China’s loyalty to Russia was already on shaky ground. Instead of firm support, Beijing rather offered Putin words of encouragement. His war is intended to weaken the West as well as Russia itself, which has made itself a vassal of China. For Xi, Putin is above all a useful troublemaker.
But on Saturday at the UN General Assembly, Foreign Minister Wang blatantly urged Russia’s allies to show restraint. The background: Beijing fears instability will spill over into its own sphere of interest in Central Asia if Russia continues to escalate its actions. Moreover, the consequences of the war become ever more painful for the economy, Felix Lee reports.
Last week, from Wednesday to Friday, reports of six long prison sentences for senior CP cadres circulated on China’s news sites. Each one reads like routine in the endless anti-corruption campaign, but the overall picture reveals a peculiar pattern: all six men were once at the top of China’s security apparatus. Propaganda accuses them not only of corruption but of conspiracy; at the head of the conspiracy is said to have been Sun Lijun, who was sentenced to death on Friday. Ruler Xi Jinping is cleaning house ahead of the CP Congress in October. Those who do not pledge unconditional loyalty will have to fear for their freedom.
An outright sensational sign of opening came from Hong Kong. Arriving travelers no longer have to go into quarantine, but are expected to watch out for symptoms on their own. The head of the administration, John Lee, has apparently managed to win a measure of independence, at least in this respect. The hope remains that the Mainland will open up eventually.
On Twitter, an alleged coup against Xi Jinping trended in our bubble on Sunday. However, there is not the slightest legitimate evidence for this rumor. Instead, the alleged evidence follows the usual script of a conspiracy theory. There is no unrest on the streets of Beijing, and the alleged “80-kilometer-long convoy of military vehicles” that entered the capital probably never existed either.
Incidentally, in 2012 there were also wild coup rumors prior to the CP Congress at which Xi Jinping took control as announced. In October, he will in all likelihood be confirmed to remain in office. The new rumors now show, above all, that nerves are on edge before the big CP Congress.
Unity at the United Nations is a rare thing. And even if the Western allies have tirelessly declared for months that Russia was largely isolated in its war of aggression against Ukraine, in the end, this was little more than wishful thinking (China.Table reported). Brazil, India, the states of the Middle East, but also many states in Africa and Latin America have at no time clearly condemned Russia’s invasion. On the contrary, the Chinese leadership in Beijing has instead even shifted the blame for the escalation to the United States and its allies.
At the UN General Debate, which ended this weekend in New York, a surprisingly different picture presented itself. Even China struck a different tone toward Putin. China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who spoke at the UN General Debate on Saturday, warned Russia and Ukraine against escalating the war. “We call on all parties concerned to keep the crisis from spilling over and to protect the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries,” Wang said. He called on the two countries to start negotiations. What is needed are “fair and pragmatic” peace talks, the Chinese foreign minister said. The “legitimate security concerns of all parties” must be taken into account, he said.
Like German Chancellor Olaf Scholz earlier in the day at the start of the General Assembly on Monday, Wang Yi expressed his concern: the concepts of sovereignty and territorial integrity are threatened. The General Assembly is the right place for such warnings because both ideas are enshrined in the UN Charter.
When the question arose in the middle of last week whether Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy would be allowed to deliver his speech via video link, an overwhelming majority of members agreed to this exception, including China. Normally, the rule is that speakers must be present in New York. Russia had attempted to prevent this concession to Ukraine.
Even before Wang Yi’s speech on Saturday, there had not been the expected unity at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit with Russia, China, India and Kazakhstan, among others, in the Uzbek capital of Samarkand (China.Table reported). “I know that today’s era is not the era for war,” India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi told Putin straight to his face.
China’s President Xi Jinping, who had also attended the meeting in Samarkand, publicly expressed his “concerns” about the situation in Ukraine for the first time. Previously, Xi had (largely) refrained from criticism, which is why Putin also thanked him for the “balanced position of our Chinese friends when it comes to the Ukraine crisis.”
Even with this cautious change of course, Xi has still not taken a clear stand against Putin. And China’s state media continues to slander Western sanctions. But at least Russia’s President Vladimir Putin can no longer rely on China as a partner.
Putin probably expected the heads of state and government of the mostly authoritarian SCO states present in Samarkand to back him up. Otherwise, he would not have flown to the summit at all. Putin cannot afford negative headlines at the moment, not least in light of his “partial mobilization”.
