It has long been anticipated, and now it was finally published last week: The German government’s China strategy. At least as exciting as its content is the question of how this content will be received and interpreted. In today’s issue, Finn Mayer-Kuckuk spoke with Merics Director Mikko Huotari about what the document could achieve. He says: Even if the China strategy has hardly surprised him – the clarity and explicitness with which the German government communicates is not a matter of course.
Beijing has taken it in stride so far: Our second analysis collects the reactions from China and Germany – including the somewhat unconventional interpretation of car manufacturer Volkswagen – and puts them in perspective.
The strategy is now here. Was this the liberation blow?
No, not a liberating blow, nor a major coup – but an important one that marks the significant changes in Germany’s China policy. In substance, very little is completely surprising. Much of what is written in it has been discussed for months. The fact that the clarity of the description and clear address of risks and challenges has been kept overall is not a matter of course and shows that there is a relatively large degree of unity in the German government at the core.
Has there at least been a redefinition of Germany’s relationship with China or does the paper merely take stock?
The redefinition of the relationship with China did not happen with this document, but began with the coalition agreement at the latest and has been fine-tuned over the past months.
There have been initial critical reactions from the Chinese side, for example, from the embassy here in Berlin. Will the strategy put a lasting strain on relations?
I don’t expect any significant consequence in terms of stress on relations, to show that they are very unhappy. China has already prepared itself for this strategy. During his visit to Berlin in June, China’s Premier Li Qiang already tried to undermine the idea of de-risking by presenting it as mere homework for companies.
The German Foreign Office assures that the document’s wording is chosen so that Beijing does not find any unacceptable formulations.
Actually, “de-risking” already bothers the Chinese side. Moreover, Beijing will continue to oppose being classified as a systemic rival or a security challenge.
What will happen now in terms of de-risking the economy?
The strategy provides concrete steps, such as a stricter screening of Chinese investments in Germany and a tightening of export controls. In addition, there is the protection of critical infrastructure and measures to reduce dependencies regarding critical raw materials. All this can already have far-reaching impacts on companies. However, the exact implementation of risk analyses remains unclear.
What is the biggest change?
Federal Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock has explicitly demanded more transparency from the companies so that the government can counteract the risks. Politicians will be asking companies about this in the coming months. However, this process does not yet have an institutional form and will remain highly controversial.
Should, for instance, the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA) monitor compliance with transparency rules?
Most would like to avoid such a – very bureaucratic – solution. Instead, the government wants to engage in dialogue with the business community. Not every dependence is equally problematic. Instead, the strategy signals companies that they can basically continue to act freely: It’s your business and your risk. Real restrictions can only be expected in areas with critical technology risks regarding dual-use and human rights.
Companies were able to act freely before. What does the paper introduce?
It formulates the issue of economic security particularly clearly. This is a novelty in Germany’s China policy.
Germany is not alone in this.
Yes, this way of thinking is anchored in the G7 context and is also driven by the European Union. This is precisely what the German government also wants: not to act alone, but to coordinate its China strategy with European premises and then act in tandem with G7 partners.
Which aspects of the strategy turned out well?
I like the basic analysis, precision, and clarity on the question: Why is China a systemic rival? That is important and new. It is also important that Germany calibrates its China policy according to China’s conduct, which means that it is conditional and open to change.
What do you find disappointing?
By traditional standards for a basic strategy document, it is too long, too detailed. It sets too few priorities. Above all, however, it struggles with the capacity to implement it. Not enough resources are provided for it. As with the national security strategy, this was a prerequisite: The strategies must not make any new demands on the budget.
Some say the tone is too harsh.
In fact, some claim that the strategy shuts the door to dialogue. They say the government is just running around with a moralistic finger. But I have seen relatively little in it that some would call value ringing. There is nothing to suggest that relations will be severed; instead, the declared goal is to professionalize them. At the same time, it shows a clear interest in maintaining contact and social exchange wherever possible.
Brussels is waiting for a China policy position from Germany, the largest EU member. Will this paper give impetus at the EU level?
If we take a fair look at the development of the last few years, we first notice that central impulses in China policy have conversely come from Brussels. However, I believe that everyone is happy when the polyphony of the German government is at least somewhat contained and the corridor in which the German government wants to shape China policy in the future is recognizable.
A similar question again with regard to the United States: Will Washington respond positively to what Berlin has produced?
