Table.Briefing: China (English)

China strategies of Taiwan candidates + More responsibility when trading with autocracies

Dear reader,

In the West, Saturday’s election in Taiwan is being analyzed primarily due to future relations with China and the accompanying risk of war. This issue has recently hardly played a role in the election campaign on the ground, writes David Demes from Taipei. But of course, all candidates have long developed a detailed agenda on how they plan to shape relations with their big neighbor should they win the election.

One thing is clear: Be it Lai, Hou or Ko – all candidates align themselves with public opinion in Taiwan. They may have different approaches, but when it comes to rapprochement with Beijing, none want to push the envelope too far. Instead of a radical change in relations, all of them more or less want to continue maintaining the status quo.

The fact that autocracies and totalitarian regimes are on the rise around the world puts many company executives in a bind: How to make a profit and sleep peacefully at the same time? Caspar Dohmen interviewed business economist Markus Scholz from the Technical University of Dresden, who explains that there can be no more “business as usual” with countries like China.

Companies should no longer pass on their individual responsibility to global institutions. After all, they are often too weak, too slow and simply incompetent when it comes to issues such as AI monitoring. Looking the other way can cause enormous costs, Scholz says. Ethical issues should be part of risk management.

Your
Fabian Peltsch
Image of Fabian  Peltsch

Feature

Relations with Beijing: Taiwan’s voters reject a dangerous change of course

The presidential candidates Lai Ching-te, Hou Yu-ih, and Ko Wen-je were at the TV election debate at the end of December.

International reporting on Taiwan is mainly dominated by China and cross-strait relations. In the domestic discourse, however, Beijing and the danger of a possible military conflict have hardly been mentioned recently. Instead, the Taiwanese press and the various political camps focussed on real estate scandals aimed at questioning the credibility of the candidates.

During the official TV debates between William Lai (DPP), Hou Yu-ih (KMT) and Ko Wen-je (TPP) on December 30, candidates were confronted with an unusually high number of questions about their strategy concerning future relations with China. In the official election notifications, which were delivered to mailboxes across the island in early January, the issues of national security and cross-strait relations were also at the top of the list of the various election programs.

China.Table has taken a closer look at the election programs and past statements of the candidates regarding their positions on China and a global risk assessment.

William Lai: China is the biggest threat to Taiwan

Tsai Ing-wen’s former rival, William Lai, has become one of the president’s biggest supporters during his time as vice president over the past four years. His stance on Taiwan’s status and relations with China has also now adapted to the social mainstream.

During his time as mayor of Tainan, Lai described himself as a “pragmatic worker for Taiwanese independence.” During the election campaign, he reinterpreted this term, following the political legacy of his boss, Tsai Ing-wen: Taiwan is already an independent state called the “Republic of China,” Lai said. Therefore, a separate declaration of independence was not necessary. This reinterpretation of his statement preserves its essence and simultaneously defuses it.

During a TV appearance where the candidates were to present their election programs, Lai rejected the criticism of his position and pointed out that, in China’s eyes, all candidates for the presidency stand for Taiwanese independence. “Or are you running for the office of Chief Executive?” he asked his opponents, referring to the title of the head of government of the Chinese Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong.

During the TV debate, Lai also declared that China posed the greatest threat to Taiwan’s survival. Nevertheless, the 64-year-old has repeatedly emphasized that his door will be open for talks with Beijing if he is elected – the only condition: Equal rights and dignity, in other words, a dialogue at eye level.

Whether Xi Jinping’s government will accept Lai’s offer is doubtful. In the run-up to the elections, the Chinese side repeatedly labeled Lai a “troublemaker” and a “destroyer of peace.” During the election campaign, the Chinese Taiwan Affairs Office echoed the KMT’s rhetoric and publicly declared that the people of Taiwan had a choice between peace and war, prosperity and decline.

Lai plans to strengthen the defense capabilities of the Taiwanese military further and continue Tsai’s submarine, ship, and aircraft projects. The plan is to strengthen Taiwan’s economic resilience, secure supply chains, and further reduce its economic dependence on China. Lai accuses the opposition KMT of wanting to return to the path of economic dependence on China.

Hou Yu-ih: Between rapprochement and defense

Former police officer Hou Yu-ih from the KMT likes to present himself as a law-and-order candidate who fights for the security of the Republic of China without a bulletproof vest in a hail of bullets. However, when asked during the debate who the biggest threat to Taiwan’s sovereignty was, he avoided mentioning Beijing by name. Hou favors a renewed rapprochement with the People’s Republic and further economic integration.

Hou’s campaign is led by King Pu-tsung, the closest confidant of former President Ma Ying-jeou, who was in office until 2016. It is, therefore, no surprise that Hou’s China strategy is based on Ma’s principle of “no unification, no independence, no armed conflict.” In his election campaign appearances, however, the focus was often more on his rejection of Taiwanese independence than on rejecting a possible unification with China.

KMT member and Sun Yat-Sen School Director Chang Ya-chung believes that Hou’s political program lacks concrete solutions and is trying to avoid the issue of cross-strait relations. “Ma just kept putting off the issue. The longer it could be put off, the better. Hou is trying to avoid the issue altogether,” says Chang.

Despite the planned rapprochement with China, Hou promises to continue investment in national defense if he wins the election and to increase defense spending to three percent of gross domestic product (currently around 2.4 percent).

Ko Wen-je: Taiwan and China are ‘part of one family’

Ko rose to prominence during the 2014 Sunflower Movement and was later elected mayor of the capital, Taipei, with the support of many activists and the DPP. There, he had the opportunity to gain experience in dealing with China. At the annual Shanghai-Taipei City Forum, Ko repeatedly declared that Taiwan and China were “part of the same family.”

Kos’ pro-China statements caused the DPP to gradually distance itself from him and finally nominate its own candidate for mayor in 2018. During the election campaign, he also announced his plan to relaunch the trade-in-services agreement with China. A demand that Hou Yu-ih also supports.

Furthermore, he believes Taiwan is not yet ready to join the CPTPP free trade agreement and should instead join the China-dominated RCEP. However, many former activists of the Sunflower Movement, which was founded ten years ago as a reaction to the agreement, see Kos’ plan as a sell-out of their values.

