Have you ever fallen victim to Chinese propaganda? No reason to be ashamed! This happens to business representatives, politicians and scientists all the time. Journalists, too, by the way. But it is not forbidden to learn from one’s mistakes.
Chinese media currently provide textbook propaganda in abundance, which can help us become more aware of the contradictions in the narratives of authoritarian states. A good example is the two completely contradictory Covid narratives from the Chinese central office: Fabian Peltsch describes the phenomenon from zero-Covid to zero-caution.
This example is so valuable because it is rare that lines of arguments in dictatorships have to be so drastically overturned overnight. Because those in power also know that their own credibility suffers as a result. However, this farce offers the opportunity to draw conclusions about other topics in which 180-degree turns are not to be expected and where contradictions, therefore, do not reveal themselves so drastically.
The dispute over the islands in the South China Sea is certainly an issue where China’s propaganda will maintain its original line, no matter what happens. Michael Radunski shows what countermeasures other states take against China’s advance. But here, too, one should not be deceived: The People’s Republic of China is essentially at the root of growing tensions. Whether one is willing to risk this transfer as a consumer of Chinese media is, of course, up to each of us to decide.
A recent report by the financial news service Bloomberg caused a stir: China is in the process of expanding several unoccupied land masses in the South China Sea. This is a dramatic intensification of China’s strategy in the South China Sea, the report said, citing two unnamed Western diplomats.
However, what is new is that the reefs are reportedly rock formations that would not have been under Chinese control before. Until now, ports, airstrips and military infrastructure have been built on reefs previously occupied by Beijing (China.Table reported). It would indeed be an unprecedented act.
China’s Foreign Ministry immediately dismissed the report as false. And Gregory Poling, head of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) in Washington, was also unable to confirm the Bloomberg report. Satellite images available to him showed no significant changes on the four reefs in question. On the contrary: “I would argue that 2022 might actually have been the first year since at least 2012 in which China did not gain greater control of the South China Sea,” Poling told China.Table.
The area in question is one of the world’s most geostrategically important regions: Around a third of all global trade passes through here, and in addition, the area is rich in raw materials. Whoever is in control here holds an extremely powerful position. Accordingly, all neighboring states have competing claims. China, with its “nine-dash line,” claims more than 80 percent of the 3.5 million square kilometer area. The situation is correspondingly tense. According to Poling, China deploys law enforcement and militia vessels over a wide area in the South China Sea to harass Southeast Asian civilians and foreign government vessels.
Collin Koh, a researcher at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies in Singapore, also points to a legal tightening of the situation under Beijing’s 2021 Coast Guard Law. “This new law authorizes naval forces to take necessary action against what Beijing may see as undermining its maritime sovereignty and rights in the South China Sea, including the use of force,” Koh explains.
Clashes between ship formations of different states on the high seas have become increasingly frequent. Perhaps the most controversial incident occurred in 2021, when China sent more than 200 alleged fishing boats with militias on board to Whitsun Reef. These vessels clearly entered the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone and came dangerously close to a reef occupied by Vietnam.
The tense situation lasted for several months. Escalation seemed inevitable when then Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte said, “If I send my marines to drive away the Chinese fishermen, I guarantee you not one of them will come home alive.”
Fortunately, the incident ended peacefully with the departure of the Chinese vessels. So far, the Chinese side has not resorted to force. “But each of these encounters carries the risk of escalation,” Koh warns.
We also observe a growing military gray zone – from the coast guard to civilian fishing. Felix Heiduk of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs explained in an interview with Table.Media: “China’s fishing fleets are increasingly operating in tandem with the coast guard and navy in order to assert territorial claims, for example against the Philippines or Vietnam.” The Chinese coast guard now possesses very large, armed ships.
There is also a new and dangerous development: While China has recently reduced its expansion activities, other countries are now beginning to massively increase their presence in the South China Sea. Satellite images show that Vietnam has expanded dredging and landfilling operations at its outposts on the Spratly Islands in the second half of 2022, creating some 170 hectares of new land. “There are no saints in the South China Sea,” Koh said. Each party has engaged in activities that violate the spirit of the 2002 Declaration of Conduct.
