Should the German armed forces have a military presence in Asia? Finn Mayer-Kuckuk got to the bottom of Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer’s still secret plans and concluded that the project carries more risks than rewards.
In January, ECB President Christine Lagarde announced the first tests with the e-Euro for the summer. And a few days ago, German and Chinese politicians exchanged views on the introduction of electronic currencies. Ning Wang has been following the developments surrounding the e-CNY. Her conclusion: The Chinese have now started the next test phase. They do not want to lose time rolling out the large-scale project.
At the end of last week, the team from China.Table exclusively revealed that the Chinese state broadcaster CGTN must also fear for its broadcasting license in Germany and that Vodafone has switched off the program as a precaution. Should one trust the information of a Professional Briefing that was launched only a few weeks ago? Colleagues from the German Press Agency, the Sueddeutsche Zeitung, and Die Zeit recognized China.Table as a reliable source and quoted us. We say – a little proudly – thank you for your trust!
If the Covid situation permits, the German Navy plans to send a warship to East Asia this summer. According to reports in Berlin, preparations for the frigate’s voyage are already underway. The Ministry of Defense officially confirms “plans to send a seagoing unit to the Indo-Pacific this year”. However, according to reports, there is still disagreement about how clear Berlin’s signal to Beijing should be.
Officially, it is a friendship and exercise mission to strengthen ties with regional allies. But unofficially, it is clear to whom Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer wants to send a message. “Of course, China is never mentioned,” says Helena Legarda, an expert on international relations and Chinese security policy at Merics. Realistically, however, only the People’s Republic’s ambitions are a possible reason for such a mission. China is expanding its claims in the Indo-Pacific, calling the usual practices regarding territories and territorial waters into question.
Observers such as Legarda consider the deployment of the frigate to be a fundamentally legitimate and sensible means of demonstrating a presence in a region in which Germany has considerable economic interests. Political Berlin, however, has a mixed opinion of the plan. Admittedly, there is no major opposition to it. In the CDU, however, Chancellor Angela Merkel is reportedly more cautious than her defense minister about the strength of the message.
Representatives of the FDP support the mission in principle. “I think it would be very good, indeed overdue, for Germany to be involved,” says Johannes Vogel, Deputy Chairman of the German-Chinese parliamentary group in the Bundestag. The Greens, on the other hand, consider clear signals to Beijing useful but do not necessarily see the military as the right means to do so. “China is an important security issue, but sending a frigate to the Indo-Pacific is just symbolic politics,” says Tobias Lindner, the defense policy spokesman for the Greens in the Bundestag. The government would do better to find a clearer line in economic relations.
China’s reaction to the ship’s voyage depends on its exact route. “Beijing has no problem with naval emissions in the region if they steer clear of the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea,” Legarda says. So, purely friendly visits to Japanese and Australian ports will likely be ignored.
The situation would be different with participation in an exercise designed to highlight freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. The US regularly conducts so-called Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs). They use a targeted transit to demonstrate that they consider a body of water to be international common property – preferably in association with allies. Legarda expects “pretty significant criticism from Beijing” for such an eventuality. The next step up would be a passage through the Taiwan Strait. But it is considered highly unlikely that the German Navy will go that far.
A single German warship in Southeast Asia may not make any difference militarily, but it sends a diplomatic signal. Germany, as an economic partner, is thus showing interest in events in the highly armed region. Kramp-Karrenbauer is avowedly in favor of greater involvement to maintain the political balance in Asia. A German naval deployment to the Indo-Pacific could help strengthen a rules-based international order, Kramp-Karrenbauer told Australian media in November. Kramp-Karrenbauer added she hoped a naval mission would be possible as early as 2021. The comments were prompted by a video conference with the Australian defense minister.
The minister’s remarks attracted more attention in East and Southeast Asia than in Germany. Taiwan and Japan are already seeing a change in German policy toward China – even if that is wishful thinking so far, given the complex mix of Berlin’s and Brussels’ foreign policy. “The chances of Germany developing a consistent Indochina strategy to contain China are rather slim,” Legarda says. A “containment” of China is also not the German government’s target.
