Recently BRICS, now ASEAN, and next weekend, G20. Everywhere, the People’s Republic works towards a new world order – ideally with considerable Chinese involvement. This is supported by China’s huge economic assets, which the country sells as a win-win situation, especially in its relations with its junior partners.
Frank Sieren reports that despite considerable territorial disputes in the South China Sea with the ASEAN states, rapprochements are indeed happening. A railway connection here, an agreement there. Economic dependence yields compliance. Let’s see how far Beijing can advance its interests with this strategy without upsetting its partners. India, for one, was quite angered immediately after the BRICS summit by new Chinese maps in school textbooks that label large parts of Indian territory as part of the People’s Republic.
Perhaps that is why China’s President Xi Jinping is avoiding a cold reception from his neighbor and won’t even travel to the G20 in New Delhi. Or does he want to show the world that this forum is no longer worth a weekend of travel? Who knows? He has been traveling a lot lately, after all. And according to Xi’s perceptions, the G20 is losing importance anyway.
Not only Chinese politics, but also Chinese technology is changing the world. The German Federal Ministry of the Interior doubts whether this is in line with German security interests. At the very least, it is now also examining stricter specifications for components of Chinese providers in the construction of the access network, as Finn Mayer-Kuckuk writes. So far, the focus has been on the core network.
Incidentally, China itself already stipulated in the 1990s the development of its own technologies and the avoidance of foreign components in its network construction as far as possible. For reasons of national security. You never know who you’re going to bring into your house.
In the run-up to the ASEAN summit, it becomes clear how torn the Southeast Asian states are about China. On the one hand, they want to cooperate ever more closely with China for economic reasons, but on the other hand, they are unwilling to let their differences with Beijing slide.
This applies above all to the conflicts in the South China Sea. China is increasingly expanding in this region at the expense of its neighbors by occupying and building on atolls that are also claimed by several other countries.
ASEAN, an association of Southeast Asian nations, was founded in 1967 and held its first summit in 1976 in Indonesia. On Bali, to be precise. Today, its members include Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
Indonesia is currently also the chair of the group and thus hosts the summit, which will start on Tuesday. With a share of around three percent, all countries combined have the same economic importance as Japan alone. China, on the other hand, has a share of 18 percent, adjusted for purchasing power.
China is the largest trading partner of all ten countries and the largest single donor of development assistance to the region. Since 2015, it has provided around 5.5 billion US dollars in real terms. That is why Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong also acknowledges that ASEAN economically depends on China.
Asean covers Asia’s major developing countries. Economists estimate that the group will grow by over five percent this year. This means that growth is at least as high, but possibly higher, than China’s. Cooperation between ASEAN and China focuses on large infrastructure projects:
As far as such infrastructure measures are concerned, China is by far the most important player in the ASEAN countries.
In foreign policy terms, ASEAN predominantly shares the concept of balancing the influence of the USA and China in the region, thus playing the superpowers against each other. A good example of this balancing act is the policy of the Philippines under the new President, Ferdinand Marcos Jr. In May 2022, he won the presidential election and subsequently readjusted the Philippines’ Sino-American relations.
Marcos has intensified the economic relationship with China, while reviving a military agreement with the United States amid tensions over a reef called “Ren’ai” for China, the Ayungin Shoal for the Philippines, and the Second Thomas Shoal internationally.
The Philippines generally allows the US military to again use more naval bases. Part of the reason is the heightened tensions. As recently as 5 August, a Chinese coast guard boat blocked a Philippine navy vessel in the Spratly Islands area and fired a water cannon at it, forcing the Philippine vessel to turn around.
The fact that there will be three ASEAN summits shows how challenging this balancing process is:
US President Joe Biden will travel to the G20 summit in Delhi, which will be held shortly afterward, and Vice President Kamala Harris to the ASEAN summit. Chinese Premier Li Qiang, on the other hand, will attend all three summits.