However, China’s actions stand out. On the one hand, because of the existing power asymmetry against other neighboring states. And on the other hand, Beijing’s self-confidence is growing.
Particularly dangerous in this context is the lack of recognized crisis mechanisms in the South China Sea. The biggest obstacle here is the lack of trust between the individual parties. External forces such as the EU or even the UN could theoretically be considered to act as independent mediators. However, China in particular rejects this as “external interference”. Instead, Beijing advocates an “Asian solution” – probably also in the hope that this will allow it to take advantage of its own supremacy.
The abrupt change in China’s Covid policy confronts the censorship authorities with a monumental task, which will certainly impact social stability: How do you explain the 180-degree turn from zero-Covid to zero-caution to your own population? A clear direction only emerged slowly after the strict measures were lifted after December 7, which also suggests a great deal of uncertainty behind the scenes.
No wonder: The around 120 official slogans that propaganda used to hammer Xi Jinping’s zero-Covid policy into the minds of the people cannot be erased overnight. The numerous cartoons in the state media, which branded the West’s opening without any hard lockdowns as a systemic failure, suddenly seemed like commentaries on their own self-made Covid disaster.
To get a grip on the situation, the propaganda machinery resorts to tried-and-tested measures: spreading optimism, hiding mistakes, and finding scapegoats. After all, as they now claim, Omicron turned out to be a kind of flu with a mortality rate that no longer requires strict lockdown measures. Authorities in the mega-metropolis of Chongqing, for example, have announced that people exhibiting mild symptoms can even go to work.
Several state-run newspapers report that a woman from Xinjiang, aged over 100, recovered from her infection “surprisingly quickly” after a 10-day hospital stay – despite suffering from pre-existing medical conditions and high blood pressure.
And yet, the overall lockdown measures had been worthwhile nonetheless, according to a Dec. 12 People’s Daily editorial. They would have bought time to create better medical conditions and keep the death toll down.
Shortly before Christmas, the state media also praised the positive effect on the economy. The strict lockdowns would have maintained economic growth, albeit at lower rates. The Global Times calls the narrative in Western media of China risking the deaths of large portions of its elderly population “racist, bigoted and intolerant.” “Any event that causes Chinese deaths is warmly welcomed by Western propagandists,” they say.
Discontent among the Chinese population was due to “different opinions” in a large country, Xi Jinping said in a televised address at the end of last year, without mentioning the many protests in China’s large cities. “Since the outbreak of the epidemic, we have always put people and life first,” Xi said.
Hu Xijin, the former editor-in-chief of the Global Times said on Twitter that during a trip from Beijing to Chengdu, he noticed that normality returned everywhere. “The impact of [the] epidemic is fading away quickly.” To prove that all is not so bad, the Global Times also points out, among other things, that overall life expectancy in China is still rising, unlike in the United States. Cynical whataboutism, considering all the deaths that now have to be mourned all over China. Moreover, Beijing still refuses to allow the use of verifiable effective mRNA vaccines from the West for ideological reasons.
Another argument that is now popping up everywhere is that the opening was planned long in advance and that decisions to this effect were already taken in November 2022 in Zhongnanhai. The “dynamic Covid policy” immediately reacted to “milder” versions like Omicron, writes the Global Times. “China’s socialist system has shown again and again that it is capable of unprecedented resilience and adaptability.”
However, proof that there was no master plan behind the opening is the fact that despite tough lockdowns, the state failed to adequately vaccinate more than 40 percent of people over the age of 80. Omicron was detected in China as early as the end of 2021. On top of that, the opening was rushed just weeks before the Spring Festival. Millions of Chinese will travel the country this week amid still-cold temperatures. This will put even more strain on the already overwhelmed healthcare system.
The way the government performed its U-turn was expected, says a 35-year-old Beijing woman who lost her job in the media industry during a lockdown. She compares the approach to a child changing their mood from one moment to the next. “It’s like 80- and 90-year-olds suddenly no longer exist.”
