Mere days after the EU announced extra tariffs on Chinese electric cars, the People’s Republic retaliated as expected: China launched an anti-dumping investigation into European pork and its by-products, Amelie Richter reports.
The move is neither surprising nor should it scare the Europeans. Rattling is part of the trade, and in the end, Beijing has to follow up its pithy threats with action. The fact that the pork industry is targeted first and not the car industry is certainly a calculated decision. This will only add to the chorus of those ranting against tariffs on Chinese imports.
But China doesn’t want a trade war. That much is certain. Instead, the country is creating some negotiating leverage so that it can work with the EU on a pragmatic solution that benefits everyone.
Meanwhile, two unusual heads of state will meet today: Russian President Vladimir Putin will visit Kim Jong-un in North Korea. Putin and Kim are both considered international pariahs in many countries. However, it seems that this rejection is uniting them.
China will closely monitor the rapprochement between Russia and North Korea. So far, Beijing has been Pyongyang’s number-one partner. Could China now risk losing influence over the Kim regime? To some extent, inevitably. But Beijing could benefit from a new division of labor between North Korea, Russia and China – and ultimately even hit the USA. Michael Radunski summarizes why.
Just a few days after the EU announced its extra tariffs on Chinese EVs, the People’s Republic retaliated as expected: China launched an anti-dumping investigation into European pork and its by-products. As the Chinese Ministry of Commerce announced on Monday (17 June), the investigation has been ongoing since Monday.
The investigation aims to:
The products examined include:
The Ministry of Commerce said the investigation was triggered by a complaint from the Chinese state-owned enterprise China Animal Husbandry Association (CAHIC) on 6 June. Last week, the ministry once again called on domestic industries to request investigations into imports if necessary in order to “protect their own legitimate rights and interests.”
Beijing wants to avoid the impression that the investigations are politically motivated. China accuses the EU Commission of doing exactly this, which launched the anti-subsidy investigation into EVs without any initiative from the industry.
CAHIC is the livestock breeding branch of the China National Agricultural Development Group Corporation. However, the agricultural group reports directly to the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC).
The EU reacted relaxed on Monday. A spokesperson for the European Commission stated that Brussels was not concerned about the opening of the investigation. He said the EU would intervene appropriately to ensure the investigation complied with all relevant World Trade Organisation rules.
However, concerned voices were heard from the affected member states: Spain called for negotiations to avoid tariffs on its pork exports to China. Spanish Agriculture Minister Luis Planas hoped there was “room for an understanding.” Economy Minister Carlos Cuerpo said Spain and the EU were working to find a balance to avoid a trade war while protecting its products from unfair trade practices. “We are already working through the European Union to find solutions that will provide a way forward without damaging the sector,” said Cuerpo in Santander.
While pork products exported to China, including stomachs, intestines, snouts and ears, are hardly consumed in Europe, they are very popular in China. According to the industry association Interporc, Spain sold around 560,000 tons of pork products worth 1.2 billion euros to China last year. With a share of around 21 percent of total imports, Spain is China’s biggest supplier of pork products, ahead of the USA (around 16 percent), Brazil (around 16 percent), the Netherlands (nine percent), Canada (nine percent) and Denmark (around nine percent).
Ulrik Bremholm, chairman of the Danish industry association Danske Slagterier, called on all parties to consider the impact on jobs, food safety and production and to find a negotiated solution with China. The Danish pork industry “will be hit incredibly hard by potential Chinese restrictions on European meat,” Bremholm told Reuters.
China banned German pork imports in 2020 after swine fever was detected in the country. Germany’s largest meat processor, Toennies, expects pork prices to fall if exporters such as Spain were to seek new markets for lost Chinese sales, which would lead to a “painful loss of income” in Germany as well. “If EU exporters, particularly Spain, cannot sell pork to China, some sales would have to be made within Europe and downward pressure on EU pork prices can be expected,” Toennies spokesperson Thomas Dosch told Reuters.
France recently negotiated a new pork deal during China’s President Xi Jinping’s visit. French pork exports are expected to increase by ten percent. If China looks for alternative suppliers outside the EU, South America could benefit from the extra tariffs on European products.
