Xi Jinping’s schedule at the G20 meeting in Bali was ambitious. Yesterday alone, he met with the leaders of Australia, France, the Netherlands, Spain, and Italy for bilateral talks. As Michael Radunski writes in his article on the summit, China’s president clearly wants to return to the pre-pandemic days. By the beginning of 2020, Xi had visited so many countries in such a short time that he eclipsed every other Chinese head of state before him. He even paid a visit to small island nations like Fiji. Party documents say that Xi believes a “period of strategic opportunism” has dawned. He must make up more diplomatic ground than ever before to achieve his foreign policy goals. In doing so, he is also relying on compromise instead of confrontation.
The biggest step was the final declaration of the G20 summit, which now states that “most members strongly condemned the war in Ukraine.” Without Xi Jinping’s approval, such a formulation would not have been possible – until now, China’s diplomats and the state media were forbidden to use the word “war” in this context. Instead, they spoke of a “special military operation” in line with Putin. The change of direction indicates that Beijing is slowly moving away from its shoulder-to-shoulder relationship with Moscow – albeit in small steps.
Slowly, the long-dreaded social credit system is being addressed, which was more or less put on hold due to the Covid pandemic in China. Several Chinese authorities have submitted a joint draft of a law that is intended to link and bundle the previously differently weighted points systems. With a centralized “Credit Reporting System” as well as “Unified Social Credit Codes,” the door would indeed be opened to total surveillance. In the draft, however, much lies in a sorry state, analyzes Finn Mayer Kuckuk. A well-thought-out law that can be implemented unambiguously and uniformly looks different.
Australia’s Anthony Albanese, France’s Emmanuel Macron, Marc Rutte of the Netherlands, then Spain’s Pedro Sánchez, and finally Italy’s Giorgia Meloni. Not to mention US President Joe Biden. It is a small glimpse into Xi Jinping’s schedule of talks at the G20 summit in Bali. It quickly becomes clear: China’s president is back on the diplomatic stage – and with vigor. His goal: to regain diplomatic ground. Cooperation instead of confrontation.
In return, Xi seems willing to make compromises. This was most evident in the negotiations on the joint G20 final declaration. Many member states wanted to condemn Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. But with Russia and China in the room, the chances of such a declaration were extremely poor. Until the very end, diplomats implied that Beijing was standing unwaveringly by Moscow’s side in the preliminary talks for the summit, agreeing on a joint declaration almost impossible. The summit is still in progress. But the word from Bali is that difficult negotiations have succeeded in finding a text that everyone can sign.
EU Council President Charles Michel expressed his relief on Tuesday. The agreement was a great success. This summit was one of the most difficult in the history of the G20, Michel said. One likes to believe him.
The agreed draft of a joint G20 statement now includes a pointed way of condemning Russia’s aggression but giving skeptical members such as China a bit of leeway. “Most members strongly condemn the war in Ukraine,” the relevant draft reads. It also calls on Moscow to cease hostilities and withdraw its troops from Ukraine immediately.
Not only the clarity of the statement is remarkable but also the choice of words: war in Ukraine – instead of “special military operation” as given by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin. So far, China’s diplomats have stuck to this and generally do not refer to the campaign as an invasion either (China.Table reported). Russia’s stance is reflected in the document as follows: “There were other views and different assessments of the situation and sanctions.”
But how was it possible to agree on such a formulation in the first place? Not without the approval of Xi Jinping. China is Russia’s most important ally. Time and again, Beijing has referred to Russia’s “legitimate security interests.” Instead of criticizing Putin’s incursion, Beijing identified the US and NATO as the real arsonists (China.Table reported).
But China is now moving away from Russia – very slowly, in tiny steps. But diplomacy has always been a laborious business. Sometimes even minimal changes can be considered a success.
Even before the G20 summit, there were initial signs that the boundless friendship between China and Russia is no longer quite so boundless. According to research by the British newspaper “Financial Times,” Beijing is not well disposed toward Russia. “Putin didn’t tell Xi the truth,” the paper quotes a Chinese official as saying. “If he had told us, we wouldn’t have been in such an awkward position.” After all, “We had more than 6,000 Chinese nationals living in Ukraine and some of them died during the evacuation, but we can’t make that public.”
