He is the man whom party leaders trust. Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping: They all allowed Wang Huning to shape their political programs. “Three Represents”, “Harmonious Society”, “Chinese Dream” – the government slogans changed, but Wang Huning remained. The former professor has been significantly shaping China’s political development from behind the scenes for almost 30 years. This week, SPD chairman Lars Klingbeil met with him in Beijing. In today’s Heads, Christiane Kuehl sheds light on this special man in the shadow of the great leaders.
How do you persuade people to have children? The birth rate in China is so low that the population is shrinking. A new “era of marriage and birth culture” is needed as massive problems loom for the economy and social systems. Monetary incentives, free social freezing, emphasizing traditional family values in the media – these are some of the strategies, but what if they don’t work? Fabian Peltsch analyzes this situation.
It has happened before, after the annexation of Crimea in 2014: Western sanctions against Russia gave Beijing an advantage in gas deals. China entered negotiations with Russia with a tailwind and secured 30 years of energy at preferential prices. Is such maneuvering the reason why China is currently holding back on the new pipeline project, Power of Siberia 2? Joern Petring analyzes why Xi is making Putin wait.
China’s President Xi Jinping has pledged to achieve the “great rejuvenation of Chinese civilization”. However, the country’s population is heading in the opposite direction, rapidly aging. Last year, the population shrank for the first time in six decades. If the decline continues, it will have massive implications for China’s social system and economic strength. The consequences are already being felt, as reported by the founder of a baby supply company in Shanghai, who recently mentioned considering a shift from baby clothing to pet clothing within the next three to five years.
Numerous challenges make Chinese couples hesitant to have children. The abolition of China’s one-child policy, which now allows families to have up to three children, has not changed the trend. The official birth rate in 2020 was 1.3 children per woman. The costs of raising and educating a child until the age of 18 in China are considerably higher compared to Germany or the United States. In 2019, these costs amounted to around €67,600, 6.9 times the annual per capita GDP. In the United States, parents spend 5.25 times the annual per capita GDP, while in Germany, it is only 3.64 times. Additionally, many women fear that having a child could negatively impact their careers.
In March, social media in China saw heated discussions after a company in Wuhan reportedly fired a young woman due to her pregnancy. The legally enshrined “special provisions for the protection of female employees” that prohibit employers from reducing female employees’ wages or terminating their contracts if they become pregnant, are rarely enforced. Moreover, numerous loopholes allow companies to circumvent these regulations. Many reports circulate on Chinese social media about reduced bonus payments or mistreatment of female employees until they resign on their own.
In a commentary in the state-run Economic Daily, it is stated that the state must now help young Chinese parents “achieve a moderate fertility level and optimize the demographic structure”. China plans to double the number of childcare facilities by 2025, according to state television CCTV. The number of childcare workers per 1,000 residents is expected to increase from 2.5 in 2022 to 4.5 in 2025. Additionally, more than 20 cities have launched pilot projects to create a “new era of marriage and birth culture“, as reported by the state-owned Global Times. The plans include tax incentives, housing support and free or subsidized education for a third child. Outdated customs, such as dowries and bride prices, are also targeted for eradication.
Certain local governments are already trying to outdo each other with their initiatives. For example, the Guangdong province plans to create jobs for mothers with children under 12 years old. The city of Shenyang in northeastern China offers a monthly subsidy of €65 to families with a third child until the child reaches the age of three. The city of Hangzhou in the eastern province of Zhejiang aims to provide a one-time grant of €2,600 for couples having a third child and €650 for couples with two children.
Some political advisors even suggest allowing unmarried women to freeze their eggs and undergo in vitro treatments. So far, such procedures are only granted to married women who can prove fertility problems. Ren Zeping, a well-known economist, even proposed that China’s central bank should print an extra ¥2 trillion ($314 billion) to encourage society to have 50 million more kids in the next 10 years. After a lively debate, Ren’s official channels on online platforms Weibo and WeChat were frozen. Critics argued that his ideas were impractical and lacked “common sense”.
