Elections were held yesterday in the former German colony of Namibia. When the counting is expected to be completed over the weekend, Beijing’s long-standing all-weather friendship could come to an end. In close cooperation with the ruling party Swapo, Chinese companies dominate all core economic sectors in this sparsely populated but resource-rich country.
Young Namibians in particular want a new vision for the country, where wealth is unevenly distributed and unemployment is high. They think Government contracts should increasingly go to domestic companies that provide work for the locals. However, Beijing is confident that things will continue as before.
Volkswagen in Xinjiang no longer does business as usual. Eleven years after the plant’s opening in Urumqi, alongside the state-owned joint venture partner SAIC, the Group is withdrawing from the region. Even if the Group still distances itself from human rights violations, the question rightly arises: why only now? For Volkswagen, this inglorious chapter ends with a loss of reputation and a lot of money.
The fact that Volkswagen has succeeded in reaching an agreement with SAIC to end their joint presence in Xinjiang probably has less to do with the Wolfsburg-based company’s influence on the fate of the state-owned enterprise SAIC than with the Chinese company’s international ambitions, writes Marcel Grzanna. Even SAIC could not ignore a red flag such as the one raised by the rating agency MSCI last year to warn investors of the risks of Volkswagen’s adventure in Xinjiang.
The only official Mao Zedong statue outside of China is located in the west of the Namibian capital Windhoek. It was unveiled in the summer of 2024 as the landmark of the “Chairman Mao School” in the Otjomuise district, which is co-financed by China. China’s ambassador Zhao Weiping explained at the inauguration that the Great Chairman stood for the “eternal friendship” between the two countries. The Namibian writer and political scientist Joseph Diescho, however, sharply criticized the erection of the statue on “Namibia’s sovereign soil”: “The decision was obviously made without the participation of Namibians,” he commented dryly.
Either way, the statue is a clear symbol of the self-confident presence of the Chinese in the South African country, which was a German colony until 1915 and was under South African rule until independence in 1990. Of the country’s three million inhabitants, it is estimated that between 4,000 and 6,000 people are Chinese citizens or Namibians of Chinese descent, not including project-based contract workers. Apart from restaurants, a few “China stores” and the highly visible Chinatown in the capital, they are surprisingly invisible on the streets.
However, the Chinese are all the more present in the Namibian economy. Even though Chinese direct investment in Namibia is rather low in contrast to other African countries such as Kenya, South Africa or Angola, Chinese companies dominate the competition for government tenders in countless sectors.
In recent years, Chinese companies have built and renovated office buildings, roads, railroads, ports and airports in Namibia. In an interview with Table.Briefings, the German-Namibian political scientist and Africa scholar Henning Melber speaks of a “quasi-monopoly of Chinese companies in the awarding of government contracts for public works”.
Mega projects such as Namibia’s largest seawater desalination plant or the country’s largest solar power plant are also being implemented by Chinese companies using win-win superlatives. Chinese companies are particularly active in the mining sector, which contributes 14.4 percent to Namibia’s gross domestic product. The Chinese have a monopoly in uranium mining in particular.
In 2019, China National Uranium Corporation Limited (CNUC) took over the Rössing uranium mine, one of the largest and longest-operating uranium mines in the world, from British-Australian mining giant Rio Tinto. Around 4.5 percent of the world’s uranium supply comes from here. In return, Namibia mainly imports consumer goods, textiles, electronics and light machinery from China. Last year, China accounted for around 8.9 percent of Namibia’s total imports. This makes the People’s Republic the country’s most important economic partner after South Africa.
While the country’s political elite courts and approves of Chinese activities, resentment is not uncommon among ordinary Namibians. If you ask around on the streets, it is acknowledged that China implements its projects according to plan and generally well. On the other hand, there has also been criticism for years that the Chinese pay local workers too low wages and sometimes treat them badly.
It was only in January that the Chinese embassy in Namibia once again rejected such accusations: They adhere to local standards and business practices. However, the mood is no longer as negative as it was around 2021, when there were even anti-Chinese protests led by trade union activist Michael Amushelelo, says political analyst Rakkel Andreas, who co-wrote a paper on Sino-Namibian relations for the Namibian Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR).