Ko presents himself as willing to compromise and prepared to show goodwill towards China. He has devised the “four mutual” principles for relations with Beijing: mutual recognition, mutual understanding, mutual respect, and mutual cooperation.

Borrowing from US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, he favors working with China where possible and confronting China where necessary. Ko believes the so-called “1992 Consensus” is outdated and says that the Hong Kong version of “one country, two systems” has no supporters in Taiwan. “It is China’s responsibility to develop a new concept,” says Ko.

No danger of an extreme policy change

Although the candidates differ in their rhetoric on China, Taiwan’s future president is unlikely to deviate much from Tsai Ing-wen’s approach to relations with China. Most Taiwanese will not accept a radical change in their government’s China policy.

Should a president Hou or Ko attempt to sign a far-reaching trade agreement with China and, in return, sacrifice some of Taiwan’s sovereignty, the island’s civil society is likely to resist, as it did ten years ago.

  • Presidential elections
  • Taiwan
  • Taiwan-Wahlen

‘It’s about protecting liberal democracy’

Markus Scholz is Professor of Business Management in Dresden.

What does it mean for responsible corporate behavior when global democracies are in retreat and autocracies are on the rise?

If I want to do business in autocracies and sleep peacefully at the same time, I have to do a lot. Unfortunately, the existing global institutions are too weak, slow and increasingly incompetent to adequately tackle certain issues, such as AI. That’s why we need to talk about the individual responsibility of companies and executives. In my opinion, the old adage “the only social responsibility of business is to increase its profits” is no longer valid in an economically globalized world in which autocracies and totalitarian regimes are on the rise.

Should companies withdraw from autocracies so they can sleep peacefully at night?

This depends on the configuration of the respective autocracy and the issues involved. As a manager of a company, I should think about withdrawing if there are intensive and widespread human rights violations and I have little or no influence on what is happening on the ground and, in the worst case, cannot even protect my own employees or am even forced to collaborate with the regime.

What can companies do?

Some support human rights NGOs in autocracies financially, or by providing information; others sponsor the training of lawyers and judges. Sometimes large companies can influence regimes and improve the human rights situation. This is not necessarily the case in China, but sometimes in countries such as Qatar or in some African states. In principle, large oil and gas companies, in particular, have a lot of influence here. It is problematic when companies behave passively, even though they have the opportunity to fight human rights violations. In such cases, it is, to a certain extent, silent complicity.

Do companies sometimes downplay their influence abroad?

Absolutely. Of course, small and medium-sized companies have no influence in China, but I do see a certain amount of power at larger companies, whether car manufacturers or suppliers. This is all the more true when companies jointly coordinate their behavior, for example via chambers of industry and commerce, and also actively cooperate with the governments at home.

How do you generally rate VW’s activities in China?

The company is obviously trying to become even more Chinese, turning even more strongly to the Chinese sales and production market and ignoring the human rights situation there to a certain extent. From VW’s perspective, I understand that they need this market, especially for the upcoming transformation. But staying in China has political and moral costs.

Several large German companies are heavily dependent on business in China. Can you imagine these companies moving their headquarters to autocratic China at some point and thus switching camps?

No, simply because this step would also be too costly. After all, there are other important markets, such as the American and European markets. Conversely, despite all the decoupling fantasies, I don’t yet see how it would be possible to withdraw completely from China. However, “business as usual” will no longer work there in the medium term. China is becoming increasingly totalitarian under Xi Jinping’s leadership and the human rights situation is becoming more and more dire.

Are there any historical comparisons?

South Africa was also an interesting market for German companies during Apartheid. Back then, they used the same arguments to stay in the market. It was called “constructive engagement” at the time. “We protect our employees. We help constructively in the country.” Change through trade was the maxim. But the Apartheid regime remained in place and only ended once there was a strong political and economic boycott, which was also strongly supported by the business community.

Some German companies are also still active in Russia, such as Metro and Rittersport.

But many others left early. Some were more hesitant and wanted to wait and see. Now many want to leave, but now it’s also a bit too late because the regime has reacted and passed corresponding laws. That makes it more difficult for companies. If they leave, they risk a total loss. That is interesting. It shows that ethical issues should actually be part of risk management. If you disregard the moral dimension, you may have to bear considerable financial consequences later down the line.

Do supply chain laws foster the individual responsibility of companies?

It obviously doesn’t work voluntarily. Naturally, legislators should normally also define the ground rules for the economy. This is exactly what has recently happened with the European Supply Chain Act. Nevertheless, acting responsibly beyond legal compliance remains an important issue for companies. All laws have loopholes. What is crucial is that companies do not exploit these loopholes to circumvent the laws.

Does the capital market allow companies to behave this responsibly?

Companies act very differently. During the pandemic, for example, vaccine manufacturer Pfizer tried to get what it could out of the situation by initiating, or at least not preventing, a bidding war between countries. I don’t consider this to be particularly responsible behavior in a situation where millions of lives had to be saved. Pfizer has a relatively large number of strong, active investors, hedge funds, and so on, who want to force top management to achieve high returns.
On the other hand, there are also listed companies in which owner families still have a strong position and tend to pursue long-term interests. Executives may have greater leeway in such constellations.

So, do investors act differently?

Exactly – we cannot generally say that shareholders do not allow any ethical responsibility on the part of management. There is also a trend towards ESG, i.e., investors focus on social and ecological criteria. But we shouldn’t assume that the segment has excessive influence. There is still a lot of room for improvement.

What will happen if more democracies collapse and authoritarian governments establish themselves in even more countries?

Then, the individual responsibility of companies will be even more important. The situation can tip globally – even in Europe. This happened in Germany in 1933, and things are not looking good in Hungary and Italy either, although the situation is, of course, not comparable to that in Germany in 1933. In the US, Donald Trump may be heading for a second term in office. In such cases, the importance of individual corporate responsibility increases. It is not about mindless activism and certainly not about partisan political engagement on the part of companies. It is about protecting liberal democracy and respecting and protecting human rights.

Markus Scholz has been Professor of Business Administration, in particular Responsible Management, at the Technical University of Dresden since October 2022. His research focuses on strategic sustainability management, sustainable change and innovation, business and human rights, as well as political engagement and corporate political responsibility.