In principle, yes. But this is also a trend that was already ongoing. The concept of de-risking had already worked its way from a chancellor’s speech to the White House. Now there is the strategy with its clear description of the challenges and a clear mention of Taiwan. Here, positions are being aligned in the G7 context. Washington will recognize many of its ideas here.
One more personal question. You are the director of Merics. And Merics is explicitly mentioned in the document as a leading research institution. Does that fill you with pride?
We are embedded in a list of many actors, research institutions and think tanks. We are not alone. But we were pleased about it. The mention is an example of the fact that a sober analysis of China will be even more needed in the future.
Merics staff have been sanctioned by China since 2021. Is the institute receiving political backing by being named in the strategy?
That may be. But more importantly, we do our homework, analyze China to the best of our ability, and are happy when this work is useful and contributes to a better understanding.
Mikko Huotari has been Director of the Mercator Institute for China Studies (Merics) in Berlin since 2020. Previously, he served as its deputy director. His research areas include Chinese foreign policy, relations with the EU and global competition.
The Chinese news app Zhi Xinwen particularly emphasized the symbolism of the cover of Germany’s new China strategy, published last Friday. It depicts the board game Go, which is “not about checkmating the other person” but about building a particularly good position. The editors interpret this as a positive sign for the relations between the two countries.
China’s leadership and the controlled media are taking the publication of the China strategy altogether sportsmanlike. Foreign Office spokesperson Wang Wenbin made it clear on Friday, however, that China does not want to be the object of de-risking. It is “counterproductive” to see everything under the aspect of national security. Germany should “not politicize normal cooperation.” Above all, it should not pursue protectionism in the name of de-risking.
The Chinese government spokesman also highlighted that there was much more understanding between Germany and China than differences. He said he was counting on Germany to continue to “view China’s development in an all-round and objective way, adopt a rational and practical China policy,” adding that there were many global challenges that the two countries wanted to work on together.
The Chinese embassy in Berlin had earlier voiced more criticism than the headquarters in Beijing. The perception of China as a systemic rival would contradict both countries’ facts and shared interests. The embassy warned against “misunderstandings and false assessments.”
The country’s highest-ranking foreign policy official, Wang Yi of the Party’s Foreign Policy Commission, did not comment directly on Germany’s China strategy over the weekend. But in a meeting with EU foreign affairs envoy Josep Borrell, he called for a predictable EU policy on China. “It should not vacillate, let alone encourage words and deeds that turn the clock back.” He said there is no fundamental conflict of interest between China and the EU.
What Wang means by this: The EU should return to its course of promoting trade with China, a course shaped under Germany’s Merkel government. This is what the finalized investment agreement Comprehensive Agreement on Investment stood for, which no longer has a prospect of becoming effective in the current environment. The CAI completely contradicts the spirit of the currently presented German strategy.
In its article on the new German strategy, the Chinese site Jiemian Xinwen put its finger on the wound: Volkswagen reportedly announced additional investments while the German government declared de-risking. The report initially summarized the key elements of the strategy for the Chinese audience clearly and soberly.
Then the article refers to a long LinkedIn post by Ralf Brandstaetter, VW’s China board member. In a constructed argumentation, Brandstaetter first praises the “political goals” behind the strategy, but then interprets them in his way. The most important instrument of geopolitical resilience, he says, is trade.
Volkswagen would not look naively at China, but will continue to invest there. The company has been managing risks and creating strong supply chains for a long time. He argues that a strong economic position for Germany in China is perfectly compatible with reducing dependencies. VW will use the innovative power of the Chinese market to become more innovative itself.
In their assessment, the various industry associations in Berlin remained closer to the intention of the German government than VW. “It is a realistic view of China that underlies the Federal Government’s new China strategy,” says Wolfgang Weber, Chairman of the Board of the German Electrical and Digital Manufacturers’ Association (ZVEI). The association is particularly positive about the fact that the strategy is to be embedded in Europe.
According to the ZVEI, further development will depend mainly on the concrete implementation: The strategy must now be developed within the set framework not to dilute its defined goals. The Federation of German Industries (BDI) expressed a similar view: “De-risking, but no decoupling – this strategy is right.” Jens Hildebrandt from the Chamber of Commerce in Beijing welcomed that the strategy does not create additional bureaucracy for companies. Chamber members have long been minimizing risks on their own, he said.
