It is still only a rumor that Chinese investors could acquire VW plants at risk of closure. From the perspective of the beleaguered workforce, this would be a glimmer of hope. China is not necessarily a country known for upholding workers’ rights – think of Uyghur forced laborers. However, Chinese investors enjoy a good reputation among German trade unions and works councils. Christian Domke-Seidel has written down for you why this is the case.
Our second analysis focuses on a very serious topic: mental health in China. Since the pandemic, Chinese society has been in a state of severe stress. The suicide rate has risen, 95 million Chinese suffer from depression, suicide cases and mental health problems are among the most discussed topics on social media. Our author Blanka Xia explains how China debates these issues.
Today’s opinion piece looks at the thaw between India and China: Journalist Debasish Roy Chowdhury, who lives in Hong Kong and Calcutta, describes why Trump’s constant threats bring the neighbors closer together. In October, the two countries agreed to end years of military stalemate along their shared Himalayan border. Since then, the détente has become increasingly apparent, writes Chowdhury.
I wish you an enjoyable read and a good start to the day,
A takeover of VW plants in Germany by a Chinese investor – as suggested by the Reuters news agency – could be a glimmer of hope for the beleaguered VW workforce. Chinese investors enjoy a good reputation among trade unions. This may come as a surprise – given the reports about Uyghur forced laborers in China, for example.
However, trade unionists say Chinese companies plan for the long term and generally have full order books. They “tend to have a long-term perspective in their investments, which is positive for the workforce. This is in contrast to more activist investors from other countries, who focus heavily on the financial market, spruce up the company, and sell it again quickly,” Romy Siegert explains in an interview with Table.Briefings. She is responsible for transnational trade union policy at the German metalworkers’ union IG Metall.
The study “Chinese investments in the Ruhr region” quotes an employee of ThyssenKrupp Tailored Blanks: “If I had to choose between Chinese and Americans, I’d prefer Chinese.” Americans do not care much about workers’ rights, “Chinese accept them.”
This is also due to the fact that for Chinese companies, the value of an investment in Germany goes beyond a potential profit. On the one hand, the label “Made in Germany” is considered valuable in the People’s Republic. After being acquired by Chinese investors, many German companies ramped up their production because the new owners wanted to sell slimmed-down versions of their products on their domestic market or in developing countries. Having good trade relations with Germany is also a political victory. An ace up the sleeve when dealing with the Communist Party and competitors.
All of this could prove important for VW employees. After all, they had to make sacrifices during the most recent wage negotiations. With the package agreed between the IG Metall union and the Volkswagen brand at the end of 2024, the company aims to cut costs by 15 billion euros per year. Money that the workforce will largely bear. By 2030, 35,000 jobs are to be cut. There will be no pay rises and bonuses have also been cut.
A look back to the summer of 2024 shows just how deep the fall is. VW had just paid out 4.5 billion euros in dividends. An enormously strong economic signal. In the fall of 2024, the trade unions entered collective bargaining with the demand to enforce a seven percent pay rise. But then everything happened very quickly. At virtually the exact moment, VW announced that the brand would have to save four billion euros and close plants.
The Group lacks growth prospects, primarily because demand in Asia has declined rapidly. Whereas Volkswagen recently sold around one in three cars in China, car buyers have increasingly opted for cheaper and more innovative domestic EVs. In the second quarter of 2024, VW shipped almost a fifth fewer cars to China. The European market alone cannot compensate for this.
At least the austerity measures included a job guarantee until 2030. Thorsten Gröger, chief negotiator for IG Metall, described the result as a package that “includes painful contributions from employees, but at the same time creates prospects for the workforce.” This also has to do with the fact that one of the union’s central demands was that no plants should be closed. A problem for VW – especially because of its plants in Dresden and Osnabrück.
Production in Dresden will be discontinued at the end of 2025. In Osnabrück – where the T-Roc Cabrio rolls off the production line – in 2027. Despite the union’s demands, what will happen after that remains to be seen. According to Volkswagen, the involvement of a third party could also be a way of keeping the plant alive. For example, through a client or buyer.
