China, the world’s largest CO2 producer, has trouble tracking its own emissions. The data is based on inaccurate estimates and indicators that the People’s Republic relies on due to a lack of better figures.
This lack of transparency has consequences, as it hampers, for example, the implementation of carbon pricing. The massive data problems also make it difficult for the state to achieve its climate targets, as analyzed by Nico Beckert. It is even possible that China may have reported higher emissions for the past year – experts are also puzzled about this. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the measures to improve the data will take effect quickly.
Xi Jinping’s visions of an alternative world order are more long-term in nature. Following the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative, which have been around for some time, he presented a third initiative this spring: the “Global Civilization Initiative“. Christiane Kuehl sheds light on how Xi aims to achieve a reform of the international order with this comprehensive package.
The COP interim conference in Bonn, beginning on 5 June, will include a global stocktake on the progress of international climate policy. Emission data plays a central role here. However, data collection is not easy. Many developing countries have made little progress in data collection in recent years. And even China, the world’s largest CO2 emitter, faces significant challenges.
Chinese CO2 data is based on estimations and surrogate indicators such as energy consumption of production. However, the estimations for many energy-heavy sectors, such as metal processing or the chemical sector, are highly inaccurate and can vary significantly from facility to facility, according to experts from consulting agency Trivium China. “A lack of reliable industry-level emissions data will hamper officials ability to tailor policy to ensure the climate goals are met,” Cory Combs from Trivium China told Table.Media. The extent of the gap between estimated and actual emissions, however, remains unclear.
The lack of data publication further exacerbates the uncertainty regarding China’s emissions. Unlike traditional developed countries, there is “no regular reporting in place that would disclose the country’s total emissions,” explained energy expert Lauri Myllyvirta. The total CO2 emissions from the energy sector are only indirectly reported annually as a reduction in CO2 intensity relative to economic output, Myllyvirta clarified to Table.Media.
“There is no disaggregation by sectors,” Myllyvirta said. CO2 emissions from cement production and other industrial emissions are not disclosed. External analysts have to estimate the total CO2 data based on the published information. Moreover, China’s national greenhouse gas inventory is outdated. The last inventory was published in 2019 and was based on data from 2014. As a developing country (Annex II country), China is not required to report regularly to the UNFCCC.
The speculation about actual emissions could also lead to China reporting excessive CO2 emissions for 2022, explained Myllyvirta. To avoid energy crises like those experienced in the recent past, the government allowed for the expansion of domestic coal production. This led to an influx of lower-quality coal into the market. Power plants had to burn more of it to generate the same amount of energy. Thus, coal consumption increased, but not necessarily CO2 emissions. After all, emissions are not so much related to the quantity as they are to the quality of the coal.
If the quality decreases, emissions also decrease. However, coal mines incorrectly reported the decreasing quality or did not report it at all. As a result, authorities assumed a consistent quality despite increasing consumption and energy output, which resulted in rising emissions. According to official data, China’s emissions increased by 1.3 percent in 2022. However, the conflicting data on coal quality and other data points indicated a decrease in emissions of around 1 percent, according to expert Myllyvirta.
Combs also stated, “The key driver of uncertainty in China’s emissions is its extensive use of coal” both for energy generation and industrial purposes, such as steel production. There are many “sources of data uncertainty”. Different types of coal of varying quality are used for various processes. China produces more steel than the rest of the world put together and has the most coal-fired power plants. The potential points for data issues accumulate “stack up at an order of magnitude that is second to none,” according to Combs.
The Chinese emissions trading system requires participating coal and gas power plants to submit annual emission reports, which are reviewed by local authorities. However, the necessary resources are lacking. “Many local governments have argued that they don’t have adequate resources to undertake the MRV process comprehensively, which often results in data falsification and the subsequent Emission reporting gap,” Seb Kennedy, an analyst at data provider Transition Zero, told Table.Media. Moreover, a significant portion of the data is reported by the companies themselves and not independently verified, Kennedy added.