“The anti-Chinese sentiment was also partly due to Namibians feeling that the influx of small Chinese pop-up stores were occupying spaces where they normally sold their goods.” Many Chinese business owners, sensitized by the events, are now taking a more cautious approach, says Andreas. And in rural areas in particular, their stores have also closed a supply gap.
In the presidential and parliamentary elections, which will take place on Thursday and are expected to be counted by the weekend, China has therefore hardly played a role as an issue and agent of influence, says Andreas. Beijing seems to have no doubts about the election victory of the Swapo Party of Namibia (formerly South-West Africa People’s Organization), the party that has been in power without interruption since Namibia’s independence in 1990.
Swapo has a long-standing “all-weather friendship” with Beijing, which dates back to the pre-independence era and has always included party donations and scholarships for cadres and cadre children. The Swapo government was also always close to Beijing in its anti-imperialist rhetoric and the idea of socialism with Namibian characteristics. However, many Namibians, especially the younger ones, say that Swapo lacks a vision for the future, such as a recipe against high unemployment. They say that the party has created a corrupt crony economy and driven the sell-out of the country, especially to China.
Namibia’s trade with the People’s Republic is still not diversified and therefore does not contribute to Namibia’s economic ambitions to increase employment levels and living standards through industrialization, writes the think tank IPPR. Just one day before the presidential election, the Construction Industries Federation of Namibia (CIF) called on the incoming government to consider more local companies when awarding construction contracts. As a bad example, the Federation cited the Ogongo-Oshakati pipeline renewal project worth €12.56 million, which was awarded entirely to foreign contractors, including the China Gezhouba Group Company and the China Jiangxi Economic and Technical International Corporation.
“If the Swapo candidate Netumbo Nandi Ndaitwah is likely to be elected, the mutually declared all-weather friendship between China and Namibia will be further strengthened. She was already a reliable ally as Foreign Minister,” says Henning Melber. However, should the political situation change fundamentally, a revision of these relations cannot be completely ruled out, depending on the constellation. “Particularly with regard to the preferential awarding of state contracts for public works such as road construction, the quasi-monopoly of Chinese companies would probably waver in favor of taking the domestic construction industry into account. However, this is unlikely to affect China’s presence in the mining sector and uranium mining in particular.”
The withdrawal from Xinjiang marks the end of a disastrous miscalculation for the German car manufacturer Volkswagen. Neither did the region develop into a lucrative location for the company in the People’s Republic of China, nor did the early warnings of a drastic level of repression against the Uyghur minority prove to be exaggerated. Everything that could go wrong for Volkswagen in Xinjiang did go wrong. Eleven years after the opening of the plant in Urumqi, alongside the state-owned joint venture partner SAIC, a chapter that cost the Group a great deal of money and reputation is coming to an end.
Uyghur representatives complain that it took the discovery of huge re-education camps with space for hundreds of thousands of people, dozens of eyewitnesses and a report by the UN Human Rights Office before Volkswagen initiated the end of its involvement. However, Volkswagen has officially denied to this day that the dramatic human rights situation in Xinjiang was the main reason for the decision. Instead, the Group justifies the poor economic development of the location as the primary motivation for its drive.
“Such an approach gives the impression that a company like Volkswagen is not seriously considering its responsibility towards those affected or the global expectations of ethical behavior. It would help the Uyghur cause if companies clearly recognized that moral considerations play a role,” says Berlin Director Haiyer Kuerban of the World Uyghur Congress (WUC).
The fact that Volkswagen has succeeded in reaching an agreement with SAIC to end their joint presence in Xinjiang probably has less to do with the Wolfsburg-based company’s influence on the fate of the state-owned enterprise. While the relationship in 1984 may have been based on China’s thirst for knowledge of Wolfsburg engineering, today it is based on Wolfsburg’s dependence on Chinese market control.
It was also the market that opened the door for SAIC to agree to end the joint venture’s involvement in Xinjiang. Even a state-owned company cannot ignore a red flag such as the one raised by the rating agency MSCI last year to warn investors of the risks of Volkswagen’s adventure in Xinjiang. SAIC and dozens of other Chinese manufacturers want to internationalize their business and are pushing into lucrative markets such as Europe and the USA. The issue of supply chains is becoming increasingly relevant there. Legislation requires importers to provide very specific documentation that the construction of their vehicles is in no way connected to forced labor.
