The summit before the summit should be more than just a photo appointment: The meeting today, Wednesday, offers the opportunity to “reconfirm the key importance of the strategic partnership between the EU and the Western Balkans,” writes EU Council President Charles Michel in his invitation letter. Despite budget problems, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz plans to travel home to meet his counterparts from Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina ahead of the EU summit.
Enlargement is a “geopolitical investment in peace, security, stability and prosperity,” according to the draft conclusions of the summit with the Western Balkan states. Ever since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the admission of new members has also been about geopolitics. A vacuum in the Balkans would be an invitation for Russia, as well as China and Turkey, to make their presence felt there. The EU thus wants to speed up the accession process but at the same time keep it performance-based. How this contradiction can be resolved is unlikely to be clarified today.
Serbia in particular is exploiting the geopolitical emergency for its seesaw policy between Brussels and Moscow. The clear calling for the candidate countries to finally join the EU’s common foreign and security policy, including the sanctions regime against Russia, is also clearly addressed to Belgrade. It will soon have even more catching up to do. The EU’s 12th sanctions package against Vladimir Putin’s war of aggression with new measures against loopholes met with broad approval in the AstV on Tuesday evening. One member state still needed internal clarification before the written procedure for formal adoption could begin, diplomats said.
That would at least be a small success ahead of the EU summit, which will be overshadowed by Viktor Orbán’s stubborn veto against the start of accession negotiations and new billions in aid for Ukraine. An end to the Hungarian blockade was not yet in sight on Tuesday.
On Wednesday, six months before the European Parliament elections on June 9, 2024, the EU Commission presented a package of measures to defend democracy. The most important element of the package is a legislative proposal that regulates the transparency and democratic accountability of interest groups that are financed from abroad. In this way, the Commission wants to prevent countries such as Russia, China or Turkey from influencing European politics, decision-making and the democratic system. The law is also intended to prevent cases of corruption such as Katargate.
However, critics fear that states such as Hungary could also use the law to discredit or silence unwelcome civil society organizations or NGOs receiving money abroad. “We will have to take a close look here to ensure that the balance is maintained,” Green MEP Sergey Lagodinsky told Table.Media.
Europe is an open democracy, said Věra Jourová, Commission Vice-President for Values and Transparency, at the presentation of the package in Brussels. “But it would be naive to think that democracy does not need any protection.” The opposite is the case. “And we should not let Putin or any other autocrat covertly interfere in our democratic process.” The Commission wants to counter this risk of foreign interference with the new law. The law is about transparency, and Jourová emphasized several times that it is not about the prosecution of criminal acts.
The Defense of Democracy Package builds on previous Commission initiatives to protect European democracy, including the European Democracy Action Plan. However, the law got off to a difficult start. The Commission had already wanted to present it in the spring. Members of the European Parliament criticized in an open letter to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen that the directive could disproportionately affect the right to freedom of association and called for an impact assessment.
“It is our understanding that the proposed directive would subject civil society organizations that receive funding from non-EU sources to a number of registration and reporting obligations,” MEPs wrote at the time. “We are concerned that these obligations will impose a disproportionate burden on civil society organizations and violate the Venice Commission/OSCE guidelines on freedom of association.”
Parliamentarians want to examine the proposal that has now been published. The proposal aims to create EU-wide harmonized rules for a high level of transparency on lobbying campaigns and similar activities carried out by organizations on behalf of a third-country government. The following transparency requirements are envisaged:
According to the Commission, the proposal also includes appropriate rules and safeguards to prevent registration requirements from being misused to restrict fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression. For example, independent supervisory authorities should be authorized to request only limited records in justified cases. In addition, the authorities must ensure no adverse consequences arise from registration. According to the proposal, complete harmonization should also prevent member states from maintaining or introducing additional requirements and practices. Jourová emphasized the latter on Tuesday in Brussels.
The Commission also wants to combat the influence of third countries by issuing recommendations to national governments and parties. “Ahead of the European Parliament elections next year, we will strengthen the integrity of elections, offline and online,” Jourová announced. Member states will be called upon to restrict or even completely ban donations from third countries to parties, political foundations, candidates and, where appropriate, political movements. So far, there is still a lack of common standards for “donations and other forms of support from third countries.” The EU member states are now to develop them to improve supervision.