Added to this are Russia’s military defeats on the battlefields of Ukraine and the surprisingly united stance of the West. All of this should have given Xi food for thought.
Last but not least, there were Putin’s nuclear threats. On the one hand, China could no longer nonchalantly ignore the nuclear saber-rattling. On the other hand, it also offers Xi a way out of his diplomatic aberration. Russian use of nuclear weapons would deeply hurt China’s own interests: This would be tantamount to opening Pandora’s box – with direct consequences in China’s immediate neighborhood. There are two nuclear powers: Pakistan to the west, and North Korea to the east. Both are officially considered China’s allies, but it is sometimes difficult for Beijing to keep them under control.
That is why the Western camp should not get too excited: China’s diplomats will want to sell Xi Jinping’s statements in Bali and his agreement to the joint G20 final declaration as a step toward the West. But Xi is acting in China’s interests.
It is against this background that Xi Jinping’s daily schedule in Bali must be evaluated. On Tuesday alone, he met with the heads of state of Australia, France, the Netherlands, Spain, and Italy. Again, it is interesting to note how skillfully Xi proceeded: Canada’s Justin Trudeau, who has recently taken a hard line toward China, did not meet with Xi as well as the two EU representatives Ursula von der Leyen or Charles Michel.
What seems like a diplomatic marathon is actually more like the return of the diplomatic jack-of-all-trades from Zhongnanhai. One should not forget: In the three years prior to the Covid pandemic Xi had visited more than 40 countries – a record by which Xi eclipsed all his predecessors. China’s president even took the time to visit countries such as Fiji (881,000 inhabitants), the Maldives (345,000 inhabitants), and Trinidad and Tobago (1.3 million inhabitants).
The reason: Xi Jinping sees the arrival of a “period of strategic opportunity.” But to achieve his foreign policy goals internationally, Xi must act. Before the pandemic, he succeeded in convincing many countries – sometimes with diplomatic charm, sometimes with economic incentives. Or simply with political pressure. It seems that China’s president wants to pick up where he left off.
The extent to which Xi Jinping’s diplomatic charm seems to be catching on in Bali is demonstrated by the new British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak. On Tuesday, he announced that he would not classify China as a “threat” to national security, as his predecessor Liz Truss announced just a few weeks ago. Instead, he will continue to view the People’s Republic as a “rival.” And Sunak also emphasized in Bali how much he hopes for an opportunity to speak with Xi in person.
A number of Chinese authorities have published their joint draft of a new social credit law on Weibo (an unofficial translation can be found here). This way, the state is gathering feedback from interested members of the public. Thus, it is only an initial trial balloon. The text may still change considerably before it is passed by the National People’s Congress.
Nevertheless, the draft is worthy of attention. It amounts to linking and bundling various points systems that have emerged in parallel in recent years. The social credit system has not yet evolved into dystopian total surveillance because there was no centralized point collection agency. With the draft, however, the legislature is now expected to move in the direction of centralized data management. Article 71 states the goal of a “credit reporting system that covers the entire society.”
According to the preamble, however, the object of the law is not primarily the citizen – but the authorities. The “credibility of government action” is to be strengthened by the system, followed immediately by “creditworthiness in economic transactions” and then “social creditworthiness.” All of this is supposed to “stabilize the socialist market economy” and punish unreliable behavior. Justice is also mentioned. In the future, there are to be points for judges, as detailed in Chapter V of the draft.
At the outset, there is much talk of coordination, which can be understood as a possible end of the chaos of the various parallel systems. Accordingly, central administration is to lie with two authorities of ministerial rank: the National Development and Reform Commission NDRC and the central bank PBoC (Article 4). All authorities are required to collect social credit data in the areas they manage. They are then to share it among relevant agencies and find applications for the information (Article 5).
However, even if the topic of standardization is the starting point, in the further course of the draft text the handwriting of many different players can be recognized. Chapters two to five of the draft deal with “establishing creditworthiness,” and here it seems that many cooks had something to contribute.