The state-run newspaper Global Times has already had several insiders and experts announce in reports that the European agricultural and aviation industries could be the focus of Chinese investigations. In addition to meat imports, dairy products and cars with larger combustion engines could also be targeted. China already launched an anti-dumping investigation into brandy in January. This was seen as a clear signal to France, which had campaigned particularly strongly for car tariffs at the EU level. The investigation is still ongoing.
German Economics Minister Robert Habeck (Green Party) will travel to China at the end of this week for a visit lasting several days. Regarding trade disputes with Beijing, his ministry referred to the responsibility of the EU Commission. However, Habeck “will of course (…) not be able to avoid addressing this issue,” his spokesperson said. The German government hopes that “solutions” can still be found on the matter of car tariffs.
This Tuesday, two unusual heads of state will meet: Russian President Vladimir Putin will visit Kim Jong-un in North Korea. Putin and Kim are regarded internationally as pariahs in many countries. However, it seems that this rejection unites them.
China will closely monitor the rapprochement between Russia and North Korea. So far, Beijing has been Pyongyang’s main partner. Could China now risk losing influence over the Kim regime? To some extent, inevitably. But Beijing could benefit from a new division of labor between North Korea, Russia and China – and ultimately even hit the USA.
It is the second meeting between Putin and Kim in just nine months – and shows how much the two countries have deepened their military relations since Russia invaded Ukraine. After all, Putin needs North Korean weapons for this campaign. Both North Korea and Russia have denied allegations of arms shipments, which would constitute a violation of several UN Security Council resolutions.
In March, South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik reported that North Korea had delivered around 7,000 containers of ammunition and other military equipment to Russia. Alongside ammunition, this includes artillery, missiles and other conventional weapons. In return, Shin said North Korea had received more than 9,000 Russian containers, presumably containing aid supplies.
Some observers even refer to North Korea as a “lifeline” for Putin – at least when it comes to weapon shipments. However, calling it Putin’s “lifeline” is not quite accurate. Russia has plenty to offer North Korea. Because in return for its support, Pyongyang apparently receives
North Korea’s space program is a top priority for Kim Jong-un. In September last year, he and Putin visited the Russian Vostochny Space Center. The aim is to put satellites into orbit that would help guide nuclear-powered ballistic missiles and track “hostile activities” in the event of a future regional conflict. Citing intelligence information, South Korea recently stated that Moscow is already supporting Pyongyang in its efforts to advance its satellite launches.
At any rate, Kim sent a telling congratulatory message to Moscow last week to mark Russia’s national holiday. “Thanks to the significant meeting between us at the Vostochny Spaceport in September last year, (North Korea)-Russia friendly and cooperative relations developed into an unbreakable relationship of comrades-in-arms,” Kim said in the message.
There are also geopolitical considerations. “Beyond reciprocity, Russia views North Korea as an important hedge against Western influence in the Pacific, so a North Korea with better space capabilities fits into Russia’s strategy well,” Ben Dubow, from the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), told Newsweek.
However, it is not only the West that monitors the rapprochement between Russia and North Korea. China is also keeping a close eye on what is happening between its two neighbors. After all, China is essentially North Korea’s main ally. It is a complicated relationship. North Korean missile tests and other provocations are by no means in the interests of Chinese ruler Xi Jinping. But it is also clear that China is the Kim regime’s life insurance.
Should Russia now gain influence, this could be to China’s detriment. Kim could certainly use Russia as a bit of leverage to gain more concessions, more aid shipments or simply more leniency from Xi Jinping. It would be Kim’s Russia card vis-à-vis China.
According to the renowned North Korea expert Chad O’Carroll from the think tank NK Pro in Seoul, the kind of military cooperation and diplomatic support between Russia and North Korea today would have been unthinkable a decade ago. He says that China’s enormous disinterest in enforcing sanctions and the increasing acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear status have also materialized surprisingly quickly.