But where do China’s sudden doubts about Moscow’s actions come from? Can we speak of a change of heart in Beijing? Or is it merely a continuation of the already rehearsed alternation of cautious criticism and insubstantial approval (China.Table reported)?
When Putin traveled to Beijing for the opening ceremony of the Winter Olympics shortly before the start of his war against Ukraine in February and informed Xi of his plans, Beijing apparently assumed Kyiv would fall quickly. Until shortly before the war began, China also maintained relations with the Ukrainian government. Ukraine was an important part of the Silk Road Initiative, which was intended to open up new trade routes between the Middle Kingdom and Europe under China’s leadership. The damage would have been limited – as long as the annexation of Ukraine happened quickly. That plan has now failed entirely. The war is entering its seventh month, and the frontline is swinging back and forth.
Furthermore, tensions in other Central Asian countries are already rising, for example in the Caucasus between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Xi now fears for stability in Central Asia. The balancing act will thus become even harder (China.Table reported). And economically, too, China’s initial benefit from the Ukraine war could backfire.
Until recently, China seemed to benefit from the Western sanctions against Russia. The gas, oil, and coal that Moscow no longer sold to the West were purchased by China – at prices well below the current horrendously high global market prices. But in the meantime, the global economy threatens to suffer so much damage that even the economic strategists in Beijing’s government quarter are getting edgy. More and more export markets of the world’s largest export nation are collapsing under the growing energy crisis. Because of inflation, consumers are holding on to their money.
And even though China officially rejects Western sanctions against Russia and considers itself a “strategic partner” to Moscow, numerous Chinese companies and financial institutions have also suspended cooperation with Russia – for fear of being co-sanctioned by the West (China.Table reported). Western trading partners are still more important to them for their business than Russia’s.
Because of his initial pledge of allegiance, Putin’s problems are now Xi’s problems as well. “The fact that Russia has been waging war for seven months and has not been victorious is an embarrassment to Xi,” says Russian economist Andrei Illarionov in an interview with Deutsche Welle. Illarionov also advised Putin between 2000 and 2005, but is now one of his critics.
Shortly before the grand CP Congress, where Xi will be named State and Party leader for the third time, Moscow’s failure “makes him look weak before the most important event in his life. But Xi could not afford to look weak,” Illarionov said. Accordingly, Xi had put pressure on Putin in Samarkand to end the war as soon as possible.
Before Samarkand, Putin was willing to continue a prolonged war of attrition – for years if necessary, Putin adviser Illarionov assesses the situation. As a result of the decisions of the last few days, Putin has radically changed his strategy. “These are not signs of his weakness or defeat; these are signs of his dependence on Xi.”
Shortly before the CP Congress in October, Xi Jinping is cleaning up the police apparatus. On Friday, Sun Lijun was sentenced to death; however, execution will be suspended, meaning he will be jailed for life. Sun’s conviction is part of a bigger picture. On Thursday, Fu Zhenghua and Wang Like were sentenced to the same harsh punishment (China.Table reported). Xi is sending an entire generation of security apparatus leaders to prison who apparently have not been loyal enough to him. Anyone who is well-connected in the police authorities is apparently already considered a political risk.
In China’s media, Sun is consistently portrayed as the leader of a “small circle” of corrupt accomplices. Accordingly, Fu, Gong, Deng and Liu are his “four tigers,” who have now also been hunted down by anti-corruption hunters. “Tigers” in Chinese parlance are senior officials who have been convicted of bribery. Chinese news coverage takes a two-pronged approach here. Officially, the sentences were handed down for corruption, and it is along this line that outrage is stirred up against the fallen cadres. At the same time, however, there are allusions to a political plot by the group. Against whom and with what goal? This is not stated.
The investigations against the alleged Sun gang started in 2020, and now the convictions have followed one after the other. Whether these men truly had formed some sort of organization is irrelevant from a practical standpoint. Xi has perceived them as a threat to his power base. The head of state wants to clean house ahead of the important 20th Party Congress (China.Table reported) and has all dissenters purged. The six convicted men had already been stripped of their power. But their convictions may still act as a deterrent to other cadres who are not fully loyal to Xi. A popular Chinese website believes the wave of convictions will have a “strong deterrent effect.” What is ostensibly meant here is corruption, but Xi’s campaigns are always about loyalty as well.