  • Demokratie

Events

Jan. 16, 2024, 2:45 p.m. CET (9:45 p.m. CST)
Center for Strategic & International Studies, Webcast: Indo-Pacific Forecast 2024 More

Jan. 17, 2024, 7 p.m. CET (2 p.m. CST)
Dezan Shira & Associates, Workshop (in Shanghai and online): Making the Right Move: Smart Relocation Choices in China and Seizing ASEAN Opportunities More

Jan. 17, 2024, 12 p.m. CET (7 p.m. CST)
Merics, livestream: MERICS China Forecast 2024 More

Jan. 18, 2024, 9 a.m. CET (4 p.m. CST)
EUSME Center, Webinar: Green Harvest: The Evolution of China’s Wine Market More

Jan. 18, 2024, 2 a.m. CET (9 a.m. CST)
Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Webinar: Election Results in Taiwan: Assessing Their Impact on Taiwan’s Political Development and Cross-Strait Relations More

News

EU Commission plans no law on outbound investment screening

The EU Commission will presumably not present a legislative proposal on outbound investment screening after all. Instead, it will only be a non-binding white paper, according to reports in Brussels. It is part of a package of measures on economic security that the Brussels authority intends to present on January 24 according to current plans. Among other things, it will also include a proposal for greater harmonization of foreign investment screening within the EU.

Outbound investment screening is a form of outward investment control. The idea is that companies must notify government agencies of investments abroad in certain economic sectors. In the past year, China, in particular, was often mentioned in this context in Brussels.

In its strategy paper last June, the Commission expressed concern that know-how on security-relevant technologies could flow to third countries such as China, not only through exports but also through investments made by European companies.

For this reason, it announced a proposal on how foreign investment in certain technology fields should be monitored. The US government urged the EU to take such a step. Last summer, US President Joe Biden ordered controls on US foreign investments, such as microelectronics, and is looking for allies.

In October, the EU reiterated that possible outbound investment screening was being examined: According to a statement at the time, the European Union and its member states were examining whether outbound investment measures could complement their existing instruments based on a risk assessment.

However, during consultations, the plans of the EU Commission faced widespread opposition from the business community and many member states. Business associations criticized the restrictions on entrepreneurial freedom of choice and new red tape. According to reports, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has bowed to this pressure. The EU Directorate-General for Trade did not respond to a request for comment from Table.Media on Thursday. tho/ari

  • EU
  • Investments
  • Trade

China further facilitates visa procedures

China’s immigration authorities plan to further expand the recently introduced visa facilitation. The aim is to reduce the bureaucratic burden, especially for visits to relatives. This was reported by the German ARD office in Shanghai on Thursday. Accordingly, foreigners visiting relatives in China will no longer have to provide documentary proof of kinship. It will now be sufficient if the person making the invitation confirms the kinship.

Business travelers, students and tourists from certain countries can also extend their stay in China by applying for a new visa or extending an existing visa at the nearest police station. It will also be possible to apply for a re-entry visa in China if a good reason for the planned exit and entry is presented to the authorities.

Since December, citizens from Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Malaysia no longer require a visa to enter China for stays of up to 15 days. Part of the reason given by the immigration authorities for these measures is to promote the re-opening of China. Beijing also hopes to boost the weak economy with more tourism and more business trips. fpe

  • Visa

Double-digit increase in car sales

Car sales in China increased by twelve percent in 2023, according to figures from the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers (CAAM). The total number of vehicles sold was 30.1 million. The segment of purely battery-electric cars grew by 25 percent to 6.7 million, while plug-in hybrids increased by 85 percent to 2.8 million.

The China Passenger Car Association (PCA) had recently reported a figure of 21.7 million models sold. The different figures are due to different base data. The PCA counts vehicle sales to customers, while CAAM measures manufacturers’ sales to dealerships.

One reason for the massive growth is the price war between manufacturers in the People’s Republic, who have driven up sales with cheap offers. However, there is also the increased demand for Chinese cars on the global market: CAAM estimates China’s exports for 2023 at 4.9 million vehicles – an increase of 58 percent. This figure is provisional. Most cars went to Russia and Mexico. jul

  • Autoindustrie
  • CAAM

Mexico overtakes China as the largest exporter to the US

Data from the US Census Bureau suggests that Mexico has overtaken China as the largest exporter to the US. Although the figures for December will not be published until February 7, it appears that Mexico has surpassed the significantly larger China as the USA’s most important source of imports in 2023. According to official statistics, this would be the first time since 2003.

US imports from China from January to November 2023 decreased by more than 21 percent compared to the same period last year. Only 14 percent of all US imports came from China. Between 2015 and 2018, it was around a fifth. Meanwhile, US imports from Mexico rose by almost five percent. Mexico’s share of total US imports in the eleven months up to November thus amounted to over 15 percent and reached a record high.

Products that the US purchases most from Mexico include cars and car parts, electronics, crude oil and agricultural products. Despite de-risking measures, however, deep and lasting dependencies exist between the US and China, for example, in rare earths. fpe

  • USA

Apple display supplier builds new plant in Chengdu

Apple supplier BOE Technology, one of the world’s largest display manufacturers, will build a production complex for flexible panels worth nine billion US dollars in Chengdu.

On Wednesday, the Chengdu city government announced that the Beijing-based company and the city’s Hi-Tech Industrial Development Zone had signed the contract for the construction of the plant. According to BOE, construction is estimated to take just under three years. Mass production is scheduled to begin in the fourth quarter of 2026. In terms of investment, it is the largest single industrial project in Sichuan’s provincial capital.

Global demand for high-end displays for laptops and tablets is growing. According to a study by industry experts from Display Supply Chain Consultants (DSCC), the global market for OLED displays, such as those produced by BOE, is expected to generate sales of 64 billion US dollars in 2026. China could, therefore, dominate the global production capacity for displays with a market share of 72 percent between 2026 and 2027. fpe

  • Technologie

Police question parents of Hong Kong democracy activists

Security police in Hong Kong have raided the home of the family of Hong Kong democracy activist Simon Cheng. The officers brought Cheng’s parents and sister in for questioning, but later let them return home. This was reported by Nikkei Asia. Cheng commented on X that he hoped his parents could “enjoy a dignified, peaceful, and serene old age.”