In fact, North Korea appears more self-confident on the international stage and more unpredictable than ever before. O’Carroll’s statement: “North Korea is emboldened by the protection of Russia and China in the UN Security Council and geopolitical crises elsewhere.”
Joel Atkinson, Professor of China Studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul, told Table.Briefings: “All three sides support the new division of labor.” China supplies Russia with what it needs to keep its war economy running. However, when it comes to direct arms deliveries, Atkinson sees a red line that Beijing is not (yet) prepared to cross. He believe China is too afraid of a strong, joint reaction from Europe and the US.
“That’s why North Korea – which, unlike China, has no trade to lose with the West and does not want to present itself in international politics as a peace mediator or Europe’s favored partner – is now taking on the role of arms supplier,” Atkinson told Table.Briefings.
North Korea, Russia, and China would all benefit from this division of labor. After all, all three countries agree on one thing – and are very open about it: They reject a Western-dominated world order under the aegis of the United States.
David Merkle – Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Consultant China
David Merkle works at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation as a China consultant. Based in Berlin, he coordinates the KAS’s work on China and also keeps an eye on the global debate with Beijing. Merkle previously worked for the KAS in Shanghai from 2013 to 2016. In 2022, he spent four months as a Visiting Fellow at the National Chung Hsing University in Taiwan. Merkle studied East Asian Studies, focusing on Greater China and politics in Bochum and Tuebingen, combined with stints abroad in Shanghai and Taipei. In addition to his work, dealing with his own visa matters. He will soon be heading back to China.
Johann Fuhrmann – Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Head of Beijing Office
Johann Fuhrmann has headed the Konrad Adenauer Foundation’s China office in Beijing since July 2021, having previously held the same position for the KAS in Mongolia. In March 2021, he was awarded the Polar Star, Mongolia’s highest order of merit for foreign citizens, for his commitment to German-Mongolian relations. Fuhrmann holds a Master’s in International Relations from the London School of Economics.
Nora Mueller – Koerber Foundation, Head of International Policy
Nora Müller has been Head of International Politics and the Berlin Office of the Koerber Foundation since 2015. On the advisory board, she coordinates the work project on public communication and civil crisis prevention. She is also a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Previously, Mueller worked in the Middle East Department of the German Federal Foreign Office and at the Goethe Institute. She holds a Master’s degree in European Studies.
Cora Jungbluth – Bertelsmann Foundation, Senior Expert China and Asia-Pacific
Cora Francisca Jungbluth is a senior expert for China and Asia-Pacific at the Bertelsmann Foundation. Her research focuses on foreign direct investment and international trade. Previously, she worked as a lecturer at the Institute for China Studies at the University of Freiburg. Cora Jungbluth studied sinology and economics at Heidelberg University, Shanghai International Studies University and Tsinghua University, Beijing. She holds a PhD in Chinese Studies from the University of Heidelberg.
Christian Straube – Stiftung Mercator GmbH, Project Manager
Christian Straube is a project manager in the Europe in the World division of Stiftung Mercator and is responsible for the China portfolio. Before that, he worked as a program manager in the China program of Stiftung Asienhaus. Straube studied modern sinology, economics and South Asian politics in Heidelberg and Beijing. His motivation: Strengthening China expertise in Europe and promoting awareness of Chinese society among political decision-makers.
Sergio Grassi – Director of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) in Beijing
Sergio Grassi studied economics and sinology in Berlin and Beijing. Based in Jakarta, he was responsible for the Friedrich Ebert Foundation’s (FES) country projects in Indonesia and Malaysia for six years until summer 2021. Prior to that, he worked at the Berlin headquarters in the Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa departments. In 2022, he was appointed Head of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Beijing. Here, the sinologist wants to build on a basis of respectful understanding – even if there are many different views to bridge.
Benjamin Reichenbach – Head of the Shanghai Office at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES)
Benjamin Reichenbach has headed the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) Shanghai office since 2023. Previously, he worked as a Desk Officer for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India in Berlin for six years. From 2013 to 2016, he headed the FES office in Venezuela and, before that, worked for two years as a project assistant in the FES office in Mexico. He began his career as a postgraduate researcher at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability and gained experience at the German Development Cooperation (GIZ) and the European Parliament.
