While masses of new electric cars are hitting the roads in China, many older battery models are nearing the end of their lives. If an EV battery falls below 70 percent of its capacity, it must be replaced. At first, a second life awaits, for example as battery storage. However, at some point, it really is time for the end of the cycle – and a new beginning. Most of the valuable raw materials can be recovered.
Battery recycling is booming in China. The country’s quotas for recovering the valuable raw materials used in batteries are very ambitious. As the big wave of discarded batteries will only arrive in Germany and Europe with some delay, it is worth looking eastwards, writes Christian Domke Seidel. Apart from ecological aspects, recycling also offers considerable economic opportunities.
The ice in the far north is melting faster than expected, and large parts of the Arctic could be ice-free as early as 2035. This will significantly change the dynamics in the region. In 2020, Sweden’s government spoke of a “new military dynamic in the Arctic region” and increased its defense budget by around 40 percent.
A particular concern in the Arctic is Russia, which produces 90 percent of its gas and 60 percent of its oil here, and for which the Arctic is also a key military region for deterrence and defense. This month, the Chinese Coast Guard joined Russian ships on a patrol in the Arctic for the first time, although analysts believe this was more symbolic than anything else. Russia and China are cooperating in the Arctic primarily for practical reasons, particularly in gas and oil production and the expansion of the Northern Sea Route.
Although the economic interests coincide for the time being, the relationship remains tense. Russia views China’s growing presence in the Arctic, including research stations and military interests, with suspicion and fears losing influence in the long term. Fabian Peltsch is in Reykjavík at the Arctic Circle Assembly and analyzes the balance of power and ambitions in the Arctic.
The Arctic ice is melting dramatically – large areas could be ice-free as early as 2035, far earlier than researchers estimated ten years ago. This also means new sea routes and mineral resources can be accessed in the far north. This spurs traditional Arctic states, as well as so-called observer states, into action. China defined itself as a state “close to the Arctic” in a foreign policy white paper back in 2018 – even though Dalian, China’s northernmost port, is some 5,700 kilometers from the North Pole. China’s Arctic plans also include Beijing talking about a “Polar Silk Road.”
China is primarily interested in mining resources such as rare earths and uranium, for example, in Greenland, which China has long been wooing with infrastructure projects. However, ice-free sea routes across the Arctic Ocean are also of high interest to China as alternative and supplementary routes to the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal. 80 percent of Chinese oil imports currently have to pass through the Strait of Malacca, a bottleneck that the USA and other countries could easily block in the event of a conflict.
On a geopolitical level, the Arctic has been a place of cooperation since the end of the Cold War, which has been reflected above all in joint research, for example, on biodiversity and climate change. Problems were solved in the Arctic Council, an intergovernmental forum consisting of Iceland, Norway, Finland, Russia, the USA, Canada and – because of Greenland – Denmark. Security policy is still not part of the Arctic Council’s mandate. Yet since Russia annexed Crimea and the invasion of Ukraine, security issues have also been a pressing issue here.
The Arctic is vital to Russia’s superpower claim and a key military region for deterrence and defense. Russia has the longest Arctic border of all neighboring states, and the Arctic and sub-Arctic cover a fifth of its land territory. Around 90 percent of Russia’s gas and 60 percent of its oil production are located there, as well as around 60 percent of its gas and oil reserves. Russia also regards the polar region as part of its continental shelf, i.e., as a seamless continuation of its underwater territory, creating additional territorial disputes.
In recent years, Moscow has continued ramping up its Arctic military activities. Russia conducts large-scale military drills in the north almost every year involving thousands of soldiers, aircraft, heavy equipment, underwater drones and submarines. Reactivated military bases from the Cold War can launch S-400 medium-range missiles that can reach Greenland and Alaska. MiG-31 fighter jets and other fighter-bombers can also take off from the Arctic Ocean from Russian-claimed archipelagos such as Franz Josef Land.
