After the first representative days at the COP29 world climate conference in Baku with many speeches, it’s now time to get down to business: The real negotiations begin. Our colleagues from Climate.Table are on the ground in Azerbaijan. They are currently providing a daily briefing with the most important insights from the conference.
The statement by China’s Vice-Premier Ding Xuexiang caused a particular stir there. He said that China had “provided and mobilized a total of $24.5 billion in climate finance for other developing countries” since 2016. Nico Beckert analyzes how this statement could generally be a positive sign for climate finance. Because there is more to Ding’s formulation.
In absolute figures, Germany is the fourth most important host country for international students worldwide. There were just under 380,000 in 2021 – the majority of them from outside the EU. And just over 40,000 of them came from China.
An important reason for many: the fact that studying in Germany is free. However, an above-average number of Chinese students leave Germany after their studies, as Markus Weisskopf writes. This means that the calculation of tuition-free studies in exchange for future employees could no longer work out in the future. Especially against the backdrop of increasingly tight university budgets, these developments are also being viewed more critically in the university community.
At COP29, after the photo ops and speeches by the heads of government, the actual negotiations on the new global climate finance target NCQG started. The responsible negotiators presented a new text to the delegations on Wednesday. In the evening, however, the proposal was returned to the negotiators with a request to streamline it – observers consider this a minor setback due to chaotic procedures; however, everything is still in the green.
Meanwhile, the various groups sent signals of flexibility: China formally published information on its climate financing for the first time. And the multilateral development banks (MDBs) declared their intention to increase climate finance spending by 2030 significantly.
The statement by China’s Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang at the Leaders Summit attracted particular attention. He stated that China had “provided and mobilized project funds of more than 177bn RMB (24.5bn USD)” in climate finance for other developing countries since 2016. Unlike in the past, he did not refer to Chinese spending on “South-South cooperation” but used the terms “provided and mobilized for climate finance,” which are also used by the West.
For Kate Logan from the think tank Asia Society, China’s “ability and willingness to calculate its climate finance contribution to developing countries in the context of provision and mobilization” is on par with developed countries. This demonstrates “that China has capacity and political will to be more transparent about the scale and scope of its own efforts” – a possible concession in the NCQG battle.
Positive signs also came from the multilateral development banks of developed nations. They expect to be able to provide 120 billion US dollars annually in climate financing for developing and emerging countries by 2030 – a significant step up from the 74.7 billion they contributed in 2023. They also expect to mobilize 65 billion from the private sector.
The new figures from the development banks “should give the donor countries some certainty for the negotiations on the new climate finance target,” says Anja Gebel, development bank expert at Germanwatch. However, the leverage effect of World Bank funds has been overestimated in the past, says Gebel. The High Ambition Coalition (HAC) of climate frontrunners from developed and developing countries also issued a joint statement calling for an “urgent increase in climate finance.”
A new working basis for the NCQG negotiations is to be created on Thursday. The negotiators’ 34-page concept – a collection of all ideas, options and demands – will now be gradually turned into a text that the political level can decide on next week. In fact, the negotiators had already reduced the large collection of ideas to a short document of nine pages before the COP. However, the G77 group and China were unable to reach a consensus on this.
Just before the climate conference, Western countries and China indicated a willingness to compromise on the NCQG. “Since September, we have heard from both sides that they are more willing to be flexible,” Li Shuo, climate expert at the think tank Asia Society, told Table.Briefings. Germanwatch climate expert David Ryfisch confirms China is “starting to move.”
This has several reasons:
The way “to find an NCQG result that could work for China is to anchor and build on what China has already contributed,” says Li Shuo. More transparency from China could be a first compromise. “Improving the quality of reporting is an immediate step that China can take to contribute more responsibly,” Yao Zhe, Global Policy Advisor at Greenpeace East Asia, also told Table.Briefings
However, official Chinese participation in the NCQG’s anticipated core objective is unlikely. This would be tantamount to a paradigm shift. China would then also face higher expectations in other UN bodies and negotiations. Ryfisch says it will take a “creative combination of several aspects.” One tricky question is: “How can Chinese contributions become binding without China having the same level of commitment as developed countries.”
On the other hand, China could stand out in the planned investments in the new NCQG. China has already mobilized large funds for energy investments in the Global South through the New Silk Road (Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)). In the future, China intends to place a greater focus on renewable energies along the BRI.
However, the NCQG should provide new funds and not re-label old projects. Ryfisch says: “Offsetting BRI investments within the broader part of the NCQG would not be sufficient in my view.” Yao Zhe also warns that if developed countries insist on the “issue of the ‘contributor base,’ the door for constructive talks with China could close.”
