The lack of nationwide coordination of partnerships between German cities and Chinese municipalities presents a strategic risk for Germany. This is the conclusion of the study “De-Risking on the Surface, Re-Risking Underneath” by the civil and human rights organization “Freiheit für Hongkong e.V.” The study, which is exclusively available to Table.Briefings, reveals a drastic imbalance in the institutional backgrounds of the respective partner municipalities.
The constellation’s unique nature is problematic. German local politics with the right to self-government meets Chinese partners who primarily represent central government interests. According to the authors, this autonomy, combined with the lack of a formal coordination mechanism, prevents the consistent implementation of the German government’s China strategy. Berlin has no real influence on how and based on which criteria municipalities arrange their exchanges with Chinese partners.
The study emphasizes that the prospect of economic gains through a partnership with a Chinese city is never granted without concessions on a political and moral level. Particularly when joint projects or cooperation are financed with Chinese money, critical comments on Chinese human rights violations or the authoritarian political system are undesirable. The study also highlights cases where the door was opened directly to political influence on German local politics and business under the guise of promoting international cooperation.
In 1982, Duisburg and Wuhan became the first cities to form a partnership. Today, there are 115 such partnerships. In principle, German municipalities are obliged by a 1985 resolution of the Conference of Interior Ministers to limit foreign activities to local matters. In reality, however, not even federal state governments are fully informed about the partnerships of their municipalities. Just under two years ago, when the Bavarian state government responded to a written interpellation from the Green Party in the state parliament, it was forced to admit that it had no knowledge of the goals and activities of the partnerships with Chinese partners.
The study’s authors, which was reviewed by external China experts before publication, consider this to be a considerable disadvantage for Germany in its relations with the autocratic regime. The German government’s China strategy represents a fundamental change in German cooperation with China, at least on paper. The mantra of “change through trade” has been replaced by a de-risking strategy. However, despite efforts to take a more realistic view of China, “traces of this earlier naivety are still recognizable,” it says.
Germany’s China strategy explicitly welcomes city and country twinning programs. According to a paper published by the German government last year, they contribute to bilateral cooperation, improve understanding and promote exchange between civil societies.
Local governments must realize that when cooperating with Chinese cities and municipalities, they are dealing with the extended arm of the Communist Party. All state bodies in China are subordinate to the authority of the Communist Party. Even approaches to decentralization, which would give municipalities greater autonomy, have fallen by the wayside in the People’s Republic since Xi Jinping took office in 2012. His political theories include “maintaining the authority of the Central Committee of the CCP as the overriding principle and strengthening the Party’s centralized and unified leadership in external work.” In other words, every Chinese municipality primarily serves government interests when partnering with German cities.
Since last year, Article 6 of the Chinese law on foreign relations has regulated city partnerships. They are coordinated by the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC), which is, in turn, overseen by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The US government is highly critical of the association. It is said to cooperate closely with the Communist Party’s United Front, a propaganda department for foreign countries.
How determined and with what capacities China sets the framework for cooperation is shown by the example of a meeting between a German city official and Chinese representatives. While the German municipality felt sufficiently represented by one person, the Chinese side brought a handful of participants to the table, including two representatives from local foreign affairs offices, the deputy mayor and the deputy party secretary of the city. The meeting was organized by a former German official who attended the meeting with three members of his consulting firm. The report’s authors have anonymized the identity of the participants.
The study presents examples of how China links and coordinates partnerships with economic cooperation. One example is Ingolstadt, where Audi is headquartered, which has signed a town twinning agreement with Foshan. At first, the partnership resulted in the opening of the Audi Confucius Institute in the city. “However, the Chinese United Front soon used this initiative to spread Beijing’s views and strategically establish political ties at a municipal level,” it says.
