In his nearly two-hour-long speech on Sunday, Xi Jinping once again emphasized China’s energy security. But he also reiterated that the country must continue to drive forward the green transformation. So a departure from China’s climate goals is not to be expected during Xi’s third term in office. However, it will be interesting to see how he will set priorities when things get tough. “How quickly political instability and supply fears can call climate ambitions into question is something we currently witness globally,” explains Nis Gruenberg of the Merics Institute in an interview with Nico Beckert. Because when it comes to fulfilling climate issues, China’s head of state is primarily also concerned with maintaining his own power, the energy policy expert says. “The more uncertain the overall situation, the more uncertain the green transition will be.”
Meanwhile, the official pictures from the Great Hall of the People in Beijing show how firmly Xi currently sits in the saddle. Sometimes in wide angle and sometimes in long shot pictures, Xi is the center of attention in the Middle Kingdom. No one can match him, no one can get close to him. But even an autocrat needs a loyal sidekick. As for who will be the new prime minister at his side in March 2023, we can currently only read between the lines and, at best, from gestures.
One man who Xi pays particular attention to is Hu Chunhua. The 59-year-old is the youngest of China’s four vice presidents under Premier Li Keqiang, and is currently in charge of poverty reduction, agriculture and trade. For the German economy, Hu would be a preferred candidate, says Frank Sieren. He analyzes that Hu is considered a credible and pragmatic crisis manager, as he proved, for example, in the milk powder scandal of 2008. But more importantly, Hu has never lost sight of the goal of further opening China. As recently as August of this year, he declared that China must further “liberalize and simplify” trade and investment for foreign companies. Unheard-of in times of decoupling and zero-Covid isolation.
Carbon emissions have risen less sharply than before since Xi Jinping took office. How much credit can the CP leader take for this? And how important is climate protection to Xi Jinping?
It is of course always difficult to pin this on one person. But in any case, the long-term phase-out of coal and the reduction of carbon emissions are among the most important items on Xi’s political agenda. Xi sees climate protection and adaptation to climate change as a prerequisite for the party’s long-term grip on power and the current form of government. Unfortunately, in the medium term, energy security is also valued more important in China than climate policy; this is currently hurting the ambitions for emission targets.
To what extent can Xi “overrule” on climate protection? How big is the influence of the provinces and state-owned enterprises on this?
This is, of course, an extremely complex game because China is so big. There are provinces that benefit more from rapid transformation than others. But the coal provinces are losing jobs and growth. The provinces are a relatively powerful player, maybe not when it comes to standing up to the central government, but to implementing what comes from Beijing – or delaying the implementation of climate policy. And the central government also likes to turn a blind eye sometimes, especially in times of crisis.
How important is the fact that the central government’s policies are sometimes vague and leave a lot of room for interpretation?
That certainly plays a role. The central government tends to set macro targets: By how many percent per year should emissions fall or renewable energies be expanded? The provinces, the power companies – which are state-owned enterprises – and local players then have to implement these targets. And there are various interests, so of course there are delays.
Where do you see the biggest shortcomings in China’s climate policy of recent years?
China does not have adequate climate plans that would be compatible with the Paris Agreement. So even if the People’s Republic achieves its 2030/2060 targets, it would not contribute a sufficiently large share to meet the Paris climate goals. Another major shortcoming is: China does have the political will and the technical capabilities to rapidly advance the green transition. But still, with every little crisis, the coal lobby manages to slow down the phase-out. And new coal-fired power plants are still being built. This, in turn, will make the phase-out more difficult in the future.
Announced reforms in the power sector to push coal faster out of the grids have also been around for almost 20 years. But not much has happened. Yet there is a lot of potential for cutting carbon emissions in these areas.
What do you expect from Xi Jinping’s third term in office regarding climate protection?
In terms of climate policy, there will generally not be much change during the third term in office. It will move in a greener direction, with coal decreasing by a good one percent per year in the energy mix. But whether it can go faster will also be determined by realpolitik factors – be it economic crises or international tensions. The more uncertain the overall situation, the more uncertain the green transition will be. The transformation will continue, but probably at a slower pace than in a calmer global situation. We currently see globally how quickly political instability and supply fears call climate ambitions into question.
