Today at 11 a.m., Alexander Van der Bellen will receive a man in the Hofburg to whom he did not actually want to open any doors. The Austrian Federal President will meet FPÖ leader Herbert Kickl for a first meeting following the collapse of the coalition negotiations between the ÖVP, SPÖ and Neos. Kickl could soon be elected Federal Chancellor – in a coalition with the ÖVP.
After the liberal Neos party pulled out of the talks, negotiations between the Social Democrats and the Conservatives also broke down on Saturday. Chancellor Karl Nehammer has announced his resignation. Until a new government is formed, Van der Bellen intends to appoint an interim chancellor in the course of the week. New elections have not been ruled out. However, they could not take place for another three months and, according to the polls, the FPÖ would only make further gains.
With Kickl, Viktor Orbán would gain a partner and the ranks of Russia-lovers in the Council would grow. The election of the right-wing populist would also send a bitter signal to Germany and other European countries. If centrist parties are unable to agree on a common course and economic conditions do not improve, the fringes will benefit.
The probable breakthrough for the FPÖ is also a warning signal: the economic wing of the ÖVP had campaigned most strongly for an alliance. However, similarities in economic policy ideas should not be an argument for jeopardizing fundamental pillars of democracy such as the rule of law and the separation of powers.
Many observers believe that Giorgia Meloni will build a bridge between US President-elect Donald Trump and Europe in the future. In her two years in office, Meloni has established herself as a reliable partner, particularly in foreign policy, and is now one of the most influential politicians in Europe – probably also due to the weakening governments in Paris and Berlin.
She has achieved this primarily because she is more moderate on the international stage than many had feared after her election in the fall of 2022. The fact that she is pursuing a harshly conservative course in Italy, to put it mildly, is generally accepted in silence.
It is precisely this Janus-faced nature that has now earned Meloni the new role of Trump whisperer. He presented Meloni to the other guests at his resort on Saturday as “a fantastic woman who has really taken Europe by storm.” The Roman’s surprise flying visit to Mar-a-Lago at the weekend is fueling hopes of her supporters that the conservative prime minister will become Trump’s preferred ally in Europe. A mediator between him and the other EU heads of government. According to reports, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen had been informed about the trip in advance.
A role that has a history. She had already tried to enter Trump’s circle of influence in 2018. However, hardly anyone was interested in the visit by then Trump friend Steve Bannon to the Atreju youth festival organized by Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia. The far-right party had just come out of the election with 4.4 percent of the vote and was completely irrelevant outside Italy.
Six years later, Meloni’s strategy is working: When the current Trump advisor and X owner Elon Musk – who was the star guest at Atreju in 2023 – wants to speak to someone in Europe, he calls Meloni. In an interview with Corriere della Sera a few days ago, she described Musk as a “genius” at a time when Musk is campaigning for the AfD. According to Meloni, Musk is a “great personality of our time”, “an extraordinary innovator who always looks to the future.”
However, the Italian is also taking a strategic approach to her role in Europe. Meloni congratulated Trump after his election victory in November and emphasized the “unshakeable ties” between Italy and the USA. However, unlike her government partner in Rome, Lega leader Matteo Salvini, Meloni has never officially outed herself as an ardent Trump supporter.
When Notre Dame Cathedral was reopened in Paris at the beginning of December, Trump and Meloni officially met in person for the first time. In an interview with the New York Post afterwards, the soon-to-be US president praised Meloni as a “real superwoman.” There has been speculation in the Italian media for days as to whether Meloni will attend Trump’s inauguration on January 20 – which would be tantamount to provoking a large part of her European partners. The visit at the weekend is likely to have buried these plans, if they ever existed.
Interestingly, the outgoing incumbent Joe Biden is also putting Meloni on a pedestal in his last days in office. His last trip abroad as US President will take him to Rome on Thursday. The program includes an audience with Pope Francis as well as meetings with Meloni and President Sergio Mattarella. White House spokeswoman Karine Jean-Pierre said that the visit was intended to strengthen relations between the USA and Italy.