The High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva highlighted the importance of local governments for protecting and promoting human rights as early as 2019. Shortly after the Russian attack on Ukraine, the German Association of Towns and Municipalities (DStGB) also recommended that city partnerships should “openly advocate peace, human rights, democracy and the rule of law. And to position themselves clearly and beyond any doubt against a totalitarian and aggressive ruler.”
The city of Cologne, which has partnered with Beijing, shows this is possible. Last year, Cologne joined the “10, 100, 1000 Human Rights Cities and Territories by 2030” campaign by the United Cities and Local Governments (UCGL). The city council’s resolution reaffirmed that the values and principles of Cologne’s foreign policy are based on freedom, democracy and the rule of law. To remain true to its values and goals, the city has developed seven guidelines and 40 concrete measures to uphold human rights in its foreign policy.
Either way, the study recommends the urgent need for more China expertise in Germany’s municipalities. Only then can the country’s China strategy be better assessed, and potential obstacles to its implementation be recognized early on.
Mexico’s newly elected President, Claudia Sheinbaum, will have to deal with trade and investment policy in connection with China at the start of her term of office. This is because the US fears that Mexico will become a transit hub for goods to avoid its tariffs and sanctions against China.
Because Mexico is a free trade partner of the US. The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) only applies to goods manufactured in this zone, i.e., from factories in Mexico. However, such rules always have loopholes. Specifically, preliminary products and parts from China that are merely assembled in Mexico and thus easily mutate into a Mexican product.
Chinese companies also want to invest in Mexico and make it their production base with their own factories. Until now, goods from Chinese brands have generally been exempt from US customs duties if they are manufactured in Mexico.
In the US, Republicans and Democrats alike increasingly push for the development of international value chains, excluding China. The focus is primarily on future industries such as electromobility.
For example, a prerequisite for receiving generous EV subsidies is that the components that make up a car do not come from China. In mid-May, US President Joe Biden raised a series of tariffs on Chinese goods. The burden on EV imports quadrupled to 100 percent of the price. The United States is also now imposing high tariffs on batteries from China.
There are also growing concerns that Chinese companies could undermine the tariffs by relocating their production to third countries. This is where Sheinbaum and Mexico come into play. In March, EV manufacturer BYD announced plans to build new production capacities in Mexico. The search for a site is expected to be completed in the coming months. Like most Chinese companies, BYD does not yet have its own production EV facilities in Mexico.
The US is observing the plans with suspicion. This is already having an effect. While Mexico has so far actively sought Chinese investment, it has now become more cautious. According to Reuters news agency reports from April, Mexico has denied Chinese automakers access to government incentives due to pressures from the United States.
BYD recently insisted that it does not intend to produce in Mexico for the US, but for the domestic market. US Trade Representative Katherine Tai nevertheless pointed to possible countermeasures should Chinese companies attempt to export from Mexico to the US. Donald Trump even threatened to impose tariffs of 100 percent in the event of his election victory in November – despite the North American Free Trade Agreement.
Chinese investments are viewed with little criticism in Mexico. However, China has been more of an economic competitor than a partner for Mexico in the recent past. Mexico only reluctantly agreed to China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. Mexico’s trade deficit with China has grown continuously since then, and the country has lost large market shares in export industries such as electronics and textiles to China.
Unlike many other countries in Latin America, Mexico is also not a member of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Although the government under Sheinbaum’s predecessor, López Obrador from the left-wing Morena party, kept the doors open to Chinese investment, it put little effort into cultivating bilateral political relations.
Obrador’s party colleague Sheinbaum has not yet taken office, but she will likely continue the country’s unsteady China policy. Enrique Dussel Peters, Director of the Center for China-Mexico Studies at UNAM University in Mexico City, expects Sheinbaum to continue López Obrador’s economic policy in general.
He believes Sheinbaum will not restrict Chinese investments in Mexico on her own initiative. However, this does not reflect a conscious stance but rather great unawareness. Sheinbaum has hardly ever explicitly taken a position on China. Even before the presidential elections, the issue hardly plays a role in the public debate.
