The wrangling over the planned acquisition of a minority stake by the Chinese shipping company Cosco in one of the three container terminals in the German port of Hamburg is a prime example of the new vigilance of German politicians. Chinese is no longer being taken without hesitation, no matter how tempting it may be.
A careful evaluation of the deal by the Ministry of Economics is not only warranted. It is a matter of urgency. Especially since part of the critical infrastructure is to be sold to a Chinese state-owned company. Factually, approval of the investment would mean the loss of another bit of independence as far as logistics and supplies to the Federal Republic are concerned.
Supporters of the Chinese takeover certainly consider this mere hysteria. After all, their argument is that it involves only four berths and 14 container gantry cranes – a fraction of the capacity of the Port of Hamburg. But the current energy supply situation is a painful reminder of where ever-increasing dependence on an autocratic state can lead.
The author of today’s Opinion, former German Minister of Defense Rudolf Scharping, regards the economies and societies of China and Germany as already “dependent on each other”. If this is the case, then it would be one more reason to reject the port participation to avoid becoming more dependent on the economy of a systemic rival.
Preserving our independence comes with a price. And we will never all agree on just how high that price ought to be. But it is high time to make down payments.
The Chinese want it. Hamburg’s parliament wants it. And HHLA, the operator of the Port of Hamburg, also wants it. The Chinese shipping company Cosco is to acquire a stake in the Port of Hamburg – but could be stopped by the German Federal Ministry of Economics. Specifically, the deal is for a 35 percent minority stake in “Tollerort,” one of the three container terminals in the Port of Hamburg. The site has four berths and 14 container gantry cranes, and is also very well integrated with five railway tracks for the inland transport of goods.
At the start of thHamburg’sHamburgs port authorities again warned the German government not to block the potential participation of Cosco. “A refusal to the Chinese would be a disaster not only for the port but for Germany,” Axel Mattern told Reuters. The CEO of Port of Hamburg Marketing is certain: “The entry of the Chinese into the operating company would be a huge gain for the port and not a threat, especially since Cosco will soon be the world’s largest shipping company.”
However, Economy Minister Robert Habeck needs to approve the project – and there seem to be serious reservations in his ministry about the Chinese involvement. An investment audit is currently underway under the Foreign Trade and Payments Act. The case in question involves “the acquisition of a stake in a domestic company by a non-EU acquirer in the cross-sector investment review procedure”.
But the ultimate question, which is also likely to be on the minds of the German Economy Minister, is quite simple: What is Cosco’s Chinese goal in the Port of Hamburg? From an economic perspective, a Cosco investment in Hamburg is perfectly reasonable: The world’s fourth-largest shipping company and Europe’s third-largest port would grow together. According to its own figures, Cosco maintains the world’s largest fleet with almost 1,400 vessels. In terms of cargo capacity, the Chinese group ranks fourth. There would probably be many synergy effects. But is there also a political motivation?
Sinologist Mareike Ohlberg has extensively examined Chinese investments across North America and Europe – and has come to the conclusion that supposedly purely economic decisions are more often than not guided by political agendas straight from Beijing. “Beijing assures that it only wants to promote trade by taking over ports, but the People’s Republic is pursuing a long-term plan to build up strategic pressure,” she writes together with Clive Hamilton in their book “The Silent Conquest”.
A commonly used Chinese tactic is the principle of “yi shang bi zheng“, which describes the instrumentalization of domestic companies abroad. The idea is to exert pressure on the respective government. And indeed, China exploits economic dependencies to demand political loyalties – also in Europe.
Greece can serve as an example. In October 2009, in the wake of the Greek financial crisis, Cosco leased half of the container port in Piraeus for 35 years. The cost: $647 million. Seven years later, it acquired a majority shareholding in the entire port. Since then, the terminal operated by Cosco is said to generate considerable profits, made possible by increased efficiency and wage cuts. And the rundown anchorage of Piraeus has once again become one of the fastest-growing Mediterranean ports.