Consulting firms responsible for data verification have advised companies to manipulate the data to avoid purchasing CO2 certificates. According to ETS expert Zhibin Chen from research and consulting company Adelphi, the Chinese Ministry of Ecology and Environment recognized the manipulation problem “in a timely manner and conducted a major data review, resulting in most of the data being corrected”. The government has issued new data collection guidelines. However, in a country as large as China, ensuring that every company and auditor can implement the same new standard is difficult, Chen explained. It takes time to identify and resolve the issues, according to the Adelphi expert.
Cory Combs from Trivium China said that without “accurate emissions data, there can be no accurate allocation of allowances” in emissions trading. At a certain point, “the carbon pricing mechanism could well be undermined“. The expansion of the emissions trading system to sectors such as steel, cement, and aluminum has been postponed due to the poor data situation in these sectors.
China is pursuing several measures to solve data issues. The government:
According to Cory Combs from Trivium China, the Chinese Ministry of Ecology and Environment is focused on improving the “detail and accuracy of emission data”. However, many open questions remain about the possibility of achieving this in the near future, Combs concluded.
Xi Jinping has added a third initiative to his vision of an alternative world order. During a video conference in the spring with party leaders from other countries, including Cyril Ramaphosa from the South African ANC, Xi presented his new “Global Civilization Initiative” (全球文明倡议/GCI). The state media praised it, with the Global Times unironically dubbing it “Xivilization” and calling it a “gift from China to the world“.
In 2021, Xi had already presented the Global Development Initiative (全球发展倡议/GDI), followed by the Global Security Initiative (全球安全倡议/GSI) in 2022. Now, the three initiatives form a comprehensive package. “With these initiatives, China aims to resist a world order that it believes is too dominated by the West and promote its own views on issues such as global security or global governance,” says Helena Legarda, a security expert at the China think tank Merics in Berlin. “The primary target audience for all these initiatives is the global South.“
So far, all three initiatives are brief and vaguely worded, essentially reiterating China’s longstanding demands for the primacy of sovereignty and the diversity of development paths. A “no to interference in the partner country’s development path” was already part of the “Five Nos” that Beijing formulated for its China-Africa Forum for Cooperation in 2018.
“Most of these initiatives are in an early, rhetorical stage. And they will likely be implemented first in the narrative and ideological realm,” says Legarda. “For example, with the GSI, it’s not about China becoming a global security provider and replacing the United States in that role. Instead, it aims to promote China’s views on global security or shaping global norms and the global security architecture.”
The approach is similar for the GCI, according to Legarda in an interview with Table.Media. “It promotes Chinese concepts and principles, such as the idea that there are no universal values and that all civilizations or development models are equally valid and must be respected.” In his speech, Xi also tried to bridge China’s ancient civilization with other early civilizations, such as ancient Greece.
China believes that each country must consider its own national conditions to find its own path to modernization, explains Legarda. “In principle, China is implying that ‘modernization can be achieved without democracy’. Just as China has succeeded.”
There is currently no formal document for the GCI. So far, Xi’s speech titled “Embarking on the Path of Modernization Together” (携手同行现代化之路) provides insight. However, the new initiative is already finding its way into China’s foreign policy, most recently at the Central Asia Summit (C+5) in mid-May. Xi symbolically invited the heads of state from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan to the ancient imperial city of Xi’an on the historic Silk Road. The goal is to enhance cooperation with these states, which have traditionally been close to Russia, in order to build a “China-Central Asia community with a shared future,” as the jargon goes.
Xi called for the implementation of the GCI, among other things, during the summit, writes Moritz Rudolf from the Paul Tsai China Center at Yale University. Xi said it involves “official exchanges, mutual learning of civilizations and intergenerational friendship work”. The priorities of the new Central Asia platform, C+5, include “strengthening dialogue between civilizations” with keywords such as a “Cultural Silk Road” as well as increased cooperation in traditional medicine, university partnerships and cultural tourism.
Among the three, the GDI shows some early signs of concrete progress. There is now a “Group of Friends of the GDI” at the United Nations. “Of course, this is not an official UN body but an organization within the framework of the UN,” says Legarda. She identified 66 participating countries from around the globe in these meetings, but there is no official list yet. “Meetings have mostly been at the ambassadorial level, but there was also a higher-level meeting involving foreign ministers,” the expert explains.