It says a lot about the state of democracy that the Commission calls on the parties to adopt codes of conduct for “the integrity of elections and a fair election campaign.” For example, the parties should refrain from “manipulative behavior”:
In addition, the “Recommendations for inclusive and resilient electoral processes” also include socio-political demands such as equal representation in election management bodies. Governments should also promote training for citizens who wish to act as election observers. The EU states should strengthen cyber security by, among other things, identifying all institutions that operate election infrastructures and improving their defenses.
The member states are to report regularly on the implementation of the recommendations. In a new communication on the defense of democracy, the Commission provides a review of measures taken to date at the EU level and a preview of tasks still to be solved.
The Commission also wants to promote the engagement of citizens in public policy-making processes and has issued recommendations to this end. For example, those who wish to participate in citizens’ assemblies could have their participation costs reimbursed.
The Parliament also made proposals on Tuesday on the way it wants European democracy to be. MEPs want a “clear and credible link between the will of the voters and the election of the Commission President.” In other words, the Parliament (the people’s elected representatives) should propose the future Commission President.
In a resolution, the Parliament called for a binding agreement between the Parliament and the European Council. MEPs want to ensure that the European parties and political groups begin negotiations on a joint candidate immediately after the election – and before the European Council makes a proposal. In this way, the Parliament wants to prevent another candidate from being appointed to the post who was not even up for election, such as Ursula von der Leyen. At that time, the heads of state and government of the member states pushed her through as Commission President.
The Parliament now wants the lead candidate of the party with the most seats in Parliament to lead the process in the first round of negotiations. In addition, the parties and political groups should reach a “legislative agreement” that could serve as a basis for the Commission’s work program and thus guarantee that the measures after the election are in line with the will of the voters. Parliament also called on the Council to swiftly adopt the new European electoral law and the new rules for European political parties and foundations, so that at least the latter apply for the 2024 elections. With Manuel Berkel
Great self-confidence, but also great caution. This has been the maxim of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in his relationship with Kremlin leader Vladimir Putin since the start of the Russian war against Ukraine. A complex seesaw policy between the superpowers. “At the moment, I trust Russia just as much as I trust the West,” said Erdoğan in a memorable interview with the US TV station PBS in September.
The NATO state Turkey is a paradoxical “friend” of Russia. In terms of foreign policy, the two countries cooperate where possible but fight each other militarily in different theaters of war with varying degrees of intensity: in Syria, Libya and the Caucasus.
As a result of the Gaza war, Erdoğan has now found geopolitical harmony with his big neighbor after a period of testing Putin’s red lines. Both autocrats are instrumentalizing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: they are positioning themselves against Israel and the West while intensifying their own wars – Russia in Ukraine, Turkey in northern Syria (Rojava).
Erdoğan benefits from the fact that Russia is tied down and weakened by its war. Since the Nagorno-Karabakh war in September at the latest, Turkey has assumed the dominant role in the South Caucasus, previously held by Russia. Ankara is also benefiting from Moscow’s weakness in Central Asia and is strengthening its geopolitical rivalry with its neighbor to expand relations with the Central Asian states that want to reduce their dependence on Russia.
In the Ukrainian arena, in particular, Erdoğan is exploiting any weakness on Putin’s part for political and economic gain. Right at the beginning of the war, Erdoğan sent military Bayraktar drones to Ukraine, which contributed significantly to the successful defense against Russian attacks. Erdoğan closed the Bosphorus to Russian (and other) warships and repeatedly demanded the return of Crimea to Ukraine. Turkey is also heavily involved in the high-risk trade in Ukrainian grain. Following Russia’s unilateral withdrawal from the Black Sea grain agreement in July, Putin had a Turkish freighter on its way to the Ukrainian grain port of Ismajil stopped with warning shots in mid-August, but deliveries continued nonetheless.
Putin allows Erdoğan to do as he pleases because he ultimately benefits from the partnership. Despite its NATO membership, Turkey plays a key role in undermining Western sanctions against Russia, which it has explicitly not joined. The breach of sanctions by Turkish companies has been on record since the beginning of September at the latest. At that time, the USA imposed sanctions on five leading Turkish trading companies for exporting military-grade components for drones and sensor technology to Russia.