A joke is making the rounds on the Internet that sums up the confusion over the sudden turnaround in a conversation between three inmates telling each other the reasons for their arrest:
“I opposed Covid testing.”
“I supported Covid testing.”
“I conducted Covid testing.”
Of course, openly complaining is not an option. More than 1,000 social media accounts – some with millions of followers – have already been suspended for criticizing the government’s Covid policy. Hashtags such as “chameleon” and “fork-tongued” were temporarily blocked. Cartoons depicting overwhelmed crematories or comments doubting the official cause of death of deceased celebrities were also quickly filtered out.
However, the fact that the Chinese people are glad to no longer have to fear lockdowns and to finally be allowed to travel again plays right into the government’s hands. Here, too, China’s propaganda machinery has devised a strategy to avoid dealing with its own mistakes. In the state media, the precautionary measures taken by some countries to test Chinese travelers for Covid are now being slandered as “discrimination” – and this even though China also requires travelers to present negative tests.
The propaganda thus picks up on the narrative of the “China virus” at the beginning of the pandemic, with which foreign forces allegedly tried to blame China. The message behind the calculated outrage was that the Chinese made many sacrifices in the fight against the virus. And now it is foreign countries that allegedly still refuse to grant them freedom out of “revenge”.
Scientific exchange with China has recently come under suspicion. On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of scientific cooperation with China, German Research Minister Bettina Stark-Watzinger urged vigilance. China, she said, has gone from being a strategic partner to a tough competitor and systemic rival for Germany and the EU. DAAD President Joybrato Mukherjee even believes that the era of partnership relations between China and Germany is coming to an end. Politicians and science managers in Germany increasingly feel that research cooperation is unfair and unilaterally benefits China.
After 50 years of successful cooperation, mutual distrust has replaced faith in the common benefits of scientific collaboration. A strange mix of isolationism and nationalism is spreading across the globe. We live in a time of incipient deglobalization. Both Germany and China increasingly place their own interests above shared concerns and dream of a future with greater “independence” and “autonomy,” even though historically no country has ever benefited from decoupling.
But what are the consequences?
The underlying concern behind the new fear of China is that China will scientifically surpass Germany. After all, China has far more intellectual capital than any other country on earth. In 2030, 37 percent of all graduates in mint disciplines will come from China – compared to 1.4 percent from Germany.
The relevance of the Chinese education system is also reflected in the steady rise of Chinese universities in global rankings. Top German universities such as TU Munich (50th place) are already behind the Chinese ones (Qinghua University: 17, Peking University: 18).
China has the world’s most dynamic science system. In the prestigious Nature Index, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) is currently ranked first, ahead of Harvard University (second) and the Max Planck Society (third).
Another indicator is research articles submitted to professional conferences. In the field of semiconductor research, for example, the International Solid-State Circuits Conference (ISSCC) is considered an indicator of the intensity of research efforts in countries of origin. In recent years, the United States has always had the most accepted articles, followed by South Korea in second and China in third. In 2022, China had the most papers for the first time. 198 papers were accepted in total, of which 59 were from China, 42 from the US, and 32 from South Korea. China was strongly represented in all research categories.
China’s education system should be viewed less as a threat and more as an opportunity. German research institutions have been strengthened enormously by recruiting Chinese students, doctoral candidates and scientists. The German research landscape has been significantly enriched by exceptional Chinese guest scientists and partners. If Germany now turns these scientists and partnerships away, then Germany harms itself first and foremost. Today, any science system that is not open to talent and collaborations from around the world has to fear falling to second-class status.
The German science system is less threatened by China than by domestic problems such as underfunding, lack of investment and poor agility. Excellence and top international research are strengthened by cooperation, but also by international competition for talent, funding and citation indices.
