Table.Briefing: China

CAI text + Container + Shijiazhuang + Investment rules + Wind energy + Tencent + Buetikofer

  • CAI – masterpiece of Chinese negotiation
  • Container shortage leads to empty container repositioning
  • Covid situation comes to a head
  • Beijing tightens investment rules
  • Record for wind energy
  • Tencent attacks Alibaba with mini shops
  • Reinhard Buetikofer: networking – more than an answer to the BRI
Dear reader,

It’s just a moment, a single sentence on this Thursday, but words can trigger a lot in diplomacy. I believe that with joint efforts of both sides, the ‘better angels’ in China-US relations will be able to overcome evil forces,” says Beijing’s foreign office spokeswoman Hua Chunying, congratulating Joe Biden on taking office. May relations between America and China now get “back on the right track”.

Are these new tones even conciliatory? Hardly. The world powers won’t back down in the clash of interests. Biden has long since made it clear that he has no intention of reversing his predecessor’s China policy. And Beijing managed to inflame relations with threats of sanctions against Trump’s Secretary of State Mike Pompeo just seconds after the new US president swore his hand on the Bible in front of the Capitol on Wednesday.

Ursula von der Leyen promised EU parliamentarians nothing less than “the highest level” of transparency at the beginning of her term in office – especially regarding trade issues. That is exactly what the EU-China investment agreement (CAI) is all about.

But von der Leyen’s Commission lacks nothing as much as – transparency. For three weeks, MEPs (and not only them) have been waiting for the agreement text. They would have liked to assess who pulled whom across the negotiating table and what China actually promised the Europeans. The paper will be published on Friday, as Amelie Richter and Marcel Grzanna write. But there will be little to evaluate. Because of all things, the detailed “annexes” that the experts are waiting for will probably be missing.

We know that China (like other Asian countries) doesn’t give the coronavirus a chance and locks down entire cities at the slightest sign. Frank Sieren travels to Beijing and Shijiazhuang to investigate the price those affected by this strategy have to pay – especially now, before the wave of travel for the New Year.

Your
Antje Sirleschtov
Image of Antje  Sirleschtov

Feature

Masterpiece of Chinese negotiation

The Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) bears the stamp of Chinese negotiation skills. Beijing is thus greatly satisfied. The official reading there is “balanced, high-quality, mutually beneficial and win-win,” which has been quoted by party officials and state media like a prayer mill for days. And in Europe? Many observers doubt a win-win. It is true that the improved conditions for market access for European companies in China are seen as positive in principle. But numerous shortcomings of the deal provoke bitter smiles and criticism in Europe.

In the course of today, the text of the agreement is to be presented to the public for the first time – or at least parts of it. Brussels observers expect that the EU Commission will not publish the relevant annexes for the time being. However, the so-called annexes contain crucial details about the agreements. The “legal scrubbing” of the entire text is currently in progress: During this formal legal examination of the paper, formulations can still be changed. Representatives of the European Parliament, in particular, are pressing for the annexes to be published and translated promptly.

EU Parliament: ‘hasty conclusion’

The first signs that the CAI will not have an easy time in the EU Parliament – which must approve the deal – were already apparent during the Parliament’s first week of sessions following the agreement in principle between Brussels and Beijing. In a cross-party resolution on China’s actions in Hong Kong, MEPs deplored a “hasty conclusion” in the deal and that it did not adequately reflect the problematic human rights situation in Hong Kong, Xinjiang province and Tibet. “The EU risks its credibility as a global human rights actor,” said the paragraph attached to the resolution later this week. EU Commissioner for Equality Helena Dalli announced during Thursday’s debate on Hong Kong in plenary that the issue would also be on the agenda of the EU foreign ministers meeting next Monday.

And in the European Parliament, the last word has not yet been spoken: As soon as the finalized treaty texts are available in the committees of the EU Parliament, the parliamentarians will closely examine what control and sanction mechanisms are in place so that “China’s commitments actually lead to an improvement in the living conditions” of workers in the country, the China delegation’s Vice-Chair of the European Parliament, Evelyne Gebhardt, told China.Table. “Cooperation yes, but not at all costs,” the SPD politician stressed. According to participants, there was also mostly criticism of the agreement in the closed group meetings of the political groups of the EU Parliament.

‘Bad deal is better than no deal’

The agreement is the result of a seven-year tug-of-war, during which the Chinese skilfully played their trump cards to emerge as the winners from the negotiations. Noah Barkin of the German Marshall Fund, an independent US foundation that promotes transatlantic relations, speaks of the “biggest Christmas present” to Beijing.

“Positive on the one hand, disappointing in other aspects,” business circles say. There is more market access in sectors such as telecommunications, health and biotechnology, and the promise of more transparent support for state-owned companies in China in the future. But Europeans will still not be allowed to participate in public tenders, intellectual property will not be better protected than before, and the statements on the protection of workers in China are more than vague. In addition, some concessions for market access in industries such as electromobility or financial industry are not new but old commitments that have merely been repackaged.

“A bad deal is better than no deal. Let the critics put themselves in that trench for once when it comes to negotiating with the Chinese,” says an industry representative who has followed the negotiations throughout. The trench is emblematic of the great challenge of negotiating with China, which has navigated robustly through the Covid year economically. The People’s Republic was the only major global economy to report a growing economy.

Beijing’s advantage: unity

In 2008, the Taiwanese negotiation researcher Liu Birong published a guidebook entitled “The High School of Martial Arts in Business Negotiations.” The work was translated into German by sinologist Florian Mehring. “The Chinese side has shown great unity in negotiations with the Europeans, giving it a decisive advantage,” Mehring says. While Europe was under pressure to take into account many interests from its own ranks, China’s leadership was able to pursue its interests in a unified manner.

With concessions, some of which are likely to prove less painful for China, the Chinese, for their part, persuaded the Europeans to set the stage for a geostrategic success. Despite vocal criticism of China’s behavior during the Covid-19 outbreak, the introduction of the National Security Act in Hong Kong, and the detention of hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs in so-called re-education camps, Beijing strengthened its position as a global economic power even before the United States under its new president, Joe Biden, could have intervened. The conclusion of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment was the icing on the cake for Beijing, where the conclusion of the Pacific free trade agreement RCEP with numerous Western allies could already be celebrated as a stage victory.