Simon Cheng has been living in exile in London for four years, where he has been granted asylum. In mid-December, the Hong Kong police announced bounties of around 116,000 euros on him and four other members of the democracy movement living in exile for alleged violations of the National Security Law. The dissidents will be pursued “to the end,” the police announced.

Following the announcement of the bounties, the mother of democracy activist Frances Hui had already been detained and questioned by the police, and her house was also searched. Hui lives in the USA, where she has been granted political asylum. It is a common method for China’s security apparatus to put pressure on relatives of regime critics. jul

  • Demokratie
  • Nationales Sicherheitsgesetz

China Perspective

Xi’s economic xenophobia

Xi Jinping’s mistrust and hostility towards the West play a key role in China’s economic decisions. Recent statements from government authorities show this. This does not bode well for the economy. According to economists, his contempt of Western economic theories would have unfavorable implications for the Chinese economy.

Despite China’s efforts to save listless export growth and to keep foreign investors from leaving, companies dealing with China would still face from time to time consequences of the Chinese leader’s deeply-ingrained belief that international business activities could be deliberately used to sabotage it. 

Xi’s spontaneous words would not be fully made public to unnecessarily strain China’s international relations, particularly at a time when China seeks to reduce tensions with the US. But government organizations at the commission and ministerial level, whose chiefs can learn Xi’s real thoughts in internal conferences, are less constrained to make anti-western utterances. They would even have them spelled out just to please Xi. A flurry of statements from two government bodies during the final months of 2023 were perfect examples. 

Western theories versus ancient, unique China

The Central Financial Work Conference, convened every five years, and the annual Economic Work Conference, were held October 30-31 and December 12-14, respectively. Xi chaired both. 

Right after the financial conference, an article by the Central Financial Work Commission says that Xi’s speech at the conference answered many “major questions that the Marxist classic writers haven’t spoken about, our predecessors haven’t encountered, and the Western financial theories have always been unable to solve.”

In the next paragraph, a far-fetched citation was made, quoting a line on the significance of credibility from Chinese classics from the 4th century BC. Xi, a staunch believer in China’s uniqueness and Chinese wisdom, has maintained that the application of Western economics should be limited in China’s macroeconomic management.

China has never been a full-blown market economy. But the role of the People’s Bank of China, the central bank, is still as crucial as that of the US Federal Reserve. Xi doesn’t buy this. For him, the central bank is one of the departments that should listen to himself and his economic lieutenants, namely Liu He, who retired in 2023, and his successor, He Lifeng.

The fate of two central bank governors

There was a time when the central bank had quite a degree of independence. That was particularly true between 2002 and 2018 when Zhou Xiaochuan was its governor. Zhou’s words, respected both domestically and internationally, carried considerable weight in deciding China’s monetary and economic policy, especially before Xi took power in 2012.

After Zhou retired, Yi Gang, already groomed for the position for years, became the default successor. However, Yi never had the full trust and respect of the leadership. In addition to Xi’s disregard for the central bank, there was something that had to do with Yi’s résumé: having studied and taught in universities in the United States for 14 years, he was considered under too much US influence. The People’s Bank’s governor had always also been the party secretary. But when Yi took over the office, another veteran banker, Guo Shuqing, was installed as the party secretary, obviously to keep Yi’s power in check.

Yi stepped down in 2023. For the next new governor, Pan Gongsheng, a domestically trained senior banking official, the tradition of governor and party secretary combined in one was resumed. This shows contempt for the Western idea of a productive separation of powers between institutions.

The role of the Ministry for State Security

Another government agency that spoke out after the two conferences was the Ministry of State Security (MSS). Traditionally, the ministry operates behind the scenes. This is no longer the case in the Xi era.

Two days after the economic work conference, the MSS published a lengthy, stern statement, vowing to “resolutely crack down on and punish illegal and criminal activities jeopardizing the country’s economic security.”

After the financial conference, it issued a similar statement. These proclamations were no empty words. In 2023, foreign consulting firms and investment banks saw their offices raided and employees questioned or detained on espionage grounds.

US firm convicted of ‘malicious short selling’

The MSS’s high-profile actions in the economic sector didn’t start last year and were not from its own decision. China’s security authorities participated in investigations over the cause of a stock market rout in 2015 and, in an unprecedented move, linked the plunge to foreign players’ “malicious” short-selling.

The probe was concluded in 2020. Under a vaguely-worded verdict, US market maker Citadel Securities paid an equivalent of 100 million US dollars for settlement. Its four domestic partners for the margin trading were also fined, for a much smaller amount.  

The latest round of MSS warnings touched short-selling again. But the focus was on “maliciously fabricated narratives” about China’s economic policy. They were:

  • Replacing development with safety
  • Elbowing foreign investment out 
  • Holding private enterprises back 

MSS believed the aims of the “rumor-mongers” were:  

  • To disrupt market expectations and the market order,
  • undermine the confidence of international investors in China,
  • stir up financial unrest,
  • and strategically suppress China and block its development.

In the article, MSS also accused a ‘certain country’ of using finance for geopolitical games and employing “monetary hegemony” and financial sanctions to strike others. 

  • Finanzpolitik

Executive Moves

Christian Schotmann joined Swiss industrial component manufacturer Carlo Gavazzi Automation as Interim Manager China in January. The manager with a background in sales, marketing and business development worked at Helukabel China until December. He is based in Shanghai.

Knud Erik Clausen joined SternIngredients China as a Consultant at the end of 2023. Previously, he was Managing Director & Member Board of Director at Wuerth International in Shanghai. SternIngredients is part of the Hamburg-based Stern-Wywiol Group, which specializes in country-specific additives for food and animal nutrition as well as food supplements.

Is something changing in your organization? Let us know at heads@table.media!

Dessert

The mascots for the 9th Winter Asian Games in China in 2025 were revealed to the public yesterday. Binbin and Nini are inspired by two little tigers that were born in September 2023 in the Northeast Tiger Forest Park in the host city of Harbin. The official slogan of the games, freely translated by the Xinhua news agency, is: “Dream of Winter, Love among Asia” (冰雪同梦,亚洲同心).