“At one meeting, the group released a list of about 50 initial projects for practical cooperation in areas such as poverty alleviation, food security, climate change and green development, vaccines and pandemic prevention. There are very few details about the projects, but what we know is that the executing agency for most of these projects is Chinese.” Ministries or agencies such as the China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) are involved in some projects, as well as UN sub-organizations like UNIDO, UNDP or UNICEF.
Any effort to eradicate extreme poverty is generally positive for the global development agenda, writes Australian expert Mercedes Page in an article for the Lowy Institute. “China’s GDI, however, also represents a number of efforts to reshape broader global rules and governance in line with Beijing’s interests.” The GDI views development as the “master key” to “all problems”, aligning with China’s known position of seeing development as a prerequisite for the realization of individual human rights.
“We can see that China is increasingly spreading its concepts and narratives,” says Legarda. “For example, it has succeeded in incorporating some of its characteristic formulations into several UN documents, such as its concept of a ‘community with a shared future for mankind’.”
“I think we have to take these initiatives seriously,” says Legarda. “They are the next step in geopolitical competition and China’s way of pushing for the reform of the international order.” Ultimately, the current international order is largely a numbers game: Who can gather the most countries on their side for UN votes, for example? “With these new initiatives, China is trying to promote the formation of an alternative coalition that ultimately aims to challenge the current global order within the UN.”
“China has transitioned from a defensive position of ‘we don’t like the current global order’ to a proactive position of ‘here is our alternative’,” says Legarda. Indeed, Beijing’s representatives have achieved voting successes, such as in the UN Human Rights Council. However, the strategy does not always work, says Legarda. Therefore, there is no reason for the West to panic.
Experts also believe that further initiatives are possible in the future, through which Beijing intends to internationalize its own standards and guidelines. For example, a Global Climate Initiative or a Due Diligence Initiative. There is already a narrower Global Data Security Initiative.
A living legend of European-Chinese relations: Joerg Wuttke is by far the best-known and most influential German in China and has been for decades. 40 years after he first traveled to China, the 64-year-old is now stepping down as president of the EU China Chamber of Commerce and leaving the Middle Kingdom.
He has lived in China continuously for more than 30 years. Since 1997, he has been Chief Representative and General Representative of BASF, one of the German corporations with the highest investments in China. Wuttke has helped shape the company’s strategy in the People’s Republic – and above all, Wuttke has ensured that the Group’s China know-how is not lost.
However, Wuttke became much better known in China and Europe because of his functions in the Chamber of Commerce. As early as 1999, he had co-founded the German chamber, of which he was president for three years. In 2000, he and several other business representatives founded the EU Chamber. At that time, it had 51 members. Since 2007, he has been president of the EU Chamber several times. It has now grown to 1,800 members in nine cities.
Despite the many tensions in EU-China relations, Wuttke has never regretted betting on China. “If you go to school in Kraichgau in southwestern Germany as I did, you do sometimes wish you could see the big world.” That’s how it all started. On a whim, he started learning Chinese with a few buddies. China was the first big lure for him.
In 1982, the friends boarded the Trans-Siberian Railway and traveled through the then Soviet Union to the People’s Republic. They were there for three months. “That’s when the love for this country was born. In the beginning, it was just a feeling, without any second thoughts,” Wuttke admits.
At that time, he still saw a China that was in the process of opening up and shedding the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution. Big streets without cars, but a lot of curious, open-minded people. Most had never seen foreigners before. The capitalists were now friends since Mao’s death. The jackets, however, were still green or blue. “But even then, you could feel the spirit of optimism. This feeling captivated me. When I came back, it was clear: I’ll study Chinese,” says Wuttke.
His father had already talked a lot about China when Wuttke was still a child. Perhaps Wuttke even realized his father’s dream. That it was and still is his dream, too, could be seen every day. He enjoyed the office of EU Chamber President, despite its shallows. His Russian wife, who grew up in China, shares his passion for the country.
As EU Chamber of Commerce president, Wuttke has been willing to take risks and has often gone behind the scenes. He never shied away from pointing out weaknesses in EU-China relations and tried to improve the position of European companies in China. Sometimes progress was only made in very small steps, but Wuttke never let up.