Getting China on board with the NCQG could also convince other emerging countries to participate (more). “It is not only necessary to find a solution with China,” says Ryfisch. China could even “be a key to ensuring that Saudi Arabia also supports an agreement to expand the donor base.”
In absolute figures, Germany is the fourth most important host country for international students worldwide. There were just under 380,000 in 2021 – the majority of them from outside the EU. Just over 40,000 of them came from China.
One important reason for many is the fact that studying in Germany is free. While tuition fees in the UK are around €10,000 and in the USA up to €25,000 per year, the barriers to entry in Germany are relatively low. One motivation for this is that foreign students often stay in Germany after their studies and are available as skilled workers.
Despite an annual investment of around €11,000 per study place and therefore a total of around four billion euros per year, the model is “highly profitable”, says Axel Plünnecke from the German Economic Institute in Cologne when asked by Table.Briefings. After all, Germany has the highest retention rates in the world after Canada. According to DAAD figures, 46 percent of international first-year students from 2006 to 2012 were still in Germany ten years after starting their studies.
However, it is currently unclear whether the calculation will continue to work out, especially with regard to Chinese students. After all, those who come to Germany on scholarships from the China Scholarship Council (CSC), for example, are obliged to return to China after their studies. “We have heard that scholarship contracts for state scholarships from China often contain return clauses”, writes the DAAD in response to an inquiry from Table.Briefings. However, this is not uncommon in other countries of origin either.
There are apparently no official figures on Chinese scholarship holders in Germany or in other countries. “Before the Covid pandemic, we estimated that 4,000 to 5,000 Chinese students and doctoral candidates in Germany received state scholarships – for example from the China Scholarship Council”, writes the DAAD. That would be around ten to 15 percent. The BMBF also quoted similar figures when asked by Table.Briefings.
Accordingly, most Chinese students finance their academic education with private funds and therefore have no official obligation to return. However, insiders say that the Chinese state is now exerting a great deal of pressure to return, even beyond formal return clauses. Hannes Gohli from Princeton University shares this observation. However, he also points out that many Chinese students and doctoral candidates return to China simply because of their family ties.
This means that the calculation of tuition-free studies in exchange for future employment could no longer work out in the future – at least with regard to Chinese students. Against the backdrop of increasingly tight budgets, these developments are also being viewed more critically in the academic community.
The Technical University of Munich (TUM) is the first major public university in Germany to introduce tuition fees for non-EU foreigners. Since this winter semester, the costs have been between €2,000 and €6,000 per semester. Plünnecke estimates that the “beacon” TUM can afford this “without expecting a significant drop in prospective students”. The return is not insignificant: With over 20,000 international students in 2022 and more than 10,000 from non-EU countries, this would add up to an annual sum in the high double-digit millions.
When asked by Table.Briefings, TUM was not yet able to say whether the fees have led to a lower number of new students. The figures are not yet available, as enrollments are still possible until December. This step was made possible by the Bavarian Higher Education Innovation Act, which was passed in 2022. It allows universities to introduce tuition fees for students from non-EU countries. This option is otherwise only available in Saxony – until now.
One thing is certain: The experiment is being closely monitored by other universities and politicians in the country. Larger universities with a good international reputation in particular could probably afford to follow TUM’s example. They could urge their governments to change the framework conditions for them too. A chain reaction would then lead to widespread tuition fees for non-EU foreigners – at least at the larger universities.
Even with unintended consequences. Apart from a patchwork of fees, international students would be subject to social selection, meaning that those on lower incomes would have a significantly lower chance of studying in Germany. But it is not only students who are at risk of selection effects. The additional income of a few elite universities could further widen the gap between rich and poor universities, between elite and austerity – especially against the backdrop of ongoing budget problems.
And, of course, there would also be a risk that fewer international students would ultimately come to Germany. This is despite the fact that “immigration via universities is an extremely positive option for overcoming demographic challenges and at the same time strengthening Germany’s innovative power”, as Plünnecke says. Others point out a point that is at least as important from their perspective: A decline in foreign students would not only have an impact on our future potential for skilled workers, but also on international scientific and cultural exchange.
Sima Nan has made a name for himself on the Chinese internet as an ultra-nationalist who loves China but hates the West. However, nothing more has been heard from him for a few days now. According to the South China Morning Post from Hong Kong, citing official sources, the blogger, whose real name is Yu Li, has fallen victim to Chinese censorship. He is now banned from posting new articles for a year, the newspaper reports.
