“With its growth rates, India has the potential to compensate for parts of China’s business in the Asian region over the next ten to 15 years.” This is what German Economy Minister Robert Habeck said when we spoke on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Conference in the garden of the Taj Palace Hotel in New Delhi.
De-risking – it is one of the topics that is very present at the conference, as India is supposed to help buffer Germany’s China risk. However, China remains an important partner, says Habeck. But as a partner that should be approached with more confidence.
In conversations in the hallways and the rooms of the APK, another topic often came up: India’s close relations with Russia, which is under sanctions for its war of aggression against Ukraine. How selective can Germany be about the values of its partners? Find out Habeck’s answer in the interview.
Tanja Gönner, Director General of the Federation of German Industries (BDI), warns against regarding India as the holy grail of diversification. She has just returned from China. During her trip through the People’s Republic, she encountered a lot of interest in good relations, as she reports in an interview with Amelie Richter.
We wish all visitors to the APK an exciting second day!
What are your goals for this 18th APK?
This APK focuses specifically on India. I would like to solve a few market access problems – always in dialogue between the companies and my trade minister colleagues – as well as contribute to improving the overall framework conditions between Europe and India, including trade agreements.
One current issue is the supposedly close relationship between India and Russia, as demonstrated at the BRICS summit. How selective can Germany be about the values of its partners?
India buys Russian oil at dumping prices. There are clear indications that European sanctions could be circumvented through India. I keep raising this issue. India is withdrawing into one position and wants to be good friends with all sides. It wants good relations with Ukraine, Russia, Iran as well as with the EU, the USA and Israel. Of course, that is not the European view.
India, in turn, emphasizes that the country has had long-standing problems with China while we have traded with China. From their point of view, this is incomprehensible. As I see it, we can detach India from Russia to a certain extent through our continuous work. The military relations between India and Russia have historically been close, but India is also trying to reduce dependencies in the defense sector. We aim to win India over as a stronger partner for Europe.
You already mentioned the free trade agreement discussed during the government consultations. What is the status there?
The European Commission and India are negotiating the free trade agreement. The trade agreements are made at the European level. But, of course, Germany is heavily involved here. The Mercosur agreement, for example, also hinges on France. If we are smart about it, we have to find a way that allows Europe to take a more pragmatic approach. But both sides have to make compromises.
In my view, the easiest way to achieve this is to concentrate on areas that are less politically problematic, primarily industrial goods. In other words, excluding areas such as agriculture. Then we have to see how well that develops going forward. But that is not the tradition of European trade agreements; in recent decades we have consistently signed comprehensive agreements for all sectors. Nevertheless, I am in favor of it.
There are several declarations that have been prepared between the ministries and have been signed today. In my area, for example, it’s about cooperation in the hydrogen sector. But it’s also about skilled labor and research.
How do you assess the importance of India for de-risking, including our relationship with China?
With its growth rates, India can potentially compensate for parts of China’s business in the Asian region over the next 10 to 15 years. But that is a medium-term forecast. Along with the USA, China is our largest trading partner outside the EU, India is in 22nd place.
I’m not sure whether what happened in China, which as the world’s workbench became a major manufacturer for the world, will happen again. At that time, the upswing in German trade with China resulted from a globalized world. A lot was relocated to China because it was cheaper. It was assumed that all goods, all products, all batteries, all pharmaceutical precursors would still be sent back to Europe. And I don’t think anyone is assuming that anymore; recent crises have shown us the vulnerability of supply chains. However, India has enormous potential that will develop in the long term.
Tensions in East Asia are on the rise. North Korea is sending soldiers to Russia, China is lashing out at Taiwan and the Philippines. Against this backdrop, how satisfied are you with the German economy’s de-risking efforts? Investments in China are still very high, and de-risking seems to be interpreted differently by companies than was probably intended by Germany’s China strategy.