This summer, China experienced the worst heat wave ever recorded. The year before, there were floods after extreme weather. Does the central government change its climate policy after such extreme events?
No, I don’t see that happening. Far more extreme events would have to happen. The government is sticking to its Five-Year Plan, which also defines a number of climate targets. And the government has also achieved some successes. Carbon emissions have been falling for four quarters now, and the share of coal in the electricity mix is dropping by around one percent year by year. But of course, progress is still far too slow and not enough to achieve the Paris climate targets – like in many other countries.
In Germany, there has been a large climate movement for several years. It goes without saying that similar social movements are hardly possible in China. But is awareness of climate change growing among the population? Are grassroots organizations emerging that are calling for more climate protection in some form?
Of course, it is difficult to organize a civil society movement in China. But in the existing civil society, environmental protection is one of the main issues. And a part of them is also actively involved, but so far mainly in classical environmental protection, and usually in cooperation or agreement with the local governments. Large international organizations such as Greenpeace are also still active in China. Civil society has, for example, contributed to reducing air pollution in major cities.
It is also interesting to see what is happening in the press. Until now, floods or other extreme weather events have not been associated with climate change in the media. But that seems to have changed somewhat this summer. We have not yet systematically analyzed this, but first articles show that something is happening. A large part of the population is aware of the climate problems, probably even more people than in the USA. They believe in science.
Nis Gruenberg researches the relationship between the Chinese state and the Communist Party, elite politics, and China’s sustainable development at the Merics China Institute in Berlin. His publications focused on China’s energy sector and the reform of Chinese state-owned enterprises. Before joining Merics, Gruenberg conducted research at the Copenhagen Business School (CBS) and the Sino-Danish Center in Beijing. Gruenberg received his PhD from CBS and holds BA and MA degrees in Chinese Studies from Copenhagen University
“He genuinely paid interest and attention to what I had to say, as well as to my colleagues from other chambers,” says Joerg Wuttke, President of the EU Chamber of Commerce in China. He is talking about Hu Chunhua (胡春华), who at 59 is the youngest of the four vice premiers under Premier Li Keqiang, and is currently in charge of poverty reduction, agriculture and trade. He is considered one of the most promising candidates to succeed the departing Premier Li Keqiang.
Hu’s biggest disadvantage: He is no protégé of state and party leader Xi Jinping. Instead, Hu climbed the ranks of the Communist Youth League, the power base of Xi’s predecessor Hu Jintao – with whom the current strongman is said to not be particularly close with. Hu Jintao supported the younger Hu (no relation), as did the current premier, Li Keqiang.
But if Xi Jinping has to pay a price for securing a third term, Hu will have a good chance. The conciliatory gesture with which Xi demonstratively turned toward Hu Jintao after his opening speech at the 20th Party Congress might indicate this.
It is very likely that Xi will also have to give posts to officials who do not belong to his own, now dominant, CP faction. Otherwise, unrest could grow too strong. And Xi could probably settle for Hu Chunhua as premier. Hu already has a successful track record as vice premier, especially in the fight against poverty, something that was very important to Xi. It is also thanks to him that Xi could announce the end of absolute poverty in China in 2021.
More importantly, the farmer’s son from Hubei is very broadly positioned and has successfully managed provinces that could not be more diverse. This is considered an important criterion for the highest honors.
After an elite education at Peking University and joining the party in 1983 – under the impact of Deng Xiaoping’s opening policy – Hu was assigned to Tibet, China’s poorest province, for five years. Hu’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, was the local CP leader, which marked the beginning of the professional relationship between the two. Hu Chunhua himself belongs to the Tujia minority, which are native to western China and whose language is similar to Tibetan. In 2006, Hu was rewarded for his time in Tibet with the position of head of the Youth League – a post once held by his mentor Hu Jintao.