At his summer press conference in Berlin, Chancellor Olaf Scholz also presented his interpretation of the document – one day after the Foreign Minister. His view of de-risking is closer to that of VW China chief Brantstaetter than that of Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock. He expects companies to “use the opportunities to make direct investments elsewhere, including in other Asian countries, for example, to set up supply chains elsewhere,” Scholz said. In other words, he is more in favor of gradual diversification than a rapid reduction of dependencies.
In the coming weeks, the first China strategy ever adopted by the German government and presented by Foreign Minister Baerbock at Merics on July 13 will be extensively debated. It is worth remembering that this strategy is not the first attempt to put Germany’s relations with China on a consolidated footing. In May 2002, the Federal Foreign Office’s East Asia Concept was published under the ambitious title “Tasks of German Foreign Policy at the Beginning of the 21st Century”. The concept, presented to the public by Minister of State Volmer, covered China, Japan, Korea and Mongolia. It was still available on the website of the Federal Foreign Office until 2017.
At that time, the Asian crisis of 1997/98 and the political upheavals in the wake of September 11, 2001, were not long in the past. China became a member of the World Trade Organisation the year before. The first democratic change of power in Taiwan happened in 2000.
Much has changed since then, but much has also remained the same. Sino-German trade has increased tenfold between 2001 and 2022; trade with Taiwan has tripled. The number of Chinese students in Germany has also tripled. In 2001, China was the largest recipient of German development aid. Today it is zero, and rightly so, because China is now the world’s second-largest economy. The East Asia Concept already suggested it could become the largest economy “in a few decades.” The same goes for the fact that the Asia-Pacific region could also become “the starting point for crisis developments with potentially global implications.” The keyword geopolitics was already there at that time; naivety sounds different.
Was the analysis of the situation in China and the proposals for political action a good 20 years ago very different from today? Not at all. At the very beginning of the list of “central concerns” of German East Asia policy were “democracy, the rule of law and human rights.” Improving the human rights situation in China was a core goal of Germany’s efforts to promote the worldwide recognition of universal human rights. The three terms run like a common thread through the 14-page document; the protection of minorities in Tibet and Xinjiang, among other places, is prominently mentioned. At the time, however, the Federal Foreign Office expressed the hope that German business could make an important contribution to improving the situation through its business culture. This idea is absent today. Also surprisingly absent is a reference to Germany’s commitment to abolishing the death penalty. And something else is missing: A reference to the repression against members of Christian churches. Instead, the China strategy acknowledges the activities of the German congregations of the two major denominations abroad and their contribution to the dialogue with Chinese Christians.
The appeal to China’s global responsibility is also not new: Back then, with reference to responsibility for climate change, today also with the stance on the Ukraine war. As early as 2002, the aim was to convince Beijing to assume increasing responsibility for world peace and global concerns. The stance on Taiwan is also unchanged: What was needed, it even said at the time, was a peaceful solution to all issues arising between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. The fact that all this should be achieved in cooperation with EU partners was also a fundamental policy at the time, just as it is today.
So what has changed? China has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of absolute poverty in recent decades, certainly to a small extent, due to German development aid. Despite recent weak economic figures, it will likely not take decades for it to become the world’s largest economy. The number of German companies has grown to 5,000, but their sometimes spectacular success is now increasingly perceived as dependency. In terms of foreign policy, China has become more and more self-confident. This is probably another reason our view of China is becoming more critical. Would we today establish diplomatic relations with the China of 1972 – still in the midst of the Cultural Revolution?
During the presentation of the China strategy, it was mentioned that it is now important to implement it. It will indeed be exciting to observe. The East Asia Concept of 2002 had been negotiated for months, was prominently presented to the public, was the subject of both positive and critical comments for a few weeks – and then disappeared somewhere on the website of the Federal Foreign Office. Today it can no longer be found, even in its archives. There was probably no foreign policy issue for which anyone had consulted the East Asia Concept first to find out what to do. Will the China strategy fare any better?
Wolfgang Roehr worked in the German Foreign Service for three and a half decades, including in New York, Geneva, Beijing, Shanghai, and – as ambassador in the Germany-China working group – Berlin. After 2014, the doctor of law was a senior research fellow at the Germany Research Center at Tongji University. He and his wife Silvia Kettelhut have recently returned to Berlin.
