The 2020s will probably not be relaxing: While China defines its future foreign policy at the 20th Party Congress, Washington presents the US National Security Strategy. This unmistakably puts China in the spotlight as the most dangerous competitor. “If we don’t act with urgency and creativity, our window of opportunity to shape the future of international order will close,” warns Jack Sullivan, Security Advisor to US President Joe Biden.
Meanwhile, US measures such as export controls on microchips are more than pinpricks for Beijing. And the rhetoric, for example, in statements made by Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu on the fringes of the 20th Party Congress clearly reflects this. With a patriotic fighting spirit, he praises China’s combat capabilities, which are constantly being improved and will always be the first line of defense for China’s national interests and dignity. Michael Radunski draws a picture of the delicate situation and also examines what the growing tensions mean for the Europeans.
Far from home, numerous Chinese live in African towns and villages. In some places, they have such a strong presence that they have become the stereotypical image of a foreigner for the local population. When Germany’s best-known Africa correspondent Bartholomaeus Grill arrived in African villages, the children would call out Mzungu or Mlungu – “white man.” Today, he is sometimes greeted with “China, China.” Fabian Peltsch spoke with the Africa expert about China’s role on the continent. Is neo-colonialism the appropriate term for the Chinese approach? Has Europe already lost the “race for Africa”? And what soft tools does China use to secure its influence?
On the sidelines of the 20th Party Congress in Beijing on Thursday, the focus was on China’s foreign policy. While the title of the event in Beijing may be a bit unwieldy (“Under the leadership of Xi Jinping’s ideas on diplomacy, move forward and strive to break new ground for Chinese-style great power diplomacy”), the message was clear: China will continue its increasingly aggressive foreign policy under President Xi Jinping. Or to put it in the words of Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu: To dare to fight is the spiritual character of Chinese diplomacy.
“Chinese diplomacy will continue to display fighting spirit, improve our ability to fight, always stand ready at the frontline to protect our national interest and dignity,” Ma added. “We cannot be swayed by deception, deterred by intimidation, or cowed by pressure.”
Meanwhile, Shen Beili, Deputy Head of the International Department at the CP Central Committee, assured that Beijing will continue to firmly oppose “any form of domination and power politics.” “We oppose a Cold War mentality, interference in the internal affairs of others and double standards,” Shen said.
Shen’s words reflect the siege mentality that is all too readily conjured up in China’s foreign policy circles. The underlying narrative is that evil forces abroad are trying to prevent China’s peaceful rise with all their might. It is no longer necessary to mention where these evil forces can be found. And so Shen and Ma left it at hints on Thursday. Everyone in China knows that statements of this kind are directed primarily at one address: the United States.
Something similar can be observed in Washington. A few days ago, it presented the National Security Strategy – no doubt who is regarded as the most dangerous competitor: China.
For example, the highly anticipated document states unmistakably, “China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to do so.”
In the 48-page National Security Strategy, apart from China, only Russia is given a separate chapter – although this is probably mainly due to the current war against Ukraine. Despite American support for Kyiv, Biden does not want his administration’s focus to be diverted: The current task is indeed to contain Russia, but above all, it will be a matter of beating China in the competition.
The Indo-Pacific is identified as the “front” of the smoldering conflict with the People’s Republic. The preservation of a free Taiwan is also mentioned as a strategic goal.
In his speech at the party congress in Beijing, China’s President Xi Jinping once again stated unambiguously with regard to Taiwan: “The reunification of China must be achieved.” And, “We will never promise to renounce the use of force.”
Shortly thereafter, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken warned that China made a fundamental decision: According to him, the status quo is no longer acceptable to Beijing, which is why the Chinese leadership will push for reunification on a much faster schedule. On Thursday, in an interview with the US think tank Atlantic Council, Michael Gilday, Chief of the US Navy, even spoke of a “2022 or potentially a 2023 window” for China to attack Taiwan.
So far, the US has commonly cited 2027 or 2035 as possibilities. But in recent weeks, fears have increasingly spread that China might go on the offensive much earlier – although there are no authoritative public documents or statements from China that would indicate an accelerated timetable.