Demographics expert Yi Fuxian considers the approved government measures to be insufficient. He believes they are just a drop in the bucket. “The state does not have enough resources to increase the birth rate, and young people would have to pay high taxes, which would further limit their ability to raise children,” explains Yi, the chief demographer in the field of obstetrics and gynecology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, in an interview with Table.Media.
In the absence of better ideas, China is now attempting to follow the Japanese model, which, according to Yi, has already proven to be “expensive and inefficient” years ago. Despite reducing education costs, providing better childcare facilities, and offering birth and housing subsidies, Japan’s birth rate eventually settled at 1.34 births per woman. China, “aging before becoming wealthy”, does not even have the financial means to fully follow “Japan’s path”.
“The Chinese government is too eager for quick success,” believes Yi. He believes that the real problem lies deeper and is of a psychological nature. “The one-child policy has changed the Chinese attitude toward having children and distorted moral values regarding life and family. Having only one child or no children at all has become the societal norm in China.”
When Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin met in Moscow at the end of March, the Russian president had a seemingly big announcement after their discussions. The two countries had completed “all agreements” regarding the construction of the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline.
What stood out was that the joint statement was much more cautious. The Chinese did not mention the project at all in their own statement, despite negotiations between both sides for years. More than two months have passed since Xi’s visit to Moscow, and there is still no concrete news from Beijing.
“China’s silence is telling, and suggests that the implementation of this pipeline will not happen anytime soon,” according to Filip Rudnik from the Warsaw Center for East Asian Studies (OSW). Beijing could try to exploit Russia’s current problems to negotiate a better price in Moscow.
This approach would not be new. The Chinese played it cleverly when it came to the first Sino-Russian pipeline, Power of Siberia 1. The negotiations were repeatedly delayed. Then, in May 2014, the contract was suddenly signed and sealed. Beijing secured Russian gas for 30 years for $400 billion. Just a few weeks earlier, the Russians annexed Crimea. With the backing of Western sanctions imposed at the time, Beijing went into the negotiations with momentum.
Gas flowed through the Power of Siberia 1 for the first time at the end of 2019. The flow rate increases each year. This year, 22 million cubic meters are expected to be delivered, and the capacity limit of 38 billion cubic meters is projected to be reached by 2027. An additional 10 million cubic meters are planned to flow through another new pipeline, the so-called Far Eastern Route, from 2026. It will run from the Russian island of Sakhalin through the Sea of Japan to China’s Heilongjiang Province.
However, according to Russia, Power of Siberia 2 should surpass the other two pipelines. The Russian side now talks about wanting to deliver a total of 98 billion cubic meters of gas to China by 2030. With Power of Siberia 2, the Russians aim to more than double the previously agreed-upon deliveries through the other two pipelines. This is urgently needed from the Russian perspective. In 2021, the EU still imported 155 billion cubic meters of gas from Western Siberia.
It seems that Beijing is not just waiting for a favorable price. The Chinese also consider whether they want to rely on so much gas from a single source. After all, there are other suppliers. Currently, negotiations are underway for a new pipeline from Central Asia to China.
It is expected to annually transport 25 billion cubic meters of gas from Turkmenistan to the People’s Republic of China through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan for 30 years. In addition, Beijing has entered into long-term contracts for LNG deliveries with Qatar, the United States, and global oil companies. China imported 63.4 million tons of LNG gas last year.
According to a recent study by the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, China is taking a “cautious approach” towards Russia. Since the outbreak of the conflict last year, China has only moderately increased its oil and gas trade with Russia, noted author Henrik Wachtmeister. On the one hand, China is holding back due to Western sanctions. At the same time, Beijing does not want to jeopardize its strategy of energy diversification by excessively purchasing gas from Russia.
Wachtmeister further states that the Chinese are “consequently balancing between supporting its most important strategic partner in its challenge of the Western-led world order and looking after its own more self-centered interests.”