However, the concerns of China’s neighboring countries are increasing yearly. For decades, China has marked its southern border in the sea with the infamous “nine-dash line”. This line stretches for a thousand kilometers along the coasts of its neighbors and encompasses the entire South China Sea. China’s claims thus overlap extensively with those of Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. In fact, the zones of use extend only 200 miles into the sea from the mainland by international agreement – and even ships from other countries are allowed to pass through these zones. Little remains of China’s great bulge under this view. Beijing, however, has visibly expanded its claim in recent years with the transfer of war materials into the maritime area.
The word in Berlin is that a deployment that shows solidarity with regional allies is desired. This includes, above all, France, which continues to hold overseas departments in the Indian Ocean, for example, the island of Réunion or French Polynesia. Whether France is still a serious power in the Indian Ocean today remains questionable, but its presence and influence are comparatively high. There is also already an arrangement with Australia for joint maneuvres. It is thus “no wonder that Kramp-Karrenbauer first raised the issue with her Australian colleague,” says Legarda.
Meanwhile, Taiwan’s friends continue to dream of the symbolic voyage through the Taiwan Strait. However, the presence of the German ship would be understood as serious interference, after all, it expresses a foreign policy offer of protection. Beijing claims Taiwan as its own territory without restriction and takes the view that warships – unlike merchant vessels – should not be allowed to approach its coast without express permission.
Decisive people in the German government are thus shying away from the consequences of such a course. They wonder whether Germany can even sustain a confrontation with China. The attempt at a concrete, militarily tinged containment of China could set a spiral in motion whose end is hardly in sight. According to this, a half-hearted provocation would be all the more damaging because China would count the inevitable retreat as a diplomatic victory. Such experiments are considered unwise as long as Germany has not clearly defined its guidelines.
The question remains whether the heavily utilized German Navy can actually provide a frigate for the voyage around the globe. Germany has only eleven such ships. The ministry spokesman’s formulation, “a seagoing unit”, would also cover a smaller type with the corvette. But since this is a purely symbolic mission anyway, the exact type is probably secondary.
The opportunity was a good one. In keeping with the tradition of sending each other virtual red envelopes with cash gifts to mark the Chinese New Year, the Chinese central bank distributed money in digital form for the first time in Beijing during the pre-New Year period. Each of the 50,000 participants who qualified through a selection process received ¥200 (€25) in e-CNY to spend during the holiday period until Feb. 26 on certain online platforms or even on the e-commerce retailer’s JD.com sites. The Central Bank of China gave away the equivalent of €1.25 million to citizens.
The Research Institute for Digital Currency, affiliated with the central bank, has been testing the use of the e-CNY in four Chinese cities for more than half a year, most recently in Shenzhen, for example, and before that in Suzhou, Xiong’an, and Chengdu. These pilot projects mainly aim to test whether users can cope with the new currency. For example, some users did not spend their e-CNY but wanted to save them. However, this is not possible as the e-CNY has an expiry date. Also, some users do not know how to spend their e-CNY because they are unfamiliar with the new system.
Images of the e-CNY, officially called Digital Currency Electronic Payment (DCEP), circulated on the Internet last late summer, so even without precise details from the Chinese central bank, it became known what the digital yuan might look like in the future. The e-CNY will enter circulation through distribution by the central bank to commercial banks, which will then pass it on to their customers as a non-interest-bearing virtual e-wallet. This allows the e-CNY to be used without a bank account – not only by the Chinese but also internationally. China continues to push back on paying with cash and is launching the international spread of the e-CNY.