Debora Tydecks-Zhou – Representative of the Hanns-Seidel Foundation (HSS) in Beijing
Debora Tydecks-Zhou has been the representative of the Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSS) in Beijing since February 2023. Previously, she was head of the Northeast and Central Asia department in Munich and coordinated projects in Myanmar, India and Vietnam. The regional scientist specializing in Southeast Asia began her career at the German Development Cooperation (GIZ) GmbH in Indonesia and gained further experience in various positions, including at the Museum of World Cultures in Frankfurt and the DGB Bildungswerk BUND in Duesseldorf.
Anna Marti – Head of the Taipei Office of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation
Anna Marti set up the Global Innovation Hub for the Friedrich Naumann Foundation in Taipei and heads its local office. She is also responsible for the Foundation’s China bulletin. After working for the German Development Cooperation (GIZ) and the United Nations Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, she joined the Friedrich Naumann Foundation in 2016, first as Asia Officer and later as Global Innovation and Digitalization Theme Manager.
Paul Kohlenberg – Asia consultant at the Heinrich Boell Foundation Berlin
Paul Kohlenberg is a consultant in the Asia Department of the Heinrich Boell Foundation in Berlin. He was head of the Heinrich Boell Foundation in Beijing until 2022. Kohlenberg studied political science and modern China studies and previously worked for the Delegation of the European Union in Beijing, for a German university consortium in Cameroon and as a research assistant in the Asia research group at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin. He specializes in Chinese politics.
Silencing critics is part of the Communist Party’s long-term strategy. It is not always successful. During Prime Minister Li Qiang’s visit to Australia, activists protested against China’s human rights crimes. What Chinese state bodies then do is organize counter-protests. A large number of supposedly voluntary supporters are used to drown out the critical protest and thus marginalize it. In this case, this is achieved – at least in part – with the help of large Chinese flags or the banner of the Melbourne World Friendship Organization (bottom right), a United Front organization serving state propaganda.
Mere days after the EU announced extra tariffs on Chinese electric cars, the People’s Republic retaliated as expected: China launched an anti-dumping investigation into European pork and its by-products, Amelie Richter reports.
The move is neither surprising nor should it scare the Europeans. Rattling is part of the trade, and in the end, Beijing has to follow up its pithy threats with action. The fact that the pork industry is targeted first and not the car industry is certainly a calculated decision. This will only add to the chorus of those ranting against tariffs on Chinese imports.
But China doesn’t want a trade war. That much is certain. Instead, the country is creating some negotiating leverage so that it can work with the EU on a pragmatic solution that benefits everyone.
Meanwhile, two unusual heads of state will meet today: Russian President Vladimir Putin will visit Kim Jong-un in North Korea. Putin and Kim are both considered international pariahs in many countries. However, it seems that this rejection is uniting them.
China will closely monitor the rapprochement between Russia and North Korea. So far, Beijing has been Pyongyang’s number-one partner. Could China now risk losing influence over the Kim regime? To some extent, inevitably. But Beijing could benefit from a new division of labor between North Korea, Russia and China – and ultimately even hit the USA. Michael Radunski summarizes why.
Just a few days after the EU announced its extra tariffs on Chinese EVs, the People’s Republic retaliated as expected: China launched an anti-dumping investigation into European pork and its by-products. As the Chinese Ministry of Commerce announced on Monday (17 June), the investigation has been ongoing since Monday.
The investigation aims to:
The products examined include:
The Ministry of Commerce said the investigation was triggered by a complaint from the Chinese state-owned enterprise China Animal Husbandry Association (CAHIC) on 6 June. Last week, the ministry once again called on domestic industries to request investigations into imports if necessary in order to “protect their own legitimate rights and interests.”
Beijing wants to avoid the impression that the investigations are politically motivated. China accuses the EU Commission of doing exactly this, which launched the anti-subsidy investigation into EVs without any initiative from the industry.
CAHIC is the livestock breeding branch of the China National Agricultural Development Group Corporation. However, the agricultural group reports directly to the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC).