Nevertheless, some German universities have reviewed their cooperation with China. Heinrich Heine University in Duesseldorf as well as the University of Hamburg have decided to terminate cooperation with their Confucius Institutes. But self-righteous German science politicians and university administrations do not know – or do not want to know – how committed deans and presidents of many Chinese universities are to shield both international collaborations and students from political pressure. The December 2022 protests against the Covid policy started in universities precisely because courageous leaders there have been able to preserve a valuable measure of freedom over the years.
In November 2022, MIT in Cambridge published extensive guidelines for dealing with Chinese universities and research institutions, something from which German institutions can learn a lot. The commission that drafted the guidelines explicitly points out that disengaging from Chinese partners would jeopardize MIT’s position as a top university and harm scientific progress. Accordingly, cooperation with Chinese partners is to be explicitly continued and expanded. Project managers and review panels receive clear recommendations on what to consider in cooperation projects and under what circumstances such projects should be rejected.
The guidelines show that critical yet constructive interaction with Chinese partners is possible. And they also demonstrate the courage and determination of a university administration not to engage in speculation and accusations in a China-critical climate or to cave in, but to form its own judgment based on evidence and expertise.
Such an approach would also serve German universities well. German universities enjoy an excellent reputation in China, and the vast majority of returning students or academics feel a lifelong bond with Germany.
Chinese universities have led the country to the top of the world in science and technology. They survived countless political campaigns in the socialist People’s Republic of China, and time and again actively protected their freedom as scientific institutions – often under difficult circumstances. They have seen interventions like the current restrictions under Xi Jinping come and go. They need to think in the long term. And so should we.
By severing our ties with Chinese universities, we do the most harm to scholars who share the values of open and free science and work to achieve them at the risk of personal detriment. Direct collaboration and communication with students and scholars on the ground in China helps to break through the government’s omnipresent rhetoric and propaganda, provide alternative perspectives, and establish discursive spaces.
The Chinese Long March-2D carrier rocket launched 14 satellites into Earth orbit on Sunday. The rocket launched at 11:14 a.m. from the Taiyuan Spaceport in the province of Shanxi. On board, among others: the observation satellites Qilu-2 and Qilu-3.
Have you ever fallen victim to Chinese propaganda? No reason to be ashamed! This happens to business representatives, politicians and scientists all the time. Journalists, too, by the way. But it is not forbidden to learn from one’s mistakes.
Chinese media currently provide textbook propaganda in abundance, which can help us become more aware of the contradictions in the narratives of authoritarian states. A good example is the two completely contradictory Covid narratives from the Chinese central office: Fabian Peltsch describes the phenomenon from zero-Covid to zero-caution.
This example is so valuable because it is rare that lines of arguments in dictatorships have to be so drastically overturned overnight. Because those in power also know that their own credibility suffers as a result. However, this farce offers the opportunity to draw conclusions about other topics in which 180-degree turns are not to be expected and where contradictions, therefore, do not reveal themselves so drastically.
The dispute over the islands in the South China Sea is certainly an issue where China’s propaganda will maintain its original line, no matter what happens. Michael Radunski shows what countermeasures other states take against China’s advance. But here, too, one should not be deceived: The People’s Republic of China is essentially at the root of growing tensions. Whether one is willing to risk this transfer as a consumer of Chinese media is, of course, up to each of us to decide.
A recent report by the financial news service Bloomberg caused a stir: China is in the process of expanding several unoccupied land masses in the South China Sea. This is a dramatic intensification of China’s strategy in the South China Sea, the report said, citing two unnamed Western diplomats.
However, what is new is that the reefs are reportedly rock formations that would not have been under Chinese control before. Until now, ports, airstrips and military infrastructure have been built on reefs previously occupied by Beijing (China.Table reported). It would indeed be an unprecedented act.
China’s Foreign Ministry immediately dismissed the report as false. And Gregory Poling, head of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) in Washington, was also unable to confirm the Bloomberg report. Satellite images available to him showed no significant changes on the four reefs in question. On the contrary: “I would argue that 2022 might actually have been the first year since at least 2012 in which China did not gain greater control of the South China Sea,” Poling told China.Table.