Intelligence officers are harder to bring into line for Xi than business leaders or the military. In authoritarian regimes, rulers are often threatened by either the army or the intelligence services. Xi has long since replaced all generals and knows that those now in charge are surely on his side. China’s opaquely interwoven intelligence and police system, however, has considerable persistence. Most importantly, the convicted men have close ties to the Shanghai network of CP cadres around ex-President Jiang Zemin. From Xi’s perspective, this must make them seem particularly unreliable; after all, this is a potential rival faction. In a police state like China, government agencies are also disproportionately powerful. Anyone can suddenly “disappear,” and evidence can be found against anyone.
The five gentlemen now feel this firsthand. The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, a CP organ, could easily prove their corruption. Whether they actually accepted such exorbitant sums or not is something no one will ever find out. Presumably, they were corrupt in some way. What matters is who is not charged with corruption in the current China: Xi’s loyalists, whom he currently places in key positions.
Xi relies on two followers, among others, to bring the secret police under his control. Both are considered loyal and reliable:
The convicted cadres were part of the world of the Ministry for Public Security (公安部) and corresponding CP institutions. They primarily control the national police, which also has intelligence responsibilities.
Of late, less has been heard from the Ministry of State Security 国家安全部, which operates much more covertly. Chen Wenqing 陈文清, 62, has quietly run the ministry since 2016. Four years ago, rumors circulated that the more loyal Wang Xiaohong was to succeed Chen as intelligence minister. However, these rumors turned out to be false. Instead, Chen seems to continue to enjoy the strongman’s trust.
The water level of China’s largest freshwater lake has dropped to a record low. Authorities in Jiangxi have issued the highest warning alert for the water supply for the first time, Reuters reports. According to the report, the water level at a key measuring point on the Poyang has dropped from more than 19 meters to just under 7 meters in the past three months. The drought in Jiangxi has lasted for more than 70 days, while heavy rainfall has resumed in the southwest of the People’s Republic. “The extreme drought has had a serious impact on people’s drinking water supply, agricultural production and ecology,” Wang Chun, Director of the Jiangxi Provincial Water Resources Bureau, said last week, according to the South China Morning Post. According to officials, 17,000 people have been affected by drinking water problems since the end of June.
Drought in central and parts of southern China has continued for more than 30 consecutive days. 13 provinces and regions have been affected, including major grain-producing provinces such as Anhui, Henan, Jiangxi and Hunan, according to consulting agency Trivium China. The capitals of Jiangxi and Hunan have yet to see a drop of rain in September.
However, according to authorities, the droughts had only a minor impact on the fall harvest. The US Department of Agriculture also believes the damage to be not overly severe, as satellite data show, according to Trivium. Still, this news does not signal the all-clear. After all, fall and winter crops will be planted in just a few weeks. “If the drought doesn’t end in the next month or two, no amount of money can save next spring’s crop,” Trivium analysts write. nib
Clauß Essers considers himself a technophile. He originally wanted to study electrical engineering, but then became a patent attorney. He came to study law thanks to his father and uncle. “At some point, a client of mine was thinking about how he could sign contracts with Chinese SMEs.” From that day on, China never left Essers’ mind.
In 2004, he and a fellow attorney founded the China Desk, which now employs three Chinese attorneys. Essers advises both Chinese SMEs wishing to establish themselves on the German market and German companies looking to invest in China. In addition to commercial and corporate law, he specializes in tax law and complicated inheritance cases. Furthermore, he is a book author and gives lectures. He has been a partner in the law firm Hoffmann Liebs in Duesseldorf since 1999.
Engaging in dialogue, listening carefully and adapting to his conversation partner – that is what Claus Essers is good at. The best way to do this is on the ground. He has been to China more than 60 times, most recently in 2019, before the Covid pandemic and Xi Jinping’s zero-Covid policy intervened. In view of the strict quarantine regulations and the isolation of entire cities, his current motto is: don’t fly there, but arrange everything via telephone and Internet.
Essers makes no secret of his unshakable optimism about China. He recommends that his German clients hang in there and persevere. “Before 2019, trade relations with China were steadily improving, confidence was growing. That is coming back. It’s just being overshadowed by the pandemic and Russia’s Ukraine war.” Once the pandemic is under control and the ships are loaded again, “a jolt will go through the country.” Then everyone will be eager to get back to work.