Some of the text paragraphs are from regional and industry social credit systems. There are many truisms that seem out of place in national law. On the subject of the media, for example, Article 50 states, “We want to encourage the implementation of activities to promote creditworthiness so that various types of mass media activities unfold, providing guidance to the public on examples of creditworthiness and examples of lack of creditworthiness so that honesty becomes a conscious goal of society as a whole.”
The same phrases about creditworthiness are repeated over and over again in Articles 12 to 57. A concise law written by skilled lawyers looks different. In part, the draft is too general in its moral exhortations, and in part, it goes deeply into the implementation of the law. The following social sectors and occupational groups are mentioned in detail:
In short, all areas of life are covered and their institutions are to come up with ways to collect minus and plus points for their players. The ordinary citizen is not explicitly mentioned. But since all sectors of the economy are listed, a majority of the population will be part of the assessment, at least in their professional role.
The data are to be explicitly collected in a personalized manner. There are to be database keys for the cross-sectoral identification of individuals (Articles 58 and 59). A “uniform social credit number” is to be introduced for this purpose. Shortly thereafter, however, it is stated that the existing citizen number should also fill this role. Where no citizen number exists, the relevant authorities are to assign one. All institutions are also to be identified by their social credit number.
Explicitly prohibited (Article 62) are excessive inquiries into how the score came about, use of the data beyond the social credit system, and theft and manipulation of the data. The information is to be “stored for the long term.” They are used for “public assessment of the trustworthiness” of the institutions and individuals assessed.
Sinolytics is a European consulting and analysis company specializing in China. It advises European companies on their strategic orientation and concrete business activities in the People’s Republic.
“The job can sometimes kill your passion,” admits Kevin Straßmeir. At least that was what he feared before his first internship in the motorcycle sector. But after just two weeks, the Augsburg native was sure: “It definitely has to be the motorcycle industry.”
Today, Straßmeir is Director and General Manager of the Austrian motorcycle manufacturer KTM in China. He discovered his love for machines at 14 when he rode a moped around the farm for the first time while on vacation in the countryside. His motorcycle license at 18 was followed by motorcycle trips through Europe and as far as Istanbul. While studying for a degree in business administration and later media informatics, he left Europe for Shanghai for the first time – lured by the economic opportunities promised by booming China. Once he arrived, he was determined to spend more time in Asia.
During the second study visit to Singapore, the motorcycle was also part of the trip. The return travel, starting in Nepal, took him on his two-wheeler through Pakistan and Xinjiang to Kazakhstan, Russia, and the Baltic States, and finally back to Germany.
After a year of Chinese language lessons in Beijing with the DAAD’s “Language and Practice” program, he finally entered the world of motorized two-wheelers professionally in 2014: first as an intern at BMW Motorcycle in Beijing, then as a sales assistant for KTM. Straßmeir coordinated the cooperation with the local sales partners in East Asia from the very beginning, first and foremost with the motorcycle and quad specialist CFMOTO from Hangzhou. Relations with the Chinese partner went well, and in 2018 a joint venture called CFMOTO-KTMR2R was founded. Since 2020, Straßmeir has also acted as General Manager. In the meantime, there is a joint factory, where, starting in November of this year, the two-cylinder KTM 790 Duke machine will also be produced in China for the global market for the first time.
Addressing the issue of technology transfer to the Chinese partner, Straßmeir is pragmatic. “If you decide to go to market in China and source components locally, then you accept that you will reveal a lot.” With a business strategy designed for technology leadership, you usually only have a lead of three, four, or five years at most before the technology is obsolete, he says. So that you have to share the technology with Chinese partners no longer plays a significant role. To date, Straßmeir is the only German-speaking KTM employee permanently stationed in China.
In general, Straßmeir remains optimistic about the Chinese motorcycle market. Even if there are a few hurdles, for example, the ban on gasoline-powered motorcycles in many major Chinese cities, Straßmeir believes there are initial signs that the legal situation could change significantly in his favor. In any case, he has his own goal firmly in sight: By the end of 2024, his tenth anniversary at KTM, he wants the company’s sales figures in China to have increased tenfold. Clemens Ruben
Uncomfortable: Over the weekend, the first snowfalls of the beginning winter fell over parts of China’s northeastern province of Jilin. Here, a food delivery man rolls over the slippery streets of Changchun city, his hands protected by giant gloves.