Whether Meloni will use her new wealth of power to defend EU positions agreed with her partners vis-à-vis Trump or whether she will opt for an Orbanesque special path remains open. However, Italy’s dependence on billions in EU funding alone is likely to keep Meloni in check.
According to experts, independence from Russian gas is made more difficult by high network charges, long construction times for important pipelines and the inadequate implementation of European internal market rules. Slovakia is also being criticized. Prime Minister Robert Fico has been threatening Ukraine for days with an electricity boycott due to the suspension of the transit of Russian gas. Slovakia was also a transit point for gas to the west until the turn of the year. As a result of the delivery stop, it will lose out on revenues of €500 million per year.
The EU has enough LNG terminals to replace Russian supplies. Last year, around 16 billion cubic meters (bcm) of Russian gas flowed through the Ukraine pipelines. The capacities on Rügen of 10-15 bcm were hardly used in 2024, says Georg Zachmann from the Brussels think tank Bruegel. Italian LNG terminals also still have 10 bcm of free capacity. “After a corresponding reconfiguration of gas flows in Europe, existing LNG capacities should be sufficient for current demand in the region,” says the energy expert.
Other experts, however, see precisely this conversion of gas flows within the continent as the central problem. Kyiv is now focusing on a new pipeline project, the Vertical Gas Corridor. It can transport liquefied gas from Greece via Moldova to Ukraine and on to Slovakia. One advantage: Kyiv could once again count on transit fees for transportation to the west – something that the EU Commission has also repeatedly advocated.
Shortly before the turn of the year, the Ukrainian supplier DTEK received its first shipment of US LNG from the Greek terminal Revithoussa near Athens. “This is more than just a shipment, it is a strategic step,” explained Andriy Yermak, Chief of Staff to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, at X.
The Vertical Corridor is currently undergoing major expansion. The final expansion stages to increase capacity at the Greek-Bulgarian border in the west and across Romania are due to be completed in 2029. Last year, the high demand in south-eastern Europe led to bottlenecks on several connections between the countries in the region, the European regulatory agency ACER reported at a ministerial meeting in Budapest before the onset of winter.
However, according to traders, the states themselves are also hindering gas flows through convenience and national egoism. At a similar meeting in Athens in early 2024, the energy association EFET complained that network charges in Slovakia lack transparency, do not reflect actual costs and do not comply with European network codes.
The dispute between Germany, Austria and other Central European countries recently showed how network charges can affect security of supply. Users are still paying for the billions of euros needed to fill the gas storage facilities in summer 2022 via a levy. After months of intervention by its EU neighbors, the German Bundestag managed to abolish the gas storage levy at the borders at the turn of the year before Christmas.
The rising costs would otherwise have resulted in the fact that it would have been cheaper for Austria, for example, to empty its own storage facilities. “The increase in the levy is discriminatory against residents,” said FDP member of parliament Michael Kruse, complaining about the consequences for German gas customers. However, as calculations for Table.Briefings demonstrated a year ago, only a few peak consumers from industry are likely to feel the effects of the increases.
However, Germany is not alone in Europe with such trade barriers. Bulgaria and Romania, for example, have increased fees for gas trading transactions, according to the EFET overview from the beginning of 2024. According to an analysis by the information service ICIS, the Romanian network operator Transgaz is currently complicating the supply of the breakaway Moldovan region of Transnistria.
Russia stopped the supply at the turn of the year, the region can now be supplied from the EU. One obstacle, however, is the exorbitant transmission fees charged by Transgaz’s Moldovan subsidiary, writes ICIS journalist Aura Sabadus.