No specific reason was given, but it is suspected that Beijing was disturbed by the pro-Trump tones. In his last Douyin (Chinese name for TikTok) post shortly before the US election, Sima Nan joked that he was the “deputy head of Trump’s campaign office in Beijing” and expressed his preference for the Republican candidate. He explained on Weibo that he considered Trump to be favorable to China’s goals – especially because of his “transactional mentality”, which could help bring Taiwan back under Beijing’s control. A short time later, Sima Nan went quiet.
The blogger is known for his extreme and often anti-Western statements and has many followers with his provocative rhetoric. His career began in the 1990s with criticism of Falun Gong, a spiritual movement that was later banned in China. Since then, he has been a prominent voice of the nationalists, strongly condemning Western influences and vehemently defending China’s interests. With more than 44 million followers, he has a strong presence on China’s social media.
His orientation, often based on the ideology of the Communist Party and Mao Zedong, leads many to believe that his views have at least indirect official support. He regularly accuses groups and individuals of betraying China’s interests or collaborating with the US, which has earned him the nickname “the anti-US fighter”.
Beijing banned him from social media for a few weeks back in 2022. But this time the ban seems to have been a deliberate signal. A media professor from Hong Kong told the South China Morning Post anonymously: “If such people are allowed to continue spreading nonsense, it will weaken investor confidence in China’s willingness to reform.” The measures against Sima Nan are in line with China’s goal of creating a “favorable environment” for private companies and curbing extremist voices that go too far. Therefore, in addition to pro-Western views, increasingly exaggerated nationalist voices are also being censored.
A similar fate recently befell the former editor-in-chief of the equally nationalist newspaper Global Times, Hu Xijin. He disappeared from social media for more than three months this year after publishing an article in which he interpreted a key party document on economic policy. His interpretation met with fierce criticism from conservative circles and led to Hu’s post being quickly deleted. However, Hu has been back online since Oct. 31. Initially with a rather harmless post about why many Beijingers like him are now also buying residential property in the cheaper neighboring province of Hebei. Jörn Petring
Visitors to the International Import Expo, which ended on Sunday in Shanghai, were able to compare the skills of FORPHEUS against their own. The Japanese manufacturer presented the ninth version of the table tennis training robot, which is controlled with the help of artificial intelligence. Equipped with visual sensors, it tracks the table tennis ball in real time and evaluates the player’s skills. The robot adapts the return to the player’s skills and helps them to gradually refine their game.
After the first representative days at the COP29 world climate conference in Baku with many speeches, it’s now time to get down to business: The real negotiations begin. Our colleagues from Climate.Table are on the ground in Azerbaijan. They are currently providing a daily briefing with the most important insights from the conference.
The statement by China’s Vice-Premier Ding Xuexiang caused a particular stir there. He said that China had “provided and mobilized a total of $24.5 billion in climate finance for other developing countries” since 2016. Nico Beckert analyzes how this statement could generally be a positive sign for climate finance. Because there is more to Ding’s formulation.
In absolute figures, Germany is the fourth most important host country for international students worldwide. There were just under 380,000 in 2021 – the majority of them from outside the EU. And just over 40,000 of them came from China.
An important reason for many: the fact that studying in Germany is free. However, an above-average number of Chinese students leave Germany after their studies, as Markus Weisskopf writes. This means that the calculation of tuition-free studies in exchange for future employees could no longer work out in the future. Especially against the backdrop of increasingly tight university budgets, these developments are also being viewed more critically in the university community.
At COP29, after the photo ops and speeches by the heads of government, the actual negotiations on the new global climate finance target NCQG started. The responsible negotiators presented a new text to the delegations on Wednesday. In the evening, however, the proposal was returned to the negotiators with a request to streamline it – observers consider this a minor setback due to chaotic procedures; however, everything is still in the green.
Meanwhile, the various groups sent signals of flexibility: China formally published information on its climate financing for the first time. And the multilateral development banks (MDBs) declared their intention to increase climate finance spending by 2030 significantly.
The statement by China’s Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang at the Leaders Summit attracted particular attention. He stated that China had “provided and mobilized project funds of more than 177bn RMB (24.5bn USD)” in climate finance for other developing countries since 2016. Unlike in the past, he did not refer to Chinese spending on “South-South cooperation” but used the terms “provided and mobilized for climate finance,” which are also used by the West.
For Kate Logan from the think tank Asia Society, China’s “ability and willingness to calculate its climate finance contribution to developing countries in the context of provision and mobilization” is on par with developed countries. This demonstrates “that China has capacity and political will to be more transparent about the scale and scope of its own efforts” – a possible concession in the NCQG battle.