This is where the Chinese investors come into play. So far, they are nothing more than a rumor. IG Metall is just as reluctant to comment on this as the trade union-affiliated Hans Böckler Foundation, which regularly raises the issue of Chinese investors in Germany.
At least Stephan Soldanski from IG Metall in Osnabrück speaks out in the Reuters report. He said he could imagine the workforce producing Chinese cars as part of a joint venture, as long as this was done under VW conditions and “the VW logo continues to light up on the large paint tower.” But even that could be open to negotiation if the Chinese investors behave in the same way as with previous investments (such as ThyssenKrupp or Gotion Battery): “In many of the takeovers, there were commitments for multi-year site guarantees. In addition, a lot of research and development money flowed into the German subsidiaries,” said Siegert in 2023. In other words, precisely what IG Metall is demanding.
This is why the issue could quickly return to the table. The wage negotiations have not ensured the long-term or even medium-term use of the plants in Osnabrück and Dresden. On the contrary. Volkswagen has explicitly recognized the possibility of their use by third parties. The issue is also relevant in Brussels, as the local Audi plant will close at the end of February 2025.
The struggling plants would be a good opportunity for Chinese investors to avoid tariffs. BYD has long been active in Hungary, and Chery has had a plant in Spain since the beginning of 2024. Both trade unions and Chery have spoken positively about the cooperation. The Chinese manufacturer plans to expand production from 50,000 cars to 150,000 cars in 2027, which is expected to create 1,250 jobs.
But regardless of economic considerations, the takeover of the VW plants would also be a huge image gain. For a Chinese manufacturer. And for the Chinese Communist Party.
On January 14, a tragic event in Shanghai’s Minhang district caused an uproar: Three family members jumped from a high-rise building to their deaths, one by one. The mother reportedly had forced her child to study every day. That day, the child had not achieved 100 points in a school exam (the highest score in elementary school in China). After the mother scolded the child severely, the child suffered an emotional breakdown and jumped out of the high-rise building. His parents followed him to their deaths soon afterward.
The tragedy was widely discussed on social media platforms such as WeChat. Many users commented that putting a child under such pressure over bad grades was absurd. Comments such as “Are the parents crazy? Why do you always need 100 points?” and “The mother was clearly overwhelmed” were frequently posted.
Some users shared their own experiences. A user named Fangxiang wrote: “Last year, a colleague of mine had depression. He said life no longer made sense, he couldn’t sleep at night and felt exhausted. After a long vacation, he still didn’t feel better and couldn’t shake off the thoughts of suicide.” Chinese netizens also recently took a keen interest in the fate of famous Taiwanese writer Chiung Yao (琼瑶), who committed suicide in early December. Related articles and videos were viewed more than 100,000 times.
Suicide and mental health problems have recently become one of the most discussed topics on social platforms such as Douyin (the original Chinese version of TikTok) and Bilibili. According to the National Depression Blue Book 2023 (2023年国民抑郁症蓝皮书), mental health-related queries on the search engine Baidu have been increasing by 35 percent every year. Weibo registered more than 100 million mental health-related discussion posts.
Since the COVID-19 pandemic, Chinese society has been in a state of tension, which has made mental health problems more visible. The suicide rate has risen, especially among young people. As the Chinese economy is struggling, living costs continue to rise. On top of this, society offers little space to release negative emotions.
Workplace competition remains intense, and the so-called 996 working time model (nine in the morning to nine at night, six days a week) has become the norm in many sectors. The pressure leads to widespread inner exhaustion, as evidenced by newly created terms such as “to be an ox, be a horse” (做牛马), which means “working without complaining” or the unmistakable “office slave” (社畜).
According to the Blue Book, 95 million people in China suffer from depression. Half of them are young people, 30.28 percent of whom are under the age of 18. Only 36 percent of Chinese people consider their mental health to be good or very good. Among those who rate their mental health as poor, the risk of depression is 45 percent.