In addition, Premier Li will meet President Joko Widodo in Indonesia. Indonesia is one of the most important countries in the group. Southeast Asia’s largest and most populous economy continues to maintain close ties with Beijing despite all sorts of ongoing tensions in the South China Sea. Li’s four-day trip is his first official visit to an ASEAN member country since taking office in March.
Beijing’s interest is clear: The Chinese government is primarily committed to ensuring that the problems of the ASEAN countries are settled mainly between Asian countries and not, for example, with the help of the Americans or other Western countries.
On the other hand, the ASEAN countries are quite open to balancing the unequal power distribution with the help of the USA and creating a counterweight to China. This does not go down well with Beijing. Without explicitly naming the United States, Foreign Minister Wang Yi accused “external forces” of “manipulating ASEAN.”
In turn, the involvement of the Americans, in particular, guarantees the ASEAN countries that the Chinese will not cross the line. However, they are not hellbent on siding with either side but, above all, on having a choice. Depending on the issue, they want to work with both the US and China.
This summit will also determine the position of ASEAN at the subsequent G20 summit in New Delhi. Indonesia will represent them at the G20.
The German Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) has once again raised critical questions about Chinese network equipment with German telecommunications providers. They are now expected to provide information on the access network, i.e., the actual antennas, within a week. Minister Nancy Faeser is thus again following up on a survey from last spring. The BMI confirmed this to Table.Media. The German newspaper Die Welt first reported on the matter.
The Ministry has already received the responses to the March survey. Apparently, its staff are now going into detail where they suspect particular vulnerabilities. There are indications that the use of the Chinese components could “impair the public order or security of the Federal Republic.” For providers Telekom, Vodafone and Telefónica, however, this process entails considerable work.
The BMI, in turn, is thus implementing the government’s cyber security strategy, among other things. It stipulates that no suppliers who are under the influence of a rival power are to be allowed in critical infrastructure. However, all Chinese companies are obliged to cooperate with government agencies.
There is no concrete evidence of acute security risks posed by the numerous Huawei components used in Germany’s wireless and data networks. But in the government’s view, the rethinking since Russia’s attack on Ukraine demands the examination of such scenarios and the precise assessment of the risks. The German government intends to complete the review in the coming weeks.
At the same time, the German public favors more European autonomy in network technology. China, for its part, already imposed severe restrictions on foreign technologies within the People’s Republic in the 1990s in order to minimize security risks.
The current debate now also explicitly includes the access network, after revolving mainly around the core network.
As a large Huawei customer, Telekom attempted to appease the German authorities by removing the Chinese parts from the core network, but wanted to keep them in the access network.
So the BMI’s latest move marks a clear step up in the pressure on the three telecommunications providers. The more Huawei parts they get to keep, the more money they save – and the sooner they can focus on further expanding Germany’s slow networks.
Because long-term contracts with Huawei are still valid, Telekom continues to install equipment from the Chinese global market leader even today. On the other hand, the BMI has made it clear that it will insist on removing the Huawei parts if the audit finds credible evidence of risks.
However, Minister Faeser has little choice but to take a very close look at the networks. The protection of critical infrastructure is also firmly anchored in Germany’s China strategy published this July. While the government is planning a dedicated critical infrastructure law, it references existing 5G rules in the China strategy.
What is clear is that no foreign state can be allowed to sabotage data transmission in Germany by simple means. In April, Politico reported that an energy management function in particular had the Interior Ministry worried. The rumors in Berlin are that China could use it to shut down parts of the network via remote maintenance.
Faeser is now putting her foot down regarding the implementation of the strategies to reduce provider risks. As Die Welt reports from Germany’s telecommunications provider circles, experts said the deadline for answering the new detailed questions was shockingly short.