The EU reacted relaxed on Monday. A spokesperson for the European Commission stated that Brussels was not concerned about the opening of the investigation. He said the EU would intervene appropriately to ensure the investigation complied with all relevant World Trade Organisation rules.
However, concerned voices were heard from the affected member states: Spain called for negotiations to avoid tariffs on its pork exports to China. Spanish Agriculture Minister Luis Planas hoped there was “room for an understanding.” Economy Minister Carlos Cuerpo said Spain and the EU were working to find a balance to avoid a trade war while protecting its products from unfair trade practices. “We are already working through the European Union to find solutions that will provide a way forward without damaging the sector,” said Cuerpo in Santander.
While pork products exported to China, including stomachs, intestines, snouts and ears, are hardly consumed in Europe, they are very popular in China. According to the industry association Interporc, Spain sold around 560,000 tons of pork products worth 1.2 billion euros to China last year. With a share of around 21 percent of total imports, Spain is China’s biggest supplier of pork products, ahead of the USA (around 16 percent), Brazil (around 16 percent), the Netherlands (nine percent), Canada (nine percent) and Denmark (around nine percent).
Ulrik Bremholm, chairman of the Danish industry association Danske Slagterier, called on all parties to consider the impact on jobs, food safety and production and to find a negotiated solution with China. The Danish pork industry “will be hit incredibly hard by potential Chinese restrictions on European meat,” Bremholm told Reuters.
China banned German pork imports in 2020 after swine fever was detected in the country. Germany’s largest meat processor, Toennies, expects pork prices to fall if exporters such as Spain were to seek new markets for lost Chinese sales, which would lead to a “painful loss of income” in Germany as well. “If EU exporters, particularly Spain, cannot sell pork to China, some sales would have to be made within Europe and downward pressure on EU pork prices can be expected,” Toennies spokesperson Thomas Dosch told Reuters.
France recently negotiated a new pork deal during China’s President Xi Jinping’s visit. French pork exports are expected to increase by ten percent. If China looks for alternative suppliers outside the EU, South America could benefit from the extra tariffs on European products.
The state-run newspaper Global Times has already had several insiders and experts announce in reports that the European agricultural and aviation industries could be the focus of Chinese investigations. In addition to meat imports, dairy products and cars with larger combustion engines could also be targeted. China already launched an anti-dumping investigation into brandy in January. This was seen as a clear signal to France, which had campaigned particularly strongly for car tariffs at the EU level. The investigation is still ongoing.
German Economics Minister Robert Habeck (Green Party) will travel to China at the end of this week for a visit lasting several days. Regarding trade disputes with Beijing, his ministry referred to the responsibility of the EU Commission. However, Habeck “will of course (…) not be able to avoid addressing this issue,” his spokesperson said. The German government hopes that “solutions” can still be found on the matter of car tariffs.
This Tuesday, two unusual heads of state will meet: Russian President Vladimir Putin will visit Kim Jong-un in North Korea. Putin and Kim are regarded internationally as pariahs in many countries. However, it seems that this rejection unites them.
China will closely monitor the rapprochement between Russia and North Korea. So far, Beijing has been Pyongyang’s main partner. Could China now risk losing influence over the Kim regime? To some extent, inevitably. But Beijing could benefit from a new division of labor between North Korea, Russia and China – and ultimately even hit the USA.
It is the second meeting between Putin and Kim in just nine months – and shows how much the two countries have deepened their military relations since Russia invaded Ukraine. After all, Putin needs North Korean weapons for this campaign. Both North Korea and Russia have denied allegations of arms shipments, which would constitute a violation of several UN Security Council resolutions.
In March, South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik reported that North Korea had delivered around 7,000 containers of ammunition and other military equipment to Russia. Alongside ammunition, this includes artillery, missiles and other conventional weapons. In return, Shin said North Korea had received more than 9,000 Russian containers, presumably containing aid supplies.