Suicides are increasing, but the exact number is unknown. The number of suicides in China can only be derived from two samples. One can be found in the Ministry of Health’s death register (死亡登记系统), which spans around 100 million people. The other is compiled by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (中国疾病预防控制中心) and includes about ten million people. According to the latter’s figures, an average of 4.31 per 100,000 people took their own lives in 2021. The rate for men (5.11) is much higher than for women (3.5).
By comparison, in Germany, which is in the European midfield, the average suicide rate in 2023 was 12.2 per 100,000 people. However, the Chinese data only covers ten percent of the population and contains no information on suicide methods and regional distributions. The number of unreported cases could be very high.
According to a recent study by the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and Shandong University, more men than women die in connection with a depressive illness. Accordingly, younger, better-educated and urban-dwelling men are considered to be particularly at risk. Previously, it was assumed that they had a lower risk of dying from depression than women and people with a low level of education.
Prevention is crucial for dealing with mental illness. However, many people in China refuse to seek therapy out of shame. According to the Blue Book of Depression, only 9.5 percent of people with depression received treatment. Among schizophrenia patients, just under 50 percent received professional help.
At least more and more experts are speaking out on the issue. For example, Ran Ran (冉冉), Chairwoman of the Chongqing Writers’ Association and member of the National People’s Congress, proposed expanding the number of specialized psychiatric clinics and wards in public hospitals. She also recommended that psychological care should be covered by health insurance to ease the financial burden on patients. Qin He (秦和), Rector of Jilin Foreign Language University, also campaigns for depression prevention. He advocates the introduction of mandatory depression screening as part of the annual health check-up for students.
One detail stands out in Chinese media reports on suicide cases. While the media in many Western countries usually provide the contact details and emergency numbers of aid organizations, the Chinese media do not. This is another indication that China still needs to do a lot for the mental health of its citizens. Blanka Xia
We report on suicides impartially and with the appropriate caution to avoid encouraging imitation. If you are depressed or having suicidal thoughts, please seek help. Click here for a list of international suicide hotlines.
Sinolytics is a research-based business consultancy entirely focused on China. It advises European companies on their strategic orientation and specific business activities in the People’s Republic.
Weeks before his return to the White House, US President-elect Donald Trump issued a pointed warning to the BRICS countries. “Go find another sucker,” he wrote on his social media platform, Truth Social, threatening the group’s nine members with 100 percent tariffs should they attempt to challenge the dollar’s global dominance.
Trump’s warning came on the heels of his campaign promise to impose a 25 percent tariff on imported goods from Canada and Mexico on his first day in office. China, the primary target of Trump’s protectionism, is expected to face an additional 10 percent tariff. While this is hardly surprising, given the escalating trade war between China and the United States, Trump has also directed his ire at India, a founding member of the BRICS and one of America’s key allies.
So far, India has managed to avoid immediate conflict by reaffirming its commitment to the dollar. But such policy uncertainties are among the many reasons why the Indian government has been quietly hedging its bets by pursuing rapprochement with China – a move that could herald a seismic geopolitical shift.
The China-India thaw has become increasingly evident in recent months. In October, the two countries reached an agreement to end the years-long military standoff along their shared Himalayan border, setting the stage for a surprise meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia. Another sign of this shift is Indian officials’ newfound interest in attracting Chinese investment.
Meanwhile, US-India relations appear to be cooling. Since a popular uprising ousted Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August, Modi’s favored news outlets, social-media operatives, and Hindu supremacist allies have portrayed the insurrection as a CIA-orchestrated regime change. Some have even warned of similar attempts by the “American deep state” to destabilize India.
Modi’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party has since embraced anti-American sentiment, accusing the US of targeting Indian tycoon Gautam Adani – a close ally of Modi charged with securities fraud and bribery in the US – in an effort to undermine the Indian government. Such rhetoric, a stark departure from decades of strategic cooperation, evokes memories of the Cold War, when a nominally nonaligned India, wary of US interference, gravitated toward the Soviet Union.