Although Turkey subsequently blocked the transit of sanctioned goods to its neighboring country, Turkish exports of vital high-tech goods for Russia’s war machine are now apparently being shifted via supply chains in the Caucasus and Central Asia, as the British Financial Times recently reported. According to the report, “high-priority” components for the defense industry are being covertly delivered to Russia via the former Soviet republics of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. They involved 45 categories of goods such as microchips, communication devices and rifle scopes. The volume of this trade has risen sharply and has significantly increased Western concerns.
Washington thus increased the political pressure on Ankara once again to stop the continued obstruction of NATO policy by Turkish companies. Two weeks ago, US Deputy Secretary of State James O’Brien publicly warned Ankara that the Western states did not want “one of our key partners to become a place where our sanctions are circumvented.” The Turkish Foreign Ministry countered with a waxy response that everything was being done to prevent the circumvention of sanctions, but, unfortunately, such “attempts” by “obscure entities” were taking place.
At an international conference held by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Nicosia in November, which is close to the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Turkish experts explained that by tolerating the “ghost trade” of sanctioned goods, Erdoğan was also taking revenge for Putin’s massive support during the Turkish presidential and parliamentary elections in May. At that time, Putin had openly interfered in Turkish elections for the first time by deferring Turkish gas debts amounting to several hundred million dollars, thus enabling Erdoğan to promise his voters free gas supplies. This intervention further strengthened the already asymmetrical relationship of dependency between the autocrats in Putin’s favor.
In any case, the Turkish president has drawn his conclusions from the upheavals since November 2015, when the Turkish air defense shot down a Russian plane that had entered Turkish airspace from Syria. Russia imposed sanctions on Turkey; Erdoğan was forced to make a humiliating apology to Putin. Ankara then ordered Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missiles for $2 billion and, since 2018, allowed Russia to build the Akkuyu nuclear power plant in southern Turkey, which the Turkish opposition criticizes as a Russian base in the middle of Turkey.
For its part, Russia gave the green light for Turkish military operations in northern Syria and resumed construction of the TurkStream pipeline, through which Russian gas has been flowing to Turkey since January 2020. Turkey’s growing dependence on Russia for energy has given Putin enormous potential for blackmail. Moscow is currently planning to build a natural gas hub in Turkey to whitewash Russian gas into Turkish gas for export to the EU.
The volume of trade between Russia and Turkey has increased significantly since the start of the war in Ukraine and is expected to exceed US$65 billion this year. Last year, Russia was Turkey’s most important import partner for the first time with goods worth $58.85 billion, a threefold increase compared to 2021.
Nevertheless, Erdoğan remains an unpredictable risk for Putin due to his desire for “strategic autonomy.” Especially as the Turkish president is pragmatic enough not to jeopardize his NATO partnership and send signals of goodwill to the West, on which Turkey is more dependent than ever due to its huge financial and economic problems. In November, he finally forwarded the bill on Sweden’s accession to NATO to the parliament in Ankara for ratification. Nevertheless, approval is likely to be a long time coming. For the go-ahead, Erdoğan wants 40 F-16 fighter jets and 40 Eurofighters from the NATO partners.
A 36-hour negotiation marathon on the European AI Act ended on Friday with a provisional agreement: instead of a mere voluntary commitment, the developers of basic AI models such as GPT-4 or Gemini are to be subject to binding rules. These include transparency and documentation obligations and – in the case of models with so-called systemic risks – additional measures such as mandatory evaluations or increased cyber security
The negotiators struggled over this until the very end. Germany, France and Italy in particular were concerned that binding basic model regulation would pose a threat to Europe as a business location. The provisional agreement now has the potential to reconcile economic and security policy considerations. It provides for a two–tiered approach: Stricter rules would apply to larger and therefore more powerful base models than to smaller ones.
The distinguishing criterion is the computing power with which a model was trained, measured in so-called flops (floating point operations). Because the limit is to be set at 1025 flops, and only a few US models such as GPT-4 are above this, European base model developers such as the German Aleph Alpha or the French Mistral would be exempt from the stricter rules. The provisional agreement provides for this limit to be flexibly adjusted in line with advances in AI development and, if necessary, expanded to include qualitative criteria recommended by experts.