In the first round, providers had provided a comprehensive list of all Chinese parts. Now, the BMI is responding with lists of detailed questions. According to the Welt report, this can hardly be done in five working days. Collaboration: Franziska Klemenz, Corinna Visser
Chinese banks are using the withdrawal of Western capital from Russia to promote their national currency, the renminbi. The People’s Republic’s four major state-owned institutions have been increasingly available as lenders to Russian banks since the start of the Ukraine war. In the 13 months since the beginning of the invasion, they have more than quadrupled the volume of loans – from 2.2 billion to 9.7 billion US dollars. That was revealed in a study of Russian Central Bank data by Ukraine’s Kyiv School of Economics (KSE) commissioned by the Financial Times.
The bulk of the increased lending is borne by the Industrial and Commercial Bank (ICBC) and the Bank of China, with 8.8 billion dollars. “The loans by Chinese banks to Russian banks and credit institutions, which are for the most part a case of the yuan taking the place of dollars and euros, show the sanctions are doing their job,” said Andrei Onopreyenko of the CFE, who compiled the data. Trade between Russia and China hit a record 185 billion US dollars in 2022.
The largest Western lender to Russian institutions is Austria’s Raiffeisen Bank, which had increased its exposure from 20.5 billion to 29.2 billion US dollars since the outbreak of the war up to and including March. However, recent data indicated that Raiffeisen Bank reduced its exposure again by five billion US dollars. grz
“China, we have nothing to do with that,” was her first reaction when her husband confronted her with vacancies in the faraway country. And yet, soon after, the two set off for the Far East. Martina Boelck was employed as a lecturer at the Pedagogical University of Beijing between 2003 and 2008 through the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD).
During this time, while teaching Chinese students the German language and literature, regional studies and scientific writing, she also learned a lot of new things. For example, she wondered why the young adults mostly mentioned “sleeping” as a hobby and also often appeared tired in class.
She later learned that some students spent their nights gaming in video arcades. The enormous grade pressure probably also contributed to the fatigue. But her students did not only allow her extensive insights into Chinese society when it came to sleeping habits: “I could always have them write papers,” she said. For example, on the topics: Having children or not having children? Should you live together before marriage or not? “I could put in anything that interested me as a topic, and then it was discussed, and I could ask all my questions.”
She also had to familiarize herself with the procedures of the bureaucracy or the hierarchies at work. “That’s actually what I found really exciting and interesting. That you learn to take other perspectives, not just theoretically, but you’re always pushed into it.”
After this memorable experience in China, she continued to study the country back in Germany. In 2022, she published her book ” Was sie dachten, niemals über China wissen zu wollen” (“What you thought you would never want to know about China”). In 55 short chapters, she humorously describes everything she learned, experienced and researched.
In recent years, she has been particularly interested in the history of Germans in China. Together with Hilke Veth, she conceived the radio report ” Kaufleute, Missionare, Soldaten – Die Lange Nacht der China-Deutschen” (“Merchants, Missionaries, Soldiers – The long night of the Chinese-Germans”), which was broadcast by Deutschlandfunk.
The two women are working on a new book with a similar focus. We picked out 18 women who wrote about their experiences in China between the Opium Wars and the founding of the People’s Republic. We think what they experienced also reflects Sino-German history.” And Martina Boelck adds, “Our hope is to present these women and show all the exciting approaches to the country of China.”
Her passion for the history of the Germans in China is also explored in her work for Studeo (Studienwerk Deutsches Leben in Ostasien e.V.). Studeo was founded in 1992 by a group of East Asian Germans to preserve knowledge about the work of Germans in East Asia.
Among other things, Studeo collects documents and diaries, so she has access to a vast archive. With all these different works, Martina Boelck gets her money’s worth when it comes to her interests in influential female figures and life stories. Juliane Scholuebbers
Chinese coffee chain Luckin Coffee unveiled a much-discussed new product Monday in cooperation with spirits maker Kweichow Moutai: This latte macchiato contains a shot of high-proof millet-wheat liquor – Moutai. The alcohol content is said to be less than 0.5 percent, according to the supplier. Offered for 38 yuan, the drink will be half-price at launch. Kweichow Moutai already launched an alcohol-infused ice cream last year.