Cashless payments have come a long way in China in recent years, with tech giant Tencent through its payment app WeChat Pay and the e-commerce provider Alibaba with Alipay increasingly dominating the market. However, the country’s private digital payment platforms initially made China’s banking world quite nervous because banks were suddenly in the dark about their customers’ data that originated on digital payment platforms. It became harder to figure out consumer habits in China: What were they buying, how much were they spending on groceries, rent or luxury products and travel.
Now, the government is fighting back by introducing the e-CNY, by softening the hegemony of these services and by collecting data centrally.
The e-CNY is based on blockchain technology. Through this, every transaction can be tracked in detail – unlike with cash. As a result, abuses of cash use, such as corruption, terrorist financing, tax evasion or money laundering, can be restricted more strongly. However, there is also a downside to increasing government control: International data protection experts see a great danger that Beijing could gain complete insight into the finances of its citizens.
Even though the blockchain technology currently in place is insufficient to handle all retail transactions due to a lack of computing capacity and server infrastructure, China recently held more blockchain patents than any other country worldwide.
The European Central Bank (ECB) is also pursuing plans for a digital currency. It wants to produce a fundamental decision in the summer. ECB Chief Christine Lagarde wants to introduce the digital euro quickly. At the moment, however, it looks as if China will be quicker: The People’s Republic already started to push the e-CNY project six years ago. And Beijing’s monetary authority has set the goal of introducing the e-CNY by 2022.
On Wednesday and Thursday this week, NATO’s defense ministers will meet for the first time in the new year for a virtual summit with Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. He will make proposals for increased political coordination among the allies, Stoltenberg said yesterday in advance – a “more global approach to global challenges” is needed. “China and Russia are at the forefront of authoritarian resistance, so we should improve our political dialogue and cooperation with like-minded partners to promote our values and protect our interests,” Stoltenberg said.
At the meeting of the foreign ministers of the 30 alliance states in December, the threat potential of China was still at the top of the list – with the defense ministers this week, the topic will not be in focus, as a spokesperson of the defense alliance told China.Table. But the issue may be raised in talks between ministers, they said. Various proposals with regard to China are being worked on, which are to be put on the table at the NATO summit later this year.
This focus is reasonable, says Ekkehard Brose, President of the Federal Academy for Security Policy (BAKS). “China currently does not pose an acute military threat to the Alliance.” According to the defense expert, for NATO, it is now rather a matter of making China the subject of systematic analysis and also coordination in the Alliance. Setting up a proposed NATO-China Council along the lines of the NATO-Russia Council seems premature to him – there are enough issues of common interest to get a less formal dialogue going, Brose says. However, he favors an internal consultation group.
According to Brose, the rise of the People’s Republic poses challenges for NATO in several areas: for example, who has the upper hand in cyberspace and global communications and can thus determine political narratives. “The discussion about the role of the company Huawei in the expansion of the 5G networks is just the tip of the iceberg.” Furthermore, logistics, as far as it is relevant for the mobility of NATO forces, must be kept in mind, Brose said. He mentions ports or container terminals built and operated with China’s participation as an example. The greatest challenge, however, is of a political nature: Despite differing economic interests, the NATO states must not allow themselves to be divided by China to such an extent that their security policy interests are damaged, warns Brose.
“China is amid a rapid ascent, with a not yet foreseeable zenith and destination.” China is being watched closely from afar, and economic contacts are also intensive – but there is still relatively little experience in sounding out political agreements with China, for example, in the area of security and confidence building, says the BAKS President.
China’s rise was the “biggest and most drastic change in NATO strategy”, a reflection group set up by the Alliance concluded in November. “NATO must devote much more time, political resources and action to China’s security challenges,” said the panel’s report, in which China has its own chapter. Last week, the Pentagon announced it would establish a China task force. US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin will attend this week’s virtual summit for the first time.
Meia Nouwens, Senior Fellow for Chinese Defense Policy and Military Modernization at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, does not see it as a mistake either that China is not at the top of the to-do list for the first meeting. China has already been properly defined as a long-term challenge by the defense alliance, but at present, there are more pressing agenda items, such as the situation in Afghanistan, she said. “I don’t think this shows that China is not being taken seriously,” says Nouwens. After all, the People’s Republic generally presents NATO with complex tasks: political, economic and defense-related.