De-risking does not mean de-coupling. Our companies should continue to do business with China and continue to invest there – but reduce their dependence on just one market. This applies to both companies and our state. And because diversification is so important, we are here today at the Asia-Pacific Conference of German Business in India. But yes, we have to take de-risking seriously, even the German political debate does not always reflect what is happening in the world around us. The semiconductor debate is a very good example of this. The fact that Intel and Wolfspeed are postponing their chip projects for the time being is not good news. But it is often accompanied by a sound of schadenfreude.
And we are incredibly dependent on semiconductors. They come from Taiwan and South Korea in particular. Reports suggest that North Korea has just sent troops to Russia, and the whole region is on high alert anyway. This is highly dangerous. So is the conflict between China and Taiwan. Even a blockade or a situation like Covid-19 can make us painfully aware of this dangerous dependency.
The sense of urgency is sometimes masked by an ‘it will somehow work out’ attitude. That is why we, as an economy as a whole and Europe as an economic area, must take completely different measures to protect the economy, the security, and the robustness of our economy, as well as our own values and interests. This can be achieved with economic, political, and European unity, as well as with more decisive efforts such as a free trade agreement with India to reduce the risk potential in this dangerous world.
While the EU debated and negotiated tariffs on electric cars from China, China threatened to take retaliatory measures, and the tariff decision immediately led to a tit-for-tat response – it hit spirits. How do you think trade between Germany and China will develop? Is the tone getting rougher and rougher, or do you think it could improve again?
For 30 years, we have built up or let run relations with China, including our dependence. It will take years to loosen that up a bit. It is neither desirable nor my goal to completely detach ourselves from China. That would also be politically wrong because China can play a role as a player in solving crises. The climate crisis can only be solved with China. And also geopolitically: China is cooperating with Russia, but there is no complete solidarity there either, and we have no interest in seeing it happen. It cannot be in Germany’s and Europe’s interest for China, Russia, North Korea and Iran to form a solid bloc.
What do you propose here?
We must significantly increase the EU’s resilience and ability to act using completely different measures and means than we have done in recent decades. At the same time, we must remain in dialogue with China. My personal experience in talks with Chinese counterparts is that weakness is not appreciated at all. If China has the impression that Europe is divided, that threats are working, then China can divide Europe.
We are sometimes far too afraid to talk about our expectations. We don’t do the things that are a matter of course for China towards European companies. For far too long, we have allowed Chinese companies to invest in European infrastructure without scrutiny. That is impossible in China. China has very strict regulations on which products must be produced in China before they can be sold locally. This is something we are only just learning to think about.
Mrs Goenner, you were in China before you came to the APK. What impressions did you bring back with you?
Three things: The Chinese economy and the Chinese government welcomed the BDI’s visit from Germany. China continues to have a keen interest in good relations with Germany and Europe. And ultimately, in all the talks I had, I spoke in a friendly but firm manner about the concerns of the German economy, especially concerning market access and distortion of competition. And this was certainly met with interest. I have the impression that there is a desire to be perceived differently, as a partner and not just as a systemic rival.
How does this show?
There is no direct open discussion about systemic competition; it has been more paraphrased. We need to rebalance cooperation and competition. This requires a “coo-petition,” i.e., a combination of cooperation and competition. In some areas, cooperation makes sense; in others, we are in competition – both require clear framework conditions.
So, where does the BDI see the biggest issues at the moment? And how was the response?
German companies face many informal hurdles. For example, the central government has issued supposed regulations not being enforced by the provinces. We are also dealing with a state-controlled hybrid economy. The subsidies that the state grants to state-owned companies, but also to private companies, distort competition. What is interesting for us is that even private companies in China are increasingly critical of this because they are, of course, also in competition with state-owned companies. There is no fair competition for them either. After all, private companies account for 60 percent of GDP and almost 80 percent of jobs in China. Another point is that the awarding procedure of public contracts in China is simply still not transparent.
How was the response to these talks? Are promises made, and how seriously can these promises be taken?
We were signaled that they were aware of the issues and that they understood that they were important to our companies. It would be naïve to believe we will receive immediate promises of change. Beijing knows perfectly well that it can only maintain its economic growth if there is both foreign investment in China and market access for its own companies overseas.