He is an example of how you can be critical and still be respected by top Chinese politicians. Most of the time, he has struck the right tone. Chinese Sunday speeches, he has called them. At the same time, Wuttke has patiently, just as persistently, but more behind the scenes, explained China and the Chinese to Brussels. For Wuttke, there was never just one side to blame.
“China is like a fitness club for the European economy,” was one of Wuttke’s defining sentences. And it testifies to what Wuttke is: a supporter of free-market competition, in which the best should win – but on the same playing field under the same rules. That was and is not always the case in China.
When that was the case, Wuttke sometimes had trouble hiding his anger. “The Chinese” were never evil to him, but they were guided by their own hard interests. For him, dialogue was always the ultimate goal. In the most difficult times – and there were some – he always took a pragmatic approach and focused on the fields in which China and Europe had common interests. The contentious issues were left until the mood was better.
For decades, Wuttke had warned against the idea that the Chinese were developing in the same direction as the Europeans. It had long been clear to him that they have different interests and values. In Europe, this has only recently become apparent. Now his sentences unfold differently: “We cannot change China. But we can always work with China – for their benefit and ours.”
For a long time, Wuttke preached the advantages of free-market competition to the Chinese. Now the Chinese are setting world standards with their own products and innovations. Factory of the world was yesterday. “But that doesn’t mean it’s impossible to cooperate. The Chinese still need us.” He never thought much of decoupling. De-risking he did, long before politicians came up with the term. Frank Sieren
On World No Tobacco Day, students at a sports field in Tangshan, Hebei Province, form the international symbol for “No Smoking”. According to the World Health Organization, one-third of the global smoking population comes from China, with no other country having more regular smokers. The government has been trying to counter this trend for years, particularly in schools. By 2030, Beijing aims to reduce the smoking rate among the population by 20 percent. Whether such sports field activities deter smoking is questionable. However, what is believed to be helpful for smoking cessation is acupuncture and other traditional Chinese medicine practices.
China, the world’s largest CO2 producer, has trouble tracking its own emissions. The data is based on inaccurate estimates and indicators that the People’s Republic relies on due to a lack of better figures.
This lack of transparency has consequences, as it hampers, for example, the implementation of carbon pricing. The massive data problems also make it difficult for the state to achieve its climate targets, as analyzed by Nico Beckert. It is even possible that China may have reported higher emissions for the past year – experts are also puzzled about this. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the measures to improve the data will take effect quickly.
Xi Jinping’s visions of an alternative world order are more long-term in nature. Following the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative, which have been around for some time, he presented a third initiative this spring: the “Global Civilization Initiative“. Christiane Kuehl sheds light on how Xi aims to achieve a reform of the international order with this comprehensive package.
The COP interim conference in Bonn, beginning on 5 June, will include a global stocktake on the progress of international climate policy. Emission data plays a central role here. However, data collection is not easy. Many developing countries have made little progress in data collection in recent years. And even China, the world’s largest CO2 emitter, faces significant challenges.
Chinese CO2 data is based on estimations and surrogate indicators such as energy consumption of production. However, the estimations for many energy-heavy sectors, such as metal processing or the chemical sector, are highly inaccurate and can vary significantly from facility to facility, according to experts from consulting agency Trivium China. “A lack of reliable industry-level emissions data will hamper officials ability to tailor policy to ensure the climate goals are met,” Cory Combs from Trivium China told Table.Media. The extent of the gap between estimated and actual emissions, however, remains unclear.
The lack of data publication further exacerbates the uncertainty regarding China’s emissions. Unlike traditional developed countries, there is “no regular reporting in place that would disclose the country’s total emissions,” explained energy expert Lauri Myllyvirta. The total CO2 emissions from the energy sector are only indirectly reported annually as a reduction in CO2 intensity relative to economic output, Myllyvirta clarified to Table.Media.