“In such negotiations, China presents itself with the self-confidence of a country that says to itself, ‘Now it’s our turn,’” says negotiation researcher Mehring. The century of humiliation, starting with the Opium Wars in the 19th century and ending with World War 2, followed by a decades-long role as a marginal figure in world economic chess, is ingrained in China’s DNA. “Chinese people are vindictive. They haven’t forgotten the past. After these experiences, they are extremely distrustful,” Mehring said.

Nevertheless, in such negotiations, the Chinese would avoid humiliating their counterpart at all costs. The negotiating partner should also have something in his hand to cling to, even if it is less than the negotiator is claiming for himself.

However, it can also be assumed that Beijing has by no means played all its trump cards. One of them is particularly worrying for the Europeans. Since Monday, new rules for foreign investments have been in effect in the People’s Republic. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) reserves the right to examine all investments for their compatibility with national security. Similar mechanisms exist elsewhere in the world. They also exist in Germany, where the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs has banned one Chinese investment since 2012, and a handful of other Chinese interested parties have withdrawn. Nevertheless, observers in Europe fear that the new rules will devalue hard-won concessions under the investment protection agreement. Marcel Grzanna/Amelie Richter

  • Car Industry
  • Electromobility
  • Menschenrechte

Container shortage leads to empty container repositioning

There is a shortage of containers in China’s ports – with considerable consequences for German trade. “The situation will lead to enormous economic damage for some importers,” says Guido Hogenkamp from the German import and export company in Bocholt (DIG). Among other things, the company imports garden furniture and kitchen appliances from the Far East. Like any scarce commodity, transport capacity from China to Europe now becomes more expensive. “Not everyone can afford a five-fold increase in freight rates,” says Hogenkamp.

The shipping lines know the background of the container shortage and the rising freight prices. Niklas Ohling, Head of Container Steering at shipping line Hapag-Lloyd in Hamburg, sees the cause in the massive increase in global demand for goods from Asia. The shipping line had even allowed numerous ships to sail without cargo to “evacuate” unused containers from the USA and position them in Asia” – despite the enormous costs that such empty container repositioning incurs.

The mail-order company Otto sees even more reasons for the global container imbalance. According to the Hamburg-based company’s logistics department, the dilemma began after the Chinese New Year in 2020. The coronavirus had China in its grip, with workers not returning to factories and loading points. As a result, container ships were delayed by many weeks. Shortly after that, a boom in demand from Western countries began. British traders stocked up on goods just before Brexit. In Germany, retail sales rose by a good five percent in the Covid year: People equipped themselves for the home office, refurnished their apartments, and generally treated themselves to more orders during the lockdown.

Bottlenecks due to unused containers

The US also saw high demand for goods from China. “We’ve seen a 20 to 30 percent increase in the flow of goods into the US in each of the months of fall,” said Peter Tirschwell, Head of Shipping and Trade Research at analyst firm IHS Markit. “A lot of containers are now sitting around unused.” They are scattered across the country in logistics centers waiting for onward transport, but that fails to materialize. “There are additional bottlenecks due to high sick leave and stricter hygiene measures,” Tirschwell says. “Loading and unloading are not going as fast as usual.”

This leads to delays, notes Lars Jensen, founder of the Copenhagen-based industry observer SeaIntelligence. As a result, he says, there were about half a million fewer standard containers than usual in Asia in mid-December. “An aggressive repatriation strategy and new orders should have resulted in the inventory returning to normal by the end of January,” Jensen says. However, he said, as demand for goods remains high, the imbalance could increase to one million containers. While exact data on this won’t become available until March, he said, it currently looks like the balance is still waiting. Ohling of Hapag-Lloyd also believes that “the situation will probably continue for the first few months of the year.”

Covid cargo crunch

Economist Serena Zhou of the financial house Mizuho Securities in Hong Kong even sees container shortages as the current ceiling for Chinese exports, which contribute a decent part to the country’s growth. No wonder the global industry association World Shipping Council promises, “Our ocean liners are fighting the Covid cargo shortage.” It says to resolve the “unprecedented supply chain disruptions,” the industry is pulling out all the stops. Shipowners are already sharing ships across competitive borders to fill capacity. The catchy phrase “Covid cargo crunch” is already circulating.

The next milestone for the industry is the Chinese New Year 2021 on Feb. 12. “Usually, the demand for containers decreases again,” says Ohling. China takes a two-week break in its holiday season, with factories at a standstill. Exports drop accordingly. Containers that migrated to Western countries pre-Christmas period have time to return to Asia. “But this year, this effect may be weaker.” He said production is playing catch-up due to the pandemic, and many retailers are looking to restock their empty warehouses. German retailers such as notebooksbilliger.de could hardly deliver laptops before Christmas because their stocks were almost depleted.

Presumably, prices will not fall again until the second half of the year, according to experts such as Jensen and Tirschwell. From the point of view of mail-order company Otto, the higher freight rates affect the margins for different groups of goods very differently. For 20,000 T-shirts that fit in a container, a tripling of the transportation portion of the cost per item doesn’t make that much of a difference. However, if there are only a few pieces of a cheaply offered but chunky product in the container, it has a sensitive effect. And in a competitive market, such unexpected increases can hardly be passed on to the customers. Otto has booked freight capacities on a long-term basis itself – but that is no use if the shipping does not take place at all.

The cost of transporting a container load at a given point in time depends on supply and demand. Therefore, it is impossible to name a “current” price, but there is one for any point in the near future. The price determination takes place on corresponding exchanges, for example, the Baltic Exchange in London. The corresponding index FBX rose 38 percent in December alone and is currently at a new high of just over $4000 per forty-foot container. Values around $1300 are considered normal. The FBX calculates the average bid for 12 major routes. On the China-USA route, the index has already reached $4260, while in the reverse direction, it stands at $806.

  • Health
  • USA

Covid situation comes to a head

Streets and parks in Shijiazhuang are disinfected.

After Beijing’s Chinese schools were already closed this week, international schools will follow next week. The measure was decided after the British mutant of the coronavirus was discovered among about a dozen cases in Daxing, a district in south Beijing. This virus is considered much more contagious. The variant called B.1.1.7 was first found in England in September.