In 2017, the Greek government, of all governments, blocked a critical EU statement on Beijing’s human rights violations. Critics identified this as forced loyalty. “It has often been noticed that EU member states in which China invests on a large scale shy away from also representing EU values or EU interests vis-à-vis China,” commented EU parliamentarian Jo Leinen (SPD) at the time. Five years later, the German Ministry of Economics does not seem to have forgotten the Greek veto.
Cosco’s headquarters are located in Beijing’s Xicheng district. From here, it plans and expands all over the world: The company holds stakes in 52 container terminals worldwide. In Europe alone, Cosco has invested in 14 ports together with its partner company China Merchants – these include majority stakes in Valencia and Bilbao, as well as shares in North Range ports in Rotterdam, Antwerp and Zeebrugge. Around 80 percent of European imports and exports are handled via the so-called North Range, which consists of Europe’s major ports on the North Sea.
While Berlin fears the long-term geostrategic consequences of Cosco’s entry into Hamburg, port operators and politicians in the Hanseatic city see the short-term potential of such an investment. “After all, we are only talking about a minority stake in the operating company of the Tollerort terminal, which Cosco already uses to a significant extent,” says port boss Mattern. Moreover, Cosco does not want to acquire any land, he argues.
Hamburg’s First Mayor Peter Tschentscher already voiced his support for Cosco’s entry back in July. The deal would strengthen Hamburg’s role as a central European hub for goods traffic with China. In September 2021, first reports circulated that the deal between port operator HHLA and Cosco was already signed and sealed. But that was premature.
Angela Titzrath, Chair of HHLA’s executive board, told German broadcaster NDR last year that the port already has strong ties with China. “30 percent of the goods handled in Germany with China passes through the site.” Only the trade union Ver.di is concerned about working conditions and a growing “influence of shipowners on local logistics conditions” through such investments (China.Table reported).
The German government does not seem to have found a common line yet: The Foreign and Economics ministries, led by the Greens, generally oppose Chinese involvement, whereas the Chancellor’s Office, where Olaf Scholz, a former first mayor of Hamburg, is in charge, is more in favor of the plan.
However, some members of the parliamentary coalition have reportedly already made up their minds: A critical infrastructure such as a port terminal must not fall into Chinese hands, not even partially. However, media reports that Economy Minister Habeck has already vetoed Cosco’s entry have been denied so far. And yet: The way Cosco’s possible involvement in Hamburg is being handled is exemplary for Germany’s new China approach, its partner and rival.
Xin Chen imagined the beginning of his career to be different. Last year, he graduated from the southern Chinese metropolis of Shenzhen with a degree in computer science. Normally, this would have guaranteed him a job at one of China’s tech giants. But despite sending out numerous applications, the 23-year-old still hasn’t found a job.
“There are hardly any job openings anymore,” says Xin, who now has to scrape by as a food delivery driver. “I don’t see my situation improving any time soon,” he told China.Table.
Many young Chinese feel the same way as Xin. China’s urban youth unemployment rate reached 19.9 percent in July. According to the Beijing Bureau of Statistics, this is the highest figure since it began tracking youth unemployment in January 2018.
At that time, the rate was only 9.6 percent, which is not an unusually high figure by international standards. Unemployment among young people between 16 and 24 is generally higher than in the population as a whole. In a crisis, companies tend to cut back on young talent first. Experienced employees, on the other hand, have it somewhat easier to keep their jobs or find new employment, which is also reflected in the statistics in China. The general unemployment rate in urban areas recently remained at a relatively low 5.4 percent.
Above all, young Chinese are affected by the harsh Covid measures, which severely hurt the economy. The statistics bureau openly admits as much. “Companies struggling amid the Covid pandemic are less able to recruit new employees,” an authority spokesman analyzed recent figures.
The phenomenon of high youth unemployment in times of economic crisis is also known in the West. After the 2008 financial crisis, many young people in Southern Europe had just as few prospects as their peers in today’s China. In Spain, more than 20 percent of all 16-24 year-olds had no job at the time. If all students and schoolchildren in this age group are excluded, more than 50 percent had no job. Young people in Italy or Greece were not much better off. Many ended up trying their luck in other EU countries.