This shift is driven by several factors, primarily America’s diminishing ability and willingness to act as a global leader, along with China and India’s attempts to strengthen their bargaining position. With deglobalization reshaping the world economy, America has less to offer countries like India, which do not entirely rely on it for defense.
By contrast, China’s dominance in global supply chains has become impossible to ignore. As the world’s manufacturing superpower – producing more than the next nine largest manufacturers combined – China could support India’s efforts to expand its own industrial base. The government’s annual economic survey highlighted this imperative, stating that “to boost Indian manufacturing and plug India into the global supply chain,” the country must “plug itself into China’s supply chain.” To this end, the report advocated a pragmatic approach focused on attracting Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI).
Such unequivocal government support for cooperation with China was once unthinkable in India, which has maintained adversarial relations with its neighbor since the 1962 Sino-Indian War. After 20 Indian soldiers were killed in border clashes in India’s Ladakh region in 2020, India responded by imposing sweeping restrictions on investments and imports from China, limiting executive visas, and banning Chinese apps. But these measures resulted in massive losses for Indian businesses reliant on Chinese imports. Worse, they deprived India of critical Chinese investments at a time when FDI inflows were already declining.
As global supply chains shift away from China, Chinese manufacturers are also relocating, establishing bases in countries that stand to benefit from the West’s friendshoring and nearshoring strategies. Chinese investments in greenfield projects tripled year on year in 2023, to 160 billion USD, with much of these flows going to countries like Vietnam, Indonesia, Hungary, and Serbia. India, grappling with jobless growth and high youth unemployment, is eager to capitalize on this trend.
The US, once a major source of FDI, is now competing with India for investment as it seeks to boost domestic manufacturing. This competition, which is expected to intensify under Trump, has prompted India to approve several investment proposals and offer concessions – including expedited visas – to Chinese businesses and executives.
India’s course correction aligns closely with China’s interests, as the country’s economic slowdown has piqued Chinese firms’ interest in India’s rapidly growing market. India is projected to become the world’s third-largest economy by the end of this decade, and deeper engagement with it would provide China with a major buffer against US efforts to contain its geopolitical rise.
Moreover, while global attention remains focused on the escalating tariff war between the US and China, India faces significant risks of its own. Trump, who has repeatedly labeled India a “very big abuser of tariffs,” had revoked its preferential trade status during his first term, raising the likelihood of further punitive measures.
To be sure, India – designated by the US as a “Major Defense Partner” – is unlikely to abandon its strategic relationship with the US for closer ties with China. But like other emerging powers in the Global South, India is increasingly frustrated with the inherent asymmetry of the US-led liberal international order, particularly the dollar’s hegemony.
These frictions are also fueled by America’s occasional rebukes of India’s treatment of minorities. Having systematically weakened democratic institutions and tightened control over the media, Modi’s government bristles at any international criticism. Fortunately for Modi, such differences may resolve themselves. After all, it’s hard to imagine Trump being overly concerned by India’s ties to Russia, anti-Muslim policies, or democratic backsliding.
Still, as Modi steps up his efforts to transform India into a Hindu state, he may want to secure America’s support by signaling that he has alternatives. In that sense, India’s overtures to China could be viewed as a geopolitical maneuver aimed at enabling India to tell Trump to “go find another sucker” should he decide to play hardball.
Debasish Roy Chowdhury is the co-author (with John Keane) of To Kill A Democracy: India‘s Passage to Despotism (Oxford University Press, Pan Macmillan, 2021).
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2025.
www.project-syndicate.org
Editor’s note: Discussing China today means – more than ever – engaging in controversial debate. We aim to reflect the diversity of viewpoints to give you an insight into the breadth of the debate. Opinions do not reflect the views of the editorial team.