The area in question is one of the world’s most geostrategically important regions: Around a third of all global trade passes through here, and in addition, the area is rich in raw materials. Whoever is in control here holds an extremely powerful position. Accordingly, all neighboring states have competing claims. China, with its “nine-dash line,” claims more than 80 percent of the 3.5 million square kilometer area. The situation is correspondingly tense. According to Poling, China deploys law enforcement and militia vessels over a wide area in the South China Sea to harass Southeast Asian civilians and foreign government vessels.
Collin Koh, a researcher at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies in Singapore, also points to a legal tightening of the situation under Beijing’s 2021 Coast Guard Law. “This new law authorizes naval forces to take necessary action against what Beijing may see as undermining its maritime sovereignty and rights in the South China Sea, including the use of force,” Koh explains.
Clashes between ship formations of different states on the high seas have become increasingly frequent. Perhaps the most controversial incident occurred in 2021, when China sent more than 200 alleged fishing boats with militias on board to Whitsun Reef. These vessels clearly entered the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone and came dangerously close to a reef occupied by Vietnam.
The tense situation lasted for several months. Escalation seemed inevitable when then Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte said, “If I send my marines to drive away the Chinese fishermen, I guarantee you not one of them will come home alive.”
Fortunately, the incident ended peacefully with the departure of the Chinese vessels. So far, the Chinese side has not resorted to force. “But each of these encounters carries the risk of escalation,” Koh warns.
We also observe a growing military gray zone – from the coast guard to civilian fishing. Felix Heiduk of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs explained in an interview with Table.Media: “China’s fishing fleets are increasingly operating in tandem with the coast guard and navy in order to assert territorial claims, for example against the Philippines or Vietnam.” The Chinese coast guard now possesses very large, armed ships.
There is also a new and dangerous development: While China has recently reduced its expansion activities, other countries are now beginning to massively increase their presence in the South China Sea. Satellite images show that Vietnam has expanded dredging and landfilling operations at its outposts on the Spratly Islands in the second half of 2022, creating some 170 hectares of new land. “There are no saints in the South China Sea,” Koh said. Each party has engaged in activities that violate the spirit of the 2002 Declaration of Conduct.
However, China’s actions stand out. On the one hand, because of the existing power asymmetry against other neighboring states. And on the other hand, Beijing’s self-confidence is growing.
Particularly dangerous in this context is the lack of recognized crisis mechanisms in the South China Sea. The biggest obstacle here is the lack of trust between the individual parties. External forces such as the EU or even the UN could theoretically be considered to act as independent mediators. However, China in particular rejects this as “external interference”. Instead, Beijing advocates an “Asian solution” – probably also in the hope that this will allow it to take advantage of its own supremacy.
The abrupt change in China’s Covid policy confronts the censorship authorities with a monumental task, which will certainly impact social stability: How do you explain the 180-degree turn from zero-Covid to zero-caution to your own population? A clear direction only emerged slowly after the strict measures were lifted after December 7, which also suggests a great deal of uncertainty behind the scenes.
No wonder: The around 120 official slogans that propaganda used to hammer Xi Jinping’s zero-Covid policy into the minds of the people cannot be erased overnight. The numerous cartoons in the state media, which branded the West’s opening without any hard lockdowns as a systemic failure, suddenly seemed like commentaries on their own self-made Covid disaster.
To get a grip on the situation, the propaganda machinery resorts to tried-and-tested measures: spreading optimism, hiding mistakes, and finding scapegoats. After all, as they now claim, Omicron turned out to be a kind of flu with a mortality rate that no longer requires strict lockdown measures. Authorities in the mega-metropolis of Chongqing, for example, have announced that people exhibiting mild symptoms can even go to work.
Several state-run newspapers report that a woman from Xinjiang, aged over 100, recovered from her infection “surprisingly quickly” after a 10-day hospital stay – despite suffering from pre-existing medical conditions and high blood pressure.
And yet, the overall lockdown measures had been worthwhile nonetheless, according to a Dec. 12 People’s Daily editorial. They would have bought time to create better medical conditions and keep the death toll down.