One thing is clear: Xi Jinping maneuvered himself into a pressured situation with his offensive statements. Even if he prefers a “peaceful” reunification, China’s military might at some point press for action before Taiwan modernizes its military and the US delivers more weapons to the island.
Similar sentiments can be read in the US National Security Strategy. “If we do not act with urgency and creativity, our window of opportunity to shape the future of international order and tackle shared challenges will close.” In any case, Jack Sullivan, Security Advisor to US President Joe Biden, urges action, saying, “We are in the early years of a decisive decade. The terms of our competition with the People’s Republic of China will be set.”
Change through trade, long thought possible in Europe, is clearly rejected by Washington in its strategy: “Markets alone cannot respond to the rapid pace of technological change, global supply disruptions, nonmarket abuses by the PRC and other actors.”
Accordingly, the USA decided to intervene in the market – in an area that will decisively determine the competition in the information age: the production of semiconductors. After all, whoever designs and manufactures the best chips in the world will also have the best precision weapons, the most efficient factories, and the most intelligent quantum computers.
The USA and its partners are still leading in this area. But China decided on catching up – and America is apparently just as determined to prevent it: With new export control regulations, US citizens will be prohibited from engaging in the development or manufacture of microchips in China without first applying for a special license (China.Table reported).
It’s a move that will hit China hard. Just how hard also became known on Thursday. As the Bloomberg news agency reports, China’s government called a crisis meeting with the affected companies. Memory chip supplier YMTC and supercomputer specialist Dawning were reportedly among those involved in the talks. The managers made it clear that the US ban would mean the demise of the domestic industry, the Bloomberg report said. Moreover, it would make it impossible to technologically decouple the Chinese economy from the US as planned.
These are seminal days in the conflict between the USA and China. While the People’s Republic is defining the future direction of its policy at the CP Party Congress, the USA unequivocally placed its focus on China with the National Security Strategy. And it almost seems as if the signs are currently pointing more toward confrontation than competition: The overtones of Xi’s speech at the party convention were all too grim, while Joe Biden is urged by both the Republicans and his own party to take a hard line toward China.
This also has consequences for Europe and Germany. The administration under Joe Biden is making it clear that it will rely more on its allies again in this dispute. It is a step that had been called for above all in the European capitals. Whether in Paris, Berlin, or London, Donald Trump’s unilateral actions caused resentment everywhere.
But this should be clear to the decision-makers in Berlin: with more say comes more responsibility. But is Europe competent in this matter? Let alone Germany. Europe’s strongest economy still does not have its own China strategy. Being clear about its own goals and interests would be the first step. Beijing and Washington are further along in this respect.
You spent 40 years reporting from Africa as a correspondent for magazines such as ZEIT and SPIEGEL. How did you experience the expansion of the Chinese on the continent personally?
At first, I was surprised that the children in remote villages suddenly no longer called me Mzungu or Mlungu, i.e. “white man,” but instead shouted “China, China.” Since the turn of the millennium, more and more Chinese people appeared. Chinese entrepreneurs, traders, and migrants. And I had the feeling that the white man had now done his duty and was being replaced by the Chinese.
Close cooperation between African countries and the People’s Republic already existed in the 1950s and 1960s. During the Cold War, China also supported African freedom movements, for example in Eritrea. Instead of expansion, could one also speak of continuity when it comes to China and Africa?
Comrade Mao supported Comrade Nyerere in Tanzania. Jonas Savimbi, resistance leader in Angola, had also been to a Chinese school. That was the old solidarity: brother nations must cooperate, similar to what Moscow propagated in African countries. Today, people talk about South-South cooperation and win-win situations. Seen in this light, the ideological guidelines of the Cold War era fit quite well with the new strategy of the Chinese.
In the West, the word neo-colonialism is still often used in this context. As a journalist who has extensively studied African history during the colonial era, how do you assess this terminology? Is China practicing a kind of colonialism in Africa?