In 2008, Hu first became vice governor, then governor in Beijing’s neighboring province of Hebei. In 2009, however, he was offered the highest provincial job of party secretary in Inner Mongolia, a province dominated by agriculture and mineral resources and with the longest shared border with Russia. From there, Hu made it to the Politburo at the 2012 Party Congress and simultaneously became party secretary of Guangdong, China’s economically strongest and most advanced province in the deep south. He sparked a surge of innovation there, and made a name for himself as a high-tech economic reformer.
“For his policy record, I would pick Hu,” said Yu Jie, Senior Research Fellow at think tank Chatham House. “He has a very good reputation, whether in the provinces or in his position as vice premier. He’s someone who delivers.”
Beijing also considers Hu Chunhua a skilled crisis manager. In Tibet, he promoted economic development while, from Beijing’s perspective, fighting separatist organizations. He was the governor when Hebei became the epicenter of a huge scandal involving tainted milk. Hu survived the scandal and even received praise in the Party for his efficient handling of the crisis. As Mongolia’s party leader, he quelled violent riots in 2011 that left ten people dead. Local shepherds had revolted against the environmentally destructive mining industry. Hu resolved the conflict with a combination of toughness and a willingness to negotiate. The fight against corruption and the overexploitation of nature were his central themes thereafter.
Hu’s biggest rival is Wang Yang, also vice premier and Hu’s direct predecessor as party secretary in Guangdong. Wang is also considered an economic reformer. He gave Shenzhen the necessary boost to become China’s Silicon Valley. After Xi’s opening speech, Wang was the only vice premier quoted at the party congress as saying that “unity” and “strength” must now be shown. Lately, Wang always expressed noticeable loyalty to Xi.
Still, Hu Chunhua has two decisive advantages. He has experience in very poor and very rich provinces – and above all: He is eight years younger than Wang Yang. So, unlike Wang, he could govern for the next two legislative periods without exceeding the age limit of 70. In this way, Xi Jinping would also send a clear signal that he will lift the next generation to a central position.
One indication that Hu is considered a potential candidate came in July. He was allowed to write a hymn of praise about Xi’s “historic achievements”: He “personally takes command, personally goes to battle and personally supervises the battle,” Hu praised Xi’s fight against poverty.
Hu has repeatedly shown himself to be an internationally-minded economic reformer as well. In his speech to the meeting of China, South Korea, Japan and the ASEAN countries (10+3), for example, Hu called for “more entrepreneurs from around the world to invest in China.” In a speech to the France-China Committee on June 27, Hu even spoke of China’s commitment to “further open up” the country, to further “liberalize and simplify” trade and investment in China In August, in light of the zero-Covid policy, Hu urged CP cadres to once again promote greater consumption and an internationalization of the economy. Foreign trade logistics must run “more smoothly,” he said.
Hu even joked about the EU chamber’s long list of complaints about Chinese economic policy, Reuters quoted chamber chief Wuttke as saying. “Other leaders would not have taken that quite (as) well.” Companies would likely be comfortable with Hu as a premier.
Sinolytics is a European consulting and analysis company specializing in China. It advises European companies on their strategic orientation and concrete business activities in the People’s Republic.
“Both things came together: A whole new life for my country, and a whole new life for me,” Diana Mickevičienė tells about her youth. She was 18 years old when Lithuania declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1990. A historic moment. But the rulers in Moscow tried to forcefully quell Lithuania’s push for freedom on January 13, 1991. Mickevičienė was on the streets of Vilnius that night and had to witness Russian special forces opening fire on her fellow students.
The soldiers were unable to stop Lithuania’s independence, but they left scars that continue to shape Mickevičienė to this day. “Losing freedom and regaining it is part of my story,” says the now 48-year-old. In her newfound freedom, Mickevičienė studied philosophy, history and international relations.
And it qualified her for Lithuania’s diplomatic service, which is looking for fresh talent. For Mickevičienė, diplomacy is her gateway to the world, after a youth spent behind the Iron Curtain. What inspires her is that she can tell Lithuania’s story as a diplomat. The story of Soviet oppression, but also the success story of the young democratic Lithuania.