China.Table editorial team

CHINA.TABLE EDITORIAL OFFICE

Licenses:
    Dear reader,

    In the West, Saturday’s election in Taiwan is being analyzed primarily due to future relations with China and the accompanying risk of war. This issue has recently hardly played a role in the election campaign on the ground, writes David Demes from Taipei. But of course, all candidates have long developed a detailed agenda on how they plan to shape relations with their big neighbor should they win the election.

    One thing is clear: Be it Lai, Hou or Ko – all candidates align themselves with public opinion in Taiwan. They may have different approaches, but when it comes to rapprochement with Beijing, none want to push the envelope too far. Instead of a radical change in relations, all of them more or less want to continue maintaining the status quo.

    The fact that autocracies and totalitarian regimes are on the rise around the world puts many company executives in a bind: How to make a profit and sleep peacefully at the same time? Caspar Dohmen interviewed business economist Markus Scholz from the Technical University of Dresden, who explains that there can be no more “business as usual” with countries like China.

    Companies should no longer pass on their individual responsibility to global institutions. After all, they are often too weak, too slow and simply incompetent when it comes to issues such as AI monitoring. Looking the other way can cause enormous costs, Scholz says. Ethical issues should be part of risk management.

    Your
    Fabian Peltsch
    Image of Fabian  Peltsch

    Feature

    Relations with Beijing: Taiwan’s voters reject a dangerous change of course

    The presidential candidates Lai Ching-te, Hou Yu-ih, and Ko Wen-je were at the TV election debate at the end of December.

    International reporting on Taiwan is mainly dominated by China and cross-strait relations. In the domestic discourse, however, Beijing and the danger of a possible military conflict have hardly been mentioned recently. Instead, the Taiwanese press and the various political camps focussed on real estate scandals aimed at questioning the credibility of the candidates.

    During the official TV debates between William Lai (DPP), Hou Yu-ih (KMT) and Ko Wen-je (TPP) on December 30, candidates were confronted with an unusually high number of questions about their strategy concerning future relations with China. In the official election notifications, which were delivered to mailboxes across the island in early January, the issues of national security and cross-strait relations were also at the top of the list of the various election programs.

    China.Table has taken a closer look at the election programs and past statements of the candidates regarding their positions on China and a global risk assessment.

    William Lai: China is the biggest threat to Taiwan

    Tsai Ing-wen’s former rival, William Lai, has become one of the president’s biggest supporters during his time as vice president over the past four years. His stance on Taiwan’s status and relations with China has also now adapted to the social mainstream.

    During his time as mayor of Tainan, Lai described himself as a “pragmatic worker for Taiwanese independence.” During the election campaign, he reinterpreted this term, following the political legacy of his boss, Tsai Ing-wen: Taiwan is already an independent state called the “Republic of China,” Lai said. Therefore, a separate declaration of independence was not necessary. This reinterpretation of his statement preserves its essence and simultaneously defuses it.

    During a TV appearance where the candidates were to present their election programs, Lai rejected the criticism of his position and pointed out that, in China’s eyes, all candidates for the presidency stand for Taiwanese independence. “Or are you running for the office of Chief Executive?” he asked his opponents, referring to the title of the head of government of the Chinese Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong.

    During the TV debate, Lai also declared that China posed the greatest threat to Taiwan’s survival. Nevertheless, the 64-year-old has repeatedly emphasized that his door will be open for talks with Beijing if he is elected – the only condition: Equal rights and dignity, in other words, a dialogue at eye level.

    Whether Xi Jinping’s government will accept Lai’s offer is doubtful. In the run-up to the elections, the Chinese side repeatedly labeled Lai a “troublemaker” and a “destroyer of peace.” During the election campaign, the Chinese Taiwan Affairs Office echoed the KMT’s rhetoric and publicly declared that the people of Taiwan had a choice between peace and war, prosperity and decline.

    Lai plans to strengthen the defense capabilities of the Taiwanese military further and continue Tsai’s submarine, ship, and aircraft projects. The plan is to strengthen Taiwan’s economic resilience, secure supply chains, and further reduce its economic dependence on China. Lai accuses the opposition KMT of wanting to return to the path of economic dependence on China.

    Hou Yu-ih: Between rapprochement and defense

    Former police officer Hou Yu-ih from the KMT likes to present himself as a law-and-order candidate who fights for the security of the Republic of China without a bulletproof vest in a hail of bullets. However, when asked during the debate who the biggest threat to Taiwan’s sovereignty was, he avoided mentioning Beijing by name. Hou favors a renewed rapprochement with the People’s Republic and further economic integration.

    Hou’s campaign is led by King Pu-tsung, the closest confidant of former President Ma Ying-jeou, who was in office until 2016. It is, therefore, no surprise that Hou’s China strategy is based on Ma’s principle of “no unification, no independence, no armed conflict.” In his election campaign appearances, however, the focus was often more on his rejection of Taiwanese independence than on rejecting a possible unification with China.

    KMT member and Sun Yat-Sen School Director Chang Ya-chung believes that Hou’s political program lacks concrete solutions and is trying to avoid the issue of cross-strait relations. “Ma just kept putting off the issue. The longer it could be put off, the better. Hou is trying to avoid the issue altogether,” says Chang.

    Despite the planned rapprochement with China, Hou promises to continue investment in national defense if he wins the election and to increase defense spending to three percent of gross domestic product (currently around 2.4 percent).

    Ko Wen-je: Taiwan and China are ‘part of one family’

    Ko rose to prominence during the 2014 Sunflower Movement and was later elected mayor of the capital, Taipei, with the support of many activists and the DPP. There, he had the opportunity to gain experience in dealing with China. At the annual Shanghai-Taipei City Forum, Ko repeatedly declared that Taiwan and China were “part of the same family.”

    Kos’ pro-China statements caused the DPP to gradually distance itself from him and finally nominate its own candidate for mayor in 2018. During the election campaign, he also announced his plan to relaunch the trade-in-services agreement with China. A demand that Hou Yu-ih also supports.

    Furthermore, he believes Taiwan is not yet ready to join the CPTPP free trade agreement and should instead join the China-dominated RCEP. However, many former activists of the Sunflower Movement, which was founded ten years ago as a reaction to the agreement, see Kos’ plan as a sell-out of their values.

    Ko presents himself as willing to compromise and prepared to show goodwill towards China. He has devised the “four mutual” principles for relations with Beijing: mutual recognition, mutual understanding, mutual respect, and mutual cooperation.