How do you see China here in the Asia-Pacific markets? Also in terms of competition with German companies?
German companies compete with Chinese suppliers, and we often cannot win the price war against China. That’s why we must be as innovative as we are more expensive. However, German companies have never shied away from fair competition. And even if we may not be able to compete with the price, other things have always made us competitive, above all, our quality. The decisive question is: is it fair competition? If you have companies that have primarily received their research and development through state support or have built up production capacities in this way, then it is extremely difficult to compete. However, it is at least understandable that China sees the Asia-Pacific region as its sales market.
We are now in India, and some voices make it sound like the country is now the Holy Grail for German de-risking. Are we expecting a little too much?
India is undoubtedly a key growth market. However, there are many countries in this region with which we would like to work even more closely. These include Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia as emerging economies, with many options for diversification and securing new market shares. However, you must always look at the infrastructure or bureaucracy individually and the potential for free trade with these countries. Whether India alone is the Holy Grail remains to be seen.
One final question about the ongoing negotiations on European tariffs on Chinese cars. The deadline is next week, on October 30. Have you been asked about this during your trip?
It would have been strange if it had not been mentioned. We are seeing a state-controlled hybrid economy that has simply given a large number of subsidies and is then entering into competition with our market economy system. Under these conditions, Europe must, of course, also think about defensive instruments. Europe can be self-confident because China is greatly interested in the European market. Our message has always been: please, yes, negotiations. Now the positions are on the table. And now both sides have to negotiate. There will only be losers if no negotiated solution is found.
How quickly life can change, from peace to war, is a powerful memory for Romana Vlahutin that continues to shape her life and work to this day: Born and raised in the Croatian coastal city of Dubrovnik, she remembers an “incredibly comfortable, happy and easy life that was almost overnight interrupted by war.” At the time, she was studying comparative literature, theater and art. “How can you go from complete comfort to darkness within 24 hours? It’s possible, and it happens,” says Vlahutin.
Understanding conflict, its origins, reasons and logic has shaped her professional career ever since: “If you are a diplomat who conducts political analysis, it’s about understanding these cycles, understanding conflict and how and why it arises. And I’m obsessed with foresight. How can we prevent conflict, how do we get around it? What elements are we missing? Where are we not doing things right?”
Ambassador Romana Vlahutin is a career diplomat. Before joining the Croatian Foreign Ministry in 1999, she worked as an analyst for the Bassiouni UN Commission on former Yugoslavia. She also worked for the UN Tribunal (ICTY) in The Hague and the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. She finished her master studies at Harvard JF Kennedy of Government with a degree in Public Administration.
As a Croatian diplomat, she served in embassies in Washington, where she was head of the political department, and Belgrade as deputy ambassador, and from 2000 to 2004 as Director of strategic analysis and political planning at the Foreign Ministry in Zagreb and between 2006 and 2007, she was the political director of the OSCE mission in Kosovo. From 2010 to 2014 she served as the foreign policy advisor to the Croatian president.
In 2014, she was appointed the EU ambassador to Albania until 2018. “I made a full circle, from being on the recipient end of EU policies to being their protagonist. I think that helped me understand Brussels from all angles.” She also has a unique 360-degree experience: “If you want to achieve a result in all your relationships and negotiations, you have to not only understand but think from their head. You know your motives and positions, but you need to get into the brain of the person on the other side.” Her career so far has helped her to ask uncomfortable questions.
In 2019, she became the first Special Envoy for Connectivity in the European External Action Service – the origin of the EU’s Global Gateway infrastructure initiative. Since 2024, Romana Vlahutin has been a Distinguished Fellow for Geostrategy at the German Marshall Fund (GMF).
Connectivity between the European Union and the Asia-Pacific and other regions is also something Vlahutin is working on at the GMF – and thus also China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). “There is still a lot of work ahead of us,” says Vlahutin. As Special Envoy for the EU, she spearheaded the EU global connectivity strategy but was not always satisfied with the approach in Brussels. She would have liked to see far more political, and less institutional logic applied.