Donald Trump has rarely been seen as calm and pious as here, in the studio of Hong Jinshi (洪金世). The artist from the southern Chinese province of Fujian started making Zen-style Trump statues a few years ago. Now they are making an unexpected return. The figurines are selling like hotcakes on the shopping platform Taobao, depending on the size, sometimes for the equivalent of more than 2,500 euros. Hong has also recently been working on a sculpture of Elon Musk. Unlike Trump, however, Musk is not supposed to radiate divine calm. Instead, he is riding a rocket wearing a suit of armor similar to Marvel superhero Iron Man.
It is still only a rumor that Chinese investors could acquire VW plants at risk of closure. From the perspective of the beleaguered workforce, this would be a glimmer of hope. China is not necessarily a country known for upholding workers’ rights – think of Uyghur forced laborers. However, Chinese investors enjoy a good reputation among German trade unions and works councils. Christian Domke-Seidel has written down for you why this is the case.
Our second analysis focuses on a very serious topic: mental health in China. Since the pandemic, Chinese society has been in a state of severe stress. The suicide rate has risen, 95 million Chinese suffer from depression, suicide cases and mental health problems are among the most discussed topics on social media. Our author Blanka Xia explains how China debates these issues.
Today’s opinion piece looks at the thaw between India and China: Journalist Debasish Roy Chowdhury, who lives in Hong Kong and Calcutta, describes why Trump’s constant threats bring the neighbors closer together. In October, the two countries agreed to end years of military stalemate along their shared Himalayan border. Since then, the détente has become increasingly apparent, writes Chowdhury.
I wish you an enjoyable read and a good start to the day,
A takeover of VW plants in Germany by a Chinese investor – as suggested by the Reuters news agency – could be a glimmer of hope for the beleaguered VW workforce. Chinese investors enjoy a good reputation among trade unions. This may come as a surprise – given the reports about Uyghur forced laborers in China, for example.
However, trade unionists say Chinese companies plan for the long term and generally have full order books. They “tend to have a long-term perspective in their investments, which is positive for the workforce. This is in contrast to more activist investors from other countries, who focus heavily on the financial market, spruce up the company, and sell it again quickly,” Romy Siegert explains in an interview with Table.Briefings. She is responsible for transnational trade union policy at the German metalworkers’ union IG Metall.
The study “Chinese investments in the Ruhr region” quotes an employee of ThyssenKrupp Tailored Blanks: “If I had to choose between Chinese and Americans, I’d prefer Chinese.” Americans do not care much about workers’ rights, “Chinese accept them.”
This is also due to the fact that for Chinese companies, the value of an investment in Germany goes beyond a potential profit. On the one hand, the label “Made in Germany” is considered valuable in the People’s Republic. After being acquired by Chinese investors, many German companies ramped up their production because the new owners wanted to sell slimmed-down versions of their products on their domestic market or in developing countries. Having good trade relations with Germany is also a political victory. An ace up the sleeve when dealing with the Communist Party and competitors.
All of this could prove important for VW employees. After all, they had to make sacrifices during the most recent wage negotiations. With the package agreed between the IG Metall union and the Volkswagen brand at the end of 2024, the company aims to cut costs by 15 billion euros per year. Money that the workforce will largely bear. By 2030, 35,000 jobs are to be cut. There will be no pay rises and bonuses have also been cut.
A look back to the summer of 2024 shows just how deep the fall is. VW had just paid out 4.5 billion euros in dividends. An enormously strong economic signal. In the fall of 2024, the trade unions entered collective bargaining with the demand to enforce a seven percent pay rise. But then everything happened very quickly. At virtually the exact moment, VW announced that the brand would have to save four billion euros and close plants.
The Group lacks growth prospects, primarily because demand in Asia has declined rapidly. Whereas Volkswagen recently sold around one in three cars in China, car buyers have increasingly opted for cheaper and more innovative domestic EVs. In the second quarter of 2024, VW shipped almost a fifth fewer cars to China. The European market alone cannot compensate for this.
At least the austerity measures included a job guarantee until 2030. Thorsten Gröger, chief negotiator for IG Metall, described the result as a package that “includes painful contributions from employees, but at the same time creates prospects for the workforce.” This also has to do with the fact that one of the union’s central demands was that no plants should be closed. A problem for VW – especially because of its plants in Dresden and Osnabrück.