Recently BRICS, now ASEAN, and next weekend, G20. Everywhere, the People’s Republic works towards a new world order – ideally with considerable Chinese involvement. This is supported by China’s huge economic assets, which the country sells as a win-win situation, especially in its relations with its junior partners.
Frank Sieren reports that despite considerable territorial disputes in the South China Sea with the ASEAN states, rapprochements are indeed happening. A railway connection here, an agreement there. Economic dependence yields compliance. Let’s see how far Beijing can advance its interests with this strategy without upsetting its partners. India, for one, was quite angered immediately after the BRICS summit by new Chinese maps in school textbooks that label large parts of Indian territory as part of the People’s Republic.
Perhaps that is why China’s President Xi Jinping is avoiding a cold reception from his neighbor and won’t even travel to the G20 in New Delhi. Or does he want to show the world that this forum is no longer worth a weekend of travel? Who knows? He has been traveling a lot lately, after all. And according to Xi’s perceptions, the G20 is losing importance anyway.
Not only Chinese politics, but also Chinese technology is changing the world. The German Federal Ministry of the Interior doubts whether this is in line with German security interests. At the very least, it is now also examining stricter specifications for components of Chinese providers in the construction of the access network, as Finn Mayer-Kuckuk writes. So far, the focus has been on the core network.
Incidentally, China itself already stipulated in the 1990s the development of its own technologies and the avoidance of foreign components in its network construction as far as possible. For reasons of national security. You never know who you’re going to bring into your house.
In the run-up to the ASEAN summit, it becomes clear how torn the Southeast Asian states are about China. On the one hand, they want to cooperate ever more closely with China for economic reasons, but on the other hand, they are unwilling to let their differences with Beijing slide.
This applies above all to the conflicts in the South China Sea. China is increasingly expanding in this region at the expense of its neighbors by occupying and building on atolls that are also claimed by several other countries.
ASEAN, an association of Southeast Asian nations, was founded in 1967 and held its first summit in 1976 in Indonesia. On Bali, to be precise. Today, its members include Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
Indonesia is currently also the chair of the group and thus hosts the summit, which will start on Tuesday. With a share of around three percent, all countries combined have the same economic importance as Japan alone. China, on the other hand, has a share of 18 percent, adjusted for purchasing power.
China is the largest trading partner of all ten countries and the largest single donor of development assistance to the region. Since 2015, it has provided around 5.5 billion US dollars in real terms. That is why Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong also acknowledges that ASEAN economically depends on China.
Asean covers Asia’s major developing countries. Economists estimate that the group will grow by over five percent this year. This means that growth is at least as high, but possibly higher, than China’s. Cooperation between ASEAN and China focuses on large infrastructure projects:
As far as such infrastructure measures are concerned, China is by far the most important player in the ASEAN countries.
In foreign policy terms, ASEAN predominantly shares the concept of balancing the influence of the USA and China in the region, thus playing the superpowers against each other. A good example of this balancing act is the policy of the Philippines under the new President, Ferdinand Marcos Jr. In May 2022, he won the presidential election and subsequently readjusted the Philippines’ Sino-American relations.
Marcos has intensified the economic relationship with China, while reviving a military agreement with the United States amid tensions over a reef called “Ren’ai” for China, the Ayungin Shoal for the Philippines, and the Second Thomas Shoal internationally.
The Philippines generally allows the US military to again use more naval bases. Part of the reason is the heightened tensions. As recently as 5 August, a Chinese coast guard boat blocked a Philippine navy vessel in the Spratly Islands area and fired a water cannon at it, forcing the Philippine vessel to turn around.
The fact that there will be three ASEAN summits shows how challenging this balancing process is:
US President Joe Biden will travel to the G20 summit in Delhi, which will be held shortly afterward, and Vice President Kamala Harris to the ASEAN summit. Chinese Premier Li Qiang, on the other hand, will attend all three summits.