Especially with regard to the latter, Beijing’s involvement in Europe needs to be looked at critically: “We have seen in recent years that Chinese companies are investing in important infrastructures in NATO ally countries, which raises questions about the leverage effect or influence China is creating as a result.” Chinese investors would thus also have increased legal access to strategically important technology, Nouwens warns. Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) have been the main focus of concern recently – but last week’s meeting between China and 17 CEEC countries showed that there appears to be less cause for concern than five years ago, the analyst says. Several Eastern European and Baltic states had given the so-called 17+1 format a rather low profile, thus giving China the cold shoulder.
China is not creating fronts within the NATO allies that do not already exist, says Nouwens. But Beijing could expand those already existing. That is why one of the main tasks is now to bring all the parties in line. Some European countries, including the large states of Germany and France, still lack a clear China strategy, for example, regarding the integration of Huawei into the national telecommunications market. According to Nouwens, new challenges may also arise for NATO operations: China, as an exporter of weapons, can thus contribute to missions becoming more complex, as the People’s Republic potentially does not adhere to the same rules as Europe or the US.
According to a report by the Swedish peace research institute Sipri, China has become the world’s second-largest arms producer. According to the report, the country’s four largest arms companies together generated sales of around $54.1 billion in 2017, putting China behind the US in global arms sales but ahead of Russia. According to Sipri, the People’s Republic is the largest buyer of arms. However, the institute also warned: There is a slow increase in demand from abroad for Chinese armaments.
As a 17-year-old, Till Ammelburg experienced a new world: His family moved from southern Germany to Bangkok. His father worked there for the Swiss pharmaceutical company Roche. “At that time, I was overwhelmed by all the new opportunities,” he says, “and by how my horizons expanded.”
Getting to know new cultures and building understanding across national borders still fascinates Till Ammelburg today. Helping others find their way in a foreign country is part of his everyday life: At the innovation platform Techcode in Berlin, he advises German start-ups to help them enter the Chinese market. As a so-called start-up scout, he is often the first contact for young companies that consider taking the plunge into China. He builds relationships with them, establishes networks, organizes events and trips to China. Above all, however, he helps with the decision-making process as to whether the path to China is worthwhile for German founders at all.
While Chinese start-ups know exactly whether expansion into Europe is worthwhile, German start-ups do not pay enough attention to the China question. “There’s still too much rushing around,” says Ammelburg. But half measures do not work in China. The country is not just another market of many but a universe of its own: “Either you put everything on the China card, or you make a clear decision against it. That’s legitimate.” However, dealing with China is a must for every young company, he said. Moreover, this decision should always be made anew. “And at least once a year,” says Ammelburg.
As is well known, China is not an easy market for foreign start-ups, despite all the enticements. “Many are afraid of missing out on this huge market, even if expanding into China doesn’t always pay off,” Ammelburg says. That is a dangerous impetus, he says. To succeed in China’s fierce competition, start-ups need, above all, the ability to reinvent themselves. Chinese founders are incredibly agile and adapt quickly.
Creating an understanding of the different ways of thinking in China and Europe is what continues to drive Ammelburg. He moved back to Germany for his studies. He studied Sinology in Leipzig and Berlin and learned Mandarin during two stays in Beijing and Dalian. China still captivated him: In Shanghai, he worked for three years as a management and personnel consultant for a British company before returning to Germany for good in 2015.
He took away two lessons from his time in China. On the one hand, he was impressed by the pragmatism of the Chinese, their flexibility and their ability to put aside their own “mentalities” and pride when something does not go perfectly. On the other hand, he said, Europe can be proud of the trust people have in each other, both in private and in business. “In China, I noticed what an achievement that is. Because this trust is far less pronounced there.” Adrian Meyer
Should the German armed forces have a military presence in Asia? Finn Mayer-Kuckuk got to the bottom of Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer’s still secret plans and concluded that the project carries more risks than rewards.