However, according to ACER, there are also long-term trends behind rising grid fees at the transport level. Charges have already increased by 40 percent since 2021. The competition authorities blame several factors:
The fact that new transmission capacities alone are not enough to ensure security of supply has already been proven on the Vertical Gas Corridor. Last July, the Ukrainian transmission system operator invited tenders for the expanded capacities on the borders with Romania and Moldova for the first time. However, according to a spokesperson for Table.Briefings, there were initially no bookings.
The reason for this was the high price volatility in the region, according to documents. Elsewhere in the corridor, traders had booked lines for a maximum of two years – “even in cases where this capacity is currently heavily utilized.”
So far, the turning point has mainly been presented as a national project, as an upgrade of the German Bundeswehr. Many people often reduce it even further, namely to the special assets and the two percent of NATO spending that Germany now finally wants to deliver.
However, since February 24, 2022, it has been clearly defined what Germany must provide for Europe’s security and defense: The national contribution to NATO must be permanently available even after the special fund has been spent; Ukraine must be integrated into the West’s defense efforts in such a way that it becomes a security supplier. Thirdly, Germany must be capable and able to cooperate within NATO.
While points one and two are known, but the speed and scope of the contributions fall short of the requirements, the ability to cooperate is often forgotten. However, Germany is even falling behind here. This is dramatic, because Europe’s defense is based on the assumption that Europeans will increase their political and military clout through cooperation and unity. After all, they can only deploy the large NATO forces necessary for deterrence and defense together, and also monitor the Baltic Sea.
However, cooperation at the political and strategic level is at an all-time low. Germany’s partners have to listen to how much Germany supports Ukraine and others don’t, at least if you select the numbers the way the German government does by looking at the absolute volume instead of the ratio to economic power. Relations with key partners in Europe are at an all-time low: there is an unprecedented lack of communication with France. The opportunity for a fresh start with Poland has been missed. In many smaller formats, such as the Nordic-Baltic meetings, Germany was not even invited.
This threatens a German special path. Germany is proud of its contributions, but its partners despair at Berlin’s lack of understanding because, on the one hand, Germany’s contributions are not enough and, on the other hand, adequate security in Europe can hardly be provided without Berlin. This vicious circle of German complacency and the resulting reduced willingness to perform and the instruction of others on what they should be doing is not only causing frustration, but also a growing security gap for Europe. To prevent this from getting bigger, our allies are organizing themselves around Germany. This way, basically everyone loses (except Russia).
It will now be doubly difficult for Germany because the past three years of intensive partnership between Scholz and Biden are coming to an end. Europe may then be alone in its defense, but above all Germany is alone in Europe because it has neglected its partners. And while others – also driven by Germany’s absence – are looking for their deal with the US, an isolated Germany is likely to find itself in the critical focus of the new US administration.
Yet it was precisely the traffic light coalition that was aiming to do everything differently and emphasized in the 2021 coalition agreement that it would take “the concerns of our Central and Eastern European partner states in particular” seriously. But although Germany’s ideas on how to keep the peace and prevent war have failed since the Russian invasion at the latest, Berlin still thinks it can explain to allies from northern to south-eastern Europe what it needs militarily. And that dialog and détente are an alternative to successful deterrence. But dialog is based on secure deterrence.
This brings us to the core of the unwillingness to cooperate: Germany trusts its (false) interpretation of the past more than the evidence in the here and now and the justifications of its partners. Berlin hopes that the old Europe will not end – but it has long since passed. For the Europe of the future, however, such a Germany is dangerous: it does not create creative power through cooperation, but only in spite of Germany’s special path. For the turning point to become a reality, Germany should be less of a teacher and much more of a champion of cooperation.
Claudia Major heads the Security Policy Research Group at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin. She is a member of the Advisory Board on Innere Führung of the Ministry of Defense and the Advisory Board on Civilian Crisis Prevention of the Federal Foreign Office.
Christian Mölling heads the Bertelsmann Foundation’s Europe Program. He has been researching and advising on issues of security, defense, armaments and technology for 25 years.