The discussions about the site went on for years. Volkswagen always emphasized that no forced laborers were employed at the plant and had these statements confirmed by a controversial audit. However, this argument ignored the actual accusations of the critics. Rather, they criticized the Group’s fundamental presence in a region where the entire industrial environment is clouded by the repression against the Uyghurs. The Group was never able to disguise the impression that political will in Wolfsburg, triggered by possible pressure from Beijing, had once led to the investment.
When the use of forced laborers in the construction of a test track of the joint venture in Turpan was proven at the beginning of the year, Volkswagen pulled out its last trump card and distanced itself from the joint venture. The company did not control it, nor was Volkswagen AG legally linked to it. Now Volkswagen’s communications department is justifying the sale of the factory and test track to a subsidiary of the state-owned Shanghai Lingang Economic Development Group with the “dynamic market development”, which makes a “transformation of the joint venture” necessary.
The news was embedded in the announcement of the early extension of the joint venture’s contract until 2040. More electric, fewer emissions – this summarizes SAIC-Volkswagen’s plan for the coming years. There are to be 18 new e-models by 2030 and the aim is to be climate-neutral by 2050. The joint venture turned 40 on Monday.
Within the Group, people are more self-critical. Some voices clearly state that the change in public perception of the human rights issue in Xinjiang should have been felt. Especially as the Group knew more than ten years ago that the decision was highly political. Nevertheless, Volkswagen wanted to be convinced that it was doing the right thing – both economically and socially. The New Silk Road had only just been born as an idea and promised much closer integration of the region into international value creation, linked to greater prosperity and more purchasing power for its inhabitants. As in 1984, a pioneering spirit that was to turn out to be a specter blew through the Wolfsburg management floors.
The involvement of Uyghur employees in the plant in Urumqi reportedly met with little approval from SAIC. It is said that all Uyghurs were already under general suspicion at the time. Volkswagen had to do some convincing. The integration of the Uyghurs into the local labor market was supposed to help ease ethnic tensions. But the wish turned out to be the father of the idea.
The plant in Xinjiang is now being taken over by the Shanghai Motor Vehicle Inspection Center (SMVIC), a company that reconditions vehicles and makes them fit for the used car market. Volkswagen insisted that despite the sale of the plant, the remaining 40 Uyghur employees were guaranteed continued employment. Likely, Volkswagen will never know whether and for how long the new owner will actually honor the agreement.
Once again there are allegations of corruption against a Chinese minister – and once again it concerns the Ministry of Defense: According to a report, Dong Jun has been the subject of a corruption investigation. The proceedings are part of a larger investigation into corruption within the Chinese military, reported the Financial Times. A spokeswoman for the Foreign Ministry in Beijing described the report as a “witch hunt” and did not comment further. In previous cases, Beijing also initially did not want to know anything about the case and did not comment on it.
Former naval commander Dong was only appointed Minister of Defense in December 2023. He replaced Li Shangfu, who in turn had to vacate the post after just seven months in office. Li was subsequently expelled from the Chinese Communist Party, partly because he was accused of taking bribes. Since then, Li has not been seen in public. His predecessor Wei Fenghe had also been expelled from the Communist Party on suspicion of corruption. ari
Tech billionaire Elon Musk has excellent political contacts in China. But his mother, Maye Musk, also enjoys celebrity status in the People’s Republic. The popularity of the 76-year-old with silver-grey hair can be seen on the Chinese social media platform Xiaohongshu, for example, where she has more than half a million followers. Her posts, in which she documents her travels, fashion shows and collaborations, regularly receive thousands of likes and hundreds of comments.
Maye Musk began her modeling career at the age of 15 in South Africa and appeared on the covers of renowned magazines such as Vogue and Time. Along the way, she earned degrees in nutritional science and ran her own consulting practice. In 2019, she published her autobiography “A Woman Makes a Plan”. As a single mother, she raised her three children, including Elon Musk.