Apart from this, European AI start-ups whose applications are based on basic models could benefit in particular from a sensibly designed agreement that is put into practice. If basic models remained unregulated, these companies would potentially be exposed to excessively high compliance costs and liability risks for applications in so-called high-risk areas such as education or transport. According to the provisional agreement, the large, almost exclusively US tech companies would be held liable instead – and it is reasonable to expect them to take on the additional compliance burden.
The agreement on the tiered approach is currently subject to reservations; various details still need to be negotiated and the AI Act formally adopted. Binding basic model regulation, which is now within reach thanks to the current agreement, would be urgently needed from a safety perspective as well as from an economic perspective. AI models already pose acute dangers today, such as discriminatory content or deepfakes that influence public discourse. At the same time, progress in AI is rapid and experts warn that models could soon be able to carry out sophisticated cyberattacks or synthesize bioweapons. These risks arise from the basic models, and not from the applications that arise from them. It is therefore only the developers of the basic models who can effectively and comprehensively limit these risks.
The now-planned safety measures are an important step towards secure and trustworthy AI. However, it is questionable whether they go far enough. This applies above all to the threshold of 1025 flops: models such as GPT-3.5, which have only been trained with 1024 flops, can already assist in cyberattacks and the spread of disinformation, as legal expert Philipp Hacker writes in a statement. These models are subject to comparatively lax rules in the current version.
These fall far short of the basic security regulations that are commonplace in other areas of risky technology. Anyone who can invest several million euros in training a model with 1024 flops should also be able to afford the corresponding compliance costs. Extending these common-sense rules to a few more basic models would still primarily affect US providers and would not jeopardize the European research location. Especially as the development of basic models should not be confused with basic research, which is not affected by the above-mentioned rules anyway.
At the same time, there are also one or two gaps in the rules for models with systemic risks. For example, it is to be welcomed that these models must be checked for weaknesses as part of internal red teaming. However, external evaluations by independent audit organizations are also needed.
Binding rules for basic models are therefore in the interests of both the European AI location and the safety of the European population. The tiered approach would create a good starting point for doing justice to both dimensions. It now needs to be readjusted and then formalized. This is the only way for the world’s first comprehensive AI legislation to achieve the pioneering character that was once intended for it.
The summit before the summit should be more than just a photo appointment: The meeting today, Wednesday, offers the opportunity to “reconfirm the key importance of the strategic partnership between the EU and the Western Balkans,” writes EU Council President Charles Michel in his invitation letter. Despite budget problems, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz plans to travel home to meet his counterparts from Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina ahead of the EU summit.
Enlargement is a “geopolitical investment in peace, security, stability and prosperity,” according to the draft conclusions of the summit with the Western Balkan states. Ever since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the admission of new members has also been about geopolitics. A vacuum in the Balkans would be an invitation for Russia, as well as China and Turkey, to make their presence felt there. The EU thus wants to speed up the accession process but at the same time keep it performance-based. How this contradiction can be resolved is unlikely to be clarified today.
Serbia in particular is exploiting the geopolitical emergency for its seesaw policy between Brussels and Moscow. The clear calling for the candidate countries to finally join the EU’s common foreign and security policy, including the sanctions regime against Russia, is also clearly addressed to Belgrade. It will soon have even more catching up to do. The EU’s 12th sanctions package against Vladimir Putin’s war of aggression with new measures against loopholes met with broad approval in the AstV on Tuesday evening. One member state still needed internal clarification before the written procedure for formal adoption could begin, diplomats said.
That would at least be a small success ahead of the EU summit, which will be overshadowed by Viktor Orbán’s stubborn veto against the start of accession negotiations and new billions in aid for Ukraine. An end to the Hungarian blockade was not yet in sight on Tuesday.
On Wednesday, six months before the European Parliament elections on June 9, 2024, the EU Commission presented a package of measures to defend democracy. The most important element of the package is a legislative proposal that regulates the transparency and democratic accountability of interest groups that are financed from abroad. In this way, the Commission wants to prevent countries such as Russia, China or Turkey from influencing European politics, decision-making and the democratic system. The law is also intended to prevent cases of corruption such as Katargate.
However, critics fear that states such as Hungary could also use the law to discredit or silence unwelcome civil society organizations or NGOs receiving money abroad. “We will have to take a close look here to ensure that the balance is maintained,” Green MEP Sergey Lagodinsky told Table.Media.