However, this is not the first time the British mutant has been discovered in China. Shanghai was already affected in December last year without a severe outbreak. There was another case in Guangdong province, also without severe consequences so far. On Jan. 5, Shenzhen-based genetics company BGI developed a test kit for the British mutant, which is now used in 26 countries worldwide.

Beijing sealed off due to British mutant

Nevertheless, Chinese authorities are very cautious. The relevant districts in Beijing have been sealed off. For over a week, people in Beijing have only been able to enter public buildings and restaurants if they take a temperature and register with a health app. Although masks are not mandatory outdoors, most people in Beijing are now wearing them again. Anyone who buys fever-reducing drugs from a pharmacy must register, and the pharmacy must report within two hours. The same applies to customers with suspicious symptoms.

Another measure by Beijing is the tracking of potentially infected people. People who have been in the same restaurant as a known Covid case, for example, are contacted and visited by a medical team, which conducts a Covid test and takes samples from their homes. A major car sales center was closed for two weeks after traces of the virus were found on spare parts in the workshop.

‘Overkill’ or ‘efficient strategy’

Meanwhile, the central government has called on cities nationwide to prepare for mass testing. Cities with less than five million people must each manage the tests within two days. Larger cities will be given three to five days, as was decided by the State Council. Positive tests must be passed on to the authorities within two hours. Of particular interest: Local authorities are now obliged to report cases immediately to the central government and to hold a public press conference to provide information on the latest status.

Since Wednesday, a large quarantine center has been under construction in Shijiazhuang, one of the cities already sealed off, to accommodate up to 4,000 patients. Nearly 3,500 people, additional medical personnel, have been ordered to the provincial capital. More than 1,200 were recruited from outside the province. About eleven million people live in the greater Shijiazhuang area. Food is distributed through supply stations and can be ordered online or offline through the neighborhood committee, which also organizes and maintains the lockdown in each apartment block. This eliminates the need for police patrols on a large scale. Quarantine refusers are – unlike in the West – a major exception.

Shijiazhuang is the capital of Hebei province, which surrounds China’s capital Beijing. The province has a population of around 75 million and reported 20 Covid cases yesterday.

The news agency Reuters calls the current measures of the Chinese an “organized overkill. Therese Hesketh, Professor of Global Health at University College London (UCL), on the other hand, calls the authorities’ actions “extremely efficient”. She observed developments on the ground from October to December last year. Reactions in Chinese social media are similar. The measures are criticized, but the consensus is that they are unpleasant but necessary to prevent worse. After about half a year of relative normalcy with no new Covid cases, confidence in the government’s measures is quite high and the population is less “lockdown-weary” than in Germany, for example.

Travel wave for the New Year

For the government, on the other hand, it is also a cost calculation. It considers the measures’ financial cost to be low compared to the costs that would arise if the economy had to be shut down again. Moreover, the Chinese provincial politicians certainly don’t want to be accused of not having done everything they could to get the situation under control. This is probably the main reason why, despite the few cases, they are reacting with such extreme measures.

This is because the upcoming Chinese New Year travel wave, in particular, poses an immense risk of spreading. Traditionally, around five billion individual trips are made in China during this time. Through the last-minute lockdown last year, the government managed to reduce the traveling wave to 1.5 billion trips. This year, the government expects significantly more travel, as it is discouraged but not banned.

  • Coronavirus
  • Domestic policy of the CP China
  • Health
  • Pharma
  • Travel

News

Beijing tightens investment rules

The timing has caused raised eyebrows: Practically in parallel with the conclusion of the investment agreement with the EU (CAI), China has tightened the rules for investments in its own country. In the new version, which has been in force since Jan. 18, the government in Beijing reserves the right to require approval for company takeovers in almost all sectors. Especially towards the EU, this course seems to contradict the spirit of the investment protection agreement. “The European business community is concerned about the broad scope of the new rules,” says Joerg Wuttke, President of the EU Chamber of Commerce in Beijing.

The so-called “Measures on National Security Review of Foreign Investment” only became public this week. Leading the charge – ahead of the Ministry of Commerce – was the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China’s economic policy center. The new law essentially summarizes several existing rules. None of the individual measures is completely new.

Investment law to protect national security

The law covers all investments that “will or may impact national security“. The regulation identifies several affected key sectors: agriculture, energy, machinery, transport, culture, IT and internet, finance “and any other major industry”. This means that pretty much the entire economy falls under expanded control. Both start-ups of subsidiaries and acquisitions of existing companies are affected. Investors must submit a request for review “on their own initiative”. A “working mechanism” will then decide within 15 days. According to lawyers, it will consist of a permanently convened commission. This commission can either approve or reject the investment. The basis of the regulation is the Foreign Investment Law of 2019.

The EU Chamber is primarily concerned about the lack of appeal possibilities. There is no administrative or legal process by which decisions on investment projects can be challenged. The law explicitly states that all decisions of the relevant committee are final. “This contradicts China’s declared goal of opening up and becoming more predictable,” says Wuttke.

China has gradually tightened the reins in the course of the trade war with the USA. Each provocation from Washington has been followed by a corresponding retaliation. It’s no coincidence that some of the new rule’s formulations resemble the wording with which the US wants to control economic actors from China in the future. Moreover, it has always been an unspoken fact that no takeovers are possible against the will of the Communist Party and its institutions. Experts thus do not see a change of course but, on the contrary, even a clarification of the existing situation. The lack of real reforms to make the country more attractive and open to investors is regrettable. fin

  • Domestic policy of the CP China
  • Investments
  • NDRC

Record for wind power – subsidies to fall in 2021

China’s National Energy Administration (NEA) has reported a new high in the installation of new wind turbines for 2020. In total, turbines with a capacity of 71.7 gigawatts were connected to the power grid. That’s triple the installed capacity of the previous year and double the previous record year of 2015, writes China Energy Portal. Forty-seven gigawatts of new wind turbines were installed in December 2020 alone. It is unclear if and how many not yet fully completed turbines have been pushed forward into 2020 to receive even higher government subsidies. For 2021, government subsidies for wind power will be cut by just over a quarter (24.3 percent) year-on-year to ¥2.31 billion (about €300 million). New onshore wind projects will also no longer receive subsidized feed-in tariffs in 2021.