In 2020, she was appointed ambassador to China. By then, relations between Lithuania and China cooled noticeably. In 2019, Chinese nationalists assaulted peaceful protesters in Vilnius who showed solidarity with the Hong Kong protests. A shock for Lithuania, which celebrated its own independence from Soviet repression on that very day.
After further intimidation attempts, disappointed Lithuania left China’s 17+1 format in 2021. This also made life more difficult for Mickevičienė, as the ambassador is henceforth barred from all official appointments. Soon after, Taiwan opened a representative office under the name “Taiwan Office” in Vilnius. Beijing was furious, expelled Mickevičienė – and blocked almost all exports from Lithuania to China ever since. Things got ugly in Beijing. China downgraded the status of the embassy in Beijing, cut Lithuania off from diplomatic e-mails, simulated a bomb alert in the embassy building and gave staff seven days to leave China.
“In seven days we had to give up our whole lives in China, with families, bank accounts and pets,” recalls Mickevičienė. In the end, Western diplomats escorted the Lithuanian staff to the airport – fearing their Lithuanian colleagues with expiring accreditations would be targeted by the border police. “We understood: Because we are a small country standing up to China, they want to make an example of us,” summarizes Mickevičienė.
And she couples her analysis with a message. The EU needs to position itself better, she says, to ensure that smaller member countries do not fall under the wheels of China’s economic power. The European Commission’s Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI) is a step in the right direction, she believes. “We need instruments that show the other side: The single market is our strength, not our weakness.”
She also has a clear message for Germany: Dependence on the Chinese market deprives Germany of its political breathing room. “The situation with Russian gas should have opened Germany’s eyes,” Mickevičienė said. Jonathan Kaspar Teacher
While the CCP convenes in the Great Hall of the People, the Daxing International Hydrogen Energy Demonstration Zone on the outskirts of the capital is all about future technologies. The zone is part of a “3+N” hydrogen industry ecosystem jointly developed by the cities of Beijing and Tianjin and the province of Hebei (Jing-Jin-Ji). At a presentation, this employee presents a hydrogen hybrid motorcycle concept.
In his nearly two-hour-long speech on Sunday, Xi Jinping once again emphasized China’s energy security. But he also reiterated that the country must continue to drive forward the green transformation. So a departure from China’s climate goals is not to be expected during Xi’s third term in office. However, it will be interesting to see how he will set priorities when things get tough. “How quickly political instability and supply fears can call climate ambitions into question is something we currently witness globally,” explains Nis Gruenberg of the Merics Institute in an interview with Nico Beckert. Because when it comes to fulfilling climate issues, China’s head of state is primarily also concerned with maintaining his own power, the energy policy expert says. “The more uncertain the overall situation, the more uncertain the green transition will be.”
Meanwhile, the official pictures from the Great Hall of the People in Beijing show how firmly Xi currently sits in the saddle. Sometimes in wide angle and sometimes in long shot pictures, Xi is the center of attention in the Middle Kingdom. No one can match him, no one can get close to him. But even an autocrat needs a loyal sidekick. As for who will be the new prime minister at his side in March 2023, we can currently only read between the lines and, at best, from gestures.
One man who Xi pays particular attention to is Hu Chunhua. The 59-year-old is the youngest of China’s four vice presidents under Premier Li Keqiang, and is currently in charge of poverty reduction, agriculture and trade. For the German economy, Hu would be a preferred candidate, says Frank Sieren. He analyzes that Hu is considered a credible and pragmatic crisis manager, as he proved, for example, in the milk powder scandal of 2008. But more importantly, Hu has never lost sight of the goal of further opening China. As recently as August of this year, he declared that China must further “liberalize and simplify” trade and investment for foreign companies. Unheard-of in times of decoupling and zero-Covid isolation.
Carbon emissions have risen less sharply than before since Xi Jinping took office. How much credit can the CP leader take for this? And how important is climate protection to Xi Jinping?
It is of course always difficult to pin this on one person. But in any case, the long-term phase-out of coal and the reduction of carbon emissions are among the most important items on Xi’s political agenda. Xi sees climate protection and adaptation to climate change as a prerequisite for the party’s long-term grip on power and the current form of government. Unfortunately, in the medium term, energy security is also valued more important in China than climate policy; this is currently hurting the ambitions for emission targets.