Europe is an open democracy, said Věra Jourová, Commission Vice-President for Values and Transparency, at the presentation of the package in Brussels. “But it would be naive to think that democracy does not need any protection.” The opposite is the case. “And we should not let Putin or any other autocrat covertly interfere in our democratic process.” The Commission wants to counter this risk of foreign interference with the new law. The law is about transparency, and Jourová emphasized several times that it is not about the prosecution of criminal acts.
The Defense of Democracy Package builds on previous Commission initiatives to protect European democracy, including the European Democracy Action Plan. However, the law got off to a difficult start. The Commission had already wanted to present it in the spring. Members of the European Parliament criticized in an open letter to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen that the directive could disproportionately affect the right to freedom of association and called for an impact assessment.
“It is our understanding that the proposed directive would subject civil society organizations that receive funding from non-EU sources to a number of registration and reporting obligations,” MEPs wrote at the time. “We are concerned that these obligations will impose a disproportionate burden on civil society organizations and violate the Venice Commission/OSCE guidelines on freedom of association.”
Parliamentarians want to examine the proposal that has now been published. The proposal aims to create EU-wide harmonized rules for a high level of transparency on lobbying campaigns and similar activities carried out by organizations on behalf of a third-country government. The following transparency requirements are envisaged:
According to the Commission, the proposal also includes appropriate rules and safeguards to prevent registration requirements from being misused to restrict fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression. For example, independent supervisory authorities should be authorized to request only limited records in justified cases. In addition, the authorities must ensure no adverse consequences arise from registration. According to the proposal, complete harmonization should also prevent member states from maintaining or introducing additional requirements and practices. Jourová emphasized the latter on Tuesday in Brussels.
The Commission also wants to combat the influence of third countries by issuing recommendations to national governments and parties. “Ahead of the European Parliament elections next year, we will strengthen the integrity of elections, offline and online,” Jourová announced. Member states will be called upon to restrict or even completely ban donations from third countries to parties, political foundations, candidates and, where appropriate, political movements. So far, there is still a lack of common standards for “donations and other forms of support from third countries.” The EU member states are now to develop them to improve supervision.
It says a lot about the state of democracy that the Commission calls on the parties to adopt codes of conduct for “the integrity of elections and a fair election campaign.” For example, the parties should refrain from “manipulative behavior”:
In addition, the “Recommendations for inclusive and resilient electoral processes” also include socio-political demands such as equal representation in election management bodies. Governments should also promote training for citizens who wish to act as election observers. The EU states should strengthen cyber security by, among other things, identifying all institutions that operate election infrastructures and improving their defenses.
The member states are to report regularly on the implementation of the recommendations. In a new communication on the defense of democracy, the Commission provides a review of measures taken to date at the EU level and a preview of tasks still to be solved.
The Commission also wants to promote the engagement of citizens in public policy-making processes and has issued recommendations to this end. For example, those who wish to participate in citizens’ assemblies could have their participation costs reimbursed.
The Parliament also made proposals on Tuesday on the way it wants European democracy to be. MEPs want a “clear and credible link between the will of the voters and the election of the Commission President.” In other words, the Parliament (the people’s elected representatives) should propose the future Commission President.
In a resolution, the Parliament called for a binding agreement between the Parliament and the European Council. MEPs want to ensure that the European parties and political groups begin negotiations on a joint candidate immediately after the election – and before the European Council makes a proposal. In this way, the Parliament wants to prevent another candidate from being appointed to the post who was not even up for election, such as Ursula von der Leyen. At that time, the heads of state and government of the member states pushed her through as Commission President.
The Parliament now wants the lead candidate of the party with the most seats in Parliament to lead the process in the first round of negotiations. In addition, the parties and political groups should reach a “legislative agreement” that could serve as a basis for the Commission’s work program and thus guarantee that the measures after the election are in line with the will of the voters. Parliament also called on the Council to swiftly adopt the new European electoral law and the new rules for European political parties and foundations, so that at least the latter apply for the 2024 elections. With Manuel Berkel
Great self-confidence, but also great caution. This has been the maxim of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in his relationship with Kremlin leader Vladimir Putin since the start of the Russian war against Ukraine. A complex seesaw policy between the superpowers. “At the moment, I trust Russia just as much as I trust the West,” said Erdoğan in a memorable interview with the US TV station PBS in September.