    Borrowing from US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, he favors working with China where possible and confronting China where necessary. Ko believes the so-called “1992 Consensus” is outdated and says that the Hong Kong version of “one country, two systems” has no supporters in Taiwan. “It is China’s responsibility to develop a new concept,” says Ko.

    No danger of an extreme policy change

    Although the candidates differ in their rhetoric on China, Taiwan’s future president is unlikely to deviate much from Tsai Ing-wen’s approach to relations with China. Most Taiwanese will not accept a radical change in their government’s China policy.

    Should a president Hou or Ko attempt to sign a far-reaching trade agreement with China and, in return, sacrifice some of Taiwan’s sovereignty, the island’s civil society is likely to resist, as it did ten years ago.

    • Presidential elections
    • Taiwan
    • Taiwan-Wahlen

    ‘It’s about protecting liberal democracy’

    Markus Scholz is Professor of Business Management in Dresden.

    What does it mean for responsible corporate behavior when global democracies are in retreat and autocracies are on the rise?

    If I want to do business in autocracies and sleep peacefully at the same time, I have to do a lot. Unfortunately, the existing global institutions are too weak, slow and increasingly incompetent to adequately tackle certain issues, such as AI. That’s why we need to talk about the individual responsibility of companies and executives. In my opinion, the old adage “the only social responsibility of business is to increase its profits” is no longer valid in an economically globalized world in which autocracies and totalitarian regimes are on the rise.

    Should companies withdraw from autocracies so they can sleep peacefully at night?

    This depends on the configuration of the respective autocracy and the issues involved. As a manager of a company, I should think about withdrawing if there are intensive and widespread human rights violations and I have little or no influence on what is happening on the ground and, in the worst case, cannot even protect my own employees or am even forced to collaborate with the regime.

    What can companies do?

    Some support human rights NGOs in autocracies financially, or by providing information; others sponsor the training of lawyers and judges. Sometimes large companies can influence regimes and improve the human rights situation. This is not necessarily the case in China, but sometimes in countries such as Qatar or in some African states. In principle, large oil and gas companies, in particular, have a lot of influence here. It is problematic when companies behave passively, even though they have the opportunity to fight human rights violations. In such cases, it is, to a certain extent, silent complicity.

    Do companies sometimes downplay their influence abroad?

    Absolutely. Of course, small and medium-sized companies have no influence in China, but I do see a certain amount of power at larger companies, whether car manufacturers or suppliers. This is all the more true when companies jointly coordinate their behavior, for example via chambers of industry and commerce, and also actively cooperate with the governments at home.

    How do you generally rate VW’s activities in China?

    The company is obviously trying to become even more Chinese, turning even more strongly to the Chinese sales and production market and ignoring the human rights situation there to a certain extent. From VW’s perspective, I understand that they need this market, especially for the upcoming transformation. But staying in China has political and moral costs.

    Several large German companies are heavily dependent on business in China. Can you imagine these companies moving their headquarters to autocratic China at some point and thus switching camps?

    No, simply because this step would also be too costly. After all, there are other important markets, such as the American and European markets. Conversely, despite all the decoupling fantasies, I don’t yet see how it would be possible to withdraw completely from China. However, “business as usual” will no longer work there in the medium term. China is becoming increasingly totalitarian under Xi Jinping’s leadership and the human rights situation is becoming more and more dire.

    Are there any historical comparisons?

    South Africa was also an interesting market for German companies during Apartheid. Back then, they used the same arguments to stay in the market. It was called “constructive engagement” at the time. “We protect our employees. We help constructively in the country.” Change through trade was the maxim. But the Apartheid regime remained in place and only ended once there was a strong political and economic boycott, which was also strongly supported by the business community.

    Some German companies are also still active in Russia, such as Metro and Rittersport.

    But many others left early. Some were more hesitant and wanted to wait and see. Now many want to leave, but now it’s also a bit too late because the regime has reacted and passed corresponding laws. That makes it more difficult for companies. If they leave, they risk a total loss. That is interesting. It shows that ethical issues should actually be part of risk management. If you disregard the moral dimension, you may have to bear considerable financial consequences later down the line.

    Do supply chain laws foster the individual responsibility of companies?

    It obviously doesn’t work voluntarily. Naturally, legislators should normally also define the ground rules for the economy. This is exactly what has recently happened with the European Supply Chain Act. Nevertheless, acting responsibly beyond legal compliance remains an important issue for companies. All laws have loopholes. What is crucial is that companies do not exploit these loopholes to circumvent the laws.

    Does the capital market allow companies to behave this responsibly?

    Companies act very differently. During the pandemic, for example, vaccine manufacturer Pfizer tried to get what it could out of the situation by initiating, or at least not preventing, a bidding war between countries. I don’t consider this to be particularly responsible behavior in a situation where millions of lives had to be saved. Pfizer has a relatively large number of strong, active investors, hedge funds, and so on, who want to force top management to achieve high returns.
    On the other hand, there are also listed companies in which owner families still have a strong position and tend to pursue long-term interests. Executives may have greater leeway in such constellations.

    So, do investors act differently?

    Exactly – we cannot generally say that shareholders do not allow any ethical responsibility on the part of management. There is also a trend towards ESG, i.e., investors focus on social and ecological criteria. But we shouldn’t assume that the segment has excessive influence. There is still a lot of room for improvement.

    What will happen if more democracies collapse and authoritarian governments establish themselves in even more countries?

    Then, the individual responsibility of companies will be even more important. The situation can tip globally – even in Europe. This happened in Germany in 1933, and things are not looking good in Hungary and Italy either, although the situation is, of course, not comparable to that in Germany in 1933. In the US, Donald Trump may be heading for a second term in office. In such cases, the importance of individual corporate responsibility increases. It is not about mindless activism and certainly not about partisan political engagement on the part of companies. It is about protecting liberal democracy and respecting and protecting human rights.

    Markus Scholz has been Professor of Business Administration, in particular Responsible Management, at the Technical University of Dresden since October 2022. His research focuses on strategic sustainability management, sustainable change and innovation, business and human rights, as well as political engagement and corporate political responsibility.