“Competitiveness is becoming more and more demanding. We have to think about where our interests and the interests of our partners in the Global South overlap and how we can strengthen both our partners but ourselves as well, from creation of new manufacturing hubs to clean energy generation, tech transfer and nourishing talent and skills.” Europe must realize that they are “no longer the only ones with money and technology.” “I think that in the West, there is currently no complete understanding of what constitutes competitiveness in the Global South.”
Beijing understands this task better, says Romana Vlahutin. “The first thing China did when the BRI began was to lay out a map and show points that should be connected, where new (China centric) value chains should be created.” Brussels must understand that this is not development work, but strategic investment, and that it should not be dealt by people who do development like DG Intpa, but those who work on industrial strategies and economic issues, like DG Grow and DG Trade. “Development work, by the Treaty, can not be self-interested and therefore geopolitical.” However, investments can, and this is why it is important to make a clear distinction.
The Asia-Pacific conference is a good forum for clarifying such questions and approaches, says Vlahutin. “I am super happy that most of the audience comes from the private sector, because they are the key to success. There is so much to learn, hear and understand on what kind of risk companies are willing to take and what type of instruments they need us to deploy to mitigate that risk.” More and more companies are understanding that the “new dawn of geopolitics” also has very serious implications for their work.
Romana Vlahutin will be part of the “Oxford Style Debate on Competing Offers to the Global South” at the Asia-Pacific Conference on Saturday, October 26 at 3 p.m.
The Diwali celebrations begin in India on Monday. The festival of light, also known as Deepawali, is based on the Hindu lunar calendar and falls on the 15th day of the month of Kartik – the darkest night of the year. On this day, Hindus decorate their homes with diya oil lamps, rangoli designs and all kinds of twinkling lights. The celebrations last five days, each dedicated to a festival. Monday is day one: Dhanteras. On this day, people worship the goddess Lakshmi and the god Kubera and pray for prosperity and wealth. Devotees buy new items, including gold coins, gold bars and gold jewelry.
“With its growth rates, India has the potential to compensate for parts of China’s business in the Asian region over the next ten to 15 years.” This is what German Economy Minister Robert Habeck said when we spoke on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Conference in the garden of the Taj Palace Hotel in New Delhi.
De-risking – it is one of the topics that is very present at the conference, as India is supposed to help buffer Germany’s China risk. However, China remains an important partner, says Habeck. But as a partner that should be approached with more confidence.
In conversations in the hallways and the rooms of the APK, another topic often came up: India’s close relations with Russia, which is under sanctions for its war of aggression against Ukraine. How selective can Germany be about the values of its partners? Find out Habeck’s answer in the interview.
Tanja Gönner, Director General of the Federation of German Industries (BDI), warns against regarding India as the holy grail of diversification. She has just returned from China. During her trip through the People’s Republic, she encountered a lot of interest in good relations, as she reports in an interview with Amelie Richter.
We wish all visitors to the APK an exciting second day!
What are your goals for this 18th APK?
This APK focuses specifically on India. I would like to solve a few market access problems – always in dialogue between the companies and my trade minister colleagues – as well as contribute to improving the overall framework conditions between Europe and India, including trade agreements.
One current issue is the supposedly close relationship between India and Russia, as demonstrated at the BRICS summit. How selective can Germany be about the values of its partners?
India buys Russian oil at dumping prices. There are clear indications that European sanctions could be circumvented through India. I keep raising this issue. India is withdrawing into one position and wants to be good friends with all sides. It wants good relations with Ukraine, Russia, Iran as well as with the EU, the USA and Israel. Of course, that is not the European view.
India, in turn, emphasizes that the country has had long-standing problems with China while we have traded with China. From their point of view, this is incomprehensible. As I see it, we can detach India from Russia to a certain extent through our continuous work. The military relations between India and Russia have historically been close, but India is also trying to reduce dependencies in the defense sector. We aim to win India over as a stronger partner for Europe.
You already mentioned the free trade agreement discussed during the government consultations. What is the status there?