Please don’t be surprised if brick-dragging frogs and panda bears cross your chat window on WeChat. Make room when cartoon pigs in yellow jackets and construction workers’ helmets push heavy brick wheelbarrows by. And also show understanding when little cat paws frantically hammer on laptops with the please-don’t-disturb notice “搬砖ing” (bānzhuān-ing) – “carrying bricks at the moment” (with the English ing progressive form). Perhaps a Chinese colleague will also send you the following message: 不说了，我要搬砖了 (bù shuō le, wǒ yào bānzhuān le) “I’ll get off now, I have bricks to haul.”
No, China’s white-collar workers have not become home developers. They’ve merely taken a new everyday metaphor from the language quarry that makes a great internet meme. 搬砖 bānzhuān (from 搬 bān, “to carry, to move, to rearrange” + 砖 zhuān, “brick, clinker,”) has recently become a synonym in Chinese vernacular for poorly paid toiling, laboring and slaving away on the job. This metaphor resonates with many young people in the face of bursting dream job bubbles and overtime disillusionment. The best way to measure the popularity of buzzword is a seemingly endless list of chat emotes and digital sticker sets (表情包 biǎoqíngbāo) that pop up when you type 搬砖 bānzhuān into the WeChat emoji search box.
This brick cynicism is part of a word field that has evolved around unhappiness on the job. For example, China’s office workers also like to make fun of themselves as 打工人 dǎgōngrén “wage workers.” Originally, 打工 dǎgōng (“to work, to job,” literally “to beat work”) only referred to odd jobs or simple wage labor, such as migrant workers in the cities. In other words, monotonous and physically demanding jobs that only pay a small wage. Some white-collar workers in China’s office towers now complain that, despite all their career hopes and good training, they are ultimately just glorified day laborers.
One box lower on the frustration shelf is the 工具人 gōngjùrén, the “tool man” (工具 gōngjù “tool, instrument” + 人 rén “man”). In the past, the Chinese regarded themselves as such when they saw themselves abused in relationships as a means to an end or turned into a mindless “Swiss army knife” in partnerships, fulfilling their loved one’s every wish as an errand boy or girl. Today, some people also feel instrumentalized by their boss as PowerPoint pliers or desk screwdrivers. Recognition and reward for one’s own performance? Fat chance.
China’s IT industry, in particular, often hustles in the hamster wheel of 996-overtime evil. For this reason, employees in the tech industry have jokingly given themselves the name 码农 mǎnóng “code migrant workers” (from 码 mǎ for 代码 dàimǎ “code” as in 写代码 xiě dàimǎ “write a code” + 农 nóng as in 农民 nóngmín “migrant workers from the countryside”). This, too, is an allusion to the slaving army of rather poorly paid migrant workers who have carried China’s boom of the past decades on their shoulders.
Apparently, motivation goes to the dogs when even the supposedly attractive office job turns out to be more of a brick quarry than a picnic after years of hard cramming and studying. After all, you’re just a “working dog” (上班狗 shàngbāngǒu) or an “overtime dog” (加班狗 jiābāngǒu) and correspondingly “dog-tired” (累成狗 lèi chéng gǒu), bark exhausted and disappointed individuals with a pinch of sarcasm on blogs and posts. The counterpart to brick-dragging mode (搬砖模式 bānzhuān móshì) has also long since found a figurative name in Mandarin, of course. Those who don’t haul bricks “stroke” “fish” in China. Because 摸鱼 mōyú (literally “patting/stroking/grabbing fish”) is the trending Chinese language equivalent of being lazy on the job.
Overtime, overwork and linguistic overacting are, of course, far from being a purely Chinese phenomenon. In the West, burnout has long turned into a social wildfire in some places. We, too, are struggling to find the right work-life balance; Maybe you just have to let things rest after five o’clock and switch to digital detox mode (数字排毒 shùzì páidú). And that’s just where Chinese offers another form of “brick moving” as an alternative. In some Chinese dialects, 搬砖 bānzhuān also means “playing mahjong” (actually 打麻将 dǎ májiàng). Shuffling stones across the green felt of the mahjong table over a glass of green tea in a Chinese garden – that promises a remedy for stressed office souls, for Chinese and Western ones.
Verena Menzel runs the online language school New Chinese in Beijing.
It has long been anticipated, and now it was finally published last week: The German government’s China strategy. At least as exciting as its content is the question of how this content will be received and interpreted. In today’s issue, Finn Mayer-Kuckuk spoke with Merics Director Mikko Huotari about what the document could achieve. He says: Even if the China strategy has hardly surprised him – the clarity and explicitness with which the German government communicates is not a matter of course.