“There is no disaggregation by sectors,” Myllyvirta said. CO2 emissions from cement production and other industrial emissions are not disclosed. External analysts have to estimate the total CO2 data based on the published information. Moreover, China’s national greenhouse gas inventory is outdated. The last inventory was published in 2019 and was based on data from 2014. As a developing country (Annex II country), China is not required to report regularly to the UNFCCC.
The speculation about actual emissions could also lead to China reporting excessive CO2 emissions for 2022, explained Myllyvirta. To avoid energy crises like those experienced in the recent past, the government allowed for the expansion of domestic coal production. This led to an influx of lower-quality coal into the market. Power plants had to burn more of it to generate the same amount of energy. Thus, coal consumption increased, but not necessarily CO2 emissions. After all, emissions are not so much related to the quantity as they are to the quality of the coal.
If the quality decreases, emissions also decrease. However, coal mines incorrectly reported the decreasing quality or did not report it at all. As a result, authorities assumed a consistent quality despite increasing consumption and energy output, which resulted in rising emissions. According to official data, China’s emissions increased by 1.3 percent in 2022. However, the conflicting data on coal quality and other data points indicated a decrease in emissions of around 1 percent, according to expert Myllyvirta.
Combs also stated, “The key driver of uncertainty in China’s emissions is its extensive use of coal” both for energy generation and industrial purposes, such as steel production. There are many “sources of data uncertainty”. Different types of coal of varying quality are used for various processes. China produces more steel than the rest of the world put together and has the most coal-fired power plants. The potential points for data issues accumulate “stack up at an order of magnitude that is second to none,” according to Combs.
The Chinese emissions trading system requires participating coal and gas power plants to submit annual emission reports, which are reviewed by local authorities. However, the necessary resources are lacking. “Many local governments have argued that they don’t have adequate resources to undertake the MRV process comprehensively, which often results in data falsification and the subsequent Emission reporting gap,” Seb Kennedy, an analyst at data provider Transition Zero, told Table.Media. Moreover, a significant portion of the data is reported by the companies themselves and not independently verified, Kennedy added.
Consulting firms responsible for data verification have advised companies to manipulate the data to avoid purchasing CO2 certificates. According to ETS expert Zhibin Chen from research and consulting company Adelphi, the Chinese Ministry of Ecology and Environment recognized the manipulation problem “in a timely manner and conducted a major data review, resulting in most of the data being corrected”. The government has issued new data collection guidelines. However, in a country as large as China, ensuring that every company and auditor can implement the same new standard is difficult, Chen explained. It takes time to identify and resolve the issues, according to the Adelphi expert.
Cory Combs from Trivium China said that without “accurate emissions data, there can be no accurate allocation of allowances” in emissions trading. At a certain point, “the carbon pricing mechanism could well be undermined“. The expansion of the emissions trading system to sectors such as steel, cement, and aluminum has been postponed due to the poor data situation in these sectors.
China is pursuing several measures to solve data issues. The government:
According to Cory Combs from Trivium China, the Chinese Ministry of Ecology and Environment is focused on improving the “detail and accuracy of emission data”. However, many open questions remain about the possibility of achieving this in the near future, Combs concluded.
Xi Jinping has added a third initiative to his vision of an alternative world order. During a video conference in the spring with party leaders from other countries, including Cyril Ramaphosa from the South African ANC, Xi presented his new “Global Civilization Initiative” (全球文明倡议/GCI). The state media praised it, with the Global Times unironically dubbing it “Xivilization” and calling it a “gift from China to the world“.
In 2021, Xi had already presented the Global Development Initiative (全球发展倡议/GDI), followed by the Global Security Initiative (全球安全倡议/GSI) in 2022. Now, the three initiatives form a comprehensive package. “With these initiatives, China aims to resist a world order that it believes is too dominated by the West and promote its own views on issues such as global security or global governance,” says Helena Legarda, a security expert at the China think tank Merics in Berlin. “The primary target audience for all these initiatives is the global South.“
So far, all three initiatives are brief and vaguely worded, essentially reiterating China’s longstanding demands for the primacy of sovereignty and the diversity of development paths. A “no to interference in the partner country’s development path” was already part of the “Five Nos” that Beijing formulated for its China-Africa Forum for Cooperation in 2018.