Shortly before Christmas, the state media also praised the positive effect on the economy. The strict lockdowns would have maintained economic growth, albeit at lower rates. The Global Times calls the narrative in Western media of China risking the deaths of large portions of its elderly population “racist, bigoted and intolerant.” “Any event that causes Chinese deaths is warmly welcomed by Western propagandists,” they say.
Discontent among the Chinese population was due to “different opinions” in a large country, Xi Jinping said in a televised address at the end of last year, without mentioning the many protests in China’s large cities. “Since the outbreak of the epidemic, we have always put people and life first,” Xi said.
Hu Xijin, the former editor-in-chief of the Global Times said on Twitter that during a trip from Beijing to Chengdu, he noticed that normality returned everywhere. “The impact of [the] epidemic is fading away quickly.” To prove that all is not so bad, the Global Times also points out, among other things, that overall life expectancy in China is still rising, unlike in the United States. Cynical whataboutism, considering all the deaths that now have to be mourned all over China. Moreover, Beijing still refuses to allow the use of verifiable effective mRNA vaccines from the West for ideological reasons.
Another argument that is now popping up everywhere is that the opening was planned long in advance and that decisions to this effect were already taken in November 2022 in Zhongnanhai. The “dynamic Covid policy” immediately reacted to “milder” versions like Omicron, writes the Global Times. “China’s socialist system has shown again and again that it is capable of unprecedented resilience and adaptability.”
However, proof that there was no master plan behind the opening is the fact that despite tough lockdowns, the state failed to adequately vaccinate more than 40 percent of people over the age of 80. Omicron was detected in China as early as the end of 2021. On top of that, the opening was rushed just weeks before the Spring Festival. Millions of Chinese will travel the country this week amid still-cold temperatures. This will put even more strain on the already overwhelmed healthcare system.
The way the government performed its U-turn was expected, says a 35-year-old Beijing woman who lost her job in the media industry during a lockdown. She compares the approach to a child changing their mood from one moment to the next. “It’s like 80- and 90-year-olds suddenly no longer exist.”
A joke is making the rounds on the Internet that sums up the confusion over the sudden turnaround in a conversation between three inmates telling each other the reasons for their arrest:
“I opposed Covid testing.”
“I supported Covid testing.”
“I conducted Covid testing.”
Of course, openly complaining is not an option. More than 1,000 social media accounts – some with millions of followers – have already been suspended for criticizing the government’s Covid policy. Hashtags such as “chameleon” and “fork-tongued” were temporarily blocked. Cartoons depicting overwhelmed crematories or comments doubting the official cause of death of deceased celebrities were also quickly filtered out.
However, the fact that the Chinese people are glad to no longer have to fear lockdowns and to finally be allowed to travel again plays right into the government’s hands. Here, too, China’s propaganda machinery has devised a strategy to avoid dealing with its own mistakes. In the state media, the precautionary measures taken by some countries to test Chinese travelers for Covid are now being slandered as “discrimination” – and this even though China also requires travelers to present negative tests.
The propaganda thus picks up on the narrative of the “China virus” at the beginning of the pandemic, with which foreign forces allegedly tried to blame China. The message behind the calculated outrage was that the Chinese made many sacrifices in the fight against the virus. And now it is foreign countries that allegedly still refuse to grant them freedom out of “revenge”.
Scientific exchange with China has recently come under suspicion. On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of scientific cooperation with China, German Research Minister Bettina Stark-Watzinger urged vigilance. China, she said, has gone from being a strategic partner to a tough competitor and systemic rival for Germany and the EU. DAAD President Joybrato Mukherjee even believes that the era of partnership relations between China and Germany is coming to an end. Politicians and science managers in Germany increasingly feel that research cooperation is unfair and unilaterally benefits China.
After 50 years of successful cooperation, mutual distrust has replaced faith in the common benefits of scientific collaboration. A strange mix of isolationism and nationalism is spreading across the globe. We live in a time of incipient deglobalization. Both Germany and China increasingly place their own interests above shared concerns and dream of a future with greater “independence” and “autonomy,” even though historically no country has ever benefited from decoupling.