To what extent can Xi “overrule” on climate protection? How big is the influence of the provinces and state-owned enterprises on this?
This is, of course, an extremely complex game because China is so big. There are provinces that benefit more from rapid transformation than others. But the coal provinces are losing jobs and growth. The provinces are a relatively powerful player, maybe not when it comes to standing up to the central government, but to implementing what comes from Beijing – or delaying the implementation of climate policy. And the central government also likes to turn a blind eye sometimes, especially in times of crisis.
How important is the fact that the central government’s policies are sometimes vague and leave a lot of room for interpretation?
That certainly plays a role. The central government tends to set macro targets: By how many percent per year should emissions fall or renewable energies be expanded? The provinces, the power companies – which are state-owned enterprises – and local players then have to implement these targets. And there are various interests, so of course there are delays.
Where do you see the biggest shortcomings in China’s climate policy of recent years?
China does not have adequate climate plans that would be compatible with the Paris Agreement. So even if the People’s Republic achieves its 2030/2060 targets, it would not contribute a sufficiently large share to meet the Paris climate goals. Another major shortcoming is: China does have the political will and the technical capabilities to rapidly advance the green transition. But still, with every little crisis, the coal lobby manages to slow down the phase-out. And new coal-fired power plants are still being built. This, in turn, will make the phase-out more difficult in the future.
Announced reforms in the power sector to push coal faster out of the grids have also been around for almost 20 years. But not much has happened. Yet there is a lot of potential for cutting carbon emissions in these areas.
What do you expect from Xi Jinping’s third term in office regarding climate protection?
In terms of climate policy, there will generally not be much change during the third term in office. It will move in a greener direction, with coal decreasing by a good one percent per year in the energy mix. But whether it can go faster will also be determined by realpolitik factors – be it economic crises or international tensions. The more uncertain the overall situation, the more uncertain the green transition will be. The transformation will continue, but probably at a slower pace than in a calmer global situation. We currently see globally how quickly political instability and supply fears call climate ambitions into question.
This summer, China experienced the worst heat wave ever recorded. The year before, there were floods after extreme weather. Does the central government change its climate policy after such extreme events?
No, I don’t see that happening. Far more extreme events would have to happen. The government is sticking to its Five-Year Plan, which also defines a number of climate targets. And the government has also achieved some successes. Carbon emissions have been falling for four quarters now, and the share of coal in the electricity mix is dropping by around one percent year by year. But of course, progress is still far too slow and not enough to achieve the Paris climate targets – like in many other countries.
In Germany, there has been a large climate movement for several years. It goes without saying that similar social movements are hardly possible in China. But is awareness of climate change growing among the population? Are grassroots organizations emerging that are calling for more climate protection in some form?
Of course, it is difficult to organize a civil society movement in China. But in the existing civil society, environmental protection is one of the main issues. And a part of them is also actively involved, but so far mainly in classical environmental protection, and usually in cooperation or agreement with the local governments. Large international organizations such as Greenpeace are also still active in China. Civil society has, for example, contributed to reducing air pollution in major cities.
It is also interesting to see what is happening in the press. Until now, floods or other extreme weather events have not been associated with climate change in the media. But that seems to have changed somewhat this summer. We have not yet systematically analyzed this, but first articles show that something is happening. A large part of the population is aware of the climate problems, probably even more people than in the USA. They believe in science.
Nis Gruenberg researches the relationship between the Chinese state and the Communist Party, elite politics, and China’s sustainable development at the Merics China Institute in Berlin. His publications focused on China’s energy sector and the reform of Chinese state-owned enterprises. Before joining Merics, Gruenberg conducted research at the Copenhagen Business School (CBS) and the Sino-Danish Center in Beijing. Gruenberg received his PhD from CBS and holds BA and MA degrees in Chinese Studies from Copenhagen University
“He genuinely paid interest and attention to what I had to say, as well as to my colleagues from other chambers,” says Joerg Wuttke, President of the EU Chamber of Commerce in China. He is talking about Hu Chunhua (胡春华), who at 59 is the youngest of the four vice premiers under Premier Li Keqiang, and is currently in charge of poverty reduction, agriculture and trade. He is considered one of the most promising candidates to succeed the departing Premier Li Keqiang.