In January, ECB President Christine Lagarde announced the first tests with the e-Euro for the summer. And a few days ago, German and Chinese politicians exchanged views on the introduction of electronic currencies. Ning Wang has been following the developments surrounding the e-CNY. Her conclusion: The Chinese have now started the next test phase. They do not want to lose time rolling out the large-scale project.
At the end of last week, the team from China.Table exclusively revealed that the Chinese state broadcaster CGTN must also fear for its broadcasting license in Germany and that Vodafone has switched off the program as a precaution. Should one trust the information of a Professional Briefing that was launched only a few weeks ago? Colleagues from the German Press Agency, the Sueddeutsche Zeitung, and Die Zeit recognized China.Table as a reliable source and quoted us. We say – a little proudly – thank you for your trust!
If the Covid situation permits, the German Navy plans to send a warship to East Asia this summer. According to reports in Berlin, preparations for the frigate’s voyage are already underway. The Ministry of Defense officially confirms “plans to send a seagoing unit to the Indo-Pacific this year”. However, according to reports, there is still disagreement about how clear Berlin’s signal to Beijing should be.
Officially, it is a friendship and exercise mission to strengthen ties with regional allies. But unofficially, it is clear to whom Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer wants to send a message. “Of course, China is never mentioned,” says Helena Legarda, an expert on international relations and Chinese security policy at Merics. Realistically, however, only the People’s Republic’s ambitions are a possible reason for such a mission. China is expanding its claims in the Indo-Pacific, calling the usual practices regarding territories and territorial waters into question.
Observers such as Legarda consider the deployment of the frigate to be a fundamentally legitimate and sensible means of demonstrating a presence in a region in which Germany has considerable economic interests. Political Berlin, however, has a mixed opinion of the plan. Admittedly, there is no major opposition to it. In the CDU, however, Chancellor Angela Merkel is reportedly more cautious than her defense minister about the strength of the message.
Representatives of the FDP support the mission in principle. “I think it would be very good, indeed overdue, for Germany to be involved,” says Johannes Vogel, Deputy Chairman of the German-Chinese parliamentary group in the Bundestag. The Greens, on the other hand, consider clear signals to Beijing useful but do not necessarily see the military as the right means to do so. “China is an important security issue, but sending a frigate to the Indo-Pacific is just symbolic politics,” says Tobias Lindner, the defense policy spokesman for the Greens in the Bundestag. The government would do better to find a clearer line in economic relations.
China’s reaction to the ship’s voyage depends on its exact route. “Beijing has no problem with naval emissions in the region if they steer clear of the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea,” Legarda says. So, purely friendly visits to Japanese and Australian ports will likely be ignored.
The situation would be different with participation in an exercise designed to highlight freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. The US regularly conducts so-called Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs). They use a targeted transit to demonstrate that they consider a body of water to be international common property – preferably in association with allies. Legarda expects “pretty significant criticism from Beijing” for such an eventuality. The next step up would be a passage through the Taiwan Strait. But it is considered highly unlikely that the German Navy will go that far.
A single German warship in Southeast Asia may not make any difference militarily, but it sends a diplomatic signal. Germany, as an economic partner, is thus showing interest in events in the highly armed region. Kramp-Karrenbauer is avowedly in favor of greater involvement to maintain the political balance in Asia. A German naval deployment to the Indo-Pacific could help strengthen a rules-based international order, Kramp-Karrenbauer told Australian media in November. Kramp-Karrenbauer added she hoped a naval mission would be possible as early as 2021. The comments were prompted by a video conference with the Australian defense minister.
The minister’s remarks attracted more attention in East and Southeast Asia than in Germany. Taiwan and Japan are already seeing a change in German policy toward China – even if that is wishful thinking so far, given the complex mix of Berlin’s and Brussels’ foreign policy. “The chances of Germany developing a consistent Indochina strategy to contain China are rather slim,” Legarda says. A “containment” of China is also not the German government’s target.