Wachtmeister’s advice to Europeans: If relations with China continue to deteriorate, “a stronger Russia-China axis is likely to form through increased energy trade and cooperation.” If Europe wants to successfully implement its Russia policy, it must encourage China to maintain its initially cautious stance.
According to a study, a majority of Europeans favored their countries’ neutrality in the event of a war between the United States and China over Taiwan. Only 23 percent of respondents would choose to side with the US, as revealed in a survey published on Wednesday by the think tank European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). 62 percent of the surveyed individuals indicated their preference for neutrality in case of war. The ECFR study reportedly surveyed approximately 16,000 people aged 18 and above in eleven EU countries in April.
The survey suggests that Europeans are hesitant to reduce economic risks with China while being aware of the dangers associated with China’s economic presence in Europe. Around 43 percent of respondents still view China as a necessary partner with whom cooperation is required. However, if China were to decide to supply weapons to Russia, it would be a red line for a majority of the European public.
On average, 41 percent favored imposing sanctions on China in the event of arms deliveries, even if it had a negative impact on the Western economy. 26 percent of respondents did not provide an answer, while 33 percent opposed imposing punitive measures. According to the study, the majority of respondents in Germany (38 percent) were against sanctions. 37 percent responded that they supported sanctions against China despite the economic damage, and 25 percent of German respondents did not provide an answer.
The survey results, according to ECFR, showed that “European citizens in many respects lean more towards Team Macron than Team von der Leyen.” The respondents did not consider China as a power challenging and undermining Europe, as stated by ECFR. Germany, Sweden, France and Denmark were the only countries where the prevailing opinion regarded China as a “rival” or “opponent” rather than an “ally” or “partner”. ari
Thinkers of Chinese history always warned emperors and other rulers not to surround themselves with too clever advisors, especially those who could have their own ambitions. Xi’s top strategist Wang Huning is always very close to power but at the same time in the background – not someone who wants to be at the very top. It may be thanks to this characteristic that he now serves as a close advisor to Xi Jinping, the third state and party leader. “Xi Jinping apparently sees the workaholic Wang not as competition but as a loyal advisor whose analytical and strategic abilities he does not want to do without,” wrote Daniel Leese, professor of Sinology at the University of Freiburg, in the SZ recently.
The 67-year-old Wang is the number four in the CCP hierarchy and, along with Xi, one of only two top officials who retained their seats on the Standing Committee at the Party Congress in October. Since March, he has been the chairman of the advisory Consultative Conference (CPPCC). He acts as a guiding thinker, develops policy proposals, and even creates the appropriate slogans for them. Xi’s “Chinese Dream” is said to have come from his pen, as well as the most important slogans of his predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. “He made almost every trip, I believe, with Jiang Zemin, no matter where he went. And the same was true with Hu Jintao and then with Xi Jinping,” said China expert Kenneth Lieberthal, who was a senior Asia official in the US government under Bill Clinton between 1998 and 2000 and has met Wang several times. “He clearly has a facility for relating to personalities at the highest levels of power and building a relationship of trust.”
Wang is actually an intellectual who has learned foreign languages and has studied Marx and the systems of Western countries at the prestigious Fudan University in Shanghai. He was born in 1955 in Shandong into a family of ordinary cadres. Like Xi, he grew up during the Cultural Revolution and only gained formal education late. But with great force: He skipped the bachelor’s degree, went straight to the master’s degree, and became an assistant professor in 1985 without a formal doctorate. In the following years, he quickly rose to become the director of the Institute of Law. Until 1995, he also taught political theory, wrote many essays and books.
Wang’s most famous work is the 1991 book “America Against America”, which is still available for purchase online in English translation. As a young professor, he had been in the United States for six months, visiting 30 cities. His book shows a certain fascination with the country. According to Leese, he admired “the spirit of innovation, the free availability of knowledge and the economic performance of the system”. But at the same time, he criticized excessive individualism, the state of race relations and the influence of money in politics. According to his view, democratic processes worked best at the local level.