Not only contract procedures but also application procedures can be complex in China. Essers is currently experiencing this firsthand: “We have been in the process of setting up our own office in Shanghai for two years. All applications have been submitted to the Chinese government.” When they will be approved exactly, he says, is as uncertain as the pandemic development. “But no matter how long it takes, we will continue to pursue our office establishment.” Daniela Krause
What has the head of a camel, the ears of an ox, the horns of a stag, the neck of a snake, the abdomen of a shell, the claws of an eagle, the paws of a tiger, the scaly body of a fish, and the fiery eyes of a devil? Correct, a dragon. At least according to Chinese mythology.
The dragon is virtually a centuries-old brand ambassador of Chinese culture. For example, it is not only omnipresent in the Forbidden City – the imperial palace – but also prowls through souvenir collections across the country. The Chinese have a special relationship with the scaly mythical creatures. In China, they are not regarded as snarlingly evil and destructive, but as the ancestors of mankind. As benevolent beasts, they symbolize wealth, luck, goodness and intelligence to this day.
Such dragon mythology and cultural symbolism do not grip you much and only remind you of dusty travel guides? Then you better hold on tight. Because now we are off on a devilish dragon ride through everyday Chinese life, or rather the modern Chinese language. Because in China, dragons are literally on everyone’s lips and can sometimes even be found in places where you would hardly expect to find them – for example, on zoo tours, menus and city highways, sometimes even in the weather forecast, in fact even as a “house dragon” in every bathroom!
In Chinese zoos, for example, one encounters “dragon cats” (龙猫 lóngmāo) – better known as chinchillas – as well as “color-changing dragons” (变色龙 biànsèlóng – chameleons) or the spindly “sea dragons” (海龙 hǎilóng), also called pipefish, which do little credit to their name. Fortunately, “fear dragons” (恐龙 kǒnglóng), i.e. dinosaurs, have become extinct, especially the “brute dragon” (暴龙 bàolóng) aka Tyrannosaurus.
Among the culinary dragon genres best known in the West are primarily two liquid dragons: the green “dragon well tea” (龙井茶 lóngjǐngchá) and the “black dragon tea” (乌龙茶 wūlóngchá), the latter we know as oolong. But perhaps you have also unknowingly eaten “dragon eyes” (龙眼 lóngyǎn), meaning longan fruit, or had a “dragon shrimp” (龙虾 lóngxiā), or lobster, on your first restaurant date. The Chinese love to feast on “mini dragon shrimp” (小龙虾 xiǎolóngxiā) – the posh little brother of the fiery red creature that is the crayfish.
Unfortunately, vegetarians are also not safe from dragons and will sooner or later fall into the clutches of the tasty jagged “dragon bean” (龙豆 lóngdòu). Would you care for a “horse staple dragon” as a dessert? Fortunately, this has nothing to do with stapled horses or hoofed dragons, but is simply the phonetic translation of sugary French macarons. Please do not confuse them with the (sweet?) French President Emmanuel Macron – his name in Chinese is “Makelong” (马克龙 Mǎkèlóng), which is also just a phonetic reference, but could be translated quite literally as “horse-conquering dragon”.
Many Chinese emperors are said to have seen themselves as direct descendants of the dragons. Of course, this has been disproved today. Nevertheless, the myth continues in the dictionary. The word chénglóng 成龙 “to become a dragon” still means “to make it big” or “to become somebody big”. This saying once inspired a young Hong Kong martial artist surnamed 成 to adopt the artist pseudonym Chéng Lóng 成龙. The name served its purpose and the rest is history. In the West, we know him as Jackie Chan.
Dragons have even clawed their way into the business vocabulary. No wonder, after all, the dragon is regarded as auspicious in Chinese culture. The Putonghua, therefore, praises industry and market leaders as “dragon heads” (龙头 lóngtóu) and speaks of “market dragon heads” (市场龙头 shìchǎng lóngtóu = market leader), “dragonhead products” (龙头产品 lóngtóu chǎnpǐn = leading products), and “dragonhead companies” (龙头企业 lóngtóu qǐyè = leading companies). And if you still remembered the once emerging East and Southeast Asian economies as “tiger economies,” Chinese will prove you wrong here, too. Because China, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore have always been called亚洲四小龙 Yàzhōu sì xiǎolóng – the “four dragon babies of Asia” in this context.
Verena Menzel runs the online language school New Chinese in Beijing.