However, the concerns of China’s neighboring countries are increasing yearly. For decades, China has marked its southern border in the sea with the infamous “nine-dash line”. This line stretches for a thousand kilometers along the coasts of its neighbors and encompasses the entire South China Sea. China’s claims thus overlap extensively with those of Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. In fact, the zones of use extend only 200 miles into the sea from the mainland by international agreement – and even ships from other countries are allowed to pass through these zones. Little remains of China’s great bulge under this view. Beijing, however, has visibly expanded its claim in recent years with the transfer of war materials into the maritime area.
The word in Berlin is that a deployment that shows solidarity with regional allies is desired. This includes, above all, France, which continues to hold overseas departments in the Indian Ocean, for example, the island of Réunion or French Polynesia. Whether France is still a serious power in the Indian Ocean today remains questionable, but its presence and influence are comparatively high. There is also already an arrangement with Australia for joint maneuvres. It is thus “no wonder that Kramp-Karrenbauer first raised the issue with her Australian colleague,” says Legarda.
Meanwhile, Taiwan’s friends continue to dream of the symbolic voyage through the Taiwan Strait. However, the presence of the German ship would be understood as serious interference, after all, it expresses a foreign policy offer of protection. Beijing claims Taiwan as its own territory without restriction and takes the view that warships – unlike merchant vessels – should not be allowed to approach its coast without express permission.
Decisive people in the German government are thus shying away from the consequences of such a course. They wonder whether Germany can even sustain a confrontation with China. The attempt at a concrete, militarily tinged containment of China could set a spiral in motion whose end is hardly in sight. According to this, a half-hearted provocation would be all the more damaging because China would count the inevitable retreat as a diplomatic victory. Such experiments are considered unwise as long as Germany has not clearly defined its guidelines.
The question remains whether the heavily utilized German Navy can actually provide a frigate for the voyage around the globe. Germany has only eleven such ships. The ministry spokesman’s formulation, “a seagoing unit”, would also cover a smaller type with the corvette. But since this is a purely symbolic mission anyway, the exact type is probably secondary.
The opportunity was a good one. In keeping with the tradition of sending each other virtual red envelopes with cash gifts to mark the Chinese New Year, the Chinese central bank distributed money in digital form for the first time in Beijing during the pre-New Year period. Each of the 50,000 participants who qualified through a selection process received ¥200 (€25) in e-CNY to spend during the holiday period until Feb. 26 on certain online platforms or even on the e-commerce retailer’s JD.com sites. The Central Bank of China gave away the equivalent of €1.25 million to citizens.
The Research Institute for Digital Currency, affiliated with the central bank, has been testing the use of the e-CNY in four Chinese cities for more than half a year, most recently in Shenzhen, for example, and before that in Suzhou, Xiong’an, and Chengdu. These pilot projects mainly aim to test whether users can cope with the new currency. For example, some users did not spend their e-CNY but wanted to save them. However, this is not possible as the e-CNY has an expiry date. Also, some users do not know how to spend their e-CNY because they are unfamiliar with the new system.
Images of the e-CNY, officially called Digital Currency Electronic Payment (DCEP), circulated on the Internet last late summer, so even without precise details from the Chinese central bank, it became known what the digital yuan might look like in the future. The e-CNY will enter circulation through distribution by the central bank to commercial banks, which will then pass it on to their customers as a non-interest-bearing virtual e-wallet. This allows the e-CNY to be used without a bank account – not only by the Chinese but also internationally. China continues to push back on paying with cash and is launching the international spread of the e-CNY.