Today at 11 a.m., Alexander Van der Bellen will receive a man in the Hofburg to whom he did not actually want to open any doors. The Austrian Federal President will meet FPÖ leader Herbert Kickl for a first meeting following the collapse of the coalition negotiations between the ÖVP, SPÖ and Neos. Kickl could soon be elected Federal Chancellor – in a coalition with the ÖVP.
After the liberal Neos party pulled out of the talks, negotiations between the Social Democrats and the Conservatives also broke down on Saturday. Chancellor Karl Nehammer has announced his resignation. Until a new government is formed, Van der Bellen intends to appoint an interim chancellor in the course of the week. New elections have not been ruled out. However, they could not take place for another three months and, according to the polls, the FPÖ would only make further gains.
With Kickl, Viktor Orbán would gain a partner and the ranks of Russia-lovers in the Council would grow. The election of the right-wing populist would also send a bitter signal to Germany and other European countries. If centrist parties are unable to agree on a common course and economic conditions do not improve, the fringes will benefit.
The probable breakthrough for the FPÖ is also a warning signal: the economic wing of the ÖVP had campaigned most strongly for an alliance. However, similarities in economic policy ideas should not be an argument for jeopardizing fundamental pillars of democracy such as the rule of law and the separation of powers.
Many observers believe that Giorgia Meloni will build a bridge between US President-elect Donald Trump and Europe in the future. In her two years in office, Meloni has established herself as a reliable partner, particularly in foreign policy, and is now one of the most influential politicians in Europe – probably also due to the weakening governments in Paris and Berlin.
She has achieved this primarily because she is more moderate on the international stage than many had feared after her election in the fall of 2022. The fact that she is pursuing a harshly conservative course in Italy, to put it mildly, is generally accepted in silence.
It is precisely this Janus-faced nature that has now earned Meloni the new role of Trump whisperer. He presented Meloni to the other guests at his resort on Saturday as “a fantastic woman who has really taken Europe by storm.” The Roman’s surprise flying visit to Mar-a-Lago at the weekend is fueling hopes of her supporters that the conservative prime minister will become Trump’s preferred ally in Europe. A mediator between him and the other EU heads of government. According to reports, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen had been informed about the trip in advance.
A role that has a history. She had already tried to enter Trump’s circle of influence in 2018. However, hardly anyone was interested in the visit by then Trump friend Steve Bannon to the Atreju youth festival organized by Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia. The far-right party had just come out of the election with 4.4 percent of the vote and was completely irrelevant outside Italy.
Six years later, Meloni’s strategy is working: When the current Trump advisor and X owner Elon Musk – who was the star guest at Atreju in 2023 – wants to speak to someone in Europe, he calls Meloni. In an interview with Corriere della Sera a few days ago, she described Musk as a “genius” at a time when Musk is campaigning for the AfD. According to Meloni, Musk is a “great personality of our time”, “an extraordinary innovator who always looks to the future.”
However, the Italian is also taking a strategic approach to her role in Europe. Meloni congratulated Trump after his election victory in November and emphasized the “unshakeable ties” between Italy and the USA. However, unlike her government partner in Rome, Lega leader Matteo Salvini, Meloni has never officially outed herself as an ardent Trump supporter.
When Notre Dame Cathedral was reopened in Paris at the beginning of December, Trump and Meloni officially met in person for the first time. In an interview with the New York Post afterwards, the soon-to-be US president praised Meloni as a “real superwoman.” There has been speculation in the Italian media for days as to whether Meloni will attend Trump’s inauguration on January 20 – which would be tantamount to provoking a large part of her European partners. The visit at the weekend is likely to have buried these plans, if they ever existed.
Interestingly, the outgoing incumbent Joe Biden is also putting Meloni on a pedestal in his last days in office. His last trip abroad as US President will take him to Rome on Thursday. The program includes an audience with Pope Francis as well as meetings with Meloni and President Sergio Mattarella. White House spokeswoman Karine Jean-Pierre said that the visit was intended to strengthen relations between the USA and Italy.