China’s loyalty to Russia was already on shaky ground. Instead of firm support, Beijing rather offered Putin words of encouragement. His war is intended to weaken the West as well as Russia itself, which has made itself a vassal of China. For Xi, Putin is above all a useful troublemaker.
But on Saturday at the UN General Assembly, Foreign Minister Wang blatantly urged Russia’s allies to show restraint. The background: Beijing fears instability will spill over into its own sphere of interest in Central Asia if Russia continues to escalate its actions. Moreover, the consequences of the war become ever more painful for the economy, Felix Lee reports.
Last week, from Wednesday to Friday, reports of six long prison sentences for senior CP cadres circulated on China’s news sites. Each one reads like routine in the endless anti-corruption campaign, but the overall picture reveals a peculiar pattern: all six men were once at the top of China’s security apparatus. Propaganda accuses them not only of corruption but of conspiracy; at the head of the conspiracy is said to have been Sun Lijun, who was sentenced to death on Friday. Ruler Xi Jinping is cleaning house ahead of the CP Congress in October. Those who do not pledge unconditional loyalty will have to fear for their freedom.
An outright sensational sign of opening came from Hong Kong. Arriving travelers no longer have to go into quarantine, but are expected to watch out for symptoms on their own. The head of the administration, John Lee, has apparently managed to win a measure of independence, at least in this respect. The hope remains that the Mainland will open up eventually.
On Twitter, an alleged coup against Xi Jinping trended in our bubble on Sunday. However, there is not the slightest legitimate evidence for this rumor. Instead, the alleged evidence follows the usual script of a conspiracy theory. There is no unrest on the streets of Beijing, and the alleged “80-kilometer-long convoy of military vehicles” that entered the capital probably never existed either.
Incidentally, in 2012 there were also wild coup rumors prior to the CP Congress at which Xi Jinping took control as announced. In October, he will in all likelihood be confirmed to remain in office. The new rumors now show, above all, that nerves are on edge before the big CP Congress.
Unity at the United Nations is a rare thing. And even if the Western allies have tirelessly declared for months that Russia was largely isolated in its war of aggression against Ukraine, in the end, this was little more than wishful thinking (China.Table reported). Brazil, India, the states of the Middle East, but also many states in Africa and Latin America have at no time clearly condemned Russia’s invasion. On the contrary, the Chinese leadership in Beijing has instead even shifted the blame for the escalation to the United States and its allies.
At the UN General Debate, which ended this weekend in New York, a surprisingly different picture presented itself. Even China struck a different tone toward Putin. China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who spoke at the UN General Debate on Saturday, warned Russia and Ukraine against escalating the war. “We call on all parties concerned to keep the crisis from spilling over and to protect the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries,” Wang said. He called on the two countries to start negotiations. What is needed are “fair and pragmatic” peace talks, the Chinese foreign minister said. The “legitimate security concerns of all parties” must be taken into account, he said.
Like German Chancellor Olaf Scholz earlier in the day at the start of the General Assembly on Monday, Wang Yi expressed his concern: the concepts of sovereignty and territorial integrity are threatened. The General Assembly is the right place for such warnings because both ideas are enshrined in the UN Charter.
When the question arose in the middle of last week whether Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy would be allowed to deliver his speech via video link, an overwhelming majority of members agreed to this exception, including China. Normally, the rule is that speakers must be present in New York. Russia had attempted to prevent this concession to Ukraine.
Even before Wang Yi’s speech on Saturday, there had not been the expected unity at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit with Russia, China, India and Kazakhstan, among others, in the Uzbek capital of Samarkand (China.Table reported). “I know that today’s era is not the era for war,” India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi told Putin straight to his face.
China’s President Xi Jinping, who had also attended the meeting in Samarkand, publicly expressed his “concerns” about the situation in Ukraine for the first time. Previously, Xi had (largely) refrained from criticism, which is why Putin also thanked him for the “balanced position of our Chinese friends when it comes to the Ukraine crisis.”
Even with this cautious change of course, Xi has still not taken a clear stand against Putin. And China’s state media continues to slander Western sanctions. But at least Russia’s President Vladimir Putin can no longer rely on China as a partner.
Putin probably expected the heads of state and government of the mostly authoritarian SCO states present in Samarkand to back him up. Otherwise, he would not have flown to the summit at all. Putin cannot afford negative headlines at the moment, not least in light of his “partial mobilization”.