Meanwhile, pressure from the United States is increasing. According to Dussel Peters, the fact that electric cars produced in Mexico containing Chinese components are excluded from the US purchase incentives is already making investments less attractive for Chinese companies. In his opinion, the United States’ threat to impose tariffs on EVs produced in Mexico with Chinese participation conflicts with the North American Free Trade Agreement.
He said that the authorities in Mexico have so far been indifferent to who invests in the country. The foreign investment laws do not set any political standards – precisely what the US could push to change.
However, Jorge Guajardo, former Mexican ambassador to China and partner at the international business consultancy Denton Global Advisors in Washington, believes the fears are exaggerated. He does not expect Chinese companies to be able to circumvent the US import tariffs on electric cars via Mexico.
Guajardo even doubts that Chinese car manufacturers plan any serious investments in Mexico at all. He says that China mainly uses Mexico as a sales market, while direct foreign investment by Chinese companies in Mexico is marginal. The market for electromobility in Mexico is relatively tiny overall – in 2023, just under 20,000 electric cars were sold in Mexico, only a fraction of which came from BYD.
Dussel Peters also sees the current race to outbid tariff demands in the United States as more of an election campaign bluster. However, the confrontation between the USA and China is real, as are the consequences for Mexico, he says. The country continues to successfully maintain an economic and political balance. However, he notes a lack of serious discussion about Mexico’s future course in the difficult relationship triangle with the United States and China.
Like most other Latin American countries, Mexico lacks a solid China strategy. However, the next government will have to take a stronger stance – pressure from the US is already making sure of this. Leonardo Pape
Jens Hildebrandt – Future Vice President Government Relations Greater China at BASF
Jens Hildebrandt has made a name for himself in the German business community in China as head of the Chamber of Foreign Trade (AHK) in Beijing since 2018. As of July 1, he will head the newly established department for contacts with the Chinese government in Beijing at BASF, the world’s largest chemical company. He was head of the East Asia department at the German Chamber of Industry and Commerce (DIHK) in Berlin. Hildebrandt has a background in sinology and political science.
Ralf Brandstaetter – Member of the Board of Management for China at Volkswagen
As Chairman and CEO of Volkswagen Group China, Ralf Brandstaetter has been in charge of Germany’s largest car manufacturer’s vital China business since August 2022. He is also a member of the Group’s Board of Management. He originally trained as a factory mechanic and later earned a degree in industrial engineering. Brandstaetter was head of the Volkswagen core brand and has many years of experience in purchasing.
Carsten Senz – Vice President Corporate Communications at Huawei Technologies Germany
As the voice of Huawei in Germany, Carsten Senz has a very special role. Discussions in Germany about Chinese influence and technical sovereignty have focused on the network supplier. Senz has been with Huawei for 13 years. He was previously with Wuhan Iron & Steel. He also worked for the city of Beijing. Wuhan was one of the stations of his university studies.
Johannes Roscheck – President of Audi China
Johannes Roscheck has only been the head of Audi in China since April 2024. His task is to maintain the premium manufacturer’s market position. Roscheck can look back on a varied international career with stops in Brazil and Hungary. In the interim, he has left the company to co-found a start-up. He has a background in mechanical and industrial engineering.
Chen Yudong – Former President of Bosch China
Chen Yudong worked at Bosch from 2007 to January 2024, from 2011 as head of the national subsidiary. Under his aegis, sales increased by a factor of 3.5. He comes from Jiangsu, studied in Chongqing and earned his PhD at the University of Michigan. Chen is now on the Board of Directors of Coherix, a provider of machines for the automatic and precise application of adhesives in the smart factory of the future.
Hubertus Troska – Member of the Board of Management for China at the Mercedes-Benz Group
Hubertus Troska has been responsible for the China business of Mercedes-Benz Group AG, of which he has been a member of the Board of Management since 2012. Born in Spain, Troska studied economics and business administration as well as English and Hispanic studies. After four years in the construction industry, he joined the former Daimler-Benz AG in 1988 and rose through the ranks in various countries. Troska is also a member of the Board of Management of Mercedes-Benz AG.