“Most of these initiatives are in an early, rhetorical stage. And they will likely be implemented first in the narrative and ideological realm,” says Legarda. “For example, with the GSI, it’s not about China becoming a global security provider and replacing the United States in that role. Instead, it aims to promote China’s views on global security or shaping global norms and the global security architecture.”
The approach is similar for the GCI, according to Legarda in an interview with Table.Media. “It promotes Chinese concepts and principles, such as the idea that there are no universal values and that all civilizations or development models are equally valid and must be respected.” In his speech, Xi also tried to bridge China’s ancient civilization with other early civilizations, such as ancient Greece.
China believes that each country must consider its own national conditions to find its own path to modernization, explains Legarda. “In principle, China is implying that ‘modernization can be achieved without democracy’. Just as China has succeeded.”
There is currently no formal document for the GCI. So far, Xi’s speech titled “Embarking on the Path of Modernization Together” (携手同行现代化之路) provides insight. However, the new initiative is already finding its way into China’s foreign policy, most recently at the Central Asia Summit (C+5) in mid-May. Xi symbolically invited the heads of state from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan to the ancient imperial city of Xi’an on the historic Silk Road. The goal is to enhance cooperation with these states, which have traditionally been close to Russia, in order to build a “China-Central Asia community with a shared future,” as the jargon goes.
Xi called for the implementation of the GCI, among other things, during the summit, writes Moritz Rudolf from the Paul Tsai China Center at Yale University. Xi said it involves “official exchanges, mutual learning of civilizations and intergenerational friendship work”. The priorities of the new Central Asia platform, C+5, include “strengthening dialogue between civilizations” with keywords such as a “Cultural Silk Road” as well as increased cooperation in traditional medicine, university partnerships and cultural tourism.
Among the three, the GDI shows some early signs of concrete progress. There is now a “Group of Friends of the GDI” at the United Nations. “Of course, this is not an official UN body but an organization within the framework of the UN,” says Legarda. She identified 66 participating countries from around the globe in these meetings, but there is no official list yet. “Meetings have mostly been at the ambassadorial level, but there was also a higher-level meeting involving foreign ministers,” the expert explains.
“At one meeting, the group released a list of about 50 initial projects for practical cooperation in areas such as poverty alleviation, food security, climate change and green development, vaccines and pandemic prevention. There are very few details about the projects, but what we know is that the executing agency for most of these projects is Chinese.” Ministries or agencies such as the China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) are involved in some projects, as well as UN sub-organizations like UNIDO, UNDP or UNICEF.
Any effort to eradicate extreme poverty is generally positive for the global development agenda, writes Australian expert Mercedes Page in an article for the Lowy Institute. “China’s GDI, however, also represents a number of efforts to reshape broader global rules and governance in line with Beijing’s interests.” The GDI views development as the “master key” to “all problems”, aligning with China’s known position of seeing development as a prerequisite for the realization of individual human rights.
“We can see that China is increasingly spreading its concepts and narratives,” says Legarda. “For example, it has succeeded in incorporating some of its characteristic formulations into several UN documents, such as its concept of a ‘community with a shared future for mankind’.”
“I think we have to take these initiatives seriously,” says Legarda. “They are the next step in geopolitical competition and China’s way of pushing for the reform of the international order.” Ultimately, the current international order is largely a numbers game: Who can gather the most countries on their side for UN votes, for example? “With these new initiatives, China is trying to promote the formation of an alternative coalition that ultimately aims to challenge the current global order within the UN.”
“China has transitioned from a defensive position of ‘we don’t like the current global order’ to a proactive position of ‘here is our alternative’,” says Legarda. Indeed, Beijing’s representatives have achieved voting successes, such as in the UN Human Rights Council. However, the strategy does not always work, says Legarda. Therefore, there is no reason for the West to panic.
Experts also believe that further initiatives are possible in the future, through which Beijing intends to internationalize its own standards and guidelines. For example, a Global Climate Initiative or a Due Diligence Initiative. There is already a narrower Global Data Security Initiative.
A living legend of European-Chinese relations: Joerg Wuttke is by far the best-known and most influential German in China and has been for decades. 40 years after he first traveled to China, the 64-year-old is now stepping down as president of the EU China Chamber of Commerce and leaving the Middle Kingdom.