Whether Meloni will use her new wealth of power to defend EU positions agreed with her partners vis-à-vis Trump or whether she will opt for an Orbanesque special path remains open. However, Italy’s dependence on billions in EU funding alone is likely to keep Meloni in check.
According to experts, independence from Russian gas is made more difficult by high network charges, long construction times for important pipelines and the inadequate implementation of European internal market rules. Slovakia is also being criticized. Prime Minister Robert Fico has been threatening Ukraine for days with an electricity boycott due to the suspension of the transit of Russian gas. Slovakia was also a transit point for gas to the west until the turn of the year. As a result of the delivery stop, it will lose out on revenues of €500 million per year.
The EU has enough LNG terminals to replace Russian supplies. Last year, around 16 billion cubic meters (bcm) of Russian gas flowed through the Ukraine pipelines. The capacities on Rügen of 10-15 bcm were hardly used in 2024, says Georg Zachmann from the Brussels think tank Bruegel. Italian LNG terminals also still have 10 bcm of free capacity. “After a corresponding reconfiguration of gas flows in Europe, existing LNG capacities should be sufficient for current demand in the region,” says the energy expert.
Other experts, however, see precisely this conversion of gas flows within the continent as the central problem. Kyiv is now focusing on a new pipeline project, the Vertical Gas Corridor. It can transport liquefied gas from Greece via Moldova to Ukraine and on to Slovakia. One advantage: Kyiv could once again count on transit fees for transportation to the west – something that the EU Commission has also repeatedly advocated.
Shortly before the turn of the year, the Ukrainian supplier DTEK received its first shipment of US LNG from the Greek terminal Revithoussa near Athens. “This is more than just a shipment, it is a strategic step,” explained Andriy Yermak, Chief of Staff to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, at X.
The Vertical Corridor is currently undergoing major expansion. The final expansion stages to increase capacity at the Greek-Bulgarian border in the west and across Romania are due to be completed in 2029. Last year, the high demand in south-eastern Europe led to bottlenecks on several connections between the countries in the region, the European regulatory agency ACER reported at a ministerial meeting in Budapest before the onset of winter.
However, according to traders, the states themselves are also hindering gas flows through convenience and national egoism. At a similar meeting in Athens in early 2024, the energy association EFET complained that network charges in Slovakia lack transparency, do not reflect actual costs and do not comply with European network codes.
The dispute between Germany, Austria and other Central European countries recently showed how network charges can affect security of supply. Users are still paying for the billions of euros needed to fill the gas storage facilities in summer 2022 via a levy. After months of intervention by its EU neighbors, the German Bundestag managed to abolish the gas storage levy at the borders at the turn of the year before Christmas.
The rising costs would otherwise have resulted in the fact that it would have been cheaper for Austria, for example, to empty its own storage facilities. “The increase in the levy is discriminatory against residents,” said FDP member of parliament Michael Kruse, complaining about the consequences for German gas customers. However, as calculations for Table.Briefings demonstrated a year ago, only a few peak consumers from industry are likely to feel the effects of the increases.
However, Germany is not alone in Europe with such trade barriers. Bulgaria and Romania, for example, have increased fees for gas trading transactions, according to the EFET overview from the beginning of 2024. According to an analysis by the information service ICIS, the Romanian network operator Transgaz is currently complicating the supply of the breakaway Moldovan region of Transnistria.
Russia stopped the supply at the turn of the year, the region can now be supplied from the EU. One obstacle, however, is the exorbitant transmission fees charged by Transgaz’s Moldovan subsidiary, writes ICIS journalist Aura Sabadus.