Xi Jinping’s schedule at the G20 meeting in Bali was ambitious. Yesterday alone, he met with the leaders of Australia, France, the Netherlands, Spain, and Italy for bilateral talks. As Michael Radunski writes in his article on the summit, China’s president clearly wants to return to the pre-pandemic days. By the beginning of 2020, Xi had visited so many countries in such a short time that he eclipsed every other Chinese head of state before him. He even paid a visit to small island nations like Fiji. Party documents say that Xi believes a “period of strategic opportunism” has dawned. He must make up more diplomatic ground than ever before to achieve his foreign policy goals. In doing so, he is also relying on compromise instead of confrontation.
The biggest step was the final declaration of the G20 summit, which now states that “most members strongly condemned the war in Ukraine.” Without Xi Jinping’s approval, such a formulation would not have been possible – until now, China’s diplomats and the state media were forbidden to use the word “war” in this context. Instead, they spoke of a “special military operation” in line with Putin. The change of direction indicates that Beijing is slowly moving away from its shoulder-to-shoulder relationship with Moscow – albeit in small steps.
Slowly, the long-dreaded social credit system is being addressed, which was more or less put on hold due to the Covid pandemic in China. Several Chinese authorities have submitted a joint draft of a law that is intended to link and bundle the previously differently weighted points systems. With a centralized “Credit Reporting System” as well as “Unified Social Credit Codes,” the door would indeed be opened to total surveillance. In the draft, however, much lies in a sorry state, analyzes Finn Mayer Kuckuk. A well-thought-out law that can be implemented unambiguously and uniformly looks different.
Australia’s Anthony Albanese, France’s Emmanuel Macron, Marc Rutte of the Netherlands, then Spain’s Pedro Sánchez, and finally Italy’s Giorgia Meloni. Not to mention US President Joe Biden. It is a small glimpse into Xi Jinping’s schedule of talks at the G20 summit in Bali. It quickly becomes clear: China’s president is back on the diplomatic stage – and with vigor. His goal: to regain diplomatic ground. Cooperation instead of confrontation.
In return, Xi seems willing to make compromises. This was most evident in the negotiations on the joint G20 final declaration. Many member states wanted to condemn Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. But with Russia and China in the room, the chances of such a declaration were extremely poor. Until the very end, diplomats implied that Beijing was standing unwaveringly by Moscow’s side in the preliminary talks for the summit, agreeing on a joint declaration almost impossible. The summit is still in progress. But the word from Bali is that difficult negotiations have succeeded in finding a text that everyone can sign.
EU Council President Charles Michel expressed his relief on Tuesday. The agreement was a great success. This summit was one of the most difficult in the history of the G20, Michel said. One likes to believe him.
The agreed draft of a joint G20 statement now includes a pointed way of condemning Russia’s aggression but giving skeptical members such as China a bit of leeway. “Most members strongly condemn the war in Ukraine,” the relevant draft reads. It also calls on Moscow to cease hostilities and withdraw its troops from Ukraine immediately.
Not only the clarity of the statement is remarkable but also the choice of words: war in Ukraine – instead of “special military operation” as given by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin. So far, China’s diplomats have stuck to this and generally do not refer to the campaign as an invasion either (China.Table reported). Russia’s stance is reflected in the document as follows: “There were other views and different assessments of the situation and sanctions.”
But how was it possible to agree on such a formulation in the first place? Not without the approval of Xi Jinping. China is Russia’s most important ally. Time and again, Beijing has referred to Russia’s “legitimate security interests.” Instead of criticizing Putin’s incursion, Beijing identified the US and NATO as the real arsonists (China.Table reported).
But China is now moving away from Russia – very slowly, in tiny steps. But diplomacy has always been a laborious business. Sometimes even minimal changes can be considered a success.
Even before the G20 summit, there were initial signs that the boundless friendship between China and Russia is no longer quite so boundless. According to research by the British newspaper “Financial Times,” Beijing is not well disposed toward Russia. “Putin didn’t tell Xi the truth,” the paper quotes a Chinese official as saying. “If he had told us, we wouldn’t have been in such an awkward position.” After all, “We had more than 6,000 Chinese nationals living in Ukraine and some of them died during the evacuation, but we can’t make that public.”