China remains world champion in wind power

The cuts in wind power subsidies reflect China’s new approach to promoting renewable energies. Instead of flooding the established wind industry with subsidies, the government will increasingly rely on market mechanisms. An emissions trading system for the energy market will be launched at the beginning of February.

With the wind power capacity installed in 2020, China remains the world champion in the expansion of wind energy. Between 2014 and 1019, the country connected nearly 40 percent of the world’s wind power to the grid. At the same time, China is the largest consumer of coal and is home to half of the world’s coal-fired power capacity. In 2019, fossil fuels – coal, gas, and oil – still accounted for just over 72 percent of China’s electricity generation. In September last year, Xi Jinping announced that China aims to peak carbon emissions before 2030 and become carbon neutral before 2060. nib

  • Coal power
  • Emissions
  • Renewable energies

Tencent attacks Alibaba with mini shops

WeChat can already do (almost) everything, but it has not had its own shops so far. The Tencent group, which owns the universal communication app, now wants to close this gap – and could thus steal many smaller customers away from the trading platforms of competitor Alibaba. The service WeChat Mini Shop (Xiao Shangdian, 小商店) will move from the start-up phase to the regular operation phase soon. The goal is explicitly to “lower the threshold to enter trading activities on a small scale,” according to a page for developers.

In the city of Shijiazhuang, recently sealed off because of Covid, the authorities now want to use the new shop function of WeChat specifically to digitize small shops – so that citizens no longer have to go shopping outside. At the same time, reports of shopkeepers offering something online for the first time are piling up in China, for example, a 60-year-old optician from Guangzhou.

Tencent pushes into e-commerce

Currently, many small and micro sellers of goods bustle on the platform Taobao, which belongs to Alibaba. But WeChat stands out as much more user-friendly. Over a billion users have installed the app anyway, and have already opened payment channels. There are no other requirements for setting up your own shop. Moreover, many Chinese citizens prefer to work with their mobile phones over working on a PC.

The mini shops are a sub-application of WeChat’s mini-programs, which have created their own cosmos of commercial applications. However, Tencent has built on this, preparing an interface for merchants that no longer requires prior knowledge. Small merchants, in particular, should also be able to use their existing circle of friends for the advertisement of products.

Tencent had already made a foray into e-commerce before 2014 but merged the division with the activities of the large provider JD.com after a capital tie-up. For more complex product offerings, the mini shop providers can continue to refer to JD. Alibaba now has a 50 percent market share in China. In the course of this year, the market share of the mini shops should increase steadily. fin

  • Alibaba
  • Apps

Opinion

The EU must network more effectively

By Reinhard Buetikofer
Reinhard Bütikofer - Europa-Politiker mit einer klaren Sicht zur EU
European politician Reinhard Buetikofer (Greens), Chair of the European Parliament Delegation for Relations with China.

It is a truism that Europe needs to strengthen its role as a geopolitical and geoeconomic actor. But how it can achieve this is far less clear. This is where the strategic report on “Connectivity and EU-Asia relations” comes in, which the European Parliament adopted on Thursday by a very large majority (526 votes in favor, 43 against, 119 abstentions). The Chinese “Belt and Road Initiative” shook us up. But the ‘connectivity’ strategy is not simply a response to BRI, but a strategic perspective in its own right, which admittedly also benefits from the disappointment existing in many quarters about BRI.

MEPs call for more coherence between European foreign, development, trade, and security policies. Networking is actually in the EU‘s genes – but there has been little sign of it in external relations. The Parliament is thus making a series of “governance” proposals, which are about Brussels’ better coordination and European member states being on board. Civil society and business representatives must be involved, and, of course, the strategy needs enough money.

‘Belt and Road Initiative shook us up’

The starting point for our push was the document “Connecting Europe and Asia”, published by the EU Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) in September 2018. The paper never became popular, not even in Brussels. Connectivity needs a second breath. At its core, the paper was about physical infrastructure development: ‘bricks and mortar’. But we need to go further. To realize the basic idea of “strength through cooperation” in a contemporary way, more dimensions must play a role: digitization, for example, and contacts between people through exchange programs – priorities such as safety, health, and standardization. We must cooperate much more closely than before with partners who, like us, have an interest in ensuring that multilateralism is not stifled by great power politics. The strategy should be aligned with the EU’s overall objectives, such as the Green Deal, human rights and the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals.

Whereas the 2018 document focused primarily on Asia, the EU Parliament has a global strategy. It identifies a number of partners: A connectivity partnership already exists with Japan and negotiations are underway with India, soon to be at the summit level. We want a partnership with the African Union, if possible, by the end of 2021. Much hope rests on South Korea and Australia, and the EU adopted a joint declaration on connectivity with the Asean Community at the last ministerial meeting.

Partnership with the African Union

There is a greater interest in connectivity than Ursula von der Leyen’s EU Commission has realized so far. BusinessEurope, for example, places great emphasis on the topic in its China strategy. The 2019 connectivity conference organized by the Juncker force met with gigantic interest; 1400 participants came, a quarter being from Asia. But there is now to be a new conference in 2021, as the EU Commission has just confirmed. Among the EU member states, France, Germany and Poland have emerged as particularly interested. The current Portuguese EU presidency has a strong focus on digital connectivity and is about to inaugurate the “EllaLink” deep-sea cable for high data transport to and from South America, which incidentally was built with Nokia technology.

Simply put, the emphasis on what a global European connectivity strategy can achieve certainly also helps to ensure that Brussels, Berlin, and Paris do not get too carried away with autonomy narratives. For a geopolitical commission, for an EU that aspires to global politics, it is impossible to dispense with connectivity as a central pillar.

Reinhard Buetikofer has been a Green Member of the European Parliament since 2009. The 67-year-old is the Chair of the European Parliament Delegation for Relations with China and a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

  • Neue Seidenstraße

Dessert

The inauguration of the new US President Joe Biden is being eagerly watched in Hong Kong, too.