Cashless payments have come a long way in China in recent years, with tech giant Tencent through its payment app WeChat Pay and the e-commerce provider Alibaba with Alipay increasingly dominating the market. However, the country’s private digital payment platforms initially made China’s banking world quite nervous because banks were suddenly in the dark about their customers’ data that originated on digital payment platforms. It became harder to figure out consumer habits in China: What were they buying, how much were they spending on groceries, rent or luxury products and travel.
Now, the government is fighting back by introducing the e-CNY, by softening the hegemony of these services and by collecting data centrally.
The e-CNY is based on blockchain technology. Through this, every transaction can be tracked in detail – unlike with cash. As a result, abuses of cash use, such as corruption, terrorist financing, tax evasion or money laundering, can be restricted more strongly. However, there is also a downside to increasing government control: International data protection experts see a great danger that Beijing could gain complete insight into the finances of its citizens.
Even though the blockchain technology currently in place is insufficient to handle all retail transactions due to a lack of computing capacity and server infrastructure, China recently held more blockchain patents than any other country worldwide.
The European Central Bank (ECB) is also pursuing plans for a digital currency. It wants to produce a fundamental decision in the summer. ECB Chief Christine Lagarde wants to introduce the digital euro quickly. At the moment, however, it looks as if China will be quicker: The People’s Republic already started to push the e-CNY project six years ago. And Beijing’s monetary authority has set the goal of introducing the e-CNY by 2022.
On Wednesday and Thursday this week, NATO’s defense ministers will meet for the first time in the new year for a virtual summit with Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. He will make proposals for increased political coordination among the allies, Stoltenberg said yesterday in advance – a “more global approach to global challenges” is needed. “China and Russia are at the forefront of authoritarian resistance, so we should improve our political dialogue and cooperation with like-minded partners to promote our values and protect our interests,” Stoltenberg said.
At the meeting of the foreign ministers of the 30 alliance states in December, the threat potential of China was still at the top of the list – with the defense ministers this week, the topic will not be in focus, as a spokesperson of the defense alliance told China.Table. But the issue may be raised in talks between ministers, they said. Various proposals with regard to China are being worked on, which are to be put on the table at the NATO summit later this year.
This focus is reasonable, says Ekkehard Brose, President of the Federal Academy for Security Policy (BAKS). “China currently does not pose an acute military threat to the Alliance.” According to the defense expert, for NATO, it is now rather a matter of making China the subject of systematic analysis and also coordination in the Alliance. Setting up a proposed NATO-China Council along the lines of the NATO-Russia Council seems premature to him – there are enough issues of common interest to get a less formal dialogue going, Brose says. However, he favors an internal consultation group.
According to Brose, the rise of the People’s Republic poses challenges for NATO in several areas: for example, who has the upper hand in cyberspace and global communications and can thus determine political narratives. “The discussion about the role of the company Huawei in the expansion of the 5G networks is just the tip of the iceberg.” Furthermore, logistics, as far as it is relevant for the mobility of NATO forces, must be kept in mind, Brose said. He mentions ports or container terminals built and operated with China’s participation as an example. The greatest challenge, however, is of a political nature: Despite differing economic interests, the NATO states must not allow themselves to be divided by China to such an extent that their security policy interests are damaged, warns Brose.
“China is amid a rapid ascent, with a not yet foreseeable zenith and destination.” China is being watched closely from afar, and economic contacts are also intensive – but there is still relatively little experience in sounding out political agreements with China, for example, in the area of security and confidence building, says the BAKS President.
China’s rise was the “biggest and most drastic change in NATO strategy”, a reflection group set up by the Alliance concluded in November. “NATO must devote much more time, political resources and action to China’s security challenges,” said the panel’s report, in which China has its own chapter. Last week, the Pentagon announced it would establish a China task force. US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin will attend this week’s virtual summit for the first time.
Meia Nouwens, Senior Fellow for Chinese Defense Policy and Military Modernization at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, does not see it as a mistake either that China is not at the top of the to-do list for the first meeting. China has already been properly defined as a long-term challenge by the defense alliance, but at present, there are more pressing agenda items, such as the situation in Afghanistan, she said. “I don’t think this shows that China is not being taken seriously,” says Nouwens. After all, the People’s Republic generally presents NATO with complex tasks: political, economic and defense-related.