    • Demokratie

    Events

    Jan. 16, 2024, 2:45 p.m. CET (9:45 p.m. CST)
    Center for Strategic & International Studies, Webcast: Indo-Pacific Forecast 2024 More

    Jan. 17, 2024, 7 p.m. CET (2 p.m. CST)
    Dezan Shira & Associates, Workshop (in Shanghai and online): Making the Right Move: Smart Relocation Choices in China and Seizing ASEAN Opportunities More

    Jan. 17, 2024, 12 p.m. CET (7 p.m. CST)
    Merics, livestream: MERICS China Forecast 2024 More

    Jan. 18, 2024, 9 a.m. CET (4 p.m. CST)
    EUSME Center, Webinar: Green Harvest: The Evolution of China’s Wine Market More

    Jan. 18, 2024, 2 a.m. CET (9 a.m. CST)
    Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Webinar: Election Results in Taiwan: Assessing Their Impact on Taiwan’s Political Development and Cross-Strait Relations More

    News

    EU Commission plans no law on outbound investment screening

    The EU Commission will presumably not present a legislative proposal on outbound investment screening after all. Instead, it will only be a non-binding white paper, according to reports in Brussels. It is part of a package of measures on economic security that the Brussels authority intends to present on January 24 according to current plans. Among other things, it will also include a proposal for greater harmonization of foreign investment screening within the EU.

    Outbound investment screening is a form of outward investment control. The idea is that companies must notify government agencies of investments abroad in certain economic sectors. In the past year, China, in particular, was often mentioned in this context in Brussels.

    In its strategy paper last June, the Commission expressed concern that know-how on security-relevant technologies could flow to third countries such as China, not only through exports but also through investments made by European companies.

    For this reason, it announced a proposal on how foreign investment in certain technology fields should be monitored. The US government urged the EU to take such a step. Last summer, US President Joe Biden ordered controls on US foreign investments, such as microelectronics, and is looking for allies.

    In October, the EU reiterated that possible outbound investment screening was being examined: According to a statement at the time, the European Union and its member states were examining whether outbound investment measures could complement their existing instruments based on a risk assessment.

    However, during consultations, the plans of the EU Commission faced widespread opposition from the business community and many member states. Business associations criticized the restrictions on entrepreneurial freedom of choice and new red tape. According to reports, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has bowed to this pressure. The EU Directorate-General for Trade did not respond to a request for comment from Table.Media on Thursday. tho/ari

    • EU
    • Investments
    • Trade

    China further facilitates visa procedures

    China’s immigration authorities plan to further expand the recently introduced visa facilitation. The aim is to reduce the bureaucratic burden, especially for visits to relatives. This was reported by the German ARD office in Shanghai on Thursday. Accordingly, foreigners visiting relatives in China will no longer have to provide documentary proof of kinship. It will now be sufficient if the person making the invitation confirms the kinship.

    Business travelers, students and tourists from certain countries can also extend their stay in China by applying for a new visa or extending an existing visa at the nearest police station. It will also be possible to apply for a re-entry visa in China if a good reason for the planned exit and entry is presented to the authorities.

    Since December, citizens from Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Malaysia no longer require a visa to enter China for stays of up to 15 days. Part of the reason given by the immigration authorities for these measures is to promote the re-opening of China. Beijing also hopes to boost the weak economy with more tourism and more business trips. fpe

    • Visa

    Double-digit increase in car sales

    Car sales in China increased by twelve percent in 2023, according to figures from the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers (CAAM). The total number of vehicles sold was 30.1 million. The segment of purely battery-electric cars grew by 25 percent to 6.7 million, while plug-in hybrids increased by 85 percent to 2.8 million.

    The China Passenger Car Association (PCA) had recently reported a figure of 21.7 million models sold. The different figures are due to different base data. The PCA counts vehicle sales to customers, while CAAM measures manufacturers’ sales to dealerships.

    One reason for the massive growth is the price war between manufacturers in the People’s Republic, who have driven up sales with cheap offers. However, there is also the increased demand for Chinese cars on the global market: CAAM estimates China’s exports for 2023 at 4.9 million vehicles – an increase of 58 percent. This figure is provisional. Most cars went to Russia and Mexico. jul

    • Autoindustrie
    • CAAM

    Mexico overtakes China as the largest exporter to the US

    Data from the US Census Bureau suggests that Mexico has overtaken China as the largest exporter to the US. Although the figures for December will not be published until February 7, it appears that Mexico has surpassed the significantly larger China as the USA’s most important source of imports in 2023. According to official statistics, this would be the first time since 2003.

    US imports from China from January to November 2023 decreased by more than 21 percent compared to the same period last year. Only 14 percent of all US imports came from China. Between 2015 and 2018, it was around a fifth. Meanwhile, US imports from Mexico rose by almost five percent. Mexico’s share of total US imports in the eleven months up to November thus amounted to over 15 percent and reached a record high.

    Products that the US purchases most from Mexico include cars and car parts, electronics, crude oil and agricultural products. Despite de-risking measures, however, deep and lasting dependencies exist between the US and China, for example, in rare earths. fpe

    • USA

    Apple display supplier builds new plant in Chengdu

    Apple supplier BOE Technology, one of the world’s largest display manufacturers, will build a production complex for flexible panels worth nine billion US dollars in Chengdu.

    On Wednesday, the Chengdu city government announced that the Beijing-based company and the city’s Hi-Tech Industrial Development Zone had signed the contract for the construction of the plant. According to BOE, construction is estimated to take just under three years. Mass production is scheduled to begin in the fourth quarter of 2026. In terms of investment, it is the largest single industrial project in Sichuan’s provincial capital.

    Global demand for high-end displays for laptops and tablets is growing. According to a study by industry experts from Display Supply Chain Consultants (DSCC), the global market for OLED displays, such as those produced by BOE, is expected to generate sales of 64 billion US dollars in 2026. China could, therefore, dominate the global production capacity for displays with a market share of 72 percent between 2026 and 2027. fpe

    • Technologie

    Police question parents of Hong Kong democracy activists

    Security police in Hong Kong have raided the home of the family of Hong Kong democracy activist Simon Cheng. The officers brought Cheng’s parents and sister in for questioning, but later let them return home. This was reported by Nikkei Asia. Cheng commented on X that he hoped his parents could “enjoy a dignified, peaceful, and serene old age.”