Positive signs also came from the multilateral development banks of developed nations. They expect to be able to provide 120 billion US dollars annually in climate financing for developing and emerging countries by 2030 – a significant step up from the 74.7 billion they contributed in 2023. They also expect to mobilize 65 billion from the private sector.
The new figures from the development banks “should give the donor countries some certainty for the negotiations on the new climate finance target,” says Anja Gebel, development bank expert at Germanwatch. However, the leverage effect of World Bank funds has been overestimated in the past, says Gebel. The High Ambition Coalition (HAC) of climate frontrunners from developed and developing countries also issued a joint statement calling for an “urgent increase in climate finance.”
A new working basis for the NCQG negotiations is to be created on Thursday. The negotiators’ 34-page concept – a collection of all ideas, options and demands – will now be gradually turned into a text that the political level can decide on next week. In fact, the negotiators had already reduced the large collection of ideas to a short document of nine pages before the COP. However, the G77 group and China were unable to reach a consensus on this.
Just before the climate conference, Western countries and China indicated a willingness to compromise on the NCQG. “Since September, we have heard from both sides that they are more willing to be flexible,” Li Shuo, climate expert at the think tank Asia Society, told Table.Briefings. Germanwatch climate expert David Ryfisch confirms China is “starting to move.”
This has several reasons:
The way “to find an NCQG result that could work for China is to anchor and build on what China has already contributed,” says Li Shuo. More transparency from China could be a first compromise. “Improving the quality of reporting is an immediate step that China can take to contribute more responsibly,” Yao Zhe, Global Policy Advisor at Greenpeace East Asia, also told Table.Briefings
However, official Chinese participation in the NCQG’s anticipated core objective is unlikely. This would be tantamount to a paradigm shift. China would then also face higher expectations in other UN bodies and negotiations. Ryfisch says it will take a “creative combination of several aspects.” One tricky question is: “How can Chinese contributions become binding without China having the same level of commitment as developed countries.”
On the other hand, China could stand out in the planned investments in the new NCQG. China has already mobilized large funds for energy investments in the Global South through the New Silk Road (Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)). In the future, China intends to place a greater focus on renewable energies along the BRI.
However, the NCQG should provide new funds and not re-label old projects. Ryfisch says: “Offsetting BRI investments within the broader part of the NCQG would not be sufficient in my view.” Yao Zhe also warns that if developed countries insist on the “issue of the ‘contributor base,’ the door for constructive talks with China could close.”
Getting China on board with the NCQG could also convince other emerging countries to participate (more). “It is not only necessary to find a solution with China,” says Ryfisch. China could even “be a key to ensuring that Saudi Arabia also supports an agreement to expand the donor base.”
In absolute figures, Germany is the fourth most important host country for international students worldwide. There were just under 380,000 in 2021 – the majority of them from outside the EU. Just over 40,000 of them came from China.
One important reason for many is the fact that studying in Germany is free. While tuition fees in the UK are around €10,000 and in the USA up to €25,000 per year, the barriers to entry in Germany are relatively low. One motivation for this is that foreign students often stay in Germany after their studies and are available as skilled workers.
Despite an annual investment of around €11,000 per study place and therefore a total of around four billion euros per year, the model is “highly profitable”, says Axel Plünnecke from the German Economic Institute in Cologne when asked by Table.Briefings. After all, Germany has the highest retention rates in the world after Canada. According to DAAD figures, 46 percent of international first-year students from 2006 to 2012 were still in Germany ten years after starting their studies.
However, it is currently unclear whether the calculation will continue to work out, especially with regard to Chinese students. After all, those who come to Germany on scholarships from the China Scholarship Council (CSC), for example, are obliged to return to China after their studies. “We have heard that scholarship contracts for state scholarships from China often contain return clauses”, writes the DAAD in response to an inquiry from Table.Briefings. However, this is not uncommon in other countries of origin either.
There are apparently no official figures on Chinese scholarship holders in Germany or in other countries. “Before the Covid pandemic, we estimated that 4,000 to 5,000 Chinese students and doctoral candidates in Germany received state scholarships – for example from the China Scholarship Council”, writes the DAAD. That would be around ten to 15 percent. The BMBF also quoted similar figures when asked by Table.Briefings.
Accordingly, most Chinese students finance their academic education with private funds and therefore have no official obligation to return. However, insiders say that the Chinese state is now exerting a great deal of pressure to return, even beyond formal return clauses. Hannes Gohli from Princeton University shares this observation. However, he also points out that many Chinese students and doctoral candidates return to China simply because of their family ties.
This means that the calculation of tuition-free studies in exchange for future employment could no longer work out in the future – at least with regard to Chinese students. Against the backdrop of increasingly tight budgets, these developments are also being viewed more critically in the academic community.