Sean Green – President and CEO of BMW Group Region China
Sean Green joined BMW in 1988 as an automotive engineering apprentice and subsequently studied motor vehicle studies part-time at Windsor College and Maidenhead College in the UK. At BMW, he initially worked in the product area, for example, as parts manager and product planning manager, and from 2003 onwards, he held sales and marketing positions in various regions. Green first came to China in 2014 as Vice President MINI Region China. Since November, he has been responsible for BMW’s entire China business.
Zhang Hui – Vice President of NIO Europe
Zhang Hui heads NIO Europe with offices in Munich and Oxford, which focus on design, supply chain management and advanced engineering. He is also responsible for tapping into the EU market for the EV manufacturer. Zhang has been familiar with Germany for many years. He studied in Pforzheim and worked for Voith AG and automotive suppliers Kiekert and Leoni, among others. Zhang has been working at NIO since 2016, where he has been based in Europe since the beginning.
Christian Sommer – CEO and Chairman of the German Center Shanghai
Christian Sommer is an integral part of the German business scene in China. For almost 30 years, Sommer has been working in Shanghai and Beijing for the German Center, which is the first contact point and office site in China for many SMEs. From 1999, he headed the German Center in Shanghai and has been its General Manager since 2005. Sommer has a background in law and initially worked for a law firm in Shanghai from 1995.
Alicia García-Herrero – Chief Economist Asia Pacific at Natixis
Alicia García-Herrero is known for her expert assessments of the Chinese economy. Her primary occupation is Chief Economist for Asia-Pacific at the investment consultancy Natixis, but she is also actively involved in several think tanks. For example, she is a Senior Fellow at the European think tank Bruegel, a Non-Resident Research Fellow at the East Asia Institute of the National University of Singapore and an Associate Professor at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.
The lack of nationwide coordination of partnerships between German cities and Chinese municipalities presents a strategic risk for Germany. This is the conclusion of the study “De-Risking on the Surface, Re-Risking Underneath” by the civil and human rights organization “Freiheit für Hongkong e.V.” The study, which is exclusively available to Table.Briefings, reveals a drastic imbalance in the institutional backgrounds of the respective partner municipalities.
The constellation’s unique nature is problematic. German local politics with the right to self-government meets Chinese partners who primarily represent central government interests. According to the authors, this autonomy, combined with the lack of a formal coordination mechanism, prevents the consistent implementation of the German government’s China strategy. Berlin has no real influence on how and based on which criteria municipalities arrange their exchanges with Chinese partners.
The study emphasizes that the prospect of economic gains through a partnership with a Chinese city is never granted without concessions on a political and moral level. Particularly when joint projects or cooperation are financed with Chinese money, critical comments on Chinese human rights violations or the authoritarian political system are undesirable. The study also highlights cases where the door was opened directly to political influence on German local politics and business under the guise of promoting international cooperation.
In 1982, Duisburg and Wuhan became the first cities to form a partnership. Today, there are 115 such partnerships. In principle, German municipalities are obliged by a 1985 resolution of the Conference of Interior Ministers to limit foreign activities to local matters. In reality, however, not even federal state governments are fully informed about the partnerships of their municipalities. Just under two years ago, when the Bavarian state government responded to a written interpellation from the Green Party in the state parliament, it was forced to admit that it had no knowledge of the goals and activities of the partnerships with Chinese partners.
The study’s authors, which was reviewed by external China experts before publication, consider this to be a considerable disadvantage for Germany in its relations with the autocratic regime. The German government’s China strategy represents a fundamental change in German cooperation with China, at least on paper. The mantra of “change through trade” has been replaced by a de-risking strategy. However, despite efforts to take a more realistic view of China, “traces of this earlier naivety are still recognizable,” it says.