The European Commission and India are negotiating the free trade agreement. The trade agreements are made at the European level. But, of course, Germany is heavily involved here. The Mercosur agreement, for example, also hinges on France. If we are smart about it, we have to find a way that allows Europe to take a more pragmatic approach. But both sides have to make compromises.
In my view, the easiest way to achieve this is to concentrate on areas that are less politically problematic, primarily industrial goods. In other words, excluding areas such as agriculture. Then we have to see how well that develops going forward. But that is not the tradition of European trade agreements; in recent decades we have consistently signed comprehensive agreements for all sectors. Nevertheless, I am in favor of it.
There are several declarations that have been prepared between the ministries and have been signed today. In my area, for example, it’s about cooperation in the hydrogen sector. But it’s also about skilled labor and research.
How do you assess the importance of India for de-risking, including our relationship with China?
With its growth rates, India can potentially compensate for parts of China’s business in the Asian region over the next 10 to 15 years. But that is a medium-term forecast. Along with the USA, China is our largest trading partner outside the EU, India is in 22nd place.
I’m not sure whether what happened in China, which as the world’s workbench became a major manufacturer for the world, will happen again. At that time, the upswing in German trade with China resulted from a globalized world. A lot was relocated to China because it was cheaper. It was assumed that all goods, all products, all batteries, all pharmaceutical precursors would still be sent back to Europe. And I don’t think anyone is assuming that anymore; recent crises have shown us the vulnerability of supply chains. However, India has enormous potential that will develop in the long term.
Tensions in East Asia are on the rise. North Korea is sending soldiers to Russia, China is lashing out at Taiwan and the Philippines. Against this backdrop, how satisfied are you with the German economy’s de-risking efforts? Investments in China are still very high, and de-risking seems to be interpreted differently by companies than was probably intended by Germany’s China strategy.
De-risking does not mean de-coupling. Our companies should continue to do business with China and continue to invest there – but reduce their dependence on just one market. This applies to both companies and our state. And because diversification is so important, we are here today at the Asia-Pacific Conference of German Business in India. But yes, we have to take de-risking seriously, even the German political debate does not always reflect what is happening in the world around us. The semiconductor debate is a very good example of this. The fact that Intel and Wolfspeed are postponing their chip projects for the time being is not good news. But it is often accompanied by a sound of schadenfreude.
And we are incredibly dependent on semiconductors. They come from Taiwan and South Korea in particular. Reports suggest that North Korea has just sent troops to Russia, and the whole region is on high alert anyway. This is highly dangerous. So is the conflict between China and Taiwan. Even a blockade or a situation like Covid-19 can make us painfully aware of this dangerous dependency.
The sense of urgency is sometimes masked by an ‘it will somehow work out’ attitude. That is why we, as an economy as a whole and Europe as an economic area, must take completely different measures to protect the economy, the security, and the robustness of our economy, as well as our own values and interests. This can be achieved with economic, political, and European unity, as well as with more decisive efforts such as a free trade agreement with India to reduce the risk potential in this dangerous world.
While the EU debated and negotiated tariffs on electric cars from China, China threatened to take retaliatory measures, and the tariff decision immediately led to a tit-for-tat response – it hit spirits. How do you think trade between Germany and China will develop? Is the tone getting rougher and rougher, or do you think it could improve again?
For 30 years, we have built up or let run relations with China, including our dependence. It will take years to loosen that up a bit. It is neither desirable nor my goal to completely detach ourselves from China. That would also be politically wrong because China can play a role as a player in solving crises. The climate crisis can only be solved with China. And also geopolitically: China is cooperating with Russia, but there is no complete solidarity there either, and we have no interest in seeing it happen. It cannot be in Germany’s and Europe’s interest for China, Russia, North Korea and Iran to form a solid bloc.
What do you propose here?
We must significantly increase the EU’s resilience and ability to act using completely different measures and means than we have done in recent decades. At the same time, we must remain in dialogue with China. My personal experience in talks with Chinese counterparts is that weakness is not appreciated at all. If China has the impression that Europe is divided, that threats are working, then China can divide Europe.