Young unemployed Chinese do not have this option. Their sheer numbers make it impossible to be absorbed by other labor markets where the pandemic is no longer such a big issue. China’s unemployment problem has particular force as low corporate demand is met by an unprecedented influx of new talent. With 10.76 million students, more Chinese are graduating this year than ever before. The number of expected graduates is thus 18.4 percent higher than in 2021.
In the past, China’s tech companies were often eager to grab highly qualified university graduates. But many of them are not only weakened by the general economic crisis, but also have to cope with the government crackdown of the past two years. Across the board, companies like Tencent and Alibaba have halted hiring in parts of their companies and even downsized their staff.
Beijing is aware that it needs to solve problems on the labor market, as excessive unemployment could have an impact on the happiness of the population and thus on the stability of the country. Lu Feng, an economist at Peking University, proposes short-term employment programs subsidized by the government. Companies should also be subsidized to at least offer internships to students. But that alone will certainly not be enough. The same applies to the labor market as to the economy as a whole: If Beijing continues its strict Covid measures, an economic recovery is unlikely to materialize soon. Joern Petring/Gregor Koppenburg
From the US State Department, the Office of the Historian: “Chinese Communists: Short range – no change. Long range – we do not want 800,000,000 living in angry isolation. We want contact … (want) China – cooperative member of international community ….”; Richard Nixon in January 1969. Anyone who follows the developments up to the admission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations (1975) or the establishment of relations with the United States (1979) quickly realizes: Never in recent decades has there been so little direct interaction between China and the world.
Almost three years of the Covid pandemic have led to enormous stress, be it in human or cultural, in scientific, economic or political exchanges. When people communicate “screen to screen”, nuances are lost, that is, opportunities for greater understanding, for gradual rapprochement, or even communication. Russia’s attack on Ukraine exacerbates this alienation.
The answers to the overlapping (and mutually exacerbating) threats to climate and biodiversity, to peace and stable development, to health or to the cohesion of societies, are, in part, fundamentally different. Germany and Europe should take a close look.
This year also marks the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Japan and China. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida recently spoke of the goal of constructive and stable relations between the two countries. Like South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, the Japanese have ratified the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) with China and the ASEAN countries. It is the world’s largest free trade area and represents the economic and political interest in mutual and stable development for one-third of mankind, as well as the world’s economic performance.
India, Brazil, South Africa, and China belong to those states that consider Russia’s attack on Ukraine to be an overly European matter. For example, Indian companies are making good business by purchasing Russian oil (at a discount) and reselling the resulting products (at global market prices).
Germany and Europe should gain a more differentiated picture of reality, including China. The same applies vice versa. When diplomatic relations were established in 1972, the Cultural Revolution was raging in China, destroying people, tearing families apart, ruining China in every way. The political situation was complex, to say the least. But Germany established relations and contributed to constructive peace and development policies.
And today: The slogan of “dependency” spreads, which can, even must, be countered by “decoupling”. If the mutual dependencies are observed rationally, the emerging picture is one of mutually dependent economies and societies.
Whether it is pharmaceutical products (up to 70 percent from China) or semiconductors, whether it is intermediate products for mechanical and plant engineering or the chemical industry, whether it is rare earths, or other materials that are vital for our energy transition – the list could go on and on, in both directions. Trade has never been more extensive, investments never higher, research and development never more intensive – all despite Covid. But there is much more at stake than the economic benefits from a global division of labor and its safeguarding within a stable political framework.
The foundations of human life are being challenged worldwide. We will only find future-proof answers to these challenges together. Two examples: Without China, there is no globally viable answer to climate change. China’s goals are ambitious, but they fall short of what is needed and of what is technically possible. However, this will only change if better solutions are found for all sides in negotiations.
Supply chains must become more resilient, and the procurement of raw materials, energy and other products more diversified – but this is not directed against anyone, but rather in line with respective interests. This is immediately understood in China – as RCEP recently reminded everyone. Moreover: China, the USA and also Europe have to master such great challenges “at home”, as no one needs an escalating international situation.
