback.
However, the feedback has been mixed. Shortly after launch, Chinese tech blogger Lu Songsong warned users not to make the switch. At least one-third to one-half of the 15,000 apps Huawei promised at launch had not been fully adapted. He added that there were many “early adopter versions” with limited functionality.
Of all things, reports about a very limited WeChat test version caused some uproar. Although the first Huawei implementation of WeChat offers basic functions such as chat and the Moments feed, it lacks important features such as the short video format “Channels,” the search engine, financial services and AI translation. WeChat is, without a doubt, by far the most essential app on Chinese smartphones. So Huawei cannot afford to make any mistakes here.
However, many observers believe these are teething troubles that can be overcome quickly. At the same time, very positive reports on the new “domestic” operating system in Chinese state media have provided momentum. Huawei is already planning the next step. HarmonyOS Next will reportedly be used on mobile devices and PCs as early as next year. However, this transition could happen later than initially thought.
Chinese President Xi Jinping signaled his willingness to cooperate with Donald Trump’s upcoming US administration on Saturday. On the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in the Peruvian capital Lima, he said at what is likely to be his last meeting with outgoing US President Joe Biden: “China’s goal of a stable, healthy and sustainable China-US relationship remains unchanged,” acknowledging the “ups and downs” between the two countries. Xi went on to say that his country was prepared to work together on contentious issues such as cybercrime, trade, Taiwan, the South China Sea and Russia.
The two-hour talks in Lima took place two months before the change of power in the USA. Trump has already announced a tougher stance against China and nominated hardliners for key cabinet posts. Since then, Biden has been seen as a lame duck. According to a statement from the Chinese government, Xi emphasized China’s “four red lines” that the US must respect:
Xi also warned against a Cold War between the countries and once again rejected accusations of Chinese cyberattacks on the US. In recent months, reports surfaced of attacks on US telecommunications networks allegedly carried out by Chinese hackers. According to National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, Biden also called on China to exert pressure on North Korea not to escalate the war in Ukraine through its troop presence. According to both governments, the heads of state unanimously agreed that humans and not artificial intelligence should decide on the use of nuclear weapons. mcl/rtr
For over a decade, China has been using an increasingly aggressive hybridwarfare strategy to increase its power and influence in the strategically important South China Sea. Countering it will be one of the defining challenges for US President-elect Donald Trump’s incoming administration.
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “Chinese dream” of global preeminence depends significantly on achieving dominance in the South China Sea and ending America’s primacy in the Indo-Pacific region, an emerging global economic and geopolitical hub. And China has not hesitated to use coercive tactics in service of these objectives.
In recent years, boats belonging to countries whose territorial claims China disregards, such as the Philippines and Vietnam, have faced blockades, ramming, water-cannon attacks, and even bladed-weapon assaults by Chinese vessels. Offshore energy operations endure regular harassment. Such violent confrontations have heightened regional tensions and undermined stability in a crucial corridor linking the Pacific and Indian Ocean.
One might have expected the United States to take action to rein in China’s behavior, especially given its mutual defense treaty with the Philippines. And yet, three successive presidents – Barack Obama, Trump, and Joe Biden – have failed to offer anything beyond statements of support and symbolic action. In 2012, Obama allowed China’s brazen seizure of the disputed Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines to go unpunished.
This was hardly the first time the US failed to live up to its defense commitments to the Philippines. In 1995, the Philippines requested US help to block Chinese forces from capturing Mischief Reef, located just 129 nautical miles from the Philippine island of Palawan. US President Bill Clinton, smarting over the termination three years earlier of America’s right to maintain military bases in the Philippines, refused. Mischief Reef is now an important Chinese military base.
The more China has gotten away with, the bolder it has become. Following the capture of the Scarborough Shoal, Xi embarked on a land-reclamation frenzy, creating 1,300 hectares (3,200 acres) of new land in the South China Sea, including seven artificial islands that now serve as forward operating bases. China has built 27 military outposts on disputed islands, which now bristle with short-range missiles, reconnaissance gear, radar systems, and laser and jamming equipment. Its larger islands also feature aircraft hangars, runways, and deep-water harbors. By unilaterally redrawing South China Sea’s geopolitical map, China is ensuring that it is uniquely positioned to project power in the region.
While China is gradually undermining the Philippines’ security, the US continues to emphasize its “ironclad” defense commitment to its ally. Late last year, the Biden administration reiterated that any violent attack by a third party is covered by the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. Nevertheless, China remains unpunished – and unperturbed.
Even as China has gradually eroded the Philippines’ security – including Philippine control of areas within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) – the US has continued to underscore its “ironclad” defense commitment to its ally. Late last year, the Biden administration affirmed that any armed third-party attack against the Philippine military, coast guard, aircraft, or public vessels “anywhere in the South China Sea” is covered by the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. Yet China remains unpunished – and undeterred.
What explains this yawning gap between rhetoric and action? First and foremost, the US fears escalation, especially when its resources and attention are being consumed by the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. Moreover, the US prefers not to weigh in on sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea, where it has no territorial claims of its own. It has not even taken a position on the sovereignty of the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands, which China also claims.
The US has, however, made clear that its security treaty with Japan covers those islands and cautioned against “any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administration.” It should do the same for the Philippines, stating unequivocally that its treaty commitment to the country covers any efforts to compel a change in areas currently under Philippine administrative control, including Second Thomas Shoal, which China has been attempting to besiege.
In support of this stance, the US could cite the 2016 ruling by an international arbitration tribunal that China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea have “no legal basis” and that Chinese actions within the Philippine EEZ violated the Philippines’ sovereignty. But China’s open contempt for that ruling should dispel any hope that the South China Sea’s future will be decided by international law, which is why the US must be prepared to back up such a statement with action.
If the US does stand up for its treaty ally, it can take advantage of the nine Philippine naval and air bases to which it has gained access within the last decade, two of which are located just across from Taiwan and southern China. If it does not, China will continue to solidify its dominance over the South China Sea, thereby cornering the region’s rich energy and fishery resources and gaining the ability to disrupt supply chains and punish countries for acts it deems unfriendly.
China will not stop at the South China Sea. Under Xi’s leadership, China has used a similar combination of deception, bullying, coercion, and surprise to expand its territorial control elsewhere, from the East China Sea to the Himalayas, sparing not even the tiny country of Bhutan. As with any bully, the only way to stop China is to confront it with a credible challenger. The US must be that challenger, and it should start by defending the Philippines.
Brahma Chellaney, Professor Emeritus of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of Water, Peace, and War: Confronting the Global Water Crisis (Rowman & Littlefield, 2013).
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2024.
www.project-syndicate.org
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