His focus was on contradictions: “Today, the United States is facing challenges from Japan, largely because American institutions, culture and values resist the United States itself,” Wang wrote about a time when Japan was the United States’ biggest economic rival. It would not be surprising if Wang interpreted Washington’s policy toward rising China in a similar way: that the United States is seeking an external enemy due to its internal divisions.
1995 marked a turning point in Wang’s life when Jiang Zemin made him the head of the Political Research Department of the Central Committee’s research center. According to Leese, with the transition to CCP work, he severed all old academic connections, including those abroad, and moved to the secluded Zhongnanhai, where he still lives today. His marriage to a classmate was divorced in 1996. He met his second wife, a nurse, in Zhongnanhai, and they had a child together.
From 2002 to 2020 – an exceptionally long time – Wang led the Central Policy Research Office of the CCP, which is responsible for drafting important documents on ideology and theories, as well as providing advice on political matters. At the same time, he rose in the party hierarchy – from the Central Committee to the Politburo and, in 2017, to its Standing Committee. He stayed out of the dispute between party factions.
“Wang’s views continue to have a lasting impact on Chinese politics,” believes Leese. “At the core of his thinking, there is a contradiction between political goals and practical implementation.” It shows an “eclectic mixture of socialist-based cultural conservatism and a belief in technical solutions, including the social credit system and the inclusion of the will of the people in the form of ‘consultative democracy’.” An example of Wang’s influence: Even as a professor, Wang Huning outlined the “need for comprehensive reforms under strict party leadership” in his essays, according to Leese. This is exactly the approach that Xi Jinping is currently pursuing with his network of reform commissions within the CCP, led by himself. Christiane Kuehl
All the efforts of the past years leading up to this one big test: In China, 12.91 million students are taking the Gaokao this year – almost one million more than the previous year. The national examination, which determines access to higher education, is incredibly important and puts a lot of pressure on the participants and their families. A high-five to the teachers once again, on the way to the exam. And then it’s time to cross fingers!
He is the man whom party leaders trust. Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping: They all allowed Wang Huning to shape their political programs. “Three Represents”, “Harmonious Society”, “Chinese Dream” – the government slogans changed, but Wang Huning remained. The former professor has been significantly shaping China’s political development from behind the scenes for almost 30 years. This week, SPD chairman Lars Klingbeil met with him in Beijing. In today’s Heads, Christiane Kuehl sheds light on this special man in the shadow of the great leaders.
How do you persuade people to have children? The birth rate in China is so low that the population is shrinking. A new “era of marriage and birth culture” is needed as massive problems loom for the economy and social systems. Monetary incentives, free social freezing, emphasizing traditional family values in the media – these are some of the strategies, but what if they don’t work? Fabian Peltsch analyzes this situation.
It has happened before, after the annexation of Crimea in 2014: Western sanctions against Russia gave Beijing an advantage in gas deals. China entered negotiations with Russia with a tailwind and secured 30 years of energy at preferential prices. Is such maneuvering the reason why China is currently holding back on the new pipeline project, Power of Siberia 2? Joern Petring analyzes why Xi is making Putin wait.
China’s President Xi Jinping has pledged to achieve the “great rejuvenation of Chinese civilization”. However, the country’s population is heading in the opposite direction, rapidly aging. Last year, the population shrank for the first time in six decades. If the decline continues, it will have massive implications for China’s social system and economic strength. The consequences are already being felt, as reported by the founder of a baby supply company in Shanghai, who recently mentioned considering a shift from baby clothing to pet clothing within the next three to five years.
Numerous challenges make Chinese couples hesitant to have children. The abolition of China’s one-child policy, which now allows families to have up to three children, has not changed the trend. The official birth rate in 2020 was 1.3 children per woman. The costs of raising and educating a child until the age of 18 in China are considerably higher compared to Germany or the United States. In 2019, these costs amounted to around €67,600, 6.9 times the annual per capita GDP. In the United States, parents spend 5.25 times the annual per capita GDP, while in Germany, it is only 3.64 times. Additionally, many women fear that having a child could negatively impact their careers.