Wherever sober representation of interests becomes rhetorically charged, escalation is not far away. Democratic societies unite interests and positions. There can be no compromise on this. This is also clear in China. Who says what on which occasion and how much is expected of his counterpart is another matter. As a note: In 1992, the Japanese emperor visited China; it was a time of the most extensive expressions of friendship. Akihito expressed his “regret” (!) about other (not further discussed) parts of history.
We would cry out in outrage if a German head of state were to make such a remark in Poland or France about the history between, say, 1830 and 1945. The Chinese hosts of the Tenno, however, only kindly said that there was no need for this remark; and that is exactly how it was meant at that time and under the circumstances of that time.
China must decide whether it wants to “rebuild” the foundations of its success (especially since joining the WTO). This is one way to perceive some of the decisions made in recent years. Whether the policy of reform and opening will continue as surely as the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers flow downstream remains to be seen.
In any case, the economic consequences of the repression surrounding Covid will not be the only ones – the broad support among the Chinese population in 2020 has turned into frustration and anger, to an extent that even the leadership in Beijing cannot simply ignore. And not least: The fact that the brutal consequences of the Ukraine war on global food distribution could be mitigated with the help of the United Nations and Turkey is a good sign – for China, it is rather an urgent call to act really actively and responsibly.
Because peace is also a global challenge that cannot be answered sustainably without China. Henry Kissinger had been asked about Pelosi’s Taiwan visit (which helped no one); his hope was that the US would pursue foreign policy guided by interests, not internal politics.
Rudolf Scharping served as Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany between 1998 and 2002 and is the former Federal Chairman of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). With his consultancy firm RSBK, he has helped companies enter the Chinese market for over 15 years.
During the three-day Lunar Festival celebrations that came to an end yesterday, the Longmen Grottoes in Luoyang, Henan Province, proved to be a magnet for Chinese tourists as usual. With 2,345 niches and more than 100,000 Buddha statues, the grottoes belong to the most important Buddhist pilgrimage sites in China. Their construction began more than 1,500 years ago.
The wrangling over the planned acquisition of a minority stake by the Chinese shipping company Cosco in one of the three container terminals in the German port of Hamburg is a prime example of the new vigilance of German politicians. Chinese is no longer being taken without hesitation, no matter how tempting it may be.
A careful evaluation of the deal by the Ministry of Economics is not only warranted. It is a matter of urgency. Especially since part of the critical infrastructure is to be sold to a Chinese state-owned company. Factually, approval of the investment would mean the loss of another bit of independence as far as logistics and supplies to the Federal Republic are concerned.
Supporters of the Chinese takeover certainly consider this mere hysteria. After all, their argument is that it involves only four berths and 14 container gantry cranes – a fraction of the capacity of the Port of Hamburg. But the current energy supply situation is a painful reminder of where ever-increasing dependence on an autocratic state can lead.
The author of today’s Opinion, former German Minister of Defense Rudolf Scharping, regards the economies and societies of China and Germany as already “dependent on each other”. If this is the case, then it would be one more reason to reject the port participation to avoid becoming more dependent on the economy of a systemic rival.
Preserving our independence comes with a price. And we will never all agree on just how high that price ought to be. But it is high time to make down payments.
The Chinese want it. Hamburg’s parliament wants it. And HHLA, the operator of the Port of Hamburg, also wants it. The Chinese shipping company Cosco is to acquire a stake in the Port of Hamburg – but could be stopped by the German Federal Ministry of Economics. Specifically, the deal is for a 35 percent minority stake in “Tollerort,” one of the three container terminals in the Port of Hamburg. The site has four berths and 14 container gantry cranes, and is also very well integrated with five railway tracks for the inland transport of goods.
At the start of thHamburg’sHamburgs port authorities again warned the German government not to block the potential participation of Cosco. “A refusal to the Chinese would be a disaster not only for the port but for Germany,” Axel Mattern told Reuters. The CEO of Port of Hamburg Marketing is certain: “The entry of the Chinese into the operating company would be a huge gain for the port and not a threat, especially since Cosco will soon be the world’s largest shipping company.”