Beijing has taken it in stride so far: Our second analysis collects the reactions from China and Germany – including the somewhat unconventional interpretation of car manufacturer Volkswagen – and puts them in perspective.
The strategy is now here. Was this the liberation blow?
No, not a liberating blow, nor a major coup – but an important one that marks the significant changes in Germany’s China policy. In substance, very little is completely surprising. Much of what is written in it has been discussed for months. The fact that the clarity of the description and clear address of risks and challenges has been kept overall is not a matter of course and shows that there is a relatively large degree of unity in the German government at the core.
Has there at least been a redefinition of Germany’s relationship with China or does the paper merely take stock?
The redefinition of the relationship with China did not happen with this document, but began with the coalition agreement at the latest and has been fine-tuned over the past months.
There have been initial critical reactions from the Chinese side, for example, from the embassy here in Berlin. Will the strategy put a lasting strain on relations?
I don’t expect any significant consequence in terms of stress on relations, to show that they are very unhappy. China has already prepared itself for this strategy. During his visit to Berlin in June, China’s Premier Li Qiang already tried to undermine the idea of de-risking by presenting it as mere homework for companies.
The German Foreign Office assures that the document’s wording is chosen so that Beijing does not find any unacceptable formulations.
Actually, “de-risking” already bothers the Chinese side. Moreover, Beijing will continue to oppose being classified as a systemic rival or a security challenge.
What will happen now in terms of de-risking the economy?
The strategy provides concrete steps, such as a stricter screening of Chinese investments in Germany and a tightening of export controls. In addition, there is the protection of critical infrastructure and measures to reduce dependencies regarding critical raw materials. All this can already have far-reaching impacts on companies. However, the exact implementation of risk analyses remains unclear.
What is the biggest change?
Federal Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock has explicitly demanded more transparency from the companies so that the government can counteract the risks. Politicians will be asking companies about this in the coming months. However, this process does not yet have an institutional form and will remain highly controversial.
Should, for instance, the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA) monitor compliance with transparency rules?
Most would like to avoid such a – very bureaucratic – solution. Instead, the government wants to engage in dialogue with the business community. Not every dependence is equally problematic. Instead, the strategy signals companies that they can basically continue to act freely: It’s your business and your risk. Real restrictions can only be expected in areas with critical technology risks regarding dual-use and human rights.
Companies were able to act freely before. What does the paper introduce?
It formulates the issue of economic security particularly clearly. This is a novelty in Germany’s China policy.
Germany is not alone in this.
Yes, this way of thinking is anchored in the G7 context and is also driven by the European Union. This is precisely what the German government also wants: not to act alone, but to coordinate its China strategy with European premises and then act in tandem with G7 partners.
Which aspects of the strategy turned out well?
I like the basic analysis, precision, and clarity on the question: Why is China a systemic rival? That is important and new. It is also important that Germany calibrates its China policy according to China’s conduct, which means that it is conditional and open to change.
What do you find disappointing?
By traditional standards for a basic strategy document, it is too long, too detailed. It sets too few priorities. Above all, however, it struggles with the capacity to implement it. Not enough resources are provided for it. As with the national security strategy, this was a prerequisite: The strategies must not make any new demands on the budget.
Some say the tone is too harsh.
In fact, some claim that the strategy shuts the door to dialogue. They say the government is just running around with a moralistic finger. But I have seen relatively little in it that some would call value ringing. There is nothing to suggest that relations will be severed; instead, the declared goal is to professionalize them. At the same time, it shows a clear interest in maintaining contact and social exchange wherever possible.
Brussels is waiting for a China policy position from Germany, the largest EU member. Will this paper give impetus at the EU level?
If we take a fair look at the development of the last few years, we first notice that central impulses in China policy have conversely come from Brussels. However, I believe that everyone is happy when the polyphony of the German government is at least somewhat contained and the corridor in which the German government wants to shape China policy in the future is recognizable.
A similar question again with regard to the United States: Will Washington respond positively to what Berlin has produced?
In principle, yes. But this is also a trend that was already ongoing. The concept of de-risking had already worked its way from a chancellor’s speech to the White House. Now there is the strategy with its clear description of the challenges and a clear mention of Taiwan. Here, positions are being aligned in the G7 context. Washington will recognize many of its ideas here.