I think the word colonialism in connection with China’s expansion is inaccurate; the term and the history of colonialism are misunderstood. The colonial powers conquered, subjugated, and expropriated the colonies, they seized political power. The people had no say at all, they were simply objects of exploitation. China, on the other hand, does not interfere in the internal affairs of partner countries. Beijing cannot be accused of a colonial strategy, but it can be accused of an imperial strategy: An imperialist power strives for world domination. This can be a colonial power, but it can also be an aggressively expanding economic power like China.
Do former colonial powers possibly want to relativize their own colonial crimes with this accusation?
No, I don’t think so. It is the similarities that are striking: When foreign powers hunt for raw materials today, this can certainly be compared with the “race for Africa” in the 19th century. At that time, it was also about mineral resources, agricultural products, and plantation products. China, too, is plundering Africa’s resources. And it sells its cheap goods on the continent. However, China does not see Africa as a risk, as many Western countries and companies do, but as a great opportunity. The Chinese have fewer fears of contact with Africa than we do.
Do you see a new “race for Africa” dawning as a result of China’s massive involvement on the continent, or are we even in the middle of it already?
There is definitely a race for raw materials. Resources are becoming scarcer, competition is becoming fiercer. But this is not only true for Africa, but for the entire global South. Everywhere we see predatory capitalism, which in China is also driven by a communist party.
Has Europe already fallen behind in this respect in Africa?
China has long since overtaken its European and North American trading partners. As I said, Europeans, unlike the Chinese, have reservations about the continent; people still see investment as a high risk. But they also know that Africa has a lot to offer, for example, strategic raw materials and rare earths, which we need above all in the new technologies: Copper, aluminum, columbite, tantalite, coltan, and so on.
According to surveys, many Africans welcome Chinese investment and the Chinese have a better image in Africa than the Europeans.
Chinese involvement has done more economically in 20 years than Western development aid has done in 60 years. We are talking about mega-projects, dams, airports and seaports, mobile phone networks, pipelines, hospitals, and so on. This is seen and also rewarded by the population. Conversely, however, there are also growing reservations because the Chinese often create fewer jobs than hoped for and bring many of their own people with them from China. The second objection I hear more and more often concerns the racism of the Chinese toward black people. Some consider them to be a variety of monkeys. An African once said to me: “We are used to your white racism, we can deal with it. Chinese racism is something new. But in the end, it is no difference.”
What do you think of the narrative that China is luring economically weak countries into a debt trap?
I was recently in Zambia, a country that has a massive debt problem with the Chinese. The government overstretched itself, it has let the Chinese talk it into any number of large projects that turned out to be “white elephants.” Large sports stadiums, for example, stand around uselessly in the countryside. As a result, the mountain of debt has grown. In the meantime, the Chinese have become more cautious. The global crisis brought on by the Ukraine war is also slowing their expansionist drive. China’s Silk Road initiative is no longer running with the same force and speed.
Are such problems and dangers openly discussed?
In some countries, civil society is increasingly mobilizing against Chinese expansion. The effects are also felt in politics: The last president of Zambia was voted out of office amid accusations that he was selling out the country to the Chinese. A change of government has been achieved there. But the debt problem remains.
Is this criticism also felt in other African countries?
Criticism is heard primarily from civil society, but politicians praise cooperation with China because it stabilizes their power. Moreover, the model of the Chinese development dictatorship has become very attractive in countries like Rwanda and Ethiopia. After all, the Western model has not brought the promised prosperity. West is best – that was once the case. Now the motto in many places is: Look East!
What is your assessment of the Chinese military presence in Africa, such as the establishment of a naval base in Djibouti?
China is on its way to becoming the world power of the 21st century. This includes economic expansion, but also securing the empire through military presence. Added to this are the instruments of soft power.
What do you mean by that?
China is rapidly expanding its media in Africa. CCTV established a base in Nairobi, where it employs about 100 people. It cooperates with African media outlets, for example, by providing free programs, mostly propaganda. Nothing negative is to be reported about China, and the news business also looks at its African partners through rose-colored glasses. Confucius Institutes are also expanded throughout Africa. The pace at which the Chinese are proceeding is breathtaking. More and more Africans are studying in China. Exchanges are growing much faster than those with Europe.
What was the most interesting story you could write about the Chinese presence during your time in Africa?