Germany’s China strategy explicitly welcomes city and country twinning programs. According to a paper published by the German government last year, they contribute to bilateral cooperation, improve understanding and promote exchange between civil societies.
Local governments must realize that when cooperating with Chinese cities and municipalities, they are dealing with the extended arm of the Communist Party. All state bodies in China are subordinate to the authority of the Communist Party. Even approaches to decentralization, which would give municipalities greater autonomy, have fallen by the wayside in the People’s Republic since Xi Jinping took office in 2012. His political theories include “maintaining the authority of the Central Committee of the CCP as the overriding principle and strengthening the Party’s centralized and unified leadership in external work.” In other words, every Chinese municipality primarily serves government interests when partnering with German cities.
Since last year, Article 6 of the Chinese law on foreign relations has regulated city partnerships. They are coordinated by the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC), which is, in turn, overseen by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The US government is highly critical of the association. It is said to cooperate closely with the Communist Party’s United Front, a propaganda department for foreign countries.
How determined and with what capacities China sets the framework for cooperation is shown by the example of a meeting between a German city official and Chinese representatives. While the German municipality felt sufficiently represented by one person, the Chinese side brought a handful of participants to the table, including two representatives from local foreign affairs offices, the deputy mayor and the deputy party secretary of the city. The meeting was organized by a former German official who attended the meeting with three members of his consulting firm. The report’s authors have anonymized the identity of the participants.
The study presents examples of how China links and coordinates partnerships with economic cooperation. One example is Ingolstadt, where Audi is headquartered, which has signed a town twinning agreement with Foshan. At first, the partnership resulted in the opening of the Audi Confucius Institute in the city. “However, the Chinese United Front soon used this initiative to spread Beijing’s views and strategically establish political ties at a municipal level,” it says.
The High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva highlighted the importance of local governments for protecting and promoting human rights as early as 2019. Shortly after the Russian attack on Ukraine, the German Association of Towns and Municipalities (DStGB) also recommended that city partnerships should “openly advocate peace, human rights, democracy and the rule of law. And to position themselves clearly and beyond any doubt against a totalitarian and aggressive ruler.”
The city of Cologne, which has partnered with Beijing, shows this is possible. Last year, Cologne joined the “10, 100, 1000 Human Rights Cities and Territories by 2030” campaign by the United Cities and Local Governments (UCGL). The city council’s resolution reaffirmed that the values and principles of Cologne’s foreign policy are based on freedom, democracy and the rule of law. To remain true to its values and goals, the city has developed seven guidelines and 40 concrete measures to uphold human rights in its foreign policy.
Either way, the study recommends the urgent need for more China expertise in Germany’s municipalities. Only then can the country’s China strategy be better assessed, and potential obstacles to its implementation be recognized early on.
Mexico’s newly elected President, Claudia Sheinbaum, will have to deal with trade and investment policy in connection with China at the start of her term of office. This is because the US fears that Mexico will become a transit hub for goods to avoid its tariffs and sanctions against China.
Because Mexico is a free trade partner of the US. The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) only applies to goods manufactured in this zone, i.e., from factories in Mexico. However, such rules always have loopholes. Specifically, preliminary products and parts from China that are merely assembled in Mexico and thus easily mutate into a Mexican product.
Chinese companies also want to invest in Mexico and make it their production base with their own factories. Until now, goods from Chinese brands have generally been exempt from US customs duties if they are manufactured in Mexico.
In the US, Republicans and Democrats alike increasingly push for the development of international value chains, excluding China. The focus is primarily on future industries such as electromobility.
For example, a prerequisite for receiving generous EV subsidies is that the components that make up a car do not come from China. In mid-May, US President Joe Biden raised a series of tariffs on Chinese goods. The burden on EV imports quadrupled to 100 percent of the price. The United States is also now imposing high tariffs on batteries from China.