In a 2020 strategy paper, Sweden’s government spoke of a “new military dynamic in the Arctic” and increased its defense budget by around 40 percent. Since then, countries such as Finland and Norway have also shifted closer to the USA and NATO. As a result of its rearmament, Russia has also isolated itself in the Arctic when it comes to security policy. While the country is still part of the Arctic Council, contacts have been reduced to a minimum or severed. For example, there is hardly any research cooperation anymore. This benefits China, as Russia is opening up more and more access to its ports and territories.
“Since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has become increasingly isolated internationally. This isolation weakens Russia as a superpower, which China, as an extremely status-conscious nation, is well aware of,” Erdem Lamazhapov from the Fridtjof Nansen Institute told Table.Briefings on the sidelines of the Arctic Circle Assembly currently being held in Iceland. “In this time of weakness, China has helped Russia save face. This includes a coast guard cooperation agreement in Murmansk, as well as increased military cooperation, including joint naval drills,” says the analyst, who specializes in Sino-Russian relations in the Arctic.
This month, the Chinese Coast Guard joined Russian ships on a patrol in the Arctic for the first time. According to state broadcaster CCTV, China’s Coast Guard explained that this has “effectively expanded the scope of the Coast Guard’s navigation at sea, thoroughly tested the vessels’ ability to carry out missions in unfamiliar waters.” According to analyst Lamazhapov, however, “ultimately, these things have a larger symbolic rather than security dimension.”
Nevertheless, a Pentagon strategy report explicitly warns of increased Sino-Russian cooperation in the polar region, including the dual-use utilization of research findings that China has been gathering in the Arctic for many years as part of its “scientific diplomacy.” At the Arctic Circle in Iceland, Lisa Murkowski, US Senator for the State of Alaska, spoke of a “new cold breeze” and the danger of an “icy curtain” in the Arctic. In early October, Mike Sfraga became the first-ever Ambassador-at-Large for Arctic Affairs. China, in turn, counters that a US-dominated NATO is increasingly expanding into Arctic waters. From a nuclear strategic perspective, the Arctic indeed represents a vulnerable northern flank for China. In the event of war, the routes of American intercontinental missiles against China cross the Arctic Ocean, which is why Beijing is interested in developing early warning systems in the Arctic, among other things.
The interests of the Arctic partnership, which was born out of necessity, still coincide, most recently agreed in May with a joint declaration. The intention is to jointly extract resources, currently primarily gas. Far eastern areas of Russia and north-eastern Chinese provinces such as Heilongjiang and Jilin are also to be better integrated into the commercial exploitation of the Arctic. In the long term, however, Russia, the far more experienced and better equipped Arctic state, could lose out to China.
In fact, when China applied for observer status in the Arctic Council in 2013, Moscow rejected the idea. Even today, Russia wants to influence Chinese activities in the region and views Chinese research stations and the growing presence of Chinese Xuelong icebreakers with suspicion. Beijing does not always voluntarily share military information that would give Russia a strategic advantage. There are also known cases of Chinese espionage against Russia.
In addition, China is steadily increasing its independence from Russia through targeted investment and upgrading its ice-going naval and research vessels. With maintenance contracts for icebreakers and the expansion of Russian ports by Chinese companies, China is even well on the way to making Russia dependent on it in some areas. This dynamic could soon turn Russia into a junior partner in the Arctic – something that Moscow will hardly accept, as Marc Lanteigne, geopolitics expert at the Arctic University of Norway, explains to Table.Briefings. “This is not a relationship that I think will last in the long term, as Russia is claiming prerogatives as an Arctic state, while Beijing sees the Arctic as a new strategic frontier.”
Should China cross certain red lines, the partnership in the Arctic will soon be a thing of the past, believes Lanteigne. “China would cross this line for the Russian partner if it began to insist on greater access to the waters off Siberia or more access to the Russian Arctic coast. Even if Beijing develops a kind of independent Arctic policy in which Russia experiences a kind of devaluation, cooperation could even degenerate into hostility.”
China’s new energy vehicle (NEV) market has seen almost explosive growth in recent years. This development has also been a driver for battery recycling in the People’s Republic, as the industry faces a veritable wave of used batteries. While only 294 kilotons of used batteries were recycled in 2021, this figure will rise to around 3,000 kilotons in 2030, according to calculations by the China Automotive Technology and Research Center. According to the China Automotive Technology and Research Center, the Chinese recycling market is expected to be worth around 17 billion euros in 2030.