Maye Musk’s popularity took off in 2020 when her book was published in Chinese and was particularly well received by female readers. Musk is a symbol of “aging gracefully and self-empowerment”, Olivia Plotnick, founder of the Shanghai-based social media agency Wai Social, recently told Bloomberg.
Like her son, Mother Musk is also extremely enterprising. The senior citizen has forged close links with Chinese companies in recent years. She is a brand ambassador for mattress manufacturer AISE Baobao, for which she last visited China in November. She has also been the face of advertising campaigns for smartphone manufacturer Oppo.
What is striking is that Maye Musk – also like her son – is extremely well-disposed towards China. During a visit to Shanghai in February this year, Maye Musk also visited the Yu Garden and was impressed by the magnificent decorations. She shared photos on the X platform and commented: “In Shanghai, I saw the most magnificent representations of the Year of the Dragon.” Her son, Elon Musk, responded to this under the post: “More people should visit China.” The nationalist newspaper Global Times reported on this exchange with delight.
Maye Musk’s great popularity in China could represent a valuable form of “soft power” for her son – and therefore now probably also for President Donald Trump. On the other hand, if political tensions between the US and China increase and the situation escalates, Maye Musk could very quickly cease to be a topic of conversation on China’s social media. Jörn Petring
Angela Merkel’s autobiography “Freedom” was published in 30 countries this week. A Chinese version of Merkel’s political memoirs is available from Taiwanese publisher Infortress Publishing under the title: “自由: 回憶錄1954-2021”. In her book, Merkel reflects only relatively briefly on her relationship with China and her first encounters with Xi, whom she was able to impress with her Marxist-Leninist knowledge from her time in the GDR even before he took office as president. Remarkably, Merkel once again spoke out in favor of ratifying the CAI investment agreement with China. “I remain convinced that the agreement would mean more reliable framework conditions for investments compared to the current situation.” The CAI agreement between the EU and China has been on ice for almost three years now – with the chances of reactivation approaching zero. The EU Parliament suspended work on the agreement in 2021 after Beijing imposed sanctions on several EU parliamentarians. There had already been skepticism beforehand due to clauses on human rights and working conditions in the CAI.
Elections were held yesterday in the former German colony of Namibia. When the counting is expected to be completed over the weekend, Beijing’s long-standing all-weather friendship could come to an end. In close cooperation with the ruling party Swapo, Chinese companies dominate all core economic sectors in this sparsely populated but resource-rich country.
Young Namibians in particular want a new vision for the country, where wealth is unevenly distributed and unemployment is high. They think Government contracts should increasingly go to domestic companies that provide work for the locals. However, Beijing is confident that things will continue as before.
Volkswagen in Xinjiang no longer does business as usual. Eleven years after the plant’s opening in Urumqi, alongside the state-owned joint venture partner SAIC, the Group is withdrawing from the region. Even if the Group still distances itself from human rights violations, the question rightly arises: why only now? For Volkswagen, this inglorious chapter ends with a loss of reputation and a lot of money.
The fact that Volkswagen has succeeded in reaching an agreement with SAIC to end their joint presence in Xinjiang probably has less to do with the Wolfsburg-based company’s influence on the fate of the state-owned enterprise SAIC than with the Chinese company’s international ambitions, writes Marcel Grzanna. Even SAIC could not ignore a red flag such as the one raised by the rating agency MSCI last year to warn investors of the risks of Volkswagen’s adventure in Xinjiang.
The only official Mao Zedong statue outside of China is located in the west of the Namibian capital Windhoek. It was unveiled in the summer of 2024 as the landmark of the “Chairman Mao School” in the Otjomuise district, which is co-financed by China. China’s ambassador Zhao Weiping explained at the inauguration that the Great Chairman stood for the “eternal friendship” between the two countries. The Namibian writer and political scientist Joseph Diescho, however, sharply criticized the erection of the statue on “Namibia’s sovereign soil”: “The decision was obviously made without the participation of Namibians,” he commented dryly.
Either way, the statue is a clear symbol of the self-confident presence of the Chinese in the South African country, which was a German colony until 1915 and was under South African rule until independence in 1990. Of the country’s three million inhabitants, it is estimated that between 4,000 and 6,000 people are Chinese citizens or Namibians of Chinese descent, not including project-based contract workers. Apart from restaurants, a few “China stores” and the highly visible Chinatown in the capital, they are surprisingly invisible on the streets.