Especially with regard to the latter, Beijing’s involvement in Europe needs to be looked at critically: “We have seen in recent years that Chinese companies are investing in important infrastructures in NATO ally countries, which raises questions about the leverage effect or influence China is creating as a result.” Chinese investors would thus also have increased legal access to strategically important technology, Nouwens warns. Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) have been the main focus of concern recently – but last week’s meeting between China and 17 CEEC countries showed that there appears to be less cause for concern than five years ago, the analyst says. Several Eastern European and Baltic states had given the so-called 17+1 format a rather low profile, thus giving China the cold shoulder.
China is not creating fronts within the NATO allies that do not already exist, says Nouwens. But Beijing could expand those already existing. That is why one of the main tasks is now to bring all the parties in line. Some European countries, including the large states of Germany and France, still lack a clear China strategy, for example, regarding the integration of Huawei into the national telecommunications market. According to Nouwens, new challenges may also arise for NATO operations: China, as an exporter of weapons, can thus contribute to missions becoming more complex, as the People’s Republic potentially does not adhere to the same rules as Europe or the US.
According to a report by the Swedish peace research institute Sipri, China has become the world’s second-largest arms producer. According to the report, the country’s four largest arms companies together generated sales of around $54.1 billion in 2017, putting China behind the US in global arms sales but ahead of Russia. According to Sipri, the People’s Republic is the largest buyer of arms. However, the institute also warned: There is a slow increase in demand from abroad for Chinese armaments.
As a 17-year-old, Till Ammelburg experienced a new world: His family moved from southern Germany to Bangkok. His father worked there for the Swiss pharmaceutical company Roche. “At that time, I was overwhelmed by all the new opportunities,” he says, “and by how my horizons expanded.”
Getting to know new cultures and building understanding across national borders still fascinates Till Ammelburg today. Helping others find their way in a foreign country is part of his everyday life: At the innovation platform Techcode in Berlin, he advises German start-ups to help them enter the Chinese market. As a so-called start-up scout, he is often the first contact for young companies that consider taking the plunge into China. He builds relationships with them, establishes networks, organizes events and trips to China. Above all, however, he helps with the decision-making process as to whether the path to China is worthwhile for German founders at all.
While Chinese start-ups know exactly whether expansion into Europe is worthwhile, German start-ups do not pay enough attention to the China question. “There’s still too much rushing around,” says Ammelburg. But half measures do not work in China. The country is not just another market of many but a universe of its own: “Either you put everything on the China card, or you make a clear decision against it. That’s legitimate.” However, dealing with China is a must for every young company, he said. Moreover, this decision should always be made anew. “And at least once a year,” says Ammelburg.
As is well known, China is not an easy market for foreign start-ups, despite all the enticements. “Many are afraid of missing out on this huge market, even if expanding into China doesn’t always pay off,” Ammelburg says. That is a dangerous impetus, he says. To succeed in China’s fierce competition, start-ups need, above all, the ability to reinvent themselves. Chinese founders are incredibly agile and adapt quickly.
Creating an understanding of the different ways of thinking in China and Europe is what continues to drive Ammelburg. He moved back to Germany for his studies. He studied Sinology in Leipzig and Berlin and learned Mandarin during two stays in Beijing and Dalian. China still captivated him: In Shanghai, he worked for three years as a management and personnel consultant for a British company before returning to Germany for good in 2015.
He took away two lessons from his time in China. On the one hand, he was impressed by the pragmatism of the Chinese, their flexibility and their ability to put aside their own “mentalities” and pride when something does not go perfectly. On the other hand, he said, Europe can be proud of the trust people have in each other, both in private and in business. “In China, I noticed what an achievement that is. Because this trust is far less pronounced there.” Adrian Meyer