The Technical University of Munich (TUM) is the first major public university in Germany to introduce tuition fees for non-EU foreigners. Since this winter semester, the costs have been between €2,000 and €6,000 per semester. Plünnecke estimates that the “beacon” TUM can afford this “without expecting a significant drop in prospective students”. The return is not insignificant: With over 20,000 international students in 2022 and more than 10,000 from non-EU countries, this would add up to an annual sum in the high double-digit millions.
When asked by Table.Briefings, TUM was not yet able to say whether the fees have led to a lower number of new students. The figures are not yet available, as enrollments are still possible until December. This step was made possible by the Bavarian Higher Education Innovation Act, which was passed in 2022. It allows universities to introduce tuition fees for students from non-EU countries. This option is otherwise only available in Saxony – until now.
One thing is certain: The experiment is being closely monitored by other universities and politicians in the country. Larger universities with a good international reputation in particular could probably afford to follow TUM’s example. They could urge their governments to change the framework conditions for them too. A chain reaction would then lead to widespread tuition fees for non-EU foreigners – at least at the larger universities.
Even with unintended consequences. Apart from a patchwork of fees, international students would be subject to social selection, meaning that those on lower incomes would have a significantly lower chance of studying in Germany. But it is not only students who are at risk of selection effects. The additional income of a few elite universities could further widen the gap between rich and poor universities, between elite and austerity – especially against the backdrop of ongoing budget problems.
And, of course, there would also be a risk that fewer international students would ultimately come to Germany. This is despite the fact that “immigration via universities is an extremely positive option for overcoming demographic challenges and at the same time strengthening Germany’s innovative power”, as Plünnecke says. Others point out a point that is at least as important from their perspective: A decline in foreign students would not only have an impact on our future potential for skilled workers, but also on international scientific and cultural exchange.
Sima Nan has made a name for himself on the Chinese internet as an ultra-nationalist who loves China but hates the West. However, nothing more has been heard from him for a few days now. According to the South China Morning Post from Hong Kong, citing official sources, the blogger, whose real name is Yu Li, has fallen victim to Chinese censorship. He is now banned from posting new articles for a year, the newspaper reports.
No specific reason was given, but it is suspected that Beijing was disturbed by the pro-Trump tones. In his last Douyin (Chinese name for TikTok) post shortly before the US election, Sima Nan joked that he was the “deputy head of Trump’s campaign office in Beijing” and expressed his preference for the Republican candidate. He explained on Weibo that he considered Trump to be favorable to China’s goals – especially because of his “transactional mentality”, which could help bring Taiwan back under Beijing’s control. A short time later, Sima Nan went quiet.
The blogger is known for his extreme and often anti-Western statements and has many followers with his provocative rhetoric. His career began in the 1990s with criticism of Falun Gong, a spiritual movement that was later banned in China. Since then, he has been a prominent voice of the nationalists, strongly condemning Western influences and vehemently defending China’s interests. With more than 44 million followers, he has a strong presence on China’s social media.
His orientation, often based on the ideology of the Communist Party and Mao Zedong, leads many to believe that his views have at least indirect official support. He regularly accuses groups and individuals of betraying China’s interests or collaborating with the US, which has earned him the nickname “the anti-US fighter”.
Beijing banned him from social media for a few weeks back in 2022. But this time the ban seems to have been a deliberate signal. A media professor from Hong Kong told the South China Morning Post anonymously: “If such people are allowed to continue spreading nonsense, it will weaken investor confidence in China’s willingness to reform.” The measures against Sima Nan are in line with China’s goal of creating a “favorable environment” for private companies and curbing extremist voices that go too far. Therefore, in addition to pro-Western views, increasingly exaggerated nationalist voices are also being censored.
A similar fate recently befell the former editor-in-chief of the equally nationalist newspaper Global Times, Hu Xijin. He disappeared from social media for more than three months this year after publishing an article in which he interpreted a key party document on economic policy. His interpretation met with fierce criticism from conservative circles and led to Hu’s post being quickly deleted. However, Hu has been back online since Oct. 31. Initially with a rather harmless post about why many Beijingers like him are now also buying residential property in the cheaper neighboring province of Hebei. Jörn Petring
Visitors to the International Import Expo, which ended on Sunday in Shanghai, were able to compare the skills of FORPHEUS against their own. The Japanese manufacturer presented the ninth version of the table tennis training robot, which is controlled with the help of artificial intelligence. Equipped with visual sensors, it tracks the table tennis ball in real time and evaluates the player’s skills. The robot adapts the return to the player’s skills and helps them to gradually refine their game.