One more personal question. You are the director of Merics. And Merics is explicitly mentioned in the document as a leading research institution. Does that fill you with pride?
We are embedded in a list of many actors, research institutions and think tanks. We are not alone. But we were pleased about it. The mention is an example of the fact that a sober analysis of China will be even more needed in the future.
Merics staff have been sanctioned by China since 2021. Is the institute receiving political backing by being named in the strategy?
That may be. But more importantly, we do our homework, analyze China to the best of our ability, and are happy when this work is useful and contributes to a better understanding.
Mikko Huotari has been Director of the Mercator Institute for China Studies (Merics) in Berlin since 2020. Previously, he served as its deputy director. His research areas include Chinese foreign policy, relations with the EU and global competition.
The Chinese news app Zhi Xinwen particularly emphasized the symbolism of the cover of Germany’s new China strategy, published last Friday. It depicts the board game Go, which is “not about checkmating the other person” but about building a particularly good position. The editors interpret this as a positive sign for the relations between the two countries.
China’s leadership and the controlled media are taking the publication of the China strategy altogether sportsmanlike. Foreign Office spokesperson Wang Wenbin made it clear on Friday, however, that China does not want to be the object of de-risking. It is “counterproductive” to see everything under the aspect of national security. Germany should “not politicize normal cooperation.” Above all, it should not pursue protectionism in the name of de-risking.
The Chinese government spokesman also highlighted that there was much more understanding between Germany and China than differences. He said he was counting on Germany to continue to “view China’s development in an all-round and objective way, adopt a rational and practical China policy,” adding that there were many global challenges that the two countries wanted to work on together.
The Chinese embassy in Berlin had earlier voiced more criticism than the headquarters in Beijing. The perception of China as a systemic rival would contradict both countries’ facts and shared interests. The embassy warned against “misunderstandings and false assessments.”
The country’s highest-ranking foreign policy official, Wang Yi of the Party’s Foreign Policy Commission, did not comment directly on Germany’s China strategy over the weekend. But in a meeting with EU foreign affairs envoy Josep Borrell, he called for a predictable EU policy on China. “It should not vacillate, let alone encourage words and deeds that turn the clock back.” He said there is no fundamental conflict of interest between China and the EU.
What Wang means by this: The EU should return to its course of promoting trade with China, a course shaped under Germany’s Merkel government. This is what the finalized investment agreement Comprehensive Agreement on Investment stood for, which no longer has a prospect of becoming effective in the current environment. The CAI completely contradicts the spirit of the currently presented German strategy.
In its article on the new German strategy, the Chinese site Jiemian Xinwen put its finger on the wound: Volkswagen reportedly announced additional investments while the German government declared de-risking. The report initially summarized the key elements of the strategy for the Chinese audience clearly and soberly.
Then the article refers to a long LinkedIn post by Ralf Brandstaetter, VW’s China board member. In a constructed argumentation, Brandstaetter first praises the “political goals” behind the strategy, but then interprets them in his way. The most important instrument of geopolitical resilience, he says, is trade.
Volkswagen would not look naively at China, but will continue to invest there. The company has been managing risks and creating strong supply chains for a long time. He argues that a strong economic position for Germany in China is perfectly compatible with reducing dependencies. VW will use the innovative power of the Chinese market to become more innovative itself.
In their assessment, the various industry associations in Berlin remained closer to the intention of the German government than VW. “It is a realistic view of China that underlies the Federal Government’s new China strategy,” says Wolfgang Weber, Chairman of the Board of the German Electrical and Digital Manufacturers’ Association (ZVEI). The association is particularly positive about the fact that the strategy is to be embedded in Europe.
According to the ZVEI, further development will depend mainly on the concrete implementation: The strategy must now be developed within the set framework not to dilute its defined goals. The Federation of German Industries (BDI) expressed a similar view: “De-risking, but no decoupling – this strategy is right.” Jens Hildebrandt from the Chamber of Commerce in Beijing welcomed that the strategy does not create additional bureaucracy for companies. Chamber members have long been minimizing risks on their own, he said.
At his summer press conference in Berlin, Chancellor Olaf Scholz also presented his interpretation of the document – one day after the Foreign Minister. His view of de-risking is closer to that of VW China chief Brantstaetter than that of Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock. He expects companies to “use the opportunities to make direct investments elsewhere, including in other Asian countries, for example, to set up supply chains elsewhere,” Scholz said. In other words, he is more in favor of gradual diversification than a rapid reduction of dependencies.