But where do China’s sudden doubts about Moscow’s actions come from? Can we speak of a change of heart in Beijing? Or is it merely a continuation of the already rehearsed alternation of cautious criticism and insubstantial approval (China.Table reported)?
When Putin traveled to Beijing for the opening ceremony of the Winter Olympics shortly before the start of his war against Ukraine in February and informed Xi of his plans, Beijing apparently assumed Kyiv would fall quickly. Until shortly before the war began, China also maintained relations with the Ukrainian government. Ukraine was an important part of the Silk Road Initiative, which was intended to open up new trade routes between the Middle Kingdom and Europe under China’s leadership. The damage would have been limited – as long as the annexation of Ukraine happened quickly. That plan has now failed entirely. The war is entering its seventh month, and the frontline is swinging back and forth.
Furthermore, tensions in other Central Asian countries are already rising, for example in the Caucasus between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Xi now fears for stability in Central Asia. The balancing act will thus become even harder (China.Table reported). And economically, too, China’s initial benefit from the Ukraine war could backfire.
Until recently, China seemed to benefit from the Western sanctions against Russia. The gas, oil, and coal that Moscow no longer sold to the West were purchased by China – at prices well below the current horrendously high global market prices. But in the meantime, the global economy threatens to suffer so much damage that even the economic strategists in Beijing’s government quarter are getting edgy. More and more export markets of the world’s largest export nation are collapsing under the growing energy crisis. Because of inflation, consumers are holding on to their money.
And even though China officially rejects Western sanctions against Russia and considers itself a “strategic partner” to Moscow, numerous Chinese companies and financial institutions have also suspended cooperation with Russia – for fear of being co-sanctioned by the West (China.Table reported). Western trading partners are still more important to them for their business than Russia’s.
Because of his initial pledge of allegiance, Putin’s problems are now Xi’s problems as well. “The fact that Russia has been waging war for seven months and has not been victorious is an embarrassment to Xi,” says Russian economist Andrei Illarionov in an interview with Deutsche Welle. Illarionov also advised Putin between 2000 and 2005, but is now one of his critics.
Shortly before the grand CP Congress, where Xi will be named State and Party leader for the third time, Moscow’s failure “makes him look weak before the most important event in his life. But Xi could not afford to look weak,” Illarionov said. Accordingly, Xi had put pressure on Putin in Samarkand to end the war as soon as possible.
Before Samarkand, Putin was willing to continue a prolonged war of attrition – for years if necessary, Putin adviser Illarionov assesses the situation. As a result of the decisions of the last few days, Putin has radically changed his strategy. “These are not signs of his weakness or defeat; these are signs of his dependence on Xi.”
Shortly before the CP Congress in October, Xi Jinping is cleaning up the police apparatus. On Friday, Sun Lijun was sentenced to death; however, execution will be suspended, meaning he will be jailed for life. Sun’s conviction is part of a bigger picture. On Thursday, Fu Zhenghua and Wang Like were sentenced to the same harsh punishment (China.Table reported). Xi is sending an entire generation of security apparatus leaders to prison who apparently have not been loyal enough to him. Anyone who is well-connected in the police authorities is apparently already considered a political risk.
In China’s media, Sun is consistently portrayed as the leader of a “small circle” of corrupt accomplices. Accordingly, Fu, Gong, Deng and Liu are his “four tigers,” who have now also been hunted down by anti-corruption hunters. “Tigers” in Chinese parlance are senior officials who have been convicted of bribery. Chinese news coverage takes a two-pronged approach here. Officially, the sentences were handed down for corruption, and it is along this line that outrage is stirred up against the fallen cadres. At the same time, however, there are allusions to a political plot by the group. Against whom and with what goal? This is not stated.
The investigations against the alleged Sun gang started in 2020, and now the convictions have followed one after the other. Whether these men truly had formed some sort of organization is irrelevant from a practical standpoint. Xi has perceived them as a threat to his power base. The head of state wants to clean house ahead of the important 20th Party Congress (China.Table reported) and has all dissenters purged. The six convicted men had already been stripped of their power. But their convictions may still act as a deterrent to other cadres who are not fully loyal to Xi. A popular Chinese website believes the wave of convictions will have a “strong deterrent effect.” What is ostensibly meant here is corruption, but Xi’s campaigns are always about loyalty as well.