In addition, Premier Li will meet President Joko Widodo in Indonesia. Indonesia is one of the most important countries in the group. Southeast Asia’s largest and most populous economy continues to maintain close ties with Beijing despite all sorts of ongoing tensions in the South China Sea. Li’s four-day trip is his first official visit to an ASEAN member country since taking office in March.
Beijing’s interest is clear: The Chinese government is primarily committed to ensuring that the problems of the ASEAN countries are settled mainly between Asian countries and not, for example, with the help of the Americans or other Western countries.
On the other hand, the ASEAN countries are quite open to balancing the unequal power distribution with the help of the USA and creating a counterweight to China. This does not go down well with Beijing. Without explicitly naming the United States, Foreign Minister Wang Yi accused “external forces” of “manipulating ASEAN.”
In turn, the involvement of the Americans, in particular, guarantees the ASEAN countries that the Chinese will not cross the line. However, they are not hellbent on siding with either side but, above all, on having a choice. Depending on the issue, they want to work with both the US and China.
This summit will also determine the position of ASEAN at the subsequent G20 summit in New Delhi. Indonesia will represent them at the G20.
The German Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) has once again raised critical questions about Chinese network equipment with German telecommunications providers. They are now expected to provide information on the access network, i.e., the actual antennas, within a week. Minister Nancy Faeser is thus again following up on a survey from last spring. The BMI confirmed this to Table.Media. The German newspaper Die Welt first reported on the matter.
The Ministry has already received the responses to the March survey. Apparently, its staff are now going into detail where they suspect particular vulnerabilities. There are indications that the use of the Chinese components could “impair the public order or security of the Federal Republic.” For providers Telekom, Vodafone and Telefónica, however, this process entails considerable work.
The BMI, in turn, is thus implementing the government’s cyber security strategy, among other things. It stipulates that no suppliers who are under the influence of a rival power are to be allowed in critical infrastructure. However, all Chinese companies are obliged to cooperate with government agencies.
There is no concrete evidence of acute security risks posed by the numerous Huawei components used in Germany’s wireless and data networks. But in the government’s view, the rethinking since Russia’s attack on Ukraine demands the examination of such scenarios and the precise assessment of the risks. The German government intends to complete the review in the coming weeks.
At the same time, the German public favors more European autonomy in network technology. China, for its part, already imposed severe restrictions on foreign technologies within the People’s Republic in the 1990s in order to minimize security risks.
The current debate now also explicitly includes the access network, after revolving mainly around the core network.
As a large Huawei customer, Telekom attempted to appease the German authorities by removing the Chinese parts from the core network, but wanted to keep them in the access network.
So the BMI’s latest move marks a clear step up in the pressure on the three telecommunications providers. The more Huawei parts they get to keep, the more money they save – and the sooner they can focus on further expanding Germany’s slow networks.
Because long-term contracts with Huawei are still valid, Telekom continues to install equipment from the Chinese global market leader even today. On the other hand, the BMI has made it clear that it will insist on removing the Huawei parts if the audit finds credible evidence of risks.
However, Minister Faeser has little choice but to take a very close look at the networks. The protection of critical infrastructure is also firmly anchored in Germany’s China strategy published this July. While the government is planning a dedicated critical infrastructure law, it references existing 5G rules in the China strategy.
What is clear is that no foreign state can be allowed to sabotage data transmission in Germany by simple means. In April, Politico reported that an energy management function in particular had the Interior Ministry worried. The rumors in Berlin are that China could use it to shut down parts of the network via remote maintenance.
Faeser is now putting her foot down regarding the implementation of the strategies to reduce provider risks. As Die Welt reports from Germany’s telecommunications provider circles, experts said the deadline for answering the new detailed questions was shockingly short.