Some observers even refer to North Korea as a “lifeline” for Putin – at least when it comes to weapon shipments. However, calling it Putin’s “lifeline” is not quite accurate. Russia has plenty to offer North Korea. Because in return for its support, Pyongyang apparently receives
North Korea’s space program is a top priority for Kim Jong-un. In September last year, he and Putin visited the Russian Vostochny Space Center. The aim is to put satellites into orbit that would help guide nuclear-powered ballistic missiles and track “hostile activities” in the event of a future regional conflict. Citing intelligence information, South Korea recently stated that Moscow is already supporting Pyongyang in its efforts to advance its satellite launches.
At any rate, Kim sent a telling congratulatory message to Moscow last week to mark Russia’s national holiday. “Thanks to the significant meeting between us at the Vostochny Spaceport in September last year, (North Korea)-Russia friendly and cooperative relations developed into an unbreakable relationship of comrades-in-arms,” Kim said in the message.
There are also geopolitical considerations. “Beyond reciprocity, Russia views North Korea as an important hedge against Western influence in the Pacific, so a North Korea with better space capabilities fits into Russia’s strategy well,” Ben Dubow, from the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), told Newsweek.
However, it is not only the West that monitors the rapprochement between Russia and North Korea. China is also keeping a close eye on what is happening between its two neighbors. After all, China is essentially North Korea’s main ally. It is a complicated relationship. North Korean missile tests and other provocations are by no means in the interests of Chinese ruler Xi Jinping. But it is also clear that China is the Kim regime’s life insurance.
Should Russia now gain influence, this could be to China’s detriment. Kim could certainly use Russia as a bit of leverage to gain more concessions, more aid shipments or simply more leniency from Xi Jinping. It would be Kim’s Russia card vis-à-vis China.
According to the renowned North Korea expert Chad O’Carroll from the think tank NK Pro in Seoul, the kind of military cooperation and diplomatic support between Russia and North Korea today would have been unthinkable a decade ago. He says that China’s enormous disinterest in enforcing sanctions and the increasing acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear status have also materialized surprisingly quickly.
In fact, North Korea appears more self-confident on the international stage and more unpredictable than ever before. O’Carroll’s statement: “North Korea is emboldened by the protection of Russia and China in the UN Security Council and geopolitical crises elsewhere.”
Joel Atkinson, Professor of China Studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul, told Table.Briefings: “All three sides support the new division of labor.” China supplies Russia with what it needs to keep its war economy running. However, when it comes to direct arms deliveries, Atkinson sees a red line that Beijing is not (yet) prepared to cross. He believe China is too afraid of a strong, joint reaction from Europe and the US.
“That’s why North Korea – which, unlike China, has no trade to lose with the West and does not want to present itself in international politics as a peace mediator or Europe’s favored partner – is now taking on the role of arms supplier,” Atkinson told Table.Briefings.
North Korea, Russia, and China would all benefit from this division of labor. After all, all three countries agree on one thing – and are very open about it: They reject a Western-dominated world order under the aegis of the United States.
David Merkle – Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Consultant China
David Merkle works at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation as a China consultant. Based in Berlin, he coordinates the KAS’s work on China and also keeps an eye on the global debate with Beijing. Merkle previously worked for the KAS in Shanghai from 2013 to 2016. In 2022, he spent four months as a Visiting Fellow at the National Chung Hsing University in Taiwan. Merkle studied East Asian Studies, focusing on Greater China and politics in Bochum and Tuebingen, combined with stints abroad in Shanghai and Taipei. In addition to his work, dealing with his own visa matters. He will soon be heading back to China.
Johann Fuhrmann – Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Head of Beijing Office
Johann Fuhrmann has headed the Konrad Adenauer Foundation’s China office in Beijing since July 2021, having previously held the same position for the KAS in Mongolia. In March 2021, he was awarded the Polar Star, Mongolia’s highest order of merit for foreign citizens, for his commitment to German-Mongolian relations. Fuhrmann holds a Master’s in International Relations from the London School of Economics.