Intelligence officers are harder to bring into line for Xi than business leaders or the military. In authoritarian regimes, rulers are often threatened by either the army or the intelligence services. Xi has long since replaced all generals and knows that those now in charge are surely on his side. China’s opaquely interwoven intelligence and police system, however, has considerable persistence. Most importantly, the convicted men have close ties to the Shanghai network of CP cadres around ex-President Jiang Zemin. From Xi’s perspective, this must make them seem particularly unreliable; after all, this is a potential rival faction. In a police state like China, government agencies are also disproportionately powerful. Anyone can suddenly “disappear,” and evidence can be found against anyone.
The five gentlemen now feel this firsthand. The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, a CP organ, could easily prove their corruption. Whether they actually accepted such exorbitant sums or not is something no one will ever find out. Presumably, they were corrupt in some way. What matters is who is not charged with corruption in the current China: Xi’s loyalists, whom he currently places in key positions.
Xi relies on two followers, among others, to bring the secret police under his control. Both are considered loyal and reliable:
The convicted cadres were part of the world of the Ministry for Public Security (公安部) and corresponding CP institutions. They primarily control the national police, which also has intelligence responsibilities.
Of late, less has been heard from the Ministry of State Security 国家安全部, which operates much more covertly. Chen Wenqing 陈文清, 62, has quietly run the ministry since 2016. Four years ago, rumors circulated that the more loyal Wang Xiaohong was to succeed Chen as intelligence minister. However, these rumors turned out to be false. Instead, Chen seems to continue to enjoy the strongman’s trust.
The water level of China’s largest freshwater lake has dropped to a record low. Authorities in Jiangxi have issued the highest warning alert for the water supply for the first time, Reuters reports. According to the report, the water level at a key measuring point on the Poyang has dropped from more than 19 meters to just under 7 meters in the past three months. The drought in Jiangxi has lasted for more than 70 days, while heavy rainfall has resumed in the southwest of the People’s Republic. “The extreme drought has had a serious impact on people’s drinking water supply, agricultural production and ecology,” Wang Chun, Director of the Jiangxi Provincial Water Resources Bureau, said last week, according to the South China Morning Post. According to officials, 17,000 people have been affected by drinking water problems since the end of June.
Drought in central and parts of southern China has continued for more than 30 consecutive days. 13 provinces and regions have been affected, including major grain-producing provinces such as Anhui, Henan, Jiangxi and Hunan, according to consulting agency Trivium China. The capitals of Jiangxi and Hunan have yet to see a drop of rain in September.
However, according to authorities, the droughts had only a minor impact on the fall harvest. The US Department of Agriculture also believes the damage to be not overly severe, as satellite data show, according to Trivium. Still, this news does not signal the all-clear. After all, fall and winter crops will be planted in just a few weeks. “If the drought doesn’t end in the next month or two, no amount of money can save next spring’s crop,” Trivium analysts write. nib
Clauß Essers considers himself a technophile. He originally wanted to study electrical engineering, but then became a patent attorney. He came to study law thanks to his father and uncle. “At some point, a client of mine was thinking about how he could sign contracts with Chinese SMEs.” From that day on, China never left Essers’ mind.
In 2004, he and a fellow attorney founded the China Desk, which now employs three Chinese attorneys. Essers advises both Chinese SMEs wishing to establish themselves on the German market and German companies looking to invest in China. In addition to commercial and corporate law, he specializes in tax law and complicated inheritance cases. Furthermore, he is a book author and gives lectures. He has been a partner in the law firm Hoffmann Liebs in Duesseldorf since 1999.
Engaging in dialogue, listening carefully and adapting to his conversation partner – that is what Claus Essers is good at. The best way to do this is on the ground. He has been to China more than 60 times, most recently in 2019, before the Covid pandemic and Xi Jinping’s zero-Covid policy intervened. In view of the strict quarantine regulations and the isolation of entire cities, his current motto is: don’t fly there, but arrange everything via telephone and Internet.
Essers makes no secret of his unshakable optimism about China. He recommends that his German clients hang in there and persevere. “Before 2019, trade relations with China were steadily improving, confidence was growing. That is coming back. It’s just being overshadowed by the pandemic and Russia’s Ukraine war.” Once the pandemic is under control and the ships are loaded again, “a jolt will go through the country.” Then everyone will be eager to get back to work.