Industry and politics in China are prepared and could serve as a blueprint for Europe. Due to the rather homeopathic EV sales in Germany and Europe, the need for recycling will only arrive here with a delay. The good news is that, as the number of batteries sold and their life expectancy are known, it is possible to plan ahead for recycling.
A large proportion of valuable raw materials can be recovered. In an interview with Table Briefings, Thomas Schmaltz, Head of the Industrial Technologies business unit at the Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research ISI, expects demand for recycling to rise sharply. “These are enormous quantities that are coming our way. With many critical raw materials that are important for industry.”
During recycling, the relevant plants are divided into spokes and hubs according to their recycling depth:
The black mass contains the majority of the valuable materials. These can be processed pyrometallurgically or hydrometallurgically – i.e., in a smelting furnace or wet-chemically. The black mass can also be exported without any problems.
However, the European lithium battery recycling industry is still developing tentatively, as it depends on the return of used EV batteries. This year, around 50 kilotons of used batteries will be recycled in Europe. By 2030, the figure is expected to be around 420 kilotons.
By comparison, battery manufacturer CATL alone recycled around 100 kilotons in China in 2023, twice as much as in Europe. In a speech at the New Energy Vehicles Congress in early October, Zeng Yuqun, founder and CEO of CATL, emphasized that his company’s recycling capacity would be 270 kilotons in 2024. The company plans to reach 1,000 kilotons “in the near future.” Recycling is set to become a profitable line of business for CATL. However, the figures should be treated with caution due to the underlying technical process.
As the Fraunhofer Institute has calculated, European recycling capacity currently significantly exceeds demand. The annual capacity of hubs is around 350 kilotons, while that of spokes is a good 300 kilotons, almost twice as much as in the previous year. This contrasts with a battery return volume of barely 200 kilotons. However: “The capacities also include announced projects. How many of these will be implemented is another question. We assume that not everything will be realized,” Thomas Schmaltz points out.
At present, production waste is the primary source of recycled material. “Ramping up production and stopping processes is not simple. It produces tons of batteries that simply go straight into the scrap. It takes a relatively long time until a product emerges that the customer wants,” explains Schmaltz. Once production is ramped up, waste is reduced, but the number of batteries returning from the EV market increases.
Political targets play a decisive role in developing the recycling industry, as seen in China. Since 2018, car manufacturers have been required to have a tracking system to ensure that the use of batteries can be monitored and their recycling ensured. When batteries return after use in the car, many are initially reused – so-called “2nd-life use,” in forklift trucks or as stationary energy storage devices. Only then does the actual recycling process begin.
The Communist Party has set high quotas here to ensure it is one of the international leaders. The recovery rate for batteries has been set at least 98 percent for nickel, cobalt, and manganese and at least 85 percent for lithium, according to the scientific service of the German Parliament. According to Zeng Yuqun, CATL clearly exceeds these values. The battery manufacturer recovers 91 percent of lithium and as much as 99.6 percent of nickel, cobalt and manganese.
In Europe, the Battery Regulation will take over this task. “This regulation is important in order to create concrete framework conditions. When it comes to recycling, the balance between what is technically feasible and what makes economic sense is crucial,” says Schmaltz. “And the upper limit must be implemented to get the most out of it from an ecological perspective.”
The European version is less strict than the Chinese requirements, but still ambitious. It demands that 90 percent of the cobalt, copper, lead and nickel contained in the batteries be recovered from 2027 – and 95 percent from 2031. Initially, only 50 percent of lithium must be recycled and 80 percent by 2031.
It’s that time of year again when new and unusual pizza creations appear. Before Pizza Hut returns with a spooky pizza for Halloween, Domino’s presents a new product for October. After enjoying success in Japan and Taiwan, the cheese volcano pizza is now also available in Hong Kong and China. The crater in the middle, filled to the brim with cheese, serves as a dip bowl.