    Simon Cheng has been living in exile in London for four years, where he has been granted asylum. In mid-December, the Hong Kong police announced bounties of around 116,000 euros on him and four other members of the democracy movement living in exile for alleged violations of the National Security Law. The dissidents will be pursued “to the end,” the police announced.

    Following the announcement of the bounties, the mother of democracy activist Frances Hui had already been detained and questioned by the police, and her house was also searched. Hui lives in the USA, where she has been granted political asylum. It is a common method for China’s security apparatus to put pressure on relatives of regime critics. jul

    • Demokratie
    • Nationales Sicherheitsgesetz

    China Perspective

    Xi’s economic xenophobia

    Xi Jinping’s mistrust and hostility towards the West play a key role in China’s economic decisions. Recent statements from government authorities show this. This does not bode well for the economy. According to economists, his contempt of Western economic theories would have unfavorable implications for the Chinese economy.

    Despite China’s efforts to save listless export growth and to keep foreign investors from leaving, companies dealing with China would still face from time to time consequences of the Chinese leader’s deeply-ingrained belief that international business activities could be deliberately used to sabotage it. 

    Xi’s spontaneous words would not be fully made public to unnecessarily strain China’s international relations, particularly at a time when China seeks to reduce tensions with the US. But government organizations at the commission and ministerial level, whose chiefs can learn Xi’s real thoughts in internal conferences, are less constrained to make anti-western utterances. They would even have them spelled out just to please Xi. A flurry of statements from two government bodies during the final months of 2023 were perfect examples. 

    Western theories versus ancient, unique China

    The Central Financial Work Conference, convened every five years, and the annual Economic Work Conference, were held October 30-31 and December 12-14, respectively. Xi chaired both. 

    Right after the financial conference, an article by the Central Financial Work Commission says that Xi’s speech at the conference answered many “major questions that the Marxist classic writers haven’t spoken about, our predecessors haven’t encountered, and the Western financial theories have always been unable to solve.”

    In the next paragraph, a far-fetched citation was made, quoting a line on the significance of credibility from Chinese classics from the 4th century BC. Xi, a staunch believer in China’s uniqueness and Chinese wisdom, has maintained that the application of Western economics should be limited in China’s macroeconomic management.

    China has never been a full-blown market economy. But the role of the People’s Bank of China, the central bank, is still as crucial as that of the US Federal Reserve. Xi doesn’t buy this. For him, the central bank is one of the departments that should listen to himself and his economic lieutenants, namely Liu He, who retired in 2023, and his successor, He Lifeng.

    The fate of two central bank governors

    There was a time when the central bank had quite a degree of independence. That was particularly true between 2002 and 2018 when Zhou Xiaochuan was its governor. Zhou’s words, respected both domestically and internationally, carried considerable weight in deciding China’s monetary and economic policy, especially before Xi took power in 2012.

    After Zhou retired, Yi Gang, already groomed for the position for years, became the default successor. However, Yi never had the full trust and respect of the leadership. In addition to Xi’s disregard for the central bank, there was something that had to do with Yi’s résumé: having studied and taught in universities in the United States for 14 years, he was considered under too much US influence. The People’s Bank’s governor had always also been the party secretary. But when Yi took over the office, another veteran banker, Guo Shuqing, was installed as the party secretary, obviously to keep Yi’s power in check.

    Yi stepped down in 2023. For the next new governor, Pan Gongsheng, a domestically trained senior banking official, the tradition of governor and party secretary combined in one was resumed. This shows contempt for the Western idea of a productive separation of powers between institutions.

    The role of the Ministry for State Security

    Another government agency that spoke out after the two conferences was the Ministry of State Security (MSS). Traditionally, the ministry operates behind the scenes. This is no longer the case in the Xi era.

    Two days after the economic work conference, the MSS published a lengthy, stern statement, vowing to “resolutely crack down on and punish illegal and criminal activities jeopardizing the country’s economic security.”

    After the financial conference, it issued a similar statement. These proclamations were no empty words. In 2023, foreign consulting firms and investment banks saw their offices raided and employees questioned or detained on espionage grounds.

    US firm convicted of ‘malicious short selling’

    The MSS’s high-profile actions in the economic sector didn’t start last year and were not from its own decision. China’s security authorities participated in investigations over the cause of a stock market rout in 2015 and, in an unprecedented move, linked the plunge to foreign players’ “malicious” short-selling.

    The probe was concluded in 2020. Under a vaguely-worded verdict, US market maker Citadel Securities paid an equivalent of 100 million US dollars for settlement. Its four domestic partners for the margin trading were also fined, for a much smaller amount.  

    The latest round of MSS warnings touched short-selling again. But the focus was on “maliciously fabricated narratives” about China’s economic policy. They were:

    • Replacing development with safety
    • Elbowing foreign investment out 
    • Holding private enterprises back 

    MSS believed the aims of the “rumor-mongers” were:  

    • To disrupt market expectations and the market order,
    • undermine the confidence of international investors in China,
    • stir up financial unrest,
    • and strategically suppress China and block its development.

    In the article, MSS also accused a ‘certain country’ of using finance for geopolitical games and employing “monetary hegemony” and financial sanctions to strike others. 

    • Finanzpolitik

    Executive Moves

    Christian Schotmann joined Swiss industrial component manufacturer Carlo Gavazzi Automation as Interim Manager China in January. The manager with a background in sales, marketing and business development worked at Helukabel China until December. He is based in Shanghai.

    Knud Erik Clausen joined SternIngredients China as a Consultant at the end of 2023. Previously, he was Managing Director & Member Board of Director at Wuerth International in Shanghai. SternIngredients is part of the Hamburg-based Stern-Wywiol Group, which specializes in country-specific additives for food and animal nutrition as well as food supplements.

    Is something changing in your organization? Let us know at heads@table.media!

    Dessert

    The mascots for the 9th Winter Asian Games in China in 2025 were revealed to the public yesterday. Binbin and Nini are inspired by two little tigers that were born in September 2023 in the Northeast Tiger Forest Park in the host city of Harbin. The official slogan of the games, freely translated by the Xinhua news agency, is: “Dream of Winter, Love among Asia” (冰雪同梦,亚洲同心).

    China.Table editorial team

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