In March, social media in China saw heated discussions after a company in Wuhan reportedly fired a young woman due to her pregnancy. The legally enshrined “special provisions for the protection of female employees” that prohibit employers from reducing female employees’ wages or terminating their contracts if they become pregnant, are rarely enforced. Moreover, numerous loopholes allow companies to circumvent these regulations. Many reports circulate on Chinese social media about reduced bonus payments or mistreatment of female employees until they resign on their own.
In a commentary in the state-run Economic Daily, it is stated that the state must now help young Chinese parents “achieve a moderate fertility level and optimize the demographic structure”. China plans to double the number of childcare facilities by 2025, according to state television CCTV. The number of childcare workers per 1,000 residents is expected to increase from 2.5 in 2022 to 4.5 in 2025. Additionally, more than 20 cities have launched pilot projects to create a “new era of marriage and birth culture“, as reported by the state-owned Global Times. The plans include tax incentives, housing support and free or subsidized education for a third child. Outdated customs, such as dowries and bride prices, are also targeted for eradication.
Certain local governments are already trying to outdo each other with their initiatives. For example, the Guangdong province plans to create jobs for mothers with children under 12 years old. The city of Shenyang in northeastern China offers a monthly subsidy of €65 to families with a third child until the child reaches the age of three. The city of Hangzhou in the eastern province of Zhejiang aims to provide a one-time grant of €2,600 for couples having a third child and €650 for couples with two children.
Some political advisors even suggest allowing unmarried women to freeze their eggs and undergo in vitro treatments. So far, such procedures are only granted to married women who can prove fertility problems. Ren Zeping, a well-known economist, even proposed that China’s central bank should print an extra ¥2 trillion ($314 billion) to encourage society to have 50 million more kids in the next 10 years. After a lively debate, Ren’s official channels on online platforms Weibo and WeChat were frozen. Critics argued that his ideas were impractical and lacked “common sense”.
Demographics expert Yi Fuxian considers the approved government measures to be insufficient. He believes they are just a drop in the bucket. “The state does not have enough resources to increase the birth rate, and young people would have to pay high taxes, which would further limit their ability to raise children,” explains Yi, the chief demographer in the field of obstetrics and gynecology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, in an interview with Table.Media.
In the absence of better ideas, China is now attempting to follow the Japanese model, which, according to Yi, has already proven to be “expensive and inefficient” years ago. Despite reducing education costs, providing better childcare facilities, and offering birth and housing subsidies, Japan’s birth rate eventually settled at 1.34 births per woman. China, “aging before becoming wealthy”, does not even have the financial means to fully follow “Japan’s path”.
“The Chinese government is too eager for quick success,” believes Yi. He believes that the real problem lies deeper and is of a psychological nature. “The one-child policy has changed the Chinese attitude toward having children and distorted moral values regarding life and family. Having only one child or no children at all has become the societal norm in China.”
When Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin met in Moscow at the end of March, the Russian president had a seemingly big announcement after their discussions. The two countries had completed “all agreements” regarding the construction of the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline.
What stood out was that the joint statement was much more cautious. The Chinese did not mention the project at all in their own statement, despite negotiations between both sides for years. More than two months have passed since Xi’s visit to Moscow, and there is still no concrete news from Beijing.
“China’s silence is telling, and suggests that the implementation of this pipeline will not happen anytime soon,” according to Filip Rudnik from the Warsaw Center for East Asian Studies (OSW). Beijing could try to exploit Russia’s current problems to negotiate a better price in Moscow.
This approach would not be new. The Chinese played it cleverly when it came to the first Sino-Russian pipeline, Power of Siberia 1. The negotiations were repeatedly delayed. Then, in May 2014, the contract was suddenly signed and sealed. Beijing secured Russian gas for 30 years for $400 billion. Just a few weeks earlier, the Russians annexed Crimea. With the backing of Western sanctions imposed at the time, Beijing went into the negotiations with momentum.