While masses of new electric cars are hitting the roads in China, many older battery models are nearing the end of their lives. If an EV battery falls below 70 percent of its capacity, it must be replaced. At first, a second life awaits, for example as battery storage. However, at some point, it really is time for the end of the cycle – and a new beginning. Most of the valuable raw materials can be recovered.
Battery recycling is booming in China. The country’s quotas for recovering the valuable raw materials used in batteries are very ambitious. As the big wave of discarded batteries will only arrive in Germany and Europe with some delay, it is worth looking eastwards, writes Christian Domke Seidel. Apart from ecological aspects, recycling also offers considerable economic opportunities.
The ice in the far north is melting faster than expected, and large parts of the Arctic could be ice-free as early as 2035. This will significantly change the dynamics in the region. In 2020, Sweden’s government spoke of a “new military dynamic in the Arctic region” and increased its defense budget by around 40 percent.
A particular concern in the Arctic is Russia, which produces 90 percent of its gas and 60 percent of its oil here, and for which the Arctic is also a key military region for deterrence and defense. This month, the Chinese Coast Guard joined Russian ships on a patrol in the Arctic for the first time, although analysts believe this was more symbolic than anything else. Russia and China are cooperating in the Arctic primarily for practical reasons, particularly in gas and oil production and the expansion of the Northern Sea Route.
Although the economic interests coincide for the time being, the relationship remains tense. Russia views China’s growing presence in the Arctic, including research stations and military interests, with suspicion and fears losing influence in the long term. Fabian Peltsch is in Reykjavík at the Arctic Circle Assembly and analyzes the balance of power and ambitions in the Arctic.
The Arctic ice is melting dramatically – large areas could be ice-free as early as 2035, far earlier than researchers estimated ten years ago. This also means new sea routes and mineral resources can be accessed in the far north. This spurs traditional Arctic states, as well as so-called observer states, into action. China defined itself as a state “close to the Arctic” in a foreign policy white paper back in 2018 – even though Dalian, China’s northernmost port, is some 5,700 kilometers from the North Pole. China’s Arctic plans also include Beijing talking about a “Polar Silk Road.”
China is primarily interested in mining resources such as rare earths and uranium, for example, in Greenland, which China has long been wooing with infrastructure projects. However, ice-free sea routes across the Arctic Ocean are also of high interest to China as alternative and supplementary routes to the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal. 80 percent of Chinese oil imports currently have to pass through the Strait of Malacca, a bottleneck that the USA and other countries could easily block in the event of a conflict.
On a geopolitical level, the Arctic has been a place of cooperation since the end of the Cold War, which has been reflected above all in joint research, for example, on biodiversity and climate change. Problems were solved in the Arctic Council, an intergovernmental forum consisting of Iceland, Norway, Finland, Russia, the USA, Canada and – because of Greenland – Denmark. Security policy is still not part of the Arctic Council’s mandate. Yet since Russia annexed Crimea and the invasion of Ukraine, security issues have also been a pressing issue here.
The Arctic is vital to Russia’s superpower claim and a key military region for deterrence and defense. Russia has the longest Arctic border of all neighboring states, and the Arctic and sub-Arctic cover a fifth of its land territory. Around 90 percent of Russia’s gas and 60 percent of its oil production are located there, as well as around 60 percent of its gas and oil reserves. Russia also regards the polar region as part of its continental shelf, i.e., as a seamless continuation of its underwater territory, creating additional territorial disputes.
In recent years, Moscow has continued ramping up its Arctic military activities. Russia conducts large-scale military drills in the north almost every year involving thousands of soldiers, aircraft, heavy equipment, underwater drones and submarines. Reactivated military bases from the Cold War can launch S-400 medium-range missiles that can reach Greenland and Alaska. MiG-31 fighter jets and other fighter-bombers can also take off from the Arctic Ocean from Russian-claimed archipelagos such as Franz Josef Land.