In the coming weeks, the first China strategy ever adopted by the German government and presented by Foreign Minister Baerbock at Merics on July 13 will be extensively debated. It is worth remembering that this strategy is not the first attempt to put Germany’s relations with China on a consolidated footing. In May 2002, the Federal Foreign Office’s East Asia Concept was published under the ambitious title “Tasks of German Foreign Policy at the Beginning of the 21st Century”. The concept, presented to the public by Minister of State Volmer, covered China, Japan, Korea and Mongolia. It was still available on the website of the Federal Foreign Office until 2017.
At that time, the Asian crisis of 1997/98 and the political upheavals in the wake of September 11, 2001, were not long in the past. China became a member of the World Trade Organisation the year before. The first democratic change of power in Taiwan happened in 2000.
Much has changed since then, but much has also remained the same. Sino-German trade has increased tenfold between 2001 and 2022; trade with Taiwan has tripled. The number of Chinese students in Germany has also tripled. In 2001, China was the largest recipient of German development aid. Today it is zero, and rightly so, because China is now the world’s second-largest economy. The East Asia Concept already suggested it could become the largest economy “in a few decades.” The same goes for the fact that the Asia-Pacific region could also become “the starting point for crisis developments with potentially global implications.” The keyword geopolitics was already there at that time; naivety sounds different.
Was the analysis of the situation in China and the proposals for political action a good 20 years ago very different from today? Not at all. At the very beginning of the list of “central concerns” of German East Asia policy were “democracy, the rule of law and human rights.” Improving the human rights situation in China was a core goal of Germany’s efforts to promote the worldwide recognition of universal human rights. The three terms run like a common thread through the 14-page document; the protection of minorities in Tibet and Xinjiang, among other places, is prominently mentioned. At the time, however, the Federal Foreign Office expressed the hope that German business could make an important contribution to improving the situation through its business culture. This idea is absent today. Also surprisingly absent is a reference to Germany’s commitment to abolishing the death penalty. And something else is missing: A reference to the repression against members of Christian churches. Instead, the China strategy acknowledges the activities of the German congregations of the two major denominations abroad and their contribution to the dialogue with Chinese Christians.
The appeal to China’s global responsibility is also not new: Back then, with reference to responsibility for climate change, today also with the stance on the Ukraine war. As early as 2002, the aim was to convince Beijing to assume increasing responsibility for world peace and global concerns. The stance on Taiwan is also unchanged: What was needed, it even said at the time, was a peaceful solution to all issues arising between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. The fact that all this should be achieved in cooperation with EU partners was also a fundamental policy at the time, just as it is today.
So what has changed? China has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of absolute poverty in recent decades, certainly to a small extent, due to German development aid. Despite recent weak economic figures, it will likely not take decades for it to become the world’s largest economy. The number of German companies has grown to 5,000, but their sometimes spectacular success is now increasingly perceived as dependency. In terms of foreign policy, China has become more and more self-confident. This is probably another reason our view of China is becoming more critical. Would we today establish diplomatic relations with the China of 1972 – still in the midst of the Cultural Revolution?
During the presentation of the China strategy, it was mentioned that it is now important to implement it. It will indeed be exciting to observe. The East Asia Concept of 2002 had been negotiated for months, was prominently presented to the public, was the subject of both positive and critical comments for a few weeks – and then disappeared somewhere on the website of the Federal Foreign Office. Today it can no longer be found, even in its archives. There was probably no foreign policy issue for which anyone had consulted the East Asia Concept first to find out what to do. Will the China strategy fare any better?
Wolfgang Roehr worked in the German Foreign Service for three and a half decades, including in New York, Geneva, Beijing, Shanghai, and – as ambassador in the Germany-China working group – Berlin. After 2014, the doctor of law was a senior research fellow at the Germany Research Center at Tongji University. He and his wife Silvia Kettelhut have recently returned to Berlin.
Please don’t be surprised if brick-dragging frogs and panda bears cross your chat window on WeChat. Make room when cartoon pigs in yellow jackets and construction workers’ helmets push heavy brick wheelbarrows by. And also show understanding when little cat paws frantically hammer on laptops with the please-don’t-disturb notice “搬砖ing” (bānzhuān-ing) – “carrying bricks at the moment” (with the English ing progressive form). Perhaps a Chinese colleague will also send you the following message: 不说了，我要搬砖了 (bù shuō le, wǒ yào bānzhuān le) “I’ll get off now, I have bricks to haul.”