He has lived in China continuously for more than 30 years. Since 1997, he has been Chief Representative and General Representative of BASF, one of the German corporations with the highest investments in China. Wuttke has helped shape the company’s strategy in the People’s Republic – and above all, Wuttke has ensured that the Group’s China know-how is not lost.
However, Wuttke became much better known in China and Europe because of his functions in the Chamber of Commerce. As early as 1999, he had co-founded the German chamber, of which he was president for three years. In 2000, he and several other business representatives founded the EU Chamber. At that time, it had 51 members. Since 2007, he has been president of the EU Chamber several times. It has now grown to 1,800 members in nine cities.
Despite the many tensions in EU-China relations, Wuttke has never regretted betting on China. “If you go to school in Kraichgau in southwestern Germany as I did, you do sometimes wish you could see the big world.” That’s how it all started. On a whim, he started learning Chinese with a few buddies. China was the first big lure for him.
In 1982, the friends boarded the Trans-Siberian Railway and traveled through the then Soviet Union to the People’s Republic. They were there for three months. “That’s when the love for this country was born. In the beginning, it was just a feeling, without any second thoughts,” Wuttke admits.
At that time, he still saw a China that was in the process of opening up and shedding the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution. Big streets without cars, but a lot of curious, open-minded people. Most had never seen foreigners before. The capitalists were now friends since Mao’s death. The jackets, however, were still green or blue. “But even then, you could feel the spirit of optimism. This feeling captivated me. When I came back, it was clear: I’ll study Chinese,” says Wuttke.
His father had already talked a lot about China when Wuttke was still a child. Perhaps Wuttke even realized his father’s dream. That it was and still is his dream, too, could be seen every day. He enjoyed the office of EU Chamber President, despite its shallows. His Russian wife, who grew up in China, shares his passion for the country.
As EU Chamber of Commerce president, Wuttke has been willing to take risks and has often gone behind the scenes. He never shied away from pointing out weaknesses in EU-China relations and tried to improve the position of European companies in China. Sometimes progress was only made in very small steps, but Wuttke never let up.
He is an example of how you can be critical and still be respected by top Chinese politicians. Most of the time, he has struck the right tone. Chinese Sunday speeches, he has called them. At the same time, Wuttke has patiently, just as persistently, but more behind the scenes, explained China and the Chinese to Brussels. For Wuttke, there was never just one side to blame.
“China is like a fitness club for the European economy,” was one of Wuttke’s defining sentences. And it testifies to what Wuttke is: a supporter of free-market competition, in which the best should win – but on the same playing field under the same rules. That was and is not always the case in China.
When that was the case, Wuttke sometimes had trouble hiding his anger. “The Chinese” were never evil to him, but they were guided by their own hard interests. For him, dialogue was always the ultimate goal. In the most difficult times – and there were some – he always took a pragmatic approach and focused on the fields in which China and Europe had common interests. The contentious issues were left until the mood was better.
For decades, Wuttke had warned against the idea that the Chinese were developing in the same direction as the Europeans. It had long been clear to him that they have different interests and values. In Europe, this has only recently become apparent. Now his sentences unfold differently: “We cannot change China. But we can always work with China – for their benefit and ours.”
For a long time, Wuttke preached the advantages of free-market competition to the Chinese. Now the Chinese are setting world standards with their own products and innovations. Factory of the world was yesterday. “But that doesn’t mean it’s impossible to cooperate. The Chinese still need us.” He never thought much of decoupling. De-risking he did, long before politicians came up with the term. Frank Sieren
On World No Tobacco Day, students at a sports field in Tangshan, Hebei Province, form the international symbol for “No Smoking”. According to the World Health Organization, one-third of the global smoking population comes from China, with no other country having more regular smokers. The government has been trying to counter this trend for years, particularly in schools. By 2030, Beijing aims to reduce the smoking rate among the population by 20 percent. Whether such sports field activities deter smoking is questionable. However, what is believed to be helpful for smoking cessation is acupuncture and other traditional Chinese medicine practices.