In a 2020 strategy paper, Sweden’s government spoke of a “new military dynamic in the Arctic” and increased its defense budget by around 40 percent. Since then, countries such as Finland and Norway have also shifted closer to the USA and NATO. As a result of its rearmament, Russia has also isolated itself in the Arctic when it comes to security policy. While the country is still part of the Arctic Council, contacts have been reduced to a minimum or severed. For example, there is hardly any research cooperation anymore. This benefits China, as Russia is opening up more and more access to its ports and territories.
“Since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has become increasingly isolated internationally. This isolation weakens Russia as a superpower, which China, as an extremely status-conscious nation, is well aware of,” Erdem Lamazhapov from the Fridtjof Nansen Institute told Table.Briefings on the sidelines of the Arctic Circle Assembly currently being held in Iceland. “In this time of weakness, China has helped Russia save face. This includes a coast guard cooperation agreement in Murmansk, as well as increased military cooperation, including joint naval drills,” says the analyst, who specializes in Sino-Russian relations in the Arctic.
This month, the Chinese Coast Guard joined Russian ships on a patrol in the Arctic for the first time. According to state broadcaster CCTV, China’s Coast Guard explained that this has “effectively expanded the scope of the Coast Guard’s navigation at sea, thoroughly tested the vessels’ ability to carry out missions in unfamiliar waters.” According to analyst Lamazhapov, however, “ultimately, these things have a larger symbolic rather than security dimension.”
Nevertheless, a Pentagon strategy report explicitly warns of increased Sino-Russian cooperation in the polar region, including the dual-use utilization of research findings that China has been gathering in the Arctic for many years as part of its “scientific diplomacy.” At the Arctic Circle in Iceland, Lisa Murkowski, US Senator for the State of Alaska, spoke of a “new cold breeze” and the danger of an “icy curtain” in the Arctic. In early October, Mike Sfraga became the first-ever Ambassador-at-Large for Arctic Affairs. China, in turn, counters that a US-dominated NATO is increasingly expanding into Arctic waters. From a nuclear strategic perspective, the Arctic indeed represents a vulnerable northern flank for China. In the event of war, the routes of American intercontinental missiles against China cross the Arctic Ocean, which is why Beijing is interested in developing early warning systems in the Arctic, among other things.
The interests of the Arctic partnership, which was born out of necessity, still coincide, most recently agreed in May with a joint declaration. The intention is to jointly extract resources, currently primarily gas. Far eastern areas of Russia and north-eastern Chinese provinces such as Heilongjiang and Jilin are also to be better integrated into the commercial exploitation of the Arctic. In the long term, however, Russia, the far more experienced and better equipped Arctic state, could lose out to China.
In fact, when China applied for observer status in the Arctic Council in 2013, Moscow rejected the idea. Even today, Russia wants to influence Chinese activities in the region and views Chinese research stations and the growing presence of Chinese Xuelong icebreakers with suspicion. Beijing does not always voluntarily share military information that would give Russia a strategic advantage. There are also known cases of Chinese espionage against Russia.
In addition, China is steadily increasing its independence from Russia through targeted investment and upgrading its ice-going naval and research vessels. With maintenance contracts for icebreakers and the expansion of Russian ports by Chinese companies, China is even well on the way to making Russia dependent on it in some areas. This dynamic could soon turn Russia into a junior partner in the Arctic – something that Moscow will hardly accept, as Marc Lanteigne, geopolitics expert at the Arctic University of Norway, explains to Table.Briefings. “This is not a relationship that I think will last in the long term, as Russia is claiming prerogatives as an Arctic state, while Beijing sees the Arctic as a new strategic frontier.”
Should China cross certain red lines, the partnership in the Arctic will soon be a thing of the past, believes Lanteigne. “China would cross this line for the Russian partner if it began to insist on greater access to the waters off Siberia or more access to the Russian Arctic coast. Even if Beijing develops a kind of independent Arctic policy in which Russia experiences a kind of devaluation, cooperation could even degenerate into hostility.”
China’s new energy vehicle (NEV) market has seen almost explosive growth in recent years. This development has also been a driver for battery recycling in the People’s Republic, as the industry faces a veritable wave of used batteries. While only 294 kilotons of used batteries were recycled in 2021, this figure will rise to around 3,000 kilotons in 2030, according to calculations by the China Automotive Technology and Research Center. According to the China Automotive Technology and Research Center, the Chinese recycling market is expected to be worth around 17 billion euros in 2030.