Gas flowed through the Power of Siberia 1 for the first time at the end of 2019. The flow rate increases each year. This year, 22 million cubic meters are expected to be delivered, and the capacity limit of 38 billion cubic meters is projected to be reached by 2027. An additional 10 million cubic meters are planned to flow through another new pipeline, the so-called Far Eastern Route, from 2026. It will run from the Russian island of Sakhalin through the Sea of Japan to China’s Heilongjiang Province.
However, according to Russia, Power of Siberia 2 should surpass the other two pipelines. The Russian side now talks about wanting to deliver a total of 98 billion cubic meters of gas to China by 2030. With Power of Siberia 2, the Russians aim to more than double the previously agreed-upon deliveries through the other two pipelines. This is urgently needed from the Russian perspective. In 2021, the EU still imported 155 billion cubic meters of gas from Western Siberia.
It seems that Beijing is not just waiting for a favorable price. The Chinese also consider whether they want to rely on so much gas from a single source. After all, there are other suppliers. Currently, negotiations are underway for a new pipeline from Central Asia to China.
It is expected to annually transport 25 billion cubic meters of gas from Turkmenistan to the People’s Republic of China through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan for 30 years. In addition, Beijing has entered into long-term contracts for LNG deliveries with Qatar, the United States, and global oil companies. China imported 63.4 million tons of LNG gas last year.
According to a recent study by the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, China is taking a “cautious approach” towards Russia. Since the outbreak of the conflict last year, China has only moderately increased its oil and gas trade with Russia, noted author Henrik Wachtmeister. On the one hand, China is holding back due to Western sanctions. At the same time, Beijing does not want to jeopardize its strategy of energy diversification by excessively purchasing gas from Russia.
Wachtmeister further states that the Chinese are “consequently balancing between supporting its most important strategic partner in its challenge of the Western-led world order and looking after its own more self-centered interests.”
Wachtmeister’s advice to Europeans: If relations with China continue to deteriorate, “a stronger Russia-China axis is likely to form through increased energy trade and cooperation.” If Europe wants to successfully implement its Russia policy, it must encourage China to maintain its initially cautious stance.
According to a study, a majority of Europeans favored their countries’ neutrality in the event of a war between the United States and China over Taiwan. Only 23 percent of respondents would choose to side with the US, as revealed in a survey published on Wednesday by the think tank European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). 62 percent of the surveyed individuals indicated their preference for neutrality in case of war. The ECFR study reportedly surveyed approximately 16,000 people aged 18 and above in eleven EU countries in April.
The survey suggests that Europeans are hesitant to reduce economic risks with China while being aware of the dangers associated with China’s economic presence in Europe. Around 43 percent of respondents still view China as a necessary partner with whom cooperation is required. However, if China were to decide to supply weapons to Russia, it would be a red line for a majority of the European public.
On average, 41 percent favored imposing sanctions on China in the event of arms deliveries, even if it had a negative impact on the Western economy. 26 percent of respondents did not provide an answer, while 33 percent opposed imposing punitive measures. According to the study, the majority of respondents in Germany (38 percent) were against sanctions. 37 percent responded that they supported sanctions against China despite the economic damage, and 25 percent of German respondents did not provide an answer.
The survey results, according to ECFR, showed that “European citizens in many respects lean more towards Team Macron than Team von der Leyen.” The respondents did not consider China as a power challenging and undermining Europe, as stated by ECFR. Germany, Sweden, France and Denmark were the only countries where the prevailing opinion regarded China as a “rival” or “opponent” rather than an “ally” or “partner”. ari
Thinkers of Chinese history always warned emperors and other rulers not to surround themselves with too clever advisors, especially those who could have their own ambitions. Xi’s top strategist Wang Huning is always very close to power but at the same time in the background – not someone who wants to be at the very top. It may be thanks to this characteristic that he now serves as a close advisor to Xi Jinping, the third state and party leader. “Xi Jinping apparently sees the workaholic Wang not as competition but as a loyal advisor whose analytical and strategic abilities he does not want to do without,” wrote Daniel Leese, professor of Sinology at the University of Freiburg, in the SZ recently.