China.Table Editors

CHINA.TABLE EDITORIAL OFFICE

Licenses:
    • CAI – masterpiece of Chinese negotiation
    • Container shortage leads to empty container repositioning
    • Covid situation comes to a head
    • Beijing tightens investment rules
    • Record for wind energy
    • Tencent attacks Alibaba with mini shops
    • Reinhard Buetikofer: networking – more than an answer to the BRI
    Dear reader,

    It’s just a moment, a single sentence on this Thursday, but words can trigger a lot in diplomacy. I believe that with joint efforts of both sides, the ‘better angels’ in China-US relations will be able to overcome evil forces,” says Beijing’s foreign office spokeswoman Hua Chunying, congratulating Joe Biden on taking office. May relations between America and China now get “back on the right track”.

    Are these new tones even conciliatory? Hardly. The world powers won’t back down in the clash of interests. Biden has long since made it clear that he has no intention of reversing his predecessor’s China policy. And Beijing managed to inflame relations with threats of sanctions against Trump’s Secretary of State Mike Pompeo just seconds after the new US president swore his hand on the Bible in front of the Capitol on Wednesday.

    Ursula von der Leyen promised EU parliamentarians nothing less than “the highest level” of transparency at the beginning of her term in office – especially regarding trade issues. That is exactly what the EU-China investment agreement (CAI) is all about.

    But von der Leyen’s Commission lacks nothing as much as – transparency. For three weeks, MEPs (and not only them) have been waiting for the agreement text. They would have liked to assess who pulled whom across the negotiating table and what China actually promised the Europeans. The paper will be published on Friday, as Amelie Richter and Marcel Grzanna write. But there will be little to evaluate. Because of all things, the detailed “annexes” that the experts are waiting for will probably be missing.

    We know that China (like other Asian countries) doesn’t give the coronavirus a chance and locks down entire cities at the slightest sign. Frank Sieren travels to Beijing and Shijiazhuang to investigate the price those affected by this strategy have to pay – especially now, before the wave of travel for the New Year.

    Your
    Antje Sirleschtov
    Image of Antje  Sirleschtov

    Feature

    Masterpiece of Chinese negotiation

    The Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) bears the stamp of Chinese negotiation skills. Beijing is thus greatly satisfied. The official reading there is “balanced, high-quality, mutually beneficial and win-win,” which has been quoted by party officials and state media like a prayer mill for days. And in Europe? Many observers doubt a win-win. It is true that the improved conditions for market access for European companies in China are seen as positive in principle. But numerous shortcomings of the deal provoke bitter smiles and criticism in Europe.

    In the course of today, the text of the agreement is to be presented to the public for the first time – or at least parts of it. Brussels observers expect that the EU Commission will not publish the relevant annexes for the time being. However, the so-called annexes contain crucial details about the agreements. The “legal scrubbing” of the entire text is currently in progress: During this formal legal examination of the paper, formulations can still be changed. Representatives of the European Parliament, in particular, are pressing for the annexes to be published and translated promptly.

    EU Parliament: ‘hasty conclusion’

    The first signs that the CAI will not have an easy time in the EU Parliament – which must approve the deal – were already apparent during the Parliament’s first week of sessions following the agreement in principle between Brussels and Beijing. In a cross-party resolution on China’s actions in Hong Kong, MEPs deplored a “hasty conclusion” in the deal and that it did not adequately reflect the problematic human rights situation in Hong Kong, Xinjiang province and Tibet. “The EU risks its credibility as a global human rights actor,” said the paragraph attached to the resolution later this week. EU Commissioner for Equality Helena Dalli announced during Thursday’s debate on Hong Kong in plenary that the issue would also be on the agenda of the EU foreign ministers meeting next Monday.

    And in the European Parliament, the last word has not yet been spoken: As soon as the finalized treaty texts are available in the committees of the EU Parliament, the parliamentarians will closely examine what control and sanction mechanisms are in place so that “China’s commitments actually lead to an improvement in the living conditions” of workers in the country, the China delegation’s Vice-Chair of the European Parliament, Evelyne Gebhardt, told China.Table. “Cooperation yes, but not at all costs,” the SPD politician stressed. According to participants, there was also mostly criticism of the agreement in the closed group meetings of the political groups of the EU Parliament.

    ‘Bad deal is better than no deal’

    The agreement is the result of a seven-year tug-of-war, during which the Chinese skilfully played their trump cards to emerge as the winners from the negotiations. Noah Barkin of the German Marshall Fund, an independent US foundation that promotes transatlantic relations, speaks of the “biggest Christmas present” to Beijing.

    “Positive on the one hand, disappointing in other aspects,” business circles say. There is more market access in sectors such as telecommunications, health and biotechnology, and the promise of more transparent support for state-owned companies in China in the future. But Europeans will still not be allowed to participate in public tenders, intellectual property will not be better protected than before, and the statements on the protection of workers in China are more than vague. In addition, some concessions for market access in industries such as electromobility or financial industry are not new but old commitments that have merely been repackaged.

    “A bad deal is better than no deal. Let the critics put themselves in that trench for once when it comes to negotiating with the Chinese,” says an industry representative who has followed the negotiations throughout. The trench is emblematic of the great challenge of negotiating with China, which has navigated robustly through the Covid year economically. The People’s Republic was the only major global economy to report a growing economy.

    Beijing’s advantage: unity

    In 2008, the Taiwanese negotiation researcher Liu Birong published a guidebook entitled “The High School of Martial Arts in Business Negotiations.” The work was translated into German by sinologist Florian Mehring. “The Chinese side has shown great unity in negotiations with the Europeans, giving it a decisive advantage,” Mehring says. While Europe was under pressure to take into account many interests from its own ranks, China’s leadership was able to pursue its interests in a unified manner.

    With concessions, some of which are likely to prove less painful for China, the Chinese, for their part, persuaded the Europeans to set the stage for a geostrategic success. Despite vocal criticism of China’s behavior during the Covid-19 outbreak, the introduction of the National Security Act in Hong Kong, and the detention of hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs in so-called re-education camps, Beijing strengthened its position as a global economic power even before the United States under its new president, Joe Biden, could have intervened. The conclusion of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment was the icing on the cake for Beijing, where the conclusion of the Pacific free trade agreement RCEP with numerous Western allies could already be celebrated as a stage victory.