Industry and politics in China are prepared and could serve as a blueprint for Europe. Due to the rather homeopathic EV sales in Germany and Europe, the need for recycling will only arrive here with a delay. The good news is that, as the number of batteries sold and their life expectancy are known, it is possible to plan ahead for recycling.
A large proportion of valuable raw materials can be recovered. In an interview with Table Briefings, Thomas Schmaltz, Head of the Industrial Technologies business unit at the Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research ISI, expects demand for recycling to rise sharply. “These are enormous quantities that are coming our way. With many critical raw materials that are important for industry.”
During recycling, the relevant plants are divided into spokes and hubs according to their recycling depth:
The black mass contains the majority of the valuable materials. These can be processed pyrometallurgically or hydrometallurgically – i.e., in a smelting furnace or wet-chemically. The black mass can also be exported without any problems.
However, the European lithium battery recycling industry is still developing tentatively, as it depends on the return of used EV batteries. This year, around 50 kilotons of used batteries will be recycled in Europe. By 2030, the figure is expected to be around 420 kilotons.
By comparison, battery manufacturer CATL alone recycled around 100 kilotons in China in 2023, twice as much as in Europe. In a speech at the New Energy Vehicles Congress in early October, Zeng Yuqun, founder and CEO of CATL, emphasized that his company’s recycling capacity would be 270 kilotons in 2024. The company plans to reach 1,000 kilotons “in the near future.” Recycling is set to become a profitable line of business for CATL. However, the figures should be treated with caution due to the underlying technical process.
As the Fraunhofer Institute has calculated, European recycling capacity currently significantly exceeds demand. The annual capacity of hubs is around 350 kilotons, while that of spokes is a good 300 kilotons, almost twice as much as in the previous year. This contrasts with a battery return volume of barely 200 kilotons. However: “The capacities also include announced projects. How many of these will be implemented is another question. We assume that not everything will be realized,” Thomas Schmaltz points out.
At present, production waste is the primary source of recycled material. “Ramping up production and stopping processes is not simple. It produces tons of batteries that simply go straight into the scrap. It takes a relatively long time until a product emerges that the customer wants,” explains Schmaltz. Once production is ramped up, waste is reduced, but the number of batteries returning from the EV market increases.
Political targets play a decisive role in developing the recycling industry, as seen in China. Since 2018, car manufacturers have been required to have a tracking system to ensure that the use of batteries can be monitored and their recycling ensured. When batteries return after use in the car, many are initially reused – so-called “2nd-life use,” in forklift trucks or as stationary energy storage devices. Only then does the actual recycling process begin.
The Communist Party has set high quotas here to ensure it is one of the international leaders. The recovery rate for batteries has been set at least 98 percent for nickel, cobalt, and manganese and at least 85 percent for lithium, according to the scientific service of the German Parliament. According to Zeng Yuqun, CATL clearly exceeds these values. The battery manufacturer recovers 91 percent of lithium and as much as 99.6 percent of nickel, cobalt and manganese.
In Europe, the Battery Regulation will take over this task. “This regulation is important in order to create concrete framework conditions. When it comes to recycling, the balance between what is technically feasible and what makes economic sense is crucial,” says Schmaltz. “And the upper limit must be implemented to get the most out of it from an ecological perspective.”
The European version is less strict than the Chinese requirements, but still ambitious. It demands that 90 percent of the cobalt, copper, lead and nickel contained in the batteries be recovered from 2027 – and 95 percent from 2031. Initially, only 50 percent of lithium must be recycled and 80 percent by 2031.
It’s that time of year again when new and unusual pizza creations appear. Before Pizza Hut returns with a spooky pizza for Halloween, Domino’s presents a new product for October. After enjoying success in Japan and Taiwan, the cheese volcano pizza is now also available in Hong Kong and China. The crater in the middle, filled to the brim with cheese, serves as a dip bowl.