Hu’s biggest disadvantage: He is no protégé of state and party leader Xi Jinping. Instead, Hu climbed the ranks of the Communist Youth League, the power base of Xi’s predecessor Hu Jintao – with whom the current strongman is said to not be particularly close with. Hu Jintao supported the younger Hu (no relation), as did the current premier, Li Keqiang.
But if Xi Jinping has to pay a price for securing a third term, Hu will have a good chance. The conciliatory gesture with which Xi demonstratively turned toward Hu Jintao after his opening speech at the 20th Party Congress might indicate this.
It is very likely that Xi will also have to give posts to officials who do not belong to his own, now dominant, CP faction. Otherwise, unrest could grow too strong. And Xi could probably settle for Hu Chunhua as premier. Hu already has a successful track record as vice premier, especially in the fight against poverty, something that was very important to Xi. It is also thanks to him that Xi could announce the end of absolute poverty in China in 2021.
More importantly, the farmer’s son from Hubei is very broadly positioned and has successfully managed provinces that could not be more diverse. This is considered an important criterion for the highest honors.
After an elite education at Peking University and joining the party in 1983 – under the impact of Deng Xiaoping’s opening policy – Hu was assigned to Tibet, China’s poorest province, for five years. Hu’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, was the local CP leader, which marked the beginning of the professional relationship between the two. Hu Chunhua himself belongs to the Tujia minority, which are native to western China and whose language is similar to Tibetan. In 2006, Hu was rewarded for his time in Tibet with the position of head of the Youth League – a post once held by his mentor Hu Jintao.
In 2008, Hu first became vice governor, then governor in Beijing’s neighboring province of Hebei. In 2009, however, he was offered the highest provincial job of party secretary in Inner Mongolia, a province dominated by agriculture and mineral resources and with the longest shared border with Russia. From there, Hu made it to the Politburo at the 2012 Party Congress and simultaneously became party secretary of Guangdong, China’s economically strongest and most advanced province in the deep south. He sparked a surge of innovation there, and made a name for himself as a high-tech economic reformer.
“For his policy record, I would pick Hu,” said Yu Jie, Senior Research Fellow at think tank Chatham House. “He has a very good reputation, whether in the provinces or in his position as vice premier. He’s someone who delivers.”
Beijing also considers Hu Chunhua a skilled crisis manager. In Tibet, he promoted economic development while, from Beijing’s perspective, fighting separatist organizations. He was the governor when Hebei became the epicenter of a huge scandal involving tainted milk. Hu survived the scandal and even received praise in the Party for his efficient handling of the crisis. As Mongolia’s party leader, he quelled violent riots in 2011 that left ten people dead. Local shepherds had revolted against the environmentally destructive mining industry. Hu resolved the conflict with a combination of toughness and a willingness to negotiate. The fight against corruption and the overexploitation of nature were his central themes thereafter.
Hu’s biggest rival is Wang Yang, also vice premier and Hu’s direct predecessor as party secretary in Guangdong. Wang is also considered an economic reformer. He gave Shenzhen the necessary boost to become China’s Silicon Valley. After Xi’s opening speech, Wang was the only vice premier quoted at the party congress as saying that “unity” and “strength” must now be shown. Lately, Wang always expressed noticeable loyalty to Xi.
Still, Hu Chunhua has two decisive advantages. He has experience in very poor and very rich provinces – and above all: He is eight years younger than Wang Yang. So, unlike Wang, he could govern for the next two legislative periods without exceeding the age limit of 70. In this way, Xi Jinping would also send a clear signal that he will lift the next generation to a central position.
One indication that Hu is considered a potential candidate came in July. He was allowed to write a hymn of praise about Xi’s “historic achievements”: He “personally takes command, personally goes to battle and personally supervises the battle,” Hu praised Xi’s fight against poverty.