However, Economy Minister Robert Habeck needs to approve the project – and there seem to be serious reservations in his ministry about the Chinese involvement. An investment audit is currently underway under the Foreign Trade and Payments Act. The case in question involves “the acquisition of a stake in a domestic company by a non-EU acquirer in the cross-sector investment review procedure”.
But the ultimate question, which is also likely to be on the minds of the German Economy Minister, is quite simple: What is Cosco’s Chinese goal in the Port of Hamburg? From an economic perspective, a Cosco investment in Hamburg is perfectly reasonable: The world’s fourth-largest shipping company and Europe’s third-largest port would grow together. According to its own figures, Cosco maintains the world’s largest fleet with almost 1,400 vessels. In terms of cargo capacity, the Chinese group ranks fourth. There would probably be many synergy effects. But is there also a political motivation?
Sinologist Mareike Ohlberg has extensively examined Chinese investments across North America and Europe – and has come to the conclusion that supposedly purely economic decisions are more often than not guided by political agendas straight from Beijing. “Beijing assures that it only wants to promote trade by taking over ports, but the People’s Republic is pursuing a long-term plan to build up strategic pressure,” she writes together with Clive Hamilton in their book “The Silent Conquest”.
A commonly used Chinese tactic is the principle of “yi shang bi zheng“, which describes the instrumentalization of domestic companies abroad. The idea is to exert pressure on the respective government. And indeed, China exploits economic dependencies to demand political loyalties – also in Europe.
Greece can serve as an example. In October 2009, in the wake of the Greek financial crisis, Cosco leased half of the container port in Piraeus for 35 years. The cost: $647 million. Seven years later, it acquired a majority shareholding in the entire port. Since then, the terminal operated by Cosco is said to generate considerable profits, made possible by increased efficiency and wage cuts. And the rundown anchorage of Piraeus has once again become one of the fastest-growing Mediterranean ports.
In 2017, the Greek government, of all governments, blocked a critical EU statement on Beijing’s human rights violations. Critics identified this as forced loyalty. “It has often been noticed that EU member states in which China invests on a large scale shy away from also representing EU values or EU interests vis-à-vis China,” commented EU parliamentarian Jo Leinen (SPD) at the time. Five years later, the German Ministry of Economics does not seem to have forgotten the Greek veto.
Cosco’s headquarters are located in Beijing’s Xicheng district. From here, it plans and expands all over the world: The company holds stakes in 52 container terminals worldwide. In Europe alone, Cosco has invested in 14 ports together with its partner company China Merchants – these include majority stakes in Valencia and Bilbao, as well as shares in North Range ports in Rotterdam, Antwerp and Zeebrugge. Around 80 percent of European imports and exports are handled via the so-called North Range, which consists of Europe’s major ports on the North Sea.
While Berlin fears the long-term geostrategic consequences of Cosco’s entry into Hamburg, port operators and politicians in the Hanseatic city see the short-term potential of such an investment. “After all, we are only talking about a minority stake in the operating company of the Tollerort terminal, which Cosco already uses to a significant extent,” says port boss Mattern. Moreover, Cosco does not want to acquire any land, he argues.
Hamburg’s First Mayor Peter Tschentscher already voiced his support for Cosco’s entry back in July. The deal would strengthen Hamburg’s role as a central European hub for goods traffic with China. In September 2021, first reports circulated that the deal between port operator HHLA and Cosco was already signed and sealed. But that was premature.
Angela Titzrath, Chair of HHLA’s executive board, told German broadcaster NDR last year that the port already has strong ties with China. “30 percent of the goods handled in Germany with China passes through the site.” Only the trade union Ver.di is concerned about working conditions and a growing “influence of shipowners on local logistics conditions” through such investments (China.Table reported).
The German government does not seem to have found a common line yet: The Foreign and Economics ministries, led by the Greens, generally oppose Chinese involvement, whereas the Chancellor’s Office, where Olaf Scholz, a former first mayor of Hamburg, is in charge, is more in favor of the plan.