    “In such negotiations, China presents itself with the self-confidence of a country that says to itself, ‘Now it’s our turn,’” says negotiation researcher Mehring. The century of humiliation, starting with the Opium Wars in the 19th century and ending with World War 2, followed by a decades-long role as a marginal figure in world economic chess, is ingrained in China’s DNA. “Chinese people are vindictive. They haven’t forgotten the past. After these experiences, they are extremely distrustful,” Mehring said.

    Nevertheless, in such negotiations, the Chinese would avoid humiliating their counterpart at all costs. The negotiating partner should also have something in his hand to cling to, even if it is less than the negotiator is claiming for himself.

    However, it can also be assumed that Beijing has by no means played all its trump cards. One of them is particularly worrying for the Europeans. Since Monday, new rules for foreign investments have been in effect in the People’s Republic. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) reserves the right to examine all investments for their compatibility with national security. Similar mechanisms exist elsewhere in the world. They also exist in Germany, where the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs has banned one Chinese investment since 2012, and a handful of other Chinese interested parties have withdrawn. Nevertheless, observers in Europe fear that the new rules will devalue hard-won concessions under the investment protection agreement. Marcel Grzanna/Amelie Richter

    • Car Industry
    • Electromobility
    • Menschenrechte

    Container shortage leads to empty container repositioning

    There is a shortage of containers in China’s ports – with considerable consequences for German trade. “The situation will lead to enormous economic damage for some importers,” says Guido Hogenkamp from the German import and export company in Bocholt (DIG). Among other things, the company imports garden furniture and kitchen appliances from the Far East. Like any scarce commodity, transport capacity from China to Europe now becomes more expensive. “Not everyone can afford a five-fold increase in freight rates,” says Hogenkamp.

    The shipping lines know the background of the container shortage and the rising freight prices. Niklas Ohling, Head of Container Steering at shipping line Hapag-Lloyd in Hamburg, sees the cause in the massive increase in global demand for goods from Asia. The shipping line had even allowed numerous ships to sail without cargo to “evacuate” unused containers from the USA and position them in Asia” – despite the enormous costs that such empty container repositioning incurs.

    The mail-order company Otto sees even more reasons for the global container imbalance. According to the Hamburg-based company’s logistics department, the dilemma began after the Chinese New Year in 2020. The coronavirus had China in its grip, with workers not returning to factories and loading points. As a result, container ships were delayed by many weeks. Shortly after that, a boom in demand from Western countries began. British traders stocked up on goods just before Brexit. In Germany, retail sales rose by a good five percent in the Covid year: People equipped themselves for the home office, refurnished their apartments, and generally treated themselves to more orders during the lockdown.

    Bottlenecks due to unused containers

    The US also saw high demand for goods from China. “We’ve seen a 20 to 30 percent increase in the flow of goods into the US in each of the months of fall,” said Peter Tirschwell, Head of Shipping and Trade Research at analyst firm IHS Markit. “A lot of containers are now sitting around unused.” They are scattered across the country in logistics centers waiting for onward transport, but that fails to materialize. “There are additional bottlenecks due to high sick leave and stricter hygiene measures,” Tirschwell says. “Loading and unloading are not going as fast as usual.”

    This leads to delays, notes Lars Jensen, founder of the Copenhagen-based industry observer SeaIntelligence. As a result, he says, there were about half a million fewer standard containers than usual in Asia in mid-December. “An aggressive repatriation strategy and new orders should have resulted in the inventory returning to normal by the end of January,” Jensen says. However, he said, as demand for goods remains high, the imbalance could increase to one million containers. While exact data on this won’t become available until March, he said, it currently looks like the balance is still waiting. Ohling of Hapag-Lloyd also believes that “the situation will probably continue for the first few months of the year.”

    Covid cargo crunch

    Economist Serena Zhou of the financial house Mizuho Securities in Hong Kong even sees container shortages as the current ceiling for Chinese exports, which contribute a decent part to the country’s growth. No wonder the global industry association World Shipping Council promises, “Our ocean liners are fighting the Covid cargo shortage.” It says to resolve the “unprecedented supply chain disruptions,” the industry is pulling out all the stops. Shipowners are already sharing ships across competitive borders to fill capacity. The catchy phrase “Covid cargo crunch” is already circulating.

    The next milestone for the industry is the Chinese New Year 2021 on Feb. 12. “Usually, the demand for containers decreases again,” says Ohling. China takes a two-week break in its holiday season, with factories at a standstill. Exports drop accordingly. Containers that migrated to Western countries pre-Christmas period have time to return to Asia. “But this year, this effect may be weaker.” He said production is playing catch-up due to the pandemic, and many retailers are looking to restock their empty warehouses. German retailers such as notebooksbilliger.de could hardly deliver laptops before Christmas because their stocks were almost depleted.

    Presumably, prices will not fall again until the second half of the year, according to experts such as Jensen and Tirschwell. From the point of view of mail-order company Otto, the higher freight rates affect the margins for different groups of goods very differently. For 20,000 T-shirts that fit in a container, a tripling of the transportation portion of the cost per item doesn’t make that much of a difference. However, if there are only a few pieces of a cheaply offered but chunky product in the container, it has a sensitive effect. And in a competitive market, such unexpected increases can hardly be passed on to the customers. Otto has booked freight capacities on a long-term basis itself – but that is no use if the shipping does not take place at all.

    The cost of transporting a container load at a given point in time depends on supply and demand. Therefore, it is impossible to name a “current” price, but there is one for any point in the near future. The price determination takes place on corresponding exchanges, for example, the Baltic Exchange in London. The corresponding index FBX rose 38 percent in December alone and is currently at a new high of just over $4000 per forty-foot container. Values around $1300 are considered normal. The FBX calculates the average bid for 12 major routes. On the China-USA route, the index has already reached $4260, while in the reverse direction, it stands at $806.

    • Health
    • USA

    Covid situation comes to a head

    Streets and parks in Shijiazhuang are disinfected.

    After Beijing’s Chinese schools were already closed this week, international schools will follow next week. The measure was decided after the British mutant of the coronavirus was discovered among about a dozen cases in Daxing, a district in south Beijing. This virus is considered much more contagious. The variant called B.1.1.7 was first found in England in September.