No, China’s white-collar workers have not become home developers. They’ve merely taken a new everyday metaphor from the language quarry that makes a great internet meme. 搬砖 bānzhuān (from 搬 bān, “to carry, to move, to rearrange” + 砖 zhuān, “brick, clinker,”) has recently become a synonym in Chinese vernacular for poorly paid toiling, laboring and slaving away on the job. This metaphor resonates with many young people in the face of bursting dream job bubbles and overtime disillusionment. The best way to measure the popularity of buzzword is a seemingly endless list of chat emotes and digital sticker sets (表情包 biǎoqíngbāo) that pop up when you type 搬砖 bānzhuān into the WeChat emoji search box.
This brick cynicism is part of a word field that has evolved around unhappiness on the job. For example, China’s office workers also like to make fun of themselves as 打工人 dǎgōngrén “wage workers.” Originally, 打工 dǎgōng (“to work, to job,” literally “to beat work”) only referred to odd jobs or simple wage labor, such as migrant workers in the cities. In other words, monotonous and physically demanding jobs that only pay a small wage. Some white-collar workers in China’s office towers now complain that, despite all their career hopes and good training, they are ultimately just glorified day laborers.
One box lower on the frustration shelf is the 工具人 gōngjùrén, the “tool man” (工具 gōngjù “tool, instrument” + 人 rén “man”). In the past, the Chinese regarded themselves as such when they saw themselves abused in relationships as a means to an end or turned into a mindless “Swiss army knife” in partnerships, fulfilling their loved one’s every wish as an errand boy or girl. Today, some people also feel instrumentalized by their boss as PowerPoint pliers or desk screwdrivers. Recognition and reward for one’s own performance? Fat chance.
China’s IT industry, in particular, often hustles in the hamster wheel of 996-overtime evil. For this reason, employees in the tech industry have jokingly given themselves the name 码农 mǎnóng “code migrant workers” (from 码 mǎ for 代码 dàimǎ “code” as in 写代码 xiě dàimǎ “write a code” + 农 nóng as in 农民 nóngmín “migrant workers from the countryside”). This, too, is an allusion to the slaving army of rather poorly paid migrant workers who have carried China’s boom of the past decades on their shoulders.
Apparently, motivation goes to the dogs when even the supposedly attractive office job turns out to be more of a brick quarry than a picnic after years of hard cramming and studying. After all, you’re just a “working dog” (上班狗 shàngbāngǒu) or an “overtime dog” (加班狗 jiābāngǒu) and correspondingly “dog-tired” (累成狗 lèi chéng gǒu), bark exhausted and disappointed individuals with a pinch of sarcasm on blogs and posts. The counterpart to brick-dragging mode (搬砖模式 bānzhuān móshì) has also long since found a figurative name in Mandarin, of course. Those who don’t haul bricks “stroke” “fish” in China. Because 摸鱼 mōyú (literally “patting/stroking/grabbing fish”) is the trending Chinese language equivalent of being lazy on the job.
Overtime, overwork and linguistic overacting are, of course, far from being a purely Chinese phenomenon. In the West, burnout has long turned into a social wildfire in some places. We, too, are struggling to find the right work-life balance; Maybe you just have to let things rest after five o’clock and switch to digital detox mode (数字排毒 shùzì páidú). And that’s just where Chinese offers another form of “brick moving” as an alternative. In some Chinese dialects, 搬砖 bānzhuān also means “playing mahjong” (actually 打麻将 dǎ májiàng). Shuffling stones across the green felt of the mahjong table over a glass of green tea in a Chinese garden – that promises a remedy for stressed office souls, for Chinese and Western ones.
Verena Menzel runs the online language school New Chinese in Beijing.
Social media accounts blocked
According to its statement, China’s Cyberspace Administration blocked and fined 373 accounts on internet platforms over “fabricating and distorting public policy information” and profiting from it. This was reported by Bloomberg.
Some of the accounts on WeChat, Weibo and Xueqiu were recently shut down after spreading rumors that China would discuss a series of fiscal and economic policies at a meeting, a statement from the regulator said Saturday. This has had an impact on the stock market, it said. It also claimed that some accounts on platforms such as Kuaishou, Baidu and Zhihu had been closed or suspended due to rumors about government subsidies, policies on social security and other issues. cyb