There are also growing concerns that Chinese companies could undermine the tariffs by relocating their production to third countries. This is where Sheinbaum and Mexico come into play. In March, EV manufacturer BYD announced plans to build new production capacities in Mexico. The search for a site is expected to be completed in the coming months. Like most Chinese companies, BYD does not yet have its own production EV facilities in Mexico.
The US is observing the plans with suspicion. This is already having an effect. While Mexico has so far actively sought Chinese investment, it has now become more cautious. According to Reuters news agency reports from April, Mexico has denied Chinese automakers access to government incentives due to pressures from the United States.
BYD recently insisted that it does not intend to produce in Mexico for the US, but for the domestic market. US Trade Representative Katherine Tai nevertheless pointed to possible countermeasures should Chinese companies attempt to export from Mexico to the US. Donald Trump even threatened to impose tariffs of 100 percent in the event of his election victory in November – despite the North American Free Trade Agreement.
Chinese investments are viewed with little criticism in Mexico. However, China has been more of an economic competitor than a partner for Mexico in the recent past. Mexico only reluctantly agreed to China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. Mexico’s trade deficit with China has grown continuously since then, and the country has lost large market shares in export industries such as electronics and textiles to China.
Unlike many other countries in Latin America, Mexico is also not a member of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Although the government under Sheinbaum’s predecessor, López Obrador from the left-wing Morena party, kept the doors open to Chinese investment, it put little effort into cultivating bilateral political relations.
Obrador’s party colleague Sheinbaum has not yet taken office, but she will likely continue the country’s unsteady China policy. Enrique Dussel Peters, Director of the Center for China-Mexico Studies at UNAM University in Mexico City, expects Sheinbaum to continue López Obrador’s economic policy in general.
He believes Sheinbaum will not restrict Chinese investments in Mexico on her own initiative. However, this does not reflect a conscious stance but rather great unawareness. Sheinbaum has hardly ever explicitly taken a position on China. Even before the presidential elections, the issue hardly plays a role in the public debate.
Meanwhile, pressure from the United States is increasing. According to Dussel Peters, the fact that electric cars produced in Mexico containing Chinese components are excluded from the US purchase incentives is already making investments less attractive for Chinese companies. In his opinion, the United States’ threat to impose tariffs on EVs produced in Mexico with Chinese participation conflicts with the North American Free Trade Agreement.
He said that the authorities in Mexico have so far been indifferent to who invests in the country. The foreign investment laws do not set any political standards – precisely what the US could push to change.
However, Jorge Guajardo, former Mexican ambassador to China and partner at the international business consultancy Denton Global Advisors in Washington, believes the fears are exaggerated. He does not expect Chinese companies to be able to circumvent the US import tariffs on electric cars via Mexico.
Guajardo even doubts that Chinese car manufacturers plan any serious investments in Mexico at all. He says that China mainly uses Mexico as a sales market, while direct foreign investment by Chinese companies in Mexico is marginal. The market for electromobility in Mexico is relatively tiny overall – in 2023, just under 20,000 electric cars were sold in Mexico, only a fraction of which came from BYD.
Dussel Peters also sees the current race to outbid tariff demands in the United States as more of an election campaign bluster. However, the confrontation between the USA and China is real, as are the consequences for Mexico, he says. The country continues to successfully maintain an economic and political balance. However, he notes a lack of serious discussion about Mexico’s future course in the difficult relationship triangle with the United States and China.
Like most other Latin American countries, Mexico lacks a solid China strategy. However, the next government will have to take a stronger stance – pressure from the US is already making sure of this. Leonardo Pape
Jens Hildebrandt – Future Vice President Government Relations Greater China at BASF
Jens Hildebrandt has made a name for himself in the German business community in China as head of the Chamber of Foreign Trade (AHK) in Beijing since 2018. As of July 1, he will head the newly established department for contacts with the Chinese government in Beijing at BASF, the world’s largest chemical company. He was head of the East Asia department at the German Chamber of Industry and Commerce (DIHK) in Berlin. Hildebrandt has a background in sinology and political science.