However, the Chinese are all the more present in the Namibian economy. Even though Chinese direct investment in Namibia is rather low in contrast to other African countries such as Kenya, South Africa or Angola, Chinese companies dominate the competition for government tenders in countless sectors.
In recent years, Chinese companies have built and renovated office buildings, roads, railroads, ports and airports in Namibia. In an interview with Table.Briefings, the German-Namibian political scientist and Africa scholar Henning Melber speaks of a “quasi-monopoly of Chinese companies in the awarding of government contracts for public works”.
Mega projects such as Namibia’s largest seawater desalination plant or the country’s largest solar power plant are also being implemented by Chinese companies using win-win superlatives. Chinese companies are particularly active in the mining sector, which contributes 14.4 percent to Namibia’s gross domestic product. The Chinese have a monopoly in uranium mining in particular.
In 2019, China National Uranium Corporation Limited (CNUC) took over the Rössing uranium mine, one of the largest and longest-operating uranium mines in the world, from British-Australian mining giant Rio Tinto. Around 4.5 percent of the world’s uranium supply comes from here. In return, Namibia mainly imports consumer goods, textiles, electronics and light machinery from China. Last year, China accounted for around 8.9 percent of Namibia’s total imports. This makes the People’s Republic the country’s most important economic partner after South Africa.
While the country’s political elite courts and approves of Chinese activities, resentment is not uncommon among ordinary Namibians. If you ask around on the streets, it is acknowledged that China implements its projects according to plan and generally well. On the other hand, there has also been criticism for years that the Chinese pay local workers too low wages and sometimes treat them badly.
It was only in January that the Chinese embassy in Namibia once again rejected such accusations: They adhere to local standards and business practices. However, the mood is no longer as negative as it was around 2021, when there were even anti-Chinese protests led by trade union activist Michael Amushelelo, says political analyst Rakkel Andreas, who co-wrote a paper on Sino-Namibian relations for the Namibian Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR).
“The anti-Chinese sentiment was also partly due to Namibians feeling that the influx of small Chinese pop-up stores were occupying spaces where they normally sold their goods.” Many Chinese business owners, sensitized by the events, are now taking a more cautious approach, says Andreas. And in rural areas in particular, their stores have also closed a supply gap.
In the presidential and parliamentary elections, which will take place on Thursday and are expected to be counted by the weekend, China has therefore hardly played a role as an issue and agent of influence, says Andreas. Beijing seems to have no doubts about the election victory of the Swapo Party of Namibia (formerly South-West Africa People’s Organization), the party that has been in power without interruption since Namibia’s independence in 1990.
Swapo has a long-standing “all-weather friendship” with Beijing, which dates back to the pre-independence era and has always included party donations and scholarships for cadres and cadre children. The Swapo government was also always close to Beijing in its anti-imperialist rhetoric and the idea of socialism with Namibian characteristics. However, many Namibians, especially the younger ones, say that Swapo lacks a vision for the future, such as a recipe against high unemployment. They say that the party has created a corrupt crony economy and driven the sell-out of the country, especially to China.
Namibia’s trade with the People’s Republic is still not diversified and therefore does not contribute to Namibia’s economic ambitions to increase employment levels and living standards through industrialization, writes the think tank IPPR. Just one day before the presidential election, the Construction Industries Federation of Namibia (CIF) called on the incoming government to consider more local companies when awarding construction contracts. As a bad example, the Federation cited the Ogongo-Oshakati pipeline renewal project worth €12.56 million, which was awarded entirely to foreign contractors, including the China Gezhouba Group Company and the China Jiangxi Economic and Technical International Corporation.
“If the Swapo candidate Netumbo Nandi Ndaitwah is likely to be elected, the mutually declared all-weather friendship between China and Namibia will be further strengthened. She was already a reliable ally as Foreign Minister,” says Henning Melber. However, should the political situation change fundamentally, a revision of these relations cannot be completely ruled out, depending on the constellation. “Particularly with regard to the preferential awarding of state contracts for public works such as road construction, the quasi-monopoly of Chinese companies would probably waver in favor of taking the domestic construction industry into account. However, this is unlikely to affect China’s presence in the mining sector and uranium mining in particular.”