Nora Mueller – Koerber Foundation, Head of International Policy
Nora Müller has been Head of International Politics and the Berlin Office of the Koerber Foundation since 2015. On the advisory board, she coordinates the work project on public communication and civil crisis prevention. She is also a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Previously, Mueller worked in the Middle East Department of the German Federal Foreign Office and at the Goethe Institute. She holds a Master’s degree in European Studies.
Cora Jungbluth – Bertelsmann Foundation, Senior Expert China and Asia-Pacific
Cora Francisca Jungbluth is a senior expert for China and Asia-Pacific at the Bertelsmann Foundation. Her research focuses on foreign direct investment and international trade. Previously, she worked as a lecturer at the Institute for China Studies at the University of Freiburg. Cora Jungbluth studied sinology and economics at Heidelberg University, Shanghai International Studies University and Tsinghua University, Beijing. She holds a PhD in Chinese Studies from the University of Heidelberg.
Christian Straube – Stiftung Mercator GmbH, Project Manager
Christian Straube is a project manager in the Europe in the World division of Stiftung Mercator and is responsible for the China portfolio. Before that, he worked as a program manager in the China program of Stiftung Asienhaus. Straube studied modern sinology, economics and South Asian politics in Heidelberg and Beijing. His motivation: Strengthening China expertise in Europe and promoting awareness of Chinese society among political decision-makers.
Sergio Grassi – Director of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) in Beijing
Sergio Grassi studied economics and sinology in Berlin and Beijing. Based in Jakarta, he was responsible for the Friedrich Ebert Foundation’s (FES) country projects in Indonesia and Malaysia for six years until summer 2021. Prior to that, he worked at the Berlin headquarters in the Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa departments. In 2022, he was appointed Head of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Beijing. Here, the sinologist wants to build on a basis of respectful understanding – even if there are many different views to bridge.
Benjamin Reichenbach – Head of the Shanghai Office at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES)
Benjamin Reichenbach has headed the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) Shanghai office since 2023. Previously, he worked as a Desk Officer for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India in Berlin for six years. From 2013 to 2016, he headed the FES office in Venezuela and, before that, worked for two years as a project assistant in the FES office in Mexico. He began his career as a postgraduate researcher at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability and gained experience at the German Development Cooperation (GIZ) and the European Parliament.
Debora Tydecks-Zhou – Representative of the Hanns-Seidel Foundation (HSS) in Beijing
Debora Tydecks-Zhou has been the representative of the Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSS) in Beijing since February 2023. Previously, she was head of the Northeast and Central Asia department in Munich and coordinated projects in Myanmar, India and Vietnam. The regional scientist specializing in Southeast Asia began her career at the German Development Cooperation (GIZ) GmbH in Indonesia and gained further experience in various positions, including at the Museum of World Cultures in Frankfurt and the DGB Bildungswerk BUND in Duesseldorf.
Anna Marti – Head of the Taipei Office of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation
Anna Marti set up the Global Innovation Hub for the Friedrich Naumann Foundation in Taipei and heads its local office. She is also responsible for the Foundation’s China bulletin. After working for the German Development Cooperation (GIZ) and the United Nations Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, she joined the Friedrich Naumann Foundation in 2016, first as Asia Officer and later as Global Innovation and Digitalization Theme Manager.
Paul Kohlenberg – Asia consultant at the Heinrich Boell Foundation Berlin
Paul Kohlenberg is a consultant in the Asia Department of the Heinrich Boell Foundation in Berlin. He was head of the Heinrich Boell Foundation in Beijing until 2022. Kohlenberg studied political science and modern China studies and previously worked for the Delegation of the European Union in Beijing, for a German university consortium in Cameroon and as a research assistant in the Asia research group at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin. He specializes in Chinese politics.
Silencing critics is part of the Communist Party’s long-term strategy. It is not always successful. During Prime Minister Li Qiang’s visit to Australia, activists protested against China’s human rights crimes. What Chinese state bodies then do is organize counter-protests. A large number of supposedly voluntary supporters are used to drown out the critical protest and thus marginalize it. In this case, this is achieved – at least in part – with the help of large Chinese flags or the banner of the Melbourne World Friendship Organization (bottom right), a United Front organization serving state propaganda.