However, some members of the parliamentary coalition have reportedly already made up their minds: A critical infrastructure such as a port terminal must not fall into Chinese hands, not even partially. However, media reports that Economy Minister Habeck has already vetoed Cosco’s entry have been denied so far. And yet: The way Cosco’s possible involvement in Hamburg is being handled is exemplary for Germany’s new China approach, its partner and rival.
Xin Chen imagined the beginning of his career to be different. Last year, he graduated from the southern Chinese metropolis of Shenzhen with a degree in computer science. Normally, this would have guaranteed him a job at one of China’s tech giants. But despite sending out numerous applications, the 23-year-old still hasn’t found a job.
“There are hardly any job openings anymore,” says Xin, who now has to scrape by as a food delivery driver. “I don’t see my situation improving any time soon,” he told China.Table.
Many young Chinese feel the same way as Xin. China’s urban youth unemployment rate reached 19.9 percent in July. According to the Beijing Bureau of Statistics, this is the highest figure since it began tracking youth unemployment in January 2018.
At that time, the rate was only 9.6 percent, which is not an unusually high figure by international standards. Unemployment among young people between 16 and 24 is generally higher than in the population as a whole. In a crisis, companies tend to cut back on young talent first. Experienced employees, on the other hand, have it somewhat easier to keep their jobs or find new employment, which is also reflected in the statistics in China. The general unemployment rate in urban areas recently remained at a relatively low 5.4 percent.
Above all, young Chinese are affected by the harsh Covid measures, which severely hurt the economy. The statistics bureau openly admits as much. “Companies struggling amid the Covid pandemic are less able to recruit new employees,” an authority spokesman analyzed recent figures.
The phenomenon of high youth unemployment in times of economic crisis is also known in the West. After the 2008 financial crisis, many young people in Southern Europe had just as few prospects as their peers in today’s China. In Spain, more than 20 percent of all 16-24 year-olds had no job at the time. If all students and schoolchildren in this age group are excluded, more than 50 percent had no job. Young people in Italy or Greece were not much better off. Many ended up trying their luck in other EU countries.
Young unemployed Chinese do not have this option. Their sheer numbers make it impossible to be absorbed by other labor markets where the pandemic is no longer such a big issue. China’s unemployment problem has particular force as low corporate demand is met by an unprecedented influx of new talent. With 10.76 million students, more Chinese are graduating this year than ever before. The number of expected graduates is thus 18.4 percent higher than in 2021.
In the past, China’s tech companies were often eager to grab highly qualified university graduates. But many of them are not only weakened by the general economic crisis, but also have to cope with the government crackdown of the past two years. Across the board, companies like Tencent and Alibaba have halted hiring in parts of their companies and even downsized their staff.
Beijing is aware that it needs to solve problems on the labor market, as excessive unemployment could have an impact on the happiness of the population and thus on the stability of the country. Lu Feng, an economist at Peking University, proposes short-term employment programs subsidized by the government. Companies should also be subsidized to at least offer internships to students. But that alone will certainly not be enough. The same applies to the labor market as to the economy as a whole: If Beijing continues its strict Covid measures, an economic recovery is unlikely to materialize soon. Joern Petring/Gregor Koppenburg
From the US State Department, the Office of the Historian: “Chinese Communists: Short range – no change. Long range – we do not want 800,000,000 living in angry isolation. We want contact … (want) China – cooperative member of international community ….”; Richard Nixon in January 1969. Anyone who follows the developments up to the admission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations (1975) or the establishment of relations with the United States (1979) quickly realizes: Never in recent decades has there been so little direct interaction between China and the world.
Almost three years of the Covid pandemic have led to enormous stress, be it in human or cultural, in scientific, economic or political exchanges. When people communicate “screen to screen”, nuances are lost, that is, opportunities for greater understanding, for gradual rapprochement, or even communication. Russia’s attack on Ukraine exacerbates this alienation.
The answers to the overlapping (and mutually exacerbating) threats to climate and biodiversity, to peace and stable development, to health or to the cohesion of societies, are, in part, fundamentally different. Germany and Europe should take a close look.