    However, this is not the first time the British mutant has been discovered in China. Shanghai was already affected in December last year without a severe outbreak. There was another case in Guangdong province, also without severe consequences so far. On Jan. 5, Shenzhen-based genetics company BGI developed a test kit for the British mutant, which is now used in 26 countries worldwide.

    Beijing sealed off due to British mutant

    Nevertheless, Chinese authorities are very cautious. The relevant districts in Beijing have been sealed off. For over a week, people in Beijing have only been able to enter public buildings and restaurants if they take a temperature and register with a health app. Although masks are not mandatory outdoors, most people in Beijing are now wearing them again. Anyone who buys fever-reducing drugs from a pharmacy must register, and the pharmacy must report within two hours. The same applies to customers with suspicious symptoms.

    Another measure by Beijing is the tracking of potentially infected people. People who have been in the same restaurant as a known Covid case, for example, are contacted and visited by a medical team, which conducts a Covid test and takes samples from their homes. A major car sales center was closed for two weeks after traces of the virus were found on spare parts in the workshop.

    ‘Overkill’ or ‘efficient strategy’

    Meanwhile, the central government has called on cities nationwide to prepare for mass testing. Cities with less than five million people must each manage the tests within two days. Larger cities will be given three to five days, as was decided by the State Council. Positive tests must be passed on to the authorities within two hours. Of particular interest: Local authorities are now obliged to report cases immediately to the central government and to hold a public press conference to provide information on the latest status.

    Since Wednesday, a large quarantine center has been under construction in Shijiazhuang, one of the cities already sealed off, to accommodate up to 4,000 patients. Nearly 3,500 people, additional medical personnel, have been ordered to the provincial capital. More than 1,200 were recruited from outside the province. About eleven million people live in the greater Shijiazhuang area. Food is distributed through supply stations and can be ordered online or offline through the neighborhood committee, which also organizes and maintains the lockdown in each apartment block. This eliminates the need for police patrols on a large scale. Quarantine refusers are – unlike in the West – a major exception.

    Shijiazhuang is the capital of Hebei province, which surrounds China’s capital Beijing. The province has a population of around 75 million and reported 20 Covid cases yesterday.

    The news agency Reuters calls the current measures of the Chinese an “organized overkill. Therese Hesketh, Professor of Global Health at University College London (UCL), on the other hand, calls the authorities’ actions “extremely efficient”. She observed developments on the ground from October to December last year. Reactions in Chinese social media are similar. The measures are criticized, but the consensus is that they are unpleasant but necessary to prevent worse. After about half a year of relative normalcy with no new Covid cases, confidence in the government’s measures is quite high and the population is less “lockdown-weary” than in Germany, for example.

    Travel wave for the New Year

    For the government, on the other hand, it is also a cost calculation. It considers the measures’ financial cost to be low compared to the costs that would arise if the economy had to be shut down again. Moreover, the Chinese provincial politicians certainly don’t want to be accused of not having done everything they could to get the situation under control. This is probably the main reason why, despite the few cases, they are reacting with such extreme measures.

    This is because the upcoming Chinese New Year travel wave, in particular, poses an immense risk of spreading. Traditionally, around five billion individual trips are made in China during this time. Through the last-minute lockdown last year, the government managed to reduce the traveling wave to 1.5 billion trips. This year, the government expects significantly more travel, as it is discouraged but not banned.

    • Coronavirus
    • Domestic policy of the CP China
    • Health
    • Pharma
    • Travel

    News

    Beijing tightens investment rules

    The timing has caused raised eyebrows: Practically in parallel with the conclusion of the investment agreement with the EU (CAI), China has tightened the rules for investments in its own country. In the new version, which has been in force since Jan. 18, the government in Beijing reserves the right to require approval for company takeovers in almost all sectors. Especially towards the EU, this course seems to contradict the spirit of the investment protection agreement. “The European business community is concerned about the broad scope of the new rules,” says Joerg Wuttke, President of the EU Chamber of Commerce in Beijing.

    The so-called “Measures on National Security Review of Foreign Investment” only became public this week. Leading the charge – ahead of the Ministry of Commerce – was the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China’s economic policy center. The new law essentially summarizes several existing rules. None of the individual measures is completely new.

    Investment law to protect national security

    The law covers all investments that “will or may impact national security“. The regulation identifies several affected key sectors: agriculture, energy, machinery, transport, culture, IT and internet, finance “and any other major industry”. This means that pretty much the entire economy falls under expanded control. Both start-ups of subsidiaries and acquisitions of existing companies are affected. Investors must submit a request for review “on their own initiative”. A “working mechanism” will then decide within 15 days. According to lawyers, it will consist of a permanently convened commission. This commission can either approve or reject the investment. The basis of the regulation is the Foreign Investment Law of 2019.

    The EU Chamber is primarily concerned about the lack of appeal possibilities. There is no administrative or legal process by which decisions on investment projects can be challenged. The law explicitly states that all decisions of the relevant committee are final. “This contradicts China’s declared goal of opening up and becoming more predictable,” says Wuttke.

    China has gradually tightened the reins in the course of the trade war with the USA. Each provocation from Washington has been followed by a corresponding retaliation. It’s no coincidence that some of the new rule’s formulations resemble the wording with which the US wants to control economic actors from China in the future. Moreover, it has always been an unspoken fact that no takeovers are possible against the will of the Communist Party and its institutions. Experts thus do not see a change of course but, on the contrary, even a clarification of the existing situation. The lack of real reforms to make the country more attractive and open to investors is regrettable. fin

    • Domestic policy of the CP China
    • Investments
    • NDRC

    Record for wind power – subsidies to fall in 2021

    China’s National Energy Administration (NEA) has reported a new high in the installation of new wind turbines for 2020. In total, turbines with a capacity of 71.7 gigawatts were connected to the power grid. That’s triple the installed capacity of the previous year and double the previous record year of 2015, writes China Energy Portal. Forty-seven gigawatts of new wind turbines were installed in December 2020 alone. It is unclear if and how many not yet fully completed turbines have been pushed forward into 2020 to receive even higher government subsidies. For 2021, government subsidies for wind power will be cut by just over a quarter (24.3 percent) year-on-year to ¥2.31 billion (about €300 million). New onshore wind projects will also no longer receive subsidized feed-in tariffs in 2021.