In the first round, providers had provided a comprehensive list of all Chinese parts. Now, the BMI is responding with lists of detailed questions. According to the Welt report, this can hardly be done in five working days. Collaboration: Franziska Klemenz, Corinna Visser
Chinese banks are using the withdrawal of Western capital from Russia to promote their national currency, the renminbi. The People’s Republic’s four major state-owned institutions have been increasingly available as lenders to Russian banks since the start of the Ukraine war. In the 13 months since the beginning of the invasion, they have more than quadrupled the volume of loans – from 2.2 billion to 9.7 billion US dollars. That was revealed in a study of Russian Central Bank data by Ukraine’s Kyiv School of Economics (KSE) commissioned by the Financial Times.
The bulk of the increased lending is borne by the Industrial and Commercial Bank (ICBC) and the Bank of China, with 8.8 billion dollars. “The loans by Chinese banks to Russian banks and credit institutions, which are for the most part a case of the yuan taking the place of dollars and euros, show the sanctions are doing their job,” said Andrei Onopreyenko of the CFE, who compiled the data. Trade between Russia and China hit a record 185 billion US dollars in 2022.
The largest Western lender to Russian institutions is Austria’s Raiffeisen Bank, which had increased its exposure from 20.5 billion to 29.2 billion US dollars since the outbreak of the war up to and including March. However, recent data indicated that Raiffeisen Bank reduced its exposure again by five billion US dollars. grz
“China, we have nothing to do with that,” was her first reaction when her husband confronted her with vacancies in the faraway country. And yet, soon after, the two set off for the Far East. Martina Boelck was employed as a lecturer at the Pedagogical University of Beijing between 2003 and 2008 through the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD).
During this time, while teaching Chinese students the German language and literature, regional studies and scientific writing, she also learned a lot of new things. For example, she wondered why the young adults mostly mentioned “sleeping” as a hobby and also often appeared tired in class.
She later learned that some students spent their nights gaming in video arcades. The enormous grade pressure probably also contributed to the fatigue. But her students did not only allow her extensive insights into Chinese society when it came to sleeping habits: “I could always have them write papers,” she said. For example, on the topics: Having children or not having children? Should you live together before marriage or not? “I could put in anything that interested me as a topic, and then it was discussed, and I could ask all my questions.”
She also had to familiarize herself with the procedures of the bureaucracy or the hierarchies at work. “That’s actually what I found really exciting and interesting. That you learn to take other perspectives, not just theoretically, but you’re always pushed into it.”
After this memorable experience in China, she continued to study the country back in Germany. In 2022, she published her book ” Was sie dachten, niemals über China wissen zu wollen” (“What you thought you would never want to know about China”). In 55 short chapters, she humorously describes everything she learned, experienced and researched.
In recent years, she has been particularly interested in the history of Germans in China. Together with Hilke Veth, she conceived the radio report ” Kaufleute, Missionare, Soldaten – Die Lange Nacht der China-Deutschen” (“Merchants, Missionaries, Soldiers – The long night of the Chinese-Germans”), which was broadcast by Deutschlandfunk.
The two women are working on a new book with a similar focus. We picked out 18 women who wrote about their experiences in China between the Opium Wars and the founding of the People’s Republic. We think what they experienced also reflects Sino-German history.” And Martina Boelck adds, “Our hope is to present these women and show all the exciting approaches to the country of China.”
Her passion for the history of the Germans in China is also explored in her work for Studeo (Studienwerk Deutsches Leben in Ostasien e.V.). Studeo was founded in 1992 by a group of East Asian Germans to preserve knowledge about the work of Germans in East Asia.
Among other things, Studeo collects documents and diaries, so she has access to a vast archive. With all these different works, Martina Boelck gets her money’s worth when it comes to her interests in influential female figures and life stories. Juliane Scholuebbers
Chinese coffee chain Luckin Coffee unveiled a much-discussed new product Monday in cooperation with spirits maker Kweichow Moutai: This latte macchiato contains a shot of high-proof millet-wheat liquor – Moutai. The alcohol content is said to be less than 0.5 percent, according to the supplier. Offered for 38 yuan, the drink will be half-price at launch. Kweichow Moutai already launched an alcohol-infused ice cream last year.