This year also marks the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Japan and China. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida recently spoke of the goal of constructive and stable relations between the two countries. Like South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, the Japanese have ratified the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) with China and the ASEAN countries. It is the world’s largest free trade area and represents the economic and political interest in mutual and stable development for one-third of mankind, as well as the world’s economic performance.
India, Brazil, South Africa, and China belong to those states that consider Russia’s attack on Ukraine to be an overly European matter. For example, Indian companies are making good business by purchasing Russian oil (at a discount) and reselling the resulting products (at global market prices).
Germany and Europe should gain a more differentiated picture of reality, including China. The same applies vice versa. When diplomatic relations were established in 1972, the Cultural Revolution was raging in China, destroying people, tearing families apart, ruining China in every way. The political situation was complex, to say the least. But Germany established relations and contributed to constructive peace and development policies.
And today: The slogan of “dependency” spreads, which can, even must, be countered by “decoupling”. If the mutual dependencies are observed rationally, the emerging picture is one of mutually dependent economies and societies.
Whether it is pharmaceutical products (up to 70 percent from China) or semiconductors, whether it is intermediate products for mechanical and plant engineering or the chemical industry, whether it is rare earths, or other materials that are vital for our energy transition – the list could go on and on, in both directions. Trade has never been more extensive, investments never higher, research and development never more intensive – all despite Covid. But there is much more at stake than the economic benefits from a global division of labor and its safeguarding within a stable political framework.
The foundations of human life are being challenged worldwide. We will only find future-proof answers to these challenges together. Two examples: Without China, there is no globally viable answer to climate change. China’s goals are ambitious, but they fall short of what is needed and of what is technically possible. However, this will only change if better solutions are found for all sides in negotiations.
Supply chains must become more resilient, and the procurement of raw materials, energy and other products more diversified – but this is not directed against anyone, but rather in line with respective interests. This is immediately understood in China – as RCEP recently reminded everyone. Moreover: China, the USA and also Europe have to master such great challenges “at home”, as no one needs an escalating international situation.
Wherever sober representation of interests becomes rhetorically charged, escalation is not far away. Democratic societies unite interests and positions. There can be no compromise on this. This is also clear in China. Who says what on which occasion and how much is expected of his counterpart is another matter. As a note: In 1992, the Japanese emperor visited China; it was a time of the most extensive expressions of friendship. Akihito expressed his “regret” (!) about other (not further discussed) parts of history.
We would cry out in outrage if a German head of state were to make such a remark in Poland or France about the history between, say, 1830 and 1945. The Chinese hosts of the Tenno, however, only kindly said that there was no need for this remark; and that is exactly how it was meant at that time and under the circumstances of that time.
China must decide whether it wants to “rebuild” the foundations of its success (especially since joining the WTO). This is one way to perceive some of the decisions made in recent years. Whether the policy of reform and opening will continue as surely as the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers flow downstream remains to be seen.
In any case, the economic consequences of the repression surrounding Covid will not be the only ones – the broad support among the Chinese population in 2020 has turned into frustration and anger, to an extent that even the leadership in Beijing cannot simply ignore. And not least: The fact that the brutal consequences of the Ukraine war on global food distribution could be mitigated with the help of the United Nations and Turkey is a good sign – for China, it is rather an urgent call to act really actively and responsibly.
Because peace is also a global challenge that cannot be answered sustainably without China. Henry Kissinger had been asked about Pelosi’s Taiwan visit (which helped no one); his hope was that the US would pursue foreign policy guided by interests, not internal politics.
Rudolf Scharping served as Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany between 1998 and 2002 and is the former Federal Chairman of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). With his consultancy firm RSBK, he has helped companies enter the Chinese market for over 15 years.
During the three-day Lunar Festival celebrations that came to an end yesterday, the Longmen Grottoes in Luoyang, Henan Province, proved to be a magnet for Chinese tourists as usual. With 2,345 niches and more than 100,000 Buddha statues, the grottoes belong to the most important Buddhist pilgrimage sites in China. Their construction began more than 1,500 years ago.