The withdrawal from Xinjiang marks the end of a disastrous miscalculation for the German car manufacturer Volkswagen. Neither did the region develop into a lucrative location for the company in the People’s Republic of China, nor did the early warnings of a drastic level of repression against the Uyghur minority prove to be exaggerated. Everything that could go wrong for Volkswagen in Xinjiang did go wrong. Eleven years after the opening of the plant in Urumqi, alongside the state-owned joint venture partner SAIC, a chapter that cost the Group a great deal of money and reputation is coming to an end.
Uyghur representatives complain that it took the discovery of huge re-education camps with space for hundreds of thousands of people, dozens of eyewitnesses and a report by the UN Human Rights Office before Volkswagen initiated the end of its involvement. However, Volkswagen has officially denied to this day that the dramatic human rights situation in Xinjiang was the main reason for the decision. Instead, the Group justifies the poor economic development of the location as the primary motivation for its drive.
“Such an approach gives the impression that a company like Volkswagen is not seriously considering its responsibility towards those affected or the global expectations of ethical behavior. It would help the Uyghur cause if companies clearly recognized that moral considerations play a role,” says Berlin Director Haiyer Kuerban of the World Uyghur Congress (WUC).
The fact that Volkswagen has succeeded in reaching an agreement with SAIC to end their joint presence in Xinjiang probably has less to do with the Wolfsburg-based company’s influence on the fate of the state-owned enterprise. While the relationship in 1984 may have been based on China’s thirst for knowledge of Wolfsburg engineering, today it is based on Wolfsburg’s dependence on Chinese market control.
It was also the market that opened the door for SAIC to agree to end the joint venture’s involvement in Xinjiang. Even a state-owned company cannot ignore a red flag such as the one raised by the rating agency MSCI last year to warn investors of the risks of Volkswagen’s adventure in Xinjiang. SAIC and dozens of other Chinese manufacturers want to internationalize their business and are pushing into lucrative markets such as Europe and the USA. The issue of supply chains is becoming increasingly relevant there. Legislation requires importers to provide very specific documentation that the construction of their vehicles is in no way connected to forced labor.
The discussions about the site went on for years. Volkswagen always emphasized that no forced laborers were employed at the plant and had these statements confirmed by a controversial audit. However, this argument ignored the actual accusations of the critics. Rather, they criticized the Group’s fundamental presence in a region where the entire industrial environment is clouded by the repression against the Uyghurs. The Group was never able to disguise the impression that political will in Wolfsburg, triggered by possible pressure from Beijing, had once led to the investment.
When the use of forced laborers in the construction of a test track of the joint venture in Turpan was proven at the beginning of the year, Volkswagen pulled out its last trump card and distanced itself from the joint venture. The company did not control it, nor was Volkswagen AG legally linked to it. Now Volkswagen’s communications department is justifying the sale of the factory and test track to a subsidiary of the state-owned Shanghai Lingang Economic Development Group with the “dynamic market development”, which makes a “transformation of the joint venture” necessary.
The news was embedded in the announcement of the early extension of the joint venture’s contract until 2040. More electric, fewer emissions – this summarizes SAIC-Volkswagen’s plan for the coming years. There are to be 18 new e-models by 2030 and the aim is to be climate-neutral by 2050. The joint venture turned 40 on Monday.
Within the Group, people are more self-critical. Some voices clearly state that the change in public perception of the human rights issue in Xinjiang should have been felt. Especially as the Group knew more than ten years ago that the decision was highly political. Nevertheless, Volkswagen wanted to be convinced that it was doing the right thing – both economically and socially. The New Silk Road had only just been born as an idea and promised much closer integration of the region into international value creation, linked to greater prosperity and more purchasing power for its inhabitants. As in 1984, a pioneering spirit that was to turn out to be a specter blew through the Wolfsburg management floors.
The involvement of Uyghur employees in the plant in Urumqi reportedly met with little approval from SAIC. It is said that all Uyghurs were already under general suspicion at the time. Volkswagen had to do some convincing. The integration of the Uyghurs into the local labor market was supposed to help ease ethnic tensions. But the wish turned out to be the father of the idea.