We are sometimes far too afraid to talk about our expectations. We don’t do the things that are a matter of course for China towards European companies. For far too long, we have allowed Chinese companies to invest in European infrastructure without scrutiny. That is impossible in China. China has very strict regulations on which products must be produced in China before they can be sold locally. This is something we are only just learning to think about.
Mrs Goenner, you were in China before you came to the APK. What impressions did you bring back with you?
Three things: The Chinese economy and the Chinese government welcomed the BDI’s visit from Germany. China continues to have a keen interest in good relations with Germany and Europe. And ultimately, in all the talks I had, I spoke in a friendly but firm manner about the concerns of the German economy, especially concerning market access and distortion of competition. And this was certainly met with interest. I have the impression that there is a desire to be perceived differently, as a partner and not just as a systemic rival.
How does this show?
There is no direct open discussion about systemic competition; it has been more paraphrased. We need to rebalance cooperation and competition. This requires a “coo-petition,” i.e., a combination of cooperation and competition. In some areas, cooperation makes sense; in others, we are in competition – both require clear framework conditions.
So, where does the BDI see the biggest issues at the moment? And how was the response?
German companies face many informal hurdles. For example, the central government has issued supposed regulations not being enforced by the provinces. We are also dealing with a state-controlled hybrid economy. The subsidies that the state grants to state-owned companies, but also to private companies, distort competition. What is interesting for us is that even private companies in China are increasingly critical of this because they are, of course, also in competition with state-owned companies. There is no fair competition for them either. After all, private companies account for 60 percent of GDP and almost 80 percent of jobs in China. Another point is that the awarding procedure of public contracts in China is simply still not transparent.
How was the response to these talks? Are promises made, and how seriously can these promises be taken?
We were signaled that they were aware of the issues and that they understood that they were important to our companies. It would be naïve to believe we will receive immediate promises of change. Beijing knows perfectly well that it can only maintain its economic growth if there is both foreign investment in China and market access for its own companies overseas.
How do you see China here in the Asia-Pacific markets? Also in terms of competition with German companies?
German companies compete with Chinese suppliers, and we often cannot win the price war against China. That’s why we must be as innovative as we are more expensive. However, German companies have never shied away from fair competition. And even if we may not be able to compete with the price, other things have always made us competitive, above all, our quality. The decisive question is: is it fair competition? If you have companies that have primarily received their research and development through state support or have built up production capacities in this way, then it is extremely difficult to compete. However, it is at least understandable that China sees the Asia-Pacific region as its sales market.
We are now in India, and some voices make it sound like the country is now the Holy Grail for German de-risking. Are we expecting a little too much?
India is undoubtedly a key growth market. However, there are many countries in this region with which we would like to work even more closely. These include Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia as emerging economies, with many options for diversification and securing new market shares. However, you must always look at the infrastructure or bureaucracy individually and the potential for free trade with these countries. Whether India alone is the Holy Grail remains to be seen.
One final question about the ongoing negotiations on European tariffs on Chinese cars. The deadline is next week, on October 30. Have you been asked about this during your trip?
It would have been strange if it had not been mentioned. We are seeing a state-controlled hybrid economy that has simply given a large number of subsidies and is then entering into competition with our market economy system. Under these conditions, Europe must, of course, also think about defensive instruments. Europe can be self-confident because China is greatly interested in the European market. Our message has always been: please, yes, negotiations. Now the positions are on the table. And now both sides have to negotiate. There will only be losers if no negotiated solution is found.
How quickly life can change, from peace to war, is a powerful memory for Romana Vlahutin that continues to shape her life and work to this day: Born and raised in the Croatian coastal city of Dubrovnik, she remembers an “incredibly comfortable, happy and easy life that was almost overnight interrupted by war.” At the time, she was studying comparative literature, theater and art. “How can you go from complete comfort to darkness within 24 hours? It’s possible, and it happens,” says Vlahutin.