Ralf Brandstaetter – Member of the Board of Management for China at Volkswagen
As Chairman and CEO of Volkswagen Group China, Ralf Brandstaetter has been in charge of Germany’s largest car manufacturer’s vital China business since August 2022. He is also a member of the Group’s Board of Management. He originally trained as a factory mechanic and later earned a degree in industrial engineering. Brandstaetter was head of the Volkswagen core brand and has many years of experience in purchasing.
Carsten Senz – Vice President Corporate Communications at Huawei Technologies Germany
As the voice of Huawei in Germany, Carsten Senz has a very special role. Discussions in Germany about Chinese influence and technical sovereignty have focused on the network supplier. Senz has been with Huawei for 13 years. He was previously with Wuhan Iron & Steel. He also worked for the city of Beijing. Wuhan was one of the stations of his university studies.
Johannes Roscheck – President of Audi China
Johannes Roscheck has only been the head of Audi in China since April 2024. His task is to maintain the premium manufacturer’s market position. Roscheck can look back on a varied international career with stops in Brazil and Hungary. In the interim, he has left the company to co-found a start-up. He has a background in mechanical and industrial engineering.
Chen Yudong – Former President of Bosch China
Chen Yudong worked at Bosch from 2007 to January 2024, from 2011 as head of the national subsidiary. Under his aegis, sales increased by a factor of 3.5. He comes from Jiangsu, studied in Chongqing and earned his PhD at the University of Michigan. Chen is now on the Board of Directors of Coherix, a provider of machines for the automatic and precise application of adhesives in the smart factory of the future.
Hubertus Troska – Member of the Board of Management for China at the Mercedes-Benz Group
Hubertus Troska has been responsible for the China business of Mercedes-Benz Group AG, of which he has been a member of the Board of Management since 2012. Born in Spain, Troska studied economics and business administration as well as English and Hispanic studies. After four years in the construction industry, he joined the former Daimler-Benz AG in 1988 and rose through the ranks in various countries. Troska is also a member of the Board of Management of Mercedes-Benz AG.
Sean Green – President and CEO of BMW Group Region China
Sean Green joined BMW in 1988 as an automotive engineering apprentice and subsequently studied motor vehicle studies part-time at Windsor College and Maidenhead College in the UK. At BMW, he initially worked in the product area, for example, as parts manager and product planning manager, and from 2003 onwards, he held sales and marketing positions in various regions. Green first came to China in 2014 as Vice President MINI Region China. Since November, he has been responsible for BMW’s entire China business.
Zhang Hui – Vice President of NIO Europe
Zhang Hui heads NIO Europe with offices in Munich and Oxford, which focus on design, supply chain management and advanced engineering. He is also responsible for tapping into the EU market for the EV manufacturer. Zhang has been familiar with Germany for many years. He studied in Pforzheim and worked for Voith AG and automotive suppliers Kiekert and Leoni, among others. Zhang has been working at NIO since 2016, where he has been based in Europe since the beginning.
Christian Sommer – CEO and Chairman of the German Center Shanghai
Christian Sommer is an integral part of the German business scene in China. For almost 30 years, Sommer has been working in Shanghai and Beijing for the German Center, which is the first contact point and office site in China for many SMEs. From 1999, he headed the German Center in Shanghai and has been its General Manager since 2005. Sommer has a background in law and initially worked for a law firm in Shanghai from 1995.
Alicia García-Herrero – Chief Economist Asia Pacific at Natixis
Alicia García-Herrero is known for her expert assessments of the Chinese economy. Her primary occupation is Chief Economist for Asia-Pacific at the investment consultancy Natixis, but she is also actively involved in several think tanks. For example, she is a Senior Fellow at the European think tank Bruegel, a Non-Resident Research Fellow at the East Asia Institute of the National University of Singapore and an Associate Professor at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.