The NATO state Turkey is a paradoxical “friend” of Russia. In terms of foreign policy, the two countries cooperate where possible but fight each other militarily in different theaters of war with varying degrees of intensity: in Syria, Libya and the Caucasus.
As a result of the Gaza war, Erdoğan has now found geopolitical harmony with his big neighbor after a period of testing Putin’s red lines. Both autocrats are instrumentalizing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: they are positioning themselves against Israel and the West while intensifying their own wars – Russia in Ukraine, Turkey in northern Syria (Rojava).
Erdoğan benefits from the fact that Russia is tied down and weakened by its war. Since the Nagorno-Karabakh war in September at the latest, Turkey has assumed the dominant role in the South Caucasus, previously held by Russia. Ankara is also benefiting from Moscow’s weakness in Central Asia and is strengthening its geopolitical rivalry with its neighbor to expand relations with the Central Asian states that want to reduce their dependence on Russia.
In the Ukrainian arena, in particular, Erdoğan is exploiting any weakness on Putin’s part for political and economic gain. Right at the beginning of the war, Erdoğan sent military Bayraktar drones to Ukraine, which contributed significantly to the successful defense against Russian attacks. Erdoğan closed the Bosphorus to Russian (and other) warships and repeatedly demanded the return of Crimea to Ukraine. Turkey is also heavily involved in the high-risk trade in Ukrainian grain. Following Russia’s unilateral withdrawal from the Black Sea grain agreement in July, Putin had a Turkish freighter on its way to the Ukrainian grain port of Ismajil stopped with warning shots in mid-August, but deliveries continued nonetheless.
Putin allows Erdoğan to do as he pleases because he ultimately benefits from the partnership. Despite its NATO membership, Turkey plays a key role in undermining Western sanctions against Russia, which it has explicitly not joined. The breach of sanctions by Turkish companies has been on record since the beginning of September at the latest. At that time, the USA imposed sanctions on five leading Turkish trading companies for exporting military-grade components for drones and sensor technology to Russia.
Although Turkey subsequently blocked the transit of sanctioned goods to its neighboring country, Turkish exports of vital high-tech goods for Russia’s war machine are now apparently being shifted via supply chains in the Caucasus and Central Asia, as the British Financial Times recently reported. According to the report, “high-priority” components for the defense industry are being covertly delivered to Russia via the former Soviet republics of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. They involved 45 categories of goods such as microchips, communication devices and rifle scopes. The volume of this trade has risen sharply and has significantly increased Western concerns.
Washington thus increased the political pressure on Ankara once again to stop the continued obstruction of NATO policy by Turkish companies. Two weeks ago, US Deputy Secretary of State James O’Brien publicly warned Ankara that the Western states did not want “one of our key partners to become a place where our sanctions are circumvented.” The Turkish Foreign Ministry countered with a waxy response that everything was being done to prevent the circumvention of sanctions, but, unfortunately, such “attempts” by “obscure entities” were taking place.
At an international conference held by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Nicosia in November, which is close to the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Turkish experts explained that by tolerating the “ghost trade” of sanctioned goods, Erdoğan was also taking revenge for Putin’s massive support during the Turkish presidential and parliamentary elections in May. At that time, Putin had openly interfered in Turkish elections for the first time by deferring Turkish gas debts amounting to several hundred million dollars, thus enabling Erdoğan to promise his voters free gas supplies. This intervention further strengthened the already asymmetrical relationship of dependency between the autocrats in Putin’s favor.
In any case, the Turkish president has drawn his conclusions from the upheavals since November 2015, when the Turkish air defense shot down a Russian plane that had entered Turkish airspace from Syria. Russia imposed sanctions on Turkey; Erdoğan was forced to make a humiliating apology to Putin. Ankara then ordered Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missiles for $2 billion and, since 2018, allowed Russia to build the Akkuyu nuclear power plant in southern Turkey, which the Turkish opposition criticizes as a Russian base in the middle of Turkey.
For its part, Russia gave the green light for Turkish military operations in northern Syria and resumed construction of the TurkStream pipeline, through which Russian gas has been flowing to Turkey since January 2020. Turkey’s growing dependence on Russia for energy has given Putin enormous potential for blackmail. Moscow is currently planning to build a natural gas hub in Turkey to whitewash Russian gas into Turkish gas for export to the EU.