Added to this are Russia’s military defeats on the battlefields of Ukraine and the surprisingly united stance of the West. All of this should have given Xi food for thought.
Last but not least, there were Putin’s nuclear threats. On the one hand, China could no longer nonchalantly ignore the nuclear saber-rattling. On the other hand, it also offers Xi a way out of his diplomatic aberration. Russian use of nuclear weapons would deeply hurt China’s own interests: This would be tantamount to opening Pandora’s box – with direct consequences in China’s immediate neighborhood. There are two nuclear powers: Pakistan to the west, and North Korea to the east. Both are officially considered China’s allies, but it is sometimes difficult for Beijing to keep them under control.
That is why the Western camp should not get too excited: China’s diplomats will want to sell Xi Jinping’s statements in Bali and his agreement to the joint G20 final declaration as a step toward the West. But Xi is acting in China’s interests.
It is against this background that Xi Jinping’s daily schedule in Bali must be evaluated. On Tuesday alone, he met with the heads of state of Australia, France, the Netherlands, Spain, and Italy. Again, it is interesting to note how skillfully Xi proceeded: Canada’s Justin Trudeau, who has recently taken a hard line toward China, did not meet with Xi as well as the two EU representatives Ursula von der Leyen or Charles Michel.
What seems like a diplomatic marathon is actually more like the return of the diplomatic jack-of-all-trades from Zhongnanhai. One should not forget: In the three years prior to the Covid pandemic Xi had visited more than 40 countries – a record by which Xi eclipsed all his predecessors. China’s president even took the time to visit countries such as Fiji (881,000 inhabitants), the Maldives (345,000 inhabitants), and Trinidad and Tobago (1.3 million inhabitants).
The reason: Xi Jinping sees the arrival of a “period of strategic opportunity.” But to achieve his foreign policy goals internationally, Xi must act. Before the pandemic, he succeeded in convincing many countries – sometimes with diplomatic charm, sometimes with economic incentives. Or simply with political pressure. It seems that China’s president wants to pick up where he left off.
The extent to which Xi Jinping’s diplomatic charm seems to be catching on in Bali is demonstrated by the new British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak. On Tuesday, he announced that he would not classify China as a “threat” to national security, as his predecessor Liz Truss announced just a few weeks ago. Instead, he will continue to view the People’s Republic as a “rival.” And Sunak also emphasized in Bali how much he hopes for an opportunity to speak with Xi in person.
A number of Chinese authorities have published their joint draft of a new social credit law on Weibo (an unofficial translation can be found here). This way, the state is gathering feedback from interested members of the public. Thus, it is only an initial trial balloon. The text may still change considerably before it is passed by the National People’s Congress.
Nevertheless, the draft is worthy of attention. It amounts to linking and bundling various points systems that have emerged in parallel in recent years. The social credit system has not yet evolved into dystopian total surveillance because there was no centralized point collection agency. With the draft, however, the legislature is now expected to move in the direction of centralized data management. Article 71 states the goal of a “credit reporting system that covers the entire society.”
According to the preamble, however, the object of the law is not primarily the citizen – but the authorities. The “credibility of government action” is to be strengthened by the system, followed immediately by “creditworthiness in economic transactions” and then “social creditworthiness.” All of this is supposed to “stabilize the socialist market economy” and punish unreliable behavior. Justice is also mentioned. In the future, there are to be points for judges, as detailed in Chapter V of the draft.
At the outset, there is much talk of coordination, which can be understood as a possible end of the chaos of the various parallel systems. Accordingly, central administration is to lie with two authorities of ministerial rank: the National Development and Reform Commission NDRC and the central bank PBoC (Article 4). All authorities are required to collect social credit data in the areas they manage. They are then to share it among relevant agencies and find applications for the information (Article 5).
However, even if the topic of standardization is the starting point, in the further course of the draft text the handwriting of many different players can be recognized. Chapters two to five of the draft deal with “establishing creditworthiness,” and here it seems that many cooks had something to contribute.