Understanding conflict, its origins, reasons and logic has shaped her professional career ever since: “If you are a diplomat who conducts political analysis, it’s about understanding these cycles, understanding conflict and how and why it arises. And I’m obsessed with foresight. How can we prevent conflict, how do we get around it? What elements are we missing? Where are we not doing things right?”
Ambassador Romana Vlahutin is a career diplomat. Before joining the Croatian Foreign Ministry in 1999, she worked as an analyst for the Bassiouni UN Commission on former Yugoslavia. She also worked for the UN Tribunal (ICTY) in The Hague and the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. She finished her master studies at Harvard JF Kennedy of Government with a degree in Public Administration.
As a Croatian diplomat, she served in embassies in Washington, where she was head of the political department, and Belgrade as deputy ambassador, and from 2000 to 2004 as Director of strategic analysis and political planning at the Foreign Ministry in Zagreb and between 2006 and 2007, she was the political director of the OSCE mission in Kosovo. From 2010 to 2014 she served as the foreign policy advisor to the Croatian president.
In 2014, she was appointed the EU ambassador to Albania until 2018. “I made a full circle, from being on the recipient end of EU policies to being their protagonist. I think that helped me understand Brussels from all angles.” She also has a unique 360-degree experience: “If you want to achieve a result in all your relationships and negotiations, you have to not only understand but think from their head. You know your motives and positions, but you need to get into the brain of the person on the other side.” Her career so far has helped her to ask uncomfortable questions.
In 2019, she became the first Special Envoy for Connectivity in the European External Action Service – the origin of the EU’s Global Gateway infrastructure initiative. Since 2024, Romana Vlahutin has been a Distinguished Fellow for Geostrategy at the German Marshall Fund (GMF).
Connectivity between the European Union and the Asia-Pacific and other regions is also something Vlahutin is working on at the GMF – and thus also China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). “There is still a lot of work ahead of us,” says Vlahutin. As Special Envoy for the EU, she spearheaded the EU global connectivity strategy but was not always satisfied with the approach in Brussels. She would have liked to see far more political, and less institutional logic applied.
“Competitiveness is becoming more and more demanding. We have to think about where our interests and the interests of our partners in the Global South overlap and how we can strengthen both our partners but ourselves as well, from creation of new manufacturing hubs to clean energy generation, tech transfer and nourishing talent and skills.” Europe must realize that they are “no longer the only ones with money and technology.” “I think that in the West, there is currently no complete understanding of what constitutes competitiveness in the Global South.”
Beijing understands this task better, says Romana Vlahutin. “The first thing China did when the BRI began was to lay out a map and show points that should be connected, where new (China centric) value chains should be created.” Brussels must understand that this is not development work, but strategic investment, and that it should not be dealt by people who do development like DG Intpa, but those who work on industrial strategies and economic issues, like DG Grow and DG Trade. “Development work, by the Treaty, can not be self-interested and therefore geopolitical.” However, investments can, and this is why it is important to make a clear distinction.
The Asia-Pacific conference is a good forum for clarifying such questions and approaches, says Vlahutin. “I am super happy that most of the audience comes from the private sector, because they are the key to success. There is so much to learn, hear and understand on what kind of risk companies are willing to take and what type of instruments they need us to deploy to mitigate that risk.” More and more companies are understanding that the “new dawn of geopolitics” also has very serious implications for their work.
Romana Vlahutin will be part of the “Oxford Style Debate on Competing Offers to the Global South” at the Asia-Pacific Conference on Saturday, October 26 at 3 p.m.
The Diwali celebrations begin in India on Monday. The festival of light, also known as Deepawali, is based on the Hindu lunar calendar and falls on the 15th day of the month of Kartik – the darkest night of the year. On this day, Hindus decorate their homes with diya oil lamps, rangoli designs and all kinds of twinkling lights. The celebrations last five days, each dedicated to a festival. Monday is day one: Dhanteras. On this day, people worship the goddess Lakshmi and the god Kubera and pray for prosperity and wealth. Devotees buy new items, including gold coins, gold bars and gold jewelry.