Not only contract procedures but also application procedures can be complex in China. Essers is currently experiencing this firsthand: “We have been in the process of setting up our own office in Shanghai for two years. All applications have been submitted to the Chinese government.” When they will be approved exactly, he says, is as uncertain as the pandemic development. “But no matter how long it takes, we will continue to pursue our office establishment.” Daniela Krause
What has the head of a camel, the ears of an ox, the horns of a stag, the neck of a snake, the abdomen of a shell, the claws of an eagle, the paws of a tiger, the scaly body of a fish, and the fiery eyes of a devil? Correct, a dragon. At least according to Chinese mythology.
The dragon is virtually a centuries-old brand ambassador of Chinese culture. For example, it is not only omnipresent in the Forbidden City – the imperial palace – but also prowls through souvenir collections across the country. The Chinese have a special relationship with the scaly mythical creatures. In China, they are not regarded as snarlingly evil and destructive, but as the ancestors of mankind. As benevolent beasts, they symbolize wealth, luck, goodness and intelligence to this day.
Such dragon mythology and cultural symbolism do not grip you much and only remind you of dusty travel guides? Then you better hold on tight. Because now we are off on a devilish dragon ride through everyday Chinese life, or rather the modern Chinese language. Because in China, dragons are literally on everyone’s lips and can sometimes even be found in places where you would hardly expect to find them – for example, on zoo tours, menus and city highways, sometimes even in the weather forecast, in fact even as a “house dragon” in every bathroom!
In Chinese zoos, for example, one encounters “dragon cats” (龙猫 lóngmāo) – better known as chinchillas – as well as “color-changing dragons” (变色龙 biànsèlóng – chameleons) or the spindly “sea dragons” (海龙 hǎilóng), also called pipefish, which do little credit to their name. Fortunately, “fear dragons” (恐龙 kǒnglóng), i.e. dinosaurs, have become extinct, especially the “brute dragon” (暴龙 bàolóng) aka Tyrannosaurus.
Among the culinary dragon genres best known in the West are primarily two liquid dragons: the green “dragon well tea” (龙井茶 lóngjǐngchá) and the “black dragon tea” (乌龙茶 wūlóngchá), the latter we know as oolong. But perhaps you have also unknowingly eaten “dragon eyes” (龙眼 lóngyǎn), meaning longan fruit, or had a “dragon shrimp” (龙虾 lóngxiā), or lobster, on your first restaurant date. The Chinese love to feast on “mini dragon shrimp” (小龙虾 xiǎolóngxiā) – the posh little brother of the fiery red creature that is the crayfish.
Unfortunately, vegetarians are also not safe from dragons and will sooner or later fall into the clutches of the tasty jagged “dragon bean” (龙豆 lóngdòu). Would you care for a “horse staple dragon” as a dessert? Fortunately, this has nothing to do with stapled horses or hoofed dragons, but is simply the phonetic translation of sugary French macarons. Please do not confuse them with the (sweet?) French President Emmanuel Macron – his name in Chinese is “Makelong” (马克龙 Mǎkèlóng), which is also just a phonetic reference, but could be translated quite literally as “horse-conquering dragon”.
Many Chinese emperors are said to have seen themselves as direct descendants of the dragons. Of course, this has been disproved today. Nevertheless, the myth continues in the dictionary. The word chénglóng 成龙 “to become a dragon” still means “to make it big” or “to become somebody big”. This saying once inspired a young Hong Kong martial artist surnamed 成 to adopt the artist pseudonym Chéng Lóng 成龙. The name served its purpose and the rest is history. In the West, we know him as Jackie Chan.
Dragons have even clawed their way into the business vocabulary. No wonder, after all, the dragon is regarded as auspicious in Chinese culture. The Putonghua, therefore, praises industry and market leaders as “dragon heads” (龙头 lóngtóu) and speaks of “market dragon heads” (市场龙头 shìchǎng lóngtóu = market leader), “dragonhead products” (龙头产品 lóngtóu chǎnpǐn = leading products), and “dragonhead companies” (龙头企业 lóngtóu qǐyè = leading companies). And if you still remembered the once emerging East and Southeast Asian economies as “tiger economies,” Chinese will prove you wrong here, too. Because China, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore have always been called亚洲四小龙 Yàzhōu sì xiǎolóng – the “four dragon babies of Asia” in this context.
Verena Menzel runs the online language school New Chinese in Beijing.