But what are the consequences?
The underlying concern behind the new fear of China is that China will scientifically surpass Germany. After all, China has far more intellectual capital than any other country on earth. In 2030, 37 percent of all graduates in mint disciplines will come from China – compared to 1.4 percent from Germany.
The relevance of the Chinese education system is also reflected in the steady rise of Chinese universities in global rankings. Top German universities such as TU Munich (50th place) are already behind the Chinese ones (Qinghua University: 17, Peking University: 18).
China has the world’s most dynamic science system. In the prestigious Nature Index, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) is currently ranked first, ahead of Harvard University (second) and the Max Planck Society (third).
Another indicator is research articles submitted to professional conferences. In the field of semiconductor research, for example, the International Solid-State Circuits Conference (ISSCC) is considered an indicator of the intensity of research efforts in countries of origin. In recent years, the United States has always had the most accepted articles, followed by South Korea in second and China in third. In 2022, China had the most papers for the first time. 198 papers were accepted in total, of which 59 were from China, 42 from the US, and 32 from South Korea. China was strongly represented in all research categories.
China’s education system should be viewed less as a threat and more as an opportunity. German research institutions have been strengthened enormously by recruiting Chinese students, doctoral candidates and scientists. The German research landscape has been significantly enriched by exceptional Chinese guest scientists and partners. If Germany now turns these scientists and partnerships away, then Germany harms itself first and foremost. Today, any science system that is not open to talent and collaborations from around the world has to fear falling to second-class status.
The German science system is less threatened by China than by domestic problems such as underfunding, lack of investment and poor agility. Excellence and top international research are strengthened by cooperation, but also by international competition for talent, funding and citation indices.
Nevertheless, some German universities have reviewed their cooperation with China. Heinrich Heine University in Duesseldorf as well as the University of Hamburg have decided to terminate cooperation with their Confucius Institutes. But self-righteous German science politicians and university administrations do not know – or do not want to know – how committed deans and presidents of many Chinese universities are to shield both international collaborations and students from political pressure. The December 2022 protests against the Covid policy started in universities precisely because courageous leaders there have been able to preserve a valuable measure of freedom over the years.
In November 2022, MIT in Cambridge published extensive guidelines for dealing with Chinese universities and research institutions, something from which German institutions can learn a lot. The commission that drafted the guidelines explicitly points out that disengaging from Chinese partners would jeopardize MIT’s position as a top university and harm scientific progress. Accordingly, cooperation with Chinese partners is to be explicitly continued and expanded. Project managers and review panels receive clear recommendations on what to consider in cooperation projects and under what circumstances such projects should be rejected.
The guidelines show that critical yet constructive interaction with Chinese partners is possible. And they also demonstrate the courage and determination of a university administration not to engage in speculation and accusations in a China-critical climate or to cave in, but to form its own judgment based on evidence and expertise.
Such an approach would also serve German universities well. German universities enjoy an excellent reputation in China, and the vast majority of returning students or academics feel a lifelong bond with Germany.
Chinese universities have led the country to the top of the world in science and technology. They survived countless political campaigns in the socialist People’s Republic of China, and time and again actively protected their freedom as scientific institutions – often under difficult circumstances. They have seen interventions like the current restrictions under Xi Jinping come and go. They need to think in the long term. And so should we.
By severing our ties with Chinese universities, we do the most harm to scholars who share the values of open and free science and work to achieve them at the risk of personal detriment. Direct collaboration and communication with students and scholars on the ground in China helps to break through the government’s omnipresent rhetoric and propaganda, provide alternative perspectives, and establish discursive spaces.
The Chinese Long March-2D carrier rocket launched 14 satellites into Earth orbit on Sunday. The rocket launched at 11:14 a.m. from the Taiyuan Spaceport in the province of Shanxi. On board, among others: the observation satellites Qilu-2 and Qilu-3.