Some of the text paragraphs are from regional and industry social credit systems. There are many truisms that seem out of place in national law. On the subject of the media, for example, Article 50 states, “We want to encourage the implementation of activities to promote creditworthiness so that various types of mass media activities unfold, providing guidance to the public on examples of creditworthiness and examples of lack of creditworthiness so that honesty becomes a conscious goal of society as a whole.”
The same phrases about creditworthiness are repeated over and over again in Articles 12 to 57. A concise law written by skilled lawyers looks different. In part, the draft is too general in its moral exhortations, and in part, it goes deeply into the implementation of the law. The following social sectors and occupational groups are mentioned in detail:
In short, all areas of life are covered and their institutions are to come up with ways to collect minus and plus points for their players. The ordinary citizen is not explicitly mentioned. But since all sectors of the economy are listed, a majority of the population will be part of the assessment, at least in their professional role.
The data are to be explicitly collected in a personalized manner. There are to be database keys for the cross-sectoral identification of individuals (Articles 58 and 59). A “uniform social credit number” is to be introduced for this purpose. Shortly thereafter, however, it is stated that the existing citizen number should also fill this role. Where no citizen number exists, the relevant authorities are to assign one. All institutions are also to be identified by their social credit number.
Explicitly prohibited (Article 62) are excessive inquiries into how the score came about, use of the data beyond the social credit system, and theft and manipulation of the data. The information is to be “stored for the long term.” They are used for “public assessment of the trustworthiness” of the institutions and individuals assessed.
Sinolytics is a European consulting and analysis company specializing in China. It advises European companies on their strategic orientation and concrete business activities in the People’s Republic.
“The job can sometimes kill your passion,” admits Kevin Straßmeir. At least that was what he feared before his first internship in the motorcycle sector. But after just two weeks, the Augsburg native was sure: “It definitely has to be the motorcycle industry.”
Today, Straßmeir is Director and General Manager of the Austrian motorcycle manufacturer KTM in China. He discovered his love for machines at 14 when he rode a moped around the farm for the first time while on vacation in the countryside. His motorcycle license at 18 was followed by motorcycle trips through Europe and as far as Istanbul. While studying for a degree in business administration and later media informatics, he left Europe for Shanghai for the first time – lured by the economic opportunities promised by booming China. Once he arrived, he was determined to spend more time in Asia.
During the second study visit to Singapore, the motorcycle was also part of the trip. The return travel, starting in Nepal, took him on his two-wheeler through Pakistan and Xinjiang to Kazakhstan, Russia, and the Baltic States, and finally back to Germany.
After a year of Chinese language lessons in Beijing with the DAAD’s “Language and Practice” program, he finally entered the world of motorized two-wheelers professionally in 2014: first as an intern at BMW Motorcycle in Beijing, then as a sales assistant for KTM. Straßmeir coordinated the cooperation with the local sales partners in East Asia from the very beginning, first and foremost with the motorcycle and quad specialist CFMOTO from Hangzhou. Relations with the Chinese partner went well, and in 2018 a joint venture called CFMOTO-KTMR2R was founded. Since 2020, Straßmeir has also acted as General Manager. In the meantime, there is a joint factory, where, starting in November of this year, the two-cylinder KTM 790 Duke machine will also be produced in China for the global market for the first time.
Addressing the issue of technology transfer to the Chinese partner, Straßmeir is pragmatic. “If you decide to go to market in China and source components locally, then you accept that you will reveal a lot.” With a business strategy designed for technology leadership, you usually only have a lead of three, four, or five years at most before the technology is obsolete, he says. So that you have to share the technology with Chinese partners no longer plays a significant role. To date, Straßmeir is the only German-speaking KTM employee permanently stationed in China.
In general, Straßmeir remains optimistic about the Chinese motorcycle market. Even if there are a few hurdles, for example, the ban on gasoline-powered motorcycles in many major Chinese cities, Straßmeir believes there are initial signs that the legal situation could change significantly in his favor. In any case, he has his own goal firmly in sight: By the end of 2024, his tenth anniversary at KTM, he wants the company’s sales figures in China to have increased tenfold. Clemens Ruben
Uncomfortable: Over the weekend, the first snowfalls of the beginning winter fell over parts of China’s northeastern province of Jilin. Here, a food delivery man rolls over the slippery streets of Changchun city, his hands protected by giant gloves.