Production in Dresden will be discontinued at the end of 2025. In Osnabrück – where the T-Roc Cabrio rolls off the production line – in 2027. Despite the union’s demands, what will happen after that remains to be seen. According to Volkswagen, the involvement of a third party could also be a way of keeping the plant alive. For example, through a client or buyer.
This is where the Chinese investors come into play. So far, they are nothing more than a rumor. IG Metall is just as reluctant to comment on this as the trade union-affiliated Hans Böckler Foundation, which regularly raises the issue of Chinese investors in Germany.
At least Stephan Soldanski from IG Metall in Osnabrück speaks out in the Reuters report. He said he could imagine the workforce producing Chinese cars as part of a joint venture, as long as this was done under VW conditions and “the VW logo continues to light up on the large paint tower.” But even that could be open to negotiation if the Chinese investors behave in the same way as with previous investments (such as ThyssenKrupp or Gotion Battery): “In many of the takeovers, there were commitments for multi-year site guarantees. In addition, a lot of research and development money flowed into the German subsidiaries,” said Siegert in 2023. In other words, precisely what IG Metall is demanding.
This is why the issue could quickly return to the table. The wage negotiations have not ensured the long-term or even medium-term use of the plants in Osnabrück and Dresden. On the contrary. Volkswagen has explicitly recognized the possibility of their use by third parties. The issue is also relevant in Brussels, as the local Audi plant will close at the end of February 2025.
The struggling plants would be a good opportunity for Chinese investors to avoid tariffs. BYD has long been active in Hungary, and Chery has had a plant in Spain since the beginning of 2024. Both trade unions and Chery have spoken positively about the cooperation. The Chinese manufacturer plans to expand production from 50,000 cars to 150,000 cars in 2027, which is expected to create 1,250 jobs.
But regardless of economic considerations, the takeover of the VW plants would also be a huge image gain. For a Chinese manufacturer. And for the Chinese Communist Party.
On January 14, a tragic event in Shanghai’s Minhang district caused an uproar: Three family members jumped from a high-rise building to their deaths, one by one. The mother reportedly had forced her child to study every day. That day, the child had not achieved 100 points in a school exam (the highest score in elementary school in China). After the mother scolded the child severely, the child suffered an emotional breakdown and jumped out of the high-rise building. His parents followed him to their deaths soon afterward.
The tragedy was widely discussed on social media platforms such as WeChat. Many users commented that putting a child under such pressure over bad grades was absurd. Comments such as “Are the parents crazy? Why do you always need 100 points?” and “The mother was clearly overwhelmed” were frequently posted.
Some users shared their own experiences. A user named Fangxiang wrote: “Last year, a colleague of mine had depression. He said life no longer made sense, he couldn’t sleep at night and felt exhausted. After a long vacation, he still didn’t feel better and couldn’t shake off the thoughts of suicide.” Chinese netizens also recently took a keen interest in the fate of famous Taiwanese writer Chiung Yao (琼瑶), who committed suicide in early December. Related articles and videos were viewed more than 100,000 times.
Suicide and mental health problems have recently become one of the most discussed topics on social platforms such as Douyin (the original Chinese version of TikTok) and Bilibili. According to the National Depression Blue Book 2023 (2023年国民抑郁症蓝皮书), mental health-related queries on the search engine Baidu have been increasing by 35 percent every year. Weibo registered more than 100 million mental health-related discussion posts.
Since the COVID-19 pandemic, Chinese society has been in a state of tension, which has made mental health problems more visible. The suicide rate has risen, especially among young people. As the Chinese economy is struggling, living costs continue to rise. On top of this, society offers little space to release negative emotions.
Workplace competition remains intense, and the so-called 996 working time model (nine in the morning to nine at night, six days a week) has become the norm in many sectors. The pressure leads to widespread inner exhaustion, as evidenced by newly created terms such as “to be an ox, be a horse” (做牛马), which means “working without complaining” or the unmistakable “office slave” (社畜).