    China remains world champion in wind power

    The cuts in wind power subsidies reflect China’s new approach to promoting renewable energies. Instead of flooding the established wind industry with subsidies, the government will increasingly rely on market mechanisms. An emissions trading system for the energy market will be launched at the beginning of February.

    With the wind power capacity installed in 2020, China remains the world champion in the expansion of wind energy. Between 2014 and 1019, the country connected nearly 40 percent of the world’s wind power to the grid. At the same time, China is the largest consumer of coal and is home to half of the world’s coal-fired power capacity. In 2019, fossil fuels – coal, gas, and oil – still accounted for just over 72 percent of China’s electricity generation. In September last year, Xi Jinping announced that China aims to peak carbon emissions before 2030 and become carbon neutral before 2060. nib

    • Coal power
    • Emissions
    • Renewable energies

    Tencent attacks Alibaba with mini shops

    WeChat can already do (almost) everything, but it has not had its own shops so far. The Tencent group, which owns the universal communication app, now wants to close this gap – and could thus steal many smaller customers away from the trading platforms of competitor Alibaba. The service WeChat Mini Shop (Xiao Shangdian, 小商店) will move from the start-up phase to the regular operation phase soon. The goal is explicitly to “lower the threshold to enter trading activities on a small scale,” according to a page for developers.

    In the city of Shijiazhuang, recently sealed off because of Covid, the authorities now want to use the new shop function of WeChat specifically to digitize small shops – so that citizens no longer have to go shopping outside. At the same time, reports of shopkeepers offering something online for the first time are piling up in China, for example, a 60-year-old optician from Guangzhou.

    Tencent pushes into e-commerce

    Currently, many small and micro sellers of goods bustle on the platform Taobao, which belongs to Alibaba. But WeChat stands out as much more user-friendly. Over a billion users have installed the app anyway, and have already opened payment channels. There are no other requirements for setting up your own shop. Moreover, many Chinese citizens prefer to work with their mobile phones over working on a PC.

    The mini shops are a sub-application of WeChat’s mini-programs, which have created their own cosmos of commercial applications. However, Tencent has built on this, preparing an interface for merchants that no longer requires prior knowledge. Small merchants, in particular, should also be able to use their existing circle of friends for the advertisement of products.

    Tencent had already made a foray into e-commerce before 2014 but merged the division with the activities of the large provider JD.com after a capital tie-up. For more complex product offerings, the mini shop providers can continue to refer to JD. Alibaba now has a 50 percent market share in China. In the course of this year, the market share of the mini shops should increase steadily. fin

    • Alibaba
    • Apps

    Opinion

    The EU must network more effectively

    By Reinhard Buetikofer
    Reinhard Bütikofer - Europa-Politiker mit einer klaren Sicht zur EU
    European politician Reinhard Buetikofer (Greens), Chair of the European Parliament Delegation for Relations with China.

    It is a truism that Europe needs to strengthen its role as a geopolitical and geoeconomic actor. But how it can achieve this is far less clear. This is where the strategic report on “Connectivity and EU-Asia relations” comes in, which the European Parliament adopted on Thursday by a very large majority (526 votes in favor, 43 against, 119 abstentions). The Chinese “Belt and Road Initiative” shook us up. But the ‘connectivity’ strategy is not simply a response to BRI, but a strategic perspective in its own right, which admittedly also benefits from the disappointment existing in many quarters about BRI.

    MEPs call for more coherence between European foreign, development, trade, and security policies. Networking is actually in the EU‘s genes – but there has been little sign of it in external relations. The Parliament is thus making a series of “governance” proposals, which are about Brussels’ better coordination and European member states being on board. Civil society and business representatives must be involved, and, of course, the strategy needs enough money.

    ‘Belt and Road Initiative shook us up’

    The starting point for our push was the document “Connecting Europe and Asia”, published by the EU Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) in September 2018. The paper never became popular, not even in Brussels. Connectivity needs a second breath. At its core, the paper was about physical infrastructure development: ‘bricks and mortar’. But we need to go further. To realize the basic idea of “strength through cooperation” in a contemporary way, more dimensions must play a role: digitization, for example, and contacts between people through exchange programs – priorities such as safety, health, and standardization. We must cooperate much more closely than before with partners who, like us, have an interest in ensuring that multilateralism is not stifled by great power politics. The strategy should be aligned with the EU’s overall objectives, such as the Green Deal, human rights and the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals.

    Whereas the 2018 document focused primarily on Asia, the EU Parliament has a global strategy. It identifies a number of partners: A connectivity partnership already exists with Japan and negotiations are underway with India, soon to be at the summit level. We want a partnership with the African Union, if possible, by the end of 2021. Much hope rests on South Korea and Australia, and the EU adopted a joint declaration on connectivity with the Asean Community at the last ministerial meeting.

    Partnership with the African Union

    There is a greater interest in connectivity than Ursula von der Leyen’s EU Commission has realized so far. BusinessEurope, for example, places great emphasis on the topic in its China strategy. The 2019 connectivity conference organized by the Juncker force met with gigantic interest; 1400 participants came, a quarter being from Asia. But there is now to be a new conference in 2021, as the EU Commission has just confirmed. Among the EU member states, France, Germany and Poland have emerged as particularly interested. The current Portuguese EU presidency has a strong focus on digital connectivity and is about to inaugurate the “EllaLink” deep-sea cable for high data transport to and from South America, which incidentally was built with Nokia technology.

    Simply put, the emphasis on what a global European connectivity strategy can achieve certainly also helps to ensure that Brussels, Berlin, and Paris do not get too carried away with autonomy narratives. For a geopolitical commission, for an EU that aspires to global politics, it is impossible to dispense with connectivity as a central pillar.

    Reinhard Buetikofer has been a Green Member of the European Parliament since 2009. The 67-year-old is the Chair of the European Parliament Delegation for Relations with China and a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

    • Neue Seidenstraße

    Dessert

    The inauguration of the new US President Joe Biden is being eagerly watched in Hong Kong, too.

    China.Table Editors

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