Hu has repeatedly shown himself to be an internationally-minded economic reformer as well. In his speech to the meeting of China, South Korea, Japan and the ASEAN countries (10+3), for example, Hu called for “more entrepreneurs from around the world to invest in China.” In a speech to the France-China Committee on June 27, Hu even spoke of China’s commitment to “further open up” the country, to further “liberalize and simplify” trade and investment in China In August, in light of the zero-Covid policy, Hu urged CP cadres to once again promote greater consumption and an internationalization of the economy. Foreign trade logistics must run “more smoothly,” he said.
Hu even joked about the EU chamber’s long list of complaints about Chinese economic policy, Reuters quoted chamber chief Wuttke as saying. “Other leaders would not have taken that quite (as) well.” Companies would likely be comfortable with Hu as a premier.
Sinolytics is a European consulting and analysis company specializing in China. It advises European companies on their strategic orientation and concrete business activities in the People’s Republic.
“Both things came together: A whole new life for my country, and a whole new life for me,” Diana Mickevičienė tells about her youth. She was 18 years old when Lithuania declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1990. A historic moment. But the rulers in Moscow tried to forcefully quell Lithuania’s push for freedom on January 13, 1991. Mickevičienė was on the streets of Vilnius that night and had to witness Russian special forces opening fire on her fellow students.
The soldiers were unable to stop Lithuania’s independence, but they left scars that continue to shape Mickevičienė to this day. “Losing freedom and regaining it is part of my story,” says the now 48-year-old. In her newfound freedom, Mickevičienė studied philosophy, history and international relations.
And it qualified her for Lithuania’s diplomatic service, which is looking for fresh talent. For Mickevičienė, diplomacy is her gateway to the world, after a youth spent behind the Iron Curtain. What inspires her is that she can tell Lithuania’s story as a diplomat. The story of Soviet oppression, but also the success story of the young democratic Lithuania.
In 2020, she was appointed ambassador to China. By then, relations between Lithuania and China cooled noticeably. In 2019, Chinese nationalists assaulted peaceful protesters in Vilnius who showed solidarity with the Hong Kong protests. A shock for Lithuania, which celebrated its own independence from Soviet repression on that very day.
After further intimidation attempts, disappointed Lithuania left China’s 17+1 format in 2021. This also made life more difficult for Mickevičienė, as the ambassador is henceforth barred from all official appointments. Soon after, Taiwan opened a representative office under the name “Taiwan Office” in Vilnius. Beijing was furious, expelled Mickevičienė – and blocked almost all exports from Lithuania to China ever since. Things got ugly in Beijing. China downgraded the status of the embassy in Beijing, cut Lithuania off from diplomatic e-mails, simulated a bomb alert in the embassy building and gave staff seven days to leave China.
“In seven days we had to give up our whole lives in China, with families, bank accounts and pets,” recalls Mickevičienė. In the end, Western diplomats escorted the Lithuanian staff to the airport – fearing their Lithuanian colleagues with expiring accreditations would be targeted by the border police. “We understood: Because we are a small country standing up to China, they want to make an example of us,” summarizes Mickevičienė.
And she couples her analysis with a message. The EU needs to position itself better, she says, to ensure that smaller member countries do not fall under the wheels of China’s economic power. The European Commission’s Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI) is a step in the right direction, she believes. “We need instruments that show the other side: The single market is our strength, not our weakness.”
She also has a clear message for Germany: Dependence on the Chinese market deprives Germany of its political breathing room. “The situation with Russian gas should have opened Germany’s eyes,” Mickevičienė said. Jonathan Kaspar Teacher
While the CCP convenes in the Great Hall of the People, the Daxing International Hydrogen Energy Demonstration Zone on the outskirts of the capital is all about future technologies. The zone is part of a “3+N” hydrogen industry ecosystem jointly developed by the cities of Beijing and Tianjin and the province of Hebei (Jing-Jin-Ji). At a presentation, this employee presents a hydrogen hybrid motorcycle concept.