However, according to ACER, there are also long-term trends behind rising grid fees at the transport level. Charges have already increased by 40 percent since 2021. The competition authorities blame several factors:
The fact that new transmission capacities alone are not enough to ensure security of supply has already been proven on the Vertical Gas Corridor. Last July, the Ukrainian transmission system operator invited tenders for the expanded capacities on the borders with Romania and Moldova for the first time. However, according to a spokesperson for Table.Briefings, there were initially no bookings.
The reason for this was the high price volatility in the region, according to documents. Elsewhere in the corridor, traders had booked lines for a maximum of two years – “even in cases where this capacity is currently heavily utilized.”
So far, the turning point has mainly been presented as a national project, as an upgrade of the German Bundeswehr. Many people often reduce it even further, namely to the special assets and the two percent of NATO spending that Germany now finally wants to deliver.
However, since February 24, 2022, it has been clearly defined what Germany must provide for Europe’s security and defense: The national contribution to NATO must be permanently available even after the special fund has been spent; Ukraine must be integrated into the West’s defense efforts in such a way that it becomes a security supplier. Thirdly, Germany must be capable and able to cooperate within NATO.
While points one and two are known, but the speed and scope of the contributions fall short of the requirements, the ability to cooperate is often forgotten. However, Germany is even falling behind here. This is dramatic, because Europe’s defense is based on the assumption that Europeans will increase their political and military clout through cooperation and unity. After all, they can only deploy the large NATO forces necessary for deterrence and defense together, and also monitor the Baltic Sea.
However, cooperation at the political and strategic level is at an all-time low. Germany’s partners have to listen to how much Germany supports Ukraine and others don’t, at least if you select the numbers the way the German government does by looking at the absolute volume instead of the ratio to economic power. Relations with key partners in Europe are at an all-time low: there is an unprecedented lack of communication with France. The opportunity for a fresh start with Poland has been missed. In many smaller formats, such as the Nordic-Baltic meetings, Germany was not even invited.
This threatens a German special path. Germany is proud of its contributions, but its partners despair at Berlin’s lack of understanding because, on the one hand, Germany’s contributions are not enough and, on the other hand, adequate security in Europe can hardly be provided without Berlin. This vicious circle of German complacency and the resulting reduced willingness to perform and the instruction of others on what they should be doing is not only causing frustration, but also a growing security gap for Europe. To prevent this from getting bigger, our allies are organizing themselves around Germany. This way, basically everyone loses (except Russia).
It will now be doubly difficult for Germany because the past three years of intensive partnership between Scholz and Biden are coming to an end. Europe may then be alone in its defense, but above all Germany is alone in Europe because it has neglected its partners. And while others – also driven by Germany’s absence – are looking for their deal with the US, an isolated Germany is likely to find itself in the critical focus of the new US administration.
Yet it was precisely the traffic light coalition that was aiming to do everything differently and emphasized in the 2021 coalition agreement that it would take “the concerns of our Central and Eastern European partner states in particular” seriously. But although Germany’s ideas on how to keep the peace and prevent war have failed since the Russian invasion at the latest, Berlin still thinks it can explain to allies from northern to south-eastern Europe what it needs militarily. And that dialog and détente are an alternative to successful deterrence. But dialog is based on secure deterrence.
This brings us to the core of the unwillingness to cooperate: Germany trusts its (false) interpretation of the past more than the evidence in the here and now and the justifications of its partners. Berlin hopes that the old Europe will not end – but it has long since passed. For the Europe of the future, however, such a Germany is dangerous: it does not create creative power through cooperation, but only in spite of Germany’s special path. For the turning point to become a reality, Germany should be less of a teacher and much more of a champion of cooperation.
Claudia Major heads the Security Policy Research Group at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin. She is a member of the Advisory Board on Innere Führung of the Ministry of Defense and the Advisory Board on Civilian Crisis Prevention of the Federal Foreign Office.
Christian Mölling heads the Bertelsmann Foundation’s Europe Program. He has been researching and advising on issues of security, defense, armaments and technology for 25 years.