According to the Blue Book, 95 million people in China suffer from depression. Half of them are young people, 30.28 percent of whom are under the age of 18. Only 36 percent of Chinese people consider their mental health to be good or very good. Among those who rate their mental health as poor, the risk of depression is 45 percent.
Suicides are increasing, but the exact number is unknown. The number of suicides in China can only be derived from two samples. One can be found in the Ministry of Health’s death register (死亡登记系统), which spans around 100 million people. The other is compiled by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (中国疾病预防控制中心) and includes about ten million people. According to the latter’s figures, an average of 4.31 per 100,000 people took their own lives in 2021. The rate for men (5.11) is much higher than for women (3.5).
By comparison, in Germany, which is in the European midfield, the average suicide rate in 2023 was 12.2 per 100,000 people. However, the Chinese data only covers ten percent of the population and contains no information on suicide methods and regional distributions. The number of unreported cases could be very high.
According to a recent study by the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and Shandong University, more men than women die in connection with a depressive illness. Accordingly, younger, better-educated and urban-dwelling men are considered to be particularly at risk. Previously, it was assumed that they had a lower risk of dying from depression than women and people with a low level of education.
Prevention is crucial for dealing with mental illness. However, many people in China refuse to seek therapy out of shame. According to the Blue Book of Depression, only 9.5 percent of people with depression received treatment. Among schizophrenia patients, just under 50 percent received professional help.
At least more and more experts are speaking out on the issue. For example, Ran Ran (冉冉), Chairwoman of the Chongqing Writers’ Association and member of the National People’s Congress, proposed expanding the number of specialized psychiatric clinics and wards in public hospitals. She also recommended that psychological care should be covered by health insurance to ease the financial burden on patients. Qin He (秦和), Rector of Jilin Foreign Language University, also campaigns for depression prevention. He advocates the introduction of mandatory depression screening as part of the annual health check-up for students.
One detail stands out in Chinese media reports on suicide cases. While the media in many Western countries usually provide the contact details and emergency numbers of aid organizations, the Chinese media do not. This is another indication that China still needs to do a lot for the mental health of its citizens. Blanka Xia
We report on suicides impartially and with the appropriate caution to avoid encouraging imitation. If you are depressed or having suicidal thoughts, please seek help. Click here for a list of international suicide hotlines.
Sinolytics is a research-based business consultancy entirely focused on China. It advises European companies on their strategic orientation and specific business activities in the People’s Republic.
Weeks before his return to the White House, US President-elect Donald Trump issued a pointed warning to the BRICS countries. “Go find another sucker,” he wrote on his social media platform, Truth Social, threatening the group’s nine members with 100 percent tariffs should they attempt to challenge the dollar’s global dominance.
Trump’s warning came on the heels of his campaign promise to impose a 25 percent tariff on imported goods from Canada and Mexico on his first day in office. China, the primary target of Trump’s protectionism, is expected to face an additional 10 percent tariff. While this is hardly surprising, given the escalating trade war between China and the United States, Trump has also directed his ire at India, a founding member of the BRICS and one of America’s key allies.
So far, India has managed to avoid immediate conflict by reaffirming its commitment to the dollar. But such policy uncertainties are among the many reasons why the Indian government has been quietly hedging its bets by pursuing rapprochement with China – a move that could herald a seismic geopolitical shift.
The China-India thaw has become increasingly evident in recent months. In October, the two countries reached an agreement to end the years-long military standoff along their shared Himalayan border, setting the stage for a surprise meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia. Another sign of this shift is Indian officials’ newfound interest in attracting Chinese investment.
Meanwhile, US-India relations appear to be cooling. Since a popular uprising ousted Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August, Modi’s favored news outlets, social-media operatives, and Hindu supremacist allies have portrayed the insurrection as a CIA-orchestrated regime change. Some have even warned of similar attempts by the “American deep state” to destabilize India.