The 67-year-old Wang is the number four in the CCP hierarchy and, along with Xi, one of only two top officials who retained their seats on the Standing Committee at the Party Congress in October. Since March, he has been the chairman of the advisory Consultative Conference (CPPCC). He acts as a guiding thinker, develops policy proposals, and even creates the appropriate slogans for them. Xi’s “Chinese Dream” is said to have come from his pen, as well as the most important slogans of his predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. “He made almost every trip, I believe, with Jiang Zemin, no matter where he went. And the same was true with Hu Jintao and then with Xi Jinping,” said China expert Kenneth Lieberthal, who was a senior Asia official in the US government under Bill Clinton between 1998 and 2000 and has met Wang several times. “He clearly has a facility for relating to personalities at the highest levels of power and building a relationship of trust.”
Wang is actually an intellectual who has learned foreign languages and has studied Marx and the systems of Western countries at the prestigious Fudan University in Shanghai. He was born in 1955 in Shandong into a family of ordinary cadres. Like Xi, he grew up during the Cultural Revolution and only gained formal education late. But with great force: He skipped the bachelor’s degree, went straight to the master’s degree, and became an assistant professor in 1985 without a formal doctorate. In the following years, he quickly rose to become the director of the Institute of Law. Until 1995, he also taught political theory, wrote many essays and books.
Wang’s most famous work is the 1991 book “America Against America”, which is still available for purchase online in English translation. As a young professor, he had been in the United States for six months, visiting 30 cities. His book shows a certain fascination with the country. According to Leese, he admired “the spirit of innovation, the free availability of knowledge and the economic performance of the system”. But at the same time, he criticized excessive individualism, the state of race relations and the influence of money in politics. According to his view, democratic processes worked best at the local level.
His focus was on contradictions: “Today, the United States is facing challenges from Japan, largely because American institutions, culture and values resist the United States itself,” Wang wrote about a time when Japan was the United States’ biggest economic rival. It would not be surprising if Wang interpreted Washington’s policy toward rising China in a similar way: that the United States is seeking an external enemy due to its internal divisions.
1995 marked a turning point in Wang’s life when Jiang Zemin made him the head of the Political Research Department of the Central Committee’s research center. According to Leese, with the transition to CCP work, he severed all old academic connections, including those abroad, and moved to the secluded Zhongnanhai, where he still lives today. His marriage to a classmate was divorced in 1996. He met his second wife, a nurse, in Zhongnanhai, and they had a child together.
From 2002 to 2020 – an exceptionally long time – Wang led the Central Policy Research Office of the CCP, which is responsible for drafting important documents on ideology and theories, as well as providing advice on political matters. At the same time, he rose in the party hierarchy – from the Central Committee to the Politburo and, in 2017, to its Standing Committee. He stayed out of the dispute between party factions.
“Wang’s views continue to have a lasting impact on Chinese politics,” believes Leese. “At the core of his thinking, there is a contradiction between political goals and practical implementation.” It shows an “eclectic mixture of socialist-based cultural conservatism and a belief in technical solutions, including the social credit system and the inclusion of the will of the people in the form of ‘consultative democracy’.” An example of Wang’s influence: Even as a professor, Wang Huning outlined the “need for comprehensive reforms under strict party leadership” in his essays, according to Leese. This is exactly the approach that Xi Jinping is currently pursuing with his network of reform commissions within the CCP, led by himself. Christiane Kuehl
All the efforts of the past years leading up to this one big test: In China, 12.91 million students are taking the Gaokao this year – almost one million more than the previous year. The national examination, which determines access to higher education, is incredibly important and puts a lot of pressure on the participants and their families. A high-five to the teachers once again, on the way to the exam. And then it’s time to cross fingers!