The volume of trade between Russia and Turkey has increased significantly since the start of the war in Ukraine and is expected to exceed US$65 billion this year. Last year, Russia was Turkey’s most important import partner for the first time with goods worth $58.85 billion, a threefold increase compared to 2021.
Nevertheless, Erdoğan remains an unpredictable risk for Putin due to his desire for “strategic autonomy.” Especially as the Turkish president is pragmatic enough not to jeopardize his NATO partnership and send signals of goodwill to the West, on which Turkey is more dependent than ever due to its huge financial and economic problems. In November, he finally forwarded the bill on Sweden’s accession to NATO to the parliament in Ankara for ratification. Nevertheless, approval is likely to be a long time coming. For the go-ahead, Erdoğan wants 40 F-16 fighter jets and 40 Eurofighters from the NATO partners.
A 36-hour negotiation marathon on the European AI Act ended on Friday with a provisional agreement: instead of a mere voluntary commitment, the developers of basic AI models such as GPT-4 or Gemini are to be subject to binding rules. These include transparency and documentation obligations and – in the case of models with so-called systemic risks – additional measures such as mandatory evaluations or increased cyber security
The negotiators struggled over this until the very end. Germany, France and Italy in particular were concerned that binding basic model regulation would pose a threat to Europe as a business location. The provisional agreement now has the potential to reconcile economic and security policy considerations. It provides for a two–tiered approach: Stricter rules would apply to larger and therefore more powerful base models than to smaller ones.
The distinguishing criterion is the computing power with which a model was trained, measured in so-called flops (floating point operations). Because the limit is to be set at 1025 flops, and only a few US models such as GPT-4 are above this, European base model developers such as the German Aleph Alpha or the French Mistral would be exempt from the stricter rules. The provisional agreement provides for this limit to be flexibly adjusted in line with advances in AI development and, if necessary, expanded to include qualitative criteria recommended by experts.
Apart from this, European AI start-ups whose applications are based on basic models could benefit in particular from a sensibly designed agreement that is put into practice. If basic models remained unregulated, these companies would potentially be exposed to excessively high compliance costs and liability risks for applications in so-called high-risk areas such as education or transport. According to the provisional agreement, the large, almost exclusively US tech companies would be held liable instead – and it is reasonable to expect them to take on the additional compliance burden.
The agreement on the tiered approach is currently subject to reservations; various details still need to be negotiated and the AI Act formally adopted. Binding basic model regulation, which is now within reach thanks to the current agreement, would be urgently needed from a safety perspective as well as from an economic perspective. AI models already pose acute dangers today, such as discriminatory content or deepfakes that influence public discourse. At the same time, progress in AI is rapid and experts warn that models could soon be able to carry out sophisticated cyberattacks or synthesize bioweapons. These risks arise from the basic models, and not from the applications that arise from them. It is therefore only the developers of the basic models who can effectively and comprehensively limit these risks.
The now-planned safety measures are an important step towards secure and trustworthy AI. However, it is questionable whether they go far enough. This applies above all to the threshold of 1025 flops: models such as GPT-3.5, which have only been trained with 1024 flops, can already assist in cyberattacks and the spread of disinformation, as legal expert Philipp Hacker writes in a statement. These models are subject to comparatively lax rules in the current version.
These fall far short of the basic security regulations that are commonplace in other areas of risky technology. Anyone who can invest several million euros in training a model with 1024 flops should also be able to afford the corresponding compliance costs. Extending these common-sense rules to a few more basic models would still primarily affect US providers and would not jeopardize the European research location. Especially as the development of basic models should not be confused with basic research, which is not affected by the above-mentioned rules anyway.
At the same time, there are also one or two gaps in the rules for models with systemic risks. For example, it is to be welcomed that these models must be checked for weaknesses as part of internal red teaming. However, external evaluations by independent audit organizations are also needed.
Binding rules for basic models are therefore in the interests of both the European AI location and the safety of the European population. The tiered approach would create a good starting point for doing justice to both dimensions. It now needs to be readjusted and then formalized. This is the only way for the world’s first comprehensive AI legislation to achieve the pioneering character that was once intended for it.