Modi’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party has since embraced anti-American sentiment, accusing the US of targeting Indian tycoon Gautam Adani – a close ally of Modi charged with securities fraud and bribery in the US – in an effort to undermine the Indian government. Such rhetoric, a stark departure from decades of strategic cooperation, evokes memories of the Cold War, when a nominally nonaligned India, wary of US interference, gravitated toward the Soviet Union.
This shift is driven by several factors, primarily America’s diminishing ability and willingness to act as a global leader, along with China and India’s attempts to strengthen their bargaining position. With deglobalization reshaping the world economy, America has less to offer countries like India, which do not entirely rely on it for defense.
By contrast, China’s dominance in global supply chains has become impossible to ignore. As the world’s manufacturing superpower – producing more than the next nine largest manufacturers combined – China could support India’s efforts to expand its own industrial base. The government’s annual economic survey highlighted this imperative, stating that “to boost Indian manufacturing and plug India into the global supply chain,” the country must “plug itself into China’s supply chain.” To this end, the report advocated a pragmatic approach focused on attracting Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI).
Such unequivocal government support for cooperation with China was once unthinkable in India, which has maintained adversarial relations with its neighbor since the 1962 Sino-Indian War. After 20 Indian soldiers were killed in border clashes in India’s Ladakh region in 2020, India responded by imposing sweeping restrictions on investments and imports from China, limiting executive visas, and banning Chinese apps. But these measures resulted in massive losses for Indian businesses reliant on Chinese imports. Worse, they deprived India of critical Chinese investments at a time when FDI inflows were already declining.
As global supply chains shift away from China, Chinese manufacturers are also relocating, establishing bases in countries that stand to benefit from the West’s friendshoring and nearshoring strategies. Chinese investments in greenfield projects tripled year on year in 2023, to 160 billion USD, with much of these flows going to countries like Vietnam, Indonesia, Hungary, and Serbia. India, grappling with jobless growth and high youth unemployment, is eager to capitalize on this trend.
The US, once a major source of FDI, is now competing with India for investment as it seeks to boost domestic manufacturing. This competition, which is expected to intensify under Trump, has prompted India to approve several investment proposals and offer concessions – including expedited visas – to Chinese businesses and executives.
India’s course correction aligns closely with China’s interests, as the country’s economic slowdown has piqued Chinese firms’ interest in India’s rapidly growing market. India is projected to become the world’s third-largest economy by the end of this decade, and deeper engagement with it would provide China with a major buffer against US efforts to contain its geopolitical rise.
Moreover, while global attention remains focused on the escalating tariff war between the US and China, India faces significant risks of its own. Trump, who has repeatedly labeled India a “very big abuser of tariffs,” had revoked its preferential trade status during his first term, raising the likelihood of further punitive measures.
To be sure, India – designated by the US as a “Major Defense Partner” – is unlikely to abandon its strategic relationship with the US for closer ties with China. But like other emerging powers in the Global South, India is increasingly frustrated with the inherent asymmetry of the US-led liberal international order, particularly the dollar’s hegemony.
These frictions are also fueled by America’s occasional rebukes of India’s treatment of minorities. Having systematically weakened democratic institutions and tightened control over the media, Modi’s government bristles at any international criticism. Fortunately for Modi, such differences may resolve themselves. After all, it’s hard to imagine Trump being overly concerned by India’s ties to Russia, anti-Muslim policies, or democratic backsliding.
Still, as Modi steps up his efforts to transform India into a Hindu state, he may want to secure America’s support by signaling that he has alternatives. In that sense, India’s overtures to China could be viewed as a geopolitical maneuver aimed at enabling India to tell Trump to “go find another sucker” should he decide to play hardball.
Debasish Roy Chowdhury is the co-author (with John Keane) of To Kill A Democracy: India‘s Passage to Despotism (Oxford University Press, Pan Macmillan, 2021).
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2025.
www.project-syndicate.org
Editor’s note: Discussing China today means – more than ever – engaging in controversial debate. We aim to reflect the diversity of viewpoints to give you an insight into the breadth of the debate. Opinions do not reflect the views of the editorial team.
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