The plant in Xinjiang is now being taken over by the Shanghai Motor Vehicle Inspection Center (SMVIC), a company that reconditions vehicles and makes them fit for the used car market. Volkswagen insisted that despite the sale of the plant, the remaining 40 Uyghur employees were guaranteed continued employment. Likely, Volkswagen will never know whether and for how long the new owner will actually honor the agreement.
Once again there are allegations of corruption against a Chinese minister – and once again it concerns the Ministry of Defense: According to a report, Dong Jun has been the subject of a corruption investigation. The proceedings are part of a larger investigation into corruption within the Chinese military, reported the Financial Times. A spokeswoman for the Foreign Ministry in Beijing described the report as a “witch hunt” and did not comment further. In previous cases, Beijing also initially did not want to know anything about the case and did not comment on it.
Former naval commander Dong was only appointed Minister of Defense in December 2023. He replaced Li Shangfu, who in turn had to vacate the post after just seven months in office. Li was subsequently expelled from the Chinese Communist Party, partly because he was accused of taking bribes. Since then, Li has not been seen in public. His predecessor Wei Fenghe had also been expelled from the Communist Party on suspicion of corruption. ari
Tech billionaire Elon Musk has excellent political contacts in China. But his mother, Maye Musk, also enjoys celebrity status in the People’s Republic. The popularity of the 76-year-old with silver-grey hair can be seen on the Chinese social media platform Xiaohongshu, for example, where she has more than half a million followers. Her posts, in which she documents her travels, fashion shows and collaborations, regularly receive thousands of likes and hundreds of comments.
Maye Musk began her modeling career at the age of 15 in South Africa and appeared on the covers of renowned magazines such as Vogue and Time. Along the way, she earned degrees in nutritional science and ran her own consulting practice. In 2019, she published her autobiography “A Woman Makes a Plan”. As a single mother, she raised her three children, including Elon Musk.
Maye Musk’s popularity took off in 2020 when her book was published in Chinese and was particularly well received by female readers. Musk is a symbol of “aging gracefully and self-empowerment”, Olivia Plotnick, founder of the Shanghai-based social media agency Wai Social, recently told Bloomberg.
Like her son, Mother Musk is also extremely enterprising. The senior citizen has forged close links with Chinese companies in recent years. She is a brand ambassador for mattress manufacturer AISE Baobao, for which she last visited China in November. She has also been the face of advertising campaigns for smartphone manufacturer Oppo.
What is striking is that Maye Musk – also like her son – is extremely well-disposed towards China. During a visit to Shanghai in February this year, Maye Musk also visited the Yu Garden and was impressed by the magnificent decorations. She shared photos on the X platform and commented: “In Shanghai, I saw the most magnificent representations of the Year of the Dragon.” Her son, Elon Musk, responded to this under the post: “More people should visit China.” The nationalist newspaper Global Times reported on this exchange with delight.
Maye Musk’s great popularity in China could represent a valuable form of “soft power” for her son – and therefore now probably also for President Donald Trump. On the other hand, if political tensions between the US and China increase and the situation escalates, Maye Musk could very quickly cease to be a topic of conversation on China’s social media. Jörn Petring
Angela Merkel’s autobiography “Freedom” was published in 30 countries this week. A Chinese version of Merkel’s political memoirs is available from Taiwanese publisher Infortress Publishing under the title: “自由: 回憶錄1954-2021”. In her book, Merkel reflects only relatively briefly on her relationship with China and her first encounters with Xi, whom she was able to impress with her Marxist-Leninist knowledge from her time in the GDR even before he took office as president. Remarkably, Merkel once again spoke out in favor of ratifying the CAI investment agreement with China. “I remain convinced that the agreement would mean more reliable framework conditions for investments compared to the current situation.” The CAI agreement between the EU and China has been on ice for almost three years now – with the chances of reactivation approaching zero. The EU Parliament suspended work on the agreement in 2021 after Beijing imposed sanctions on several EU parliamentarians. There had already been skepticism beforehand due to clauses on human rights and working conditions in the CAI.