This story appeared in Der Spiegel and was about a Chinese private entrepreneur in Zambia who developed a technology to extract copper residues from old tailings piles. Zhang Mengtao created 1,000 jobs in this way. He was very open as a Chinese interlocutor, which is not common. I didn’t get the feeling that he wanted to hide anything or that he rejected the Western media. Zhang supported the expansion of a local school and donated computers. This man was, in my eyes, one of those Chinese who came to Africa not only to take but also to give. He provided the example of a Chinese entrepreneur in Africa who refutes all clichés and prejudices.
Bartholomäus Grill, born in 1954 in Oberaudorf am Inn, is Germany’s best-known Africa correspondent. He worked as a journalist on the continent for four decades. His reports have appeared in Die Zeit and Der Spiegel. Grill is the author of the bestseller “Ach, Afrika” (2003). His most recent publications are “Wir Herrenmenschen,” a reckoning with German colonial historiography, and “Afrika!” a summary of his work as a correspondent over the past 20 years. Grill lives in Cape Town.
25.10.2022, 02:30 PM (08:30 PM Beijing time)
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The Chancellor’s Office may want to push through the sale of 35 percent of the Port of Hamburg to the Chinese state-owned company Cosco – even though it was rejected by all six ministries involved in the investment review. This results from research by NDR and WDR for the political magazine Panorama.
The potential acquisition must go through an investment review process, as the port is considered critical infrastructure. Leading this process is the Ministry of Economics, which, according to the report, already requested the final rejection of the project in the federal cabinet. It fears too much influence from China. However, the Chancellor’s Office is apparently delaying the process by not putting the issue on the agenda for weeks. Without a timely cabinet decision, the law automatically comes into effect. According to the research, the Chancellor’s Office also instructed the departments involved to find a compromise to be able to approve the deal. When asked by journalists, neither the Economics Ministry nor the Chancellor’s Office wanted to comment.
Cosco is one of the largest shipping companies in the world. The Chinese state-owned company already purchased most of the port of Piraeus. As a result, the Greek container hub developed very positively. The company plans to pay the Hamburg port operator HHLA €65 million for its 35 percent share. The stake could help the Port of Hamburg to strengthen its competitive position with other ports, such as Antwerp and Rotterdam.
China experts, however, are extremely critical of Cosco’s involvement, as the group systematically buys into European ports and is under the direct control of the Chinese state. China scholar Mareike Ohlberg, for example, warns in a book on the subject that China could use economic dependencies to demand political loyalties. “Beijing asserts that it only wants to promote trade by taking over ports, but the People’s Republic is pursuing a long-term plan to build strategic pressure,” Ohlberg says. This is a strategy already being used in Europe as well, she said. (China.Table reported) jul
Reports of a 16-year-old girl who is believed to have died in quarantine are causing a stir in China. The footage, which has not yet been verified independently, shows the teenager gasping for breath in a bunk bed. The incident allegedly happened in a quarantine center in the city of Ruzhou in Henan province. Images of the lifeless body also went viral on China’s social media channels.
In another video, the girl’s alleged aunt explains that her niece died after suffering from fever, cramps, and vomiting for days. The family asked for medical aid but did not receive any. Calls to official agencies went unanswered, she said. “I just want my family and friends to see this video and spread it, so I can find a place for help, and seek justice.”
In the city of Ruzhou, buildings and neighborhoods have been sealed off in recent days. Thousands of people are said to be in quarantine. In Henan, a region of nearly 100 million people, 13 COVID-19 cases were reported on Monday and 26 on Tuesday. fpe
China may soon shorten quarantine for incoming visitors from 10 to 7 days. This was reported by Bloomberg, citing people familiar with the matter.
Currently, travelers to China must isolate for ten days after entering the country, including seven days in a hotel room followed by three days at home. According to Bloomberg, the planned new regulation includes a reduction of the hotel quarantine to two days and five days at home.
The National Health Commission has not yet commented on the report. An inquiry from Reuters went unanswered. rtr/fpe
China’s Consul General in Manchester admitted his direct involvement in a physical altercation with Hong Kong protesters. Zheng Xiyuan admitted to pulling a protester by the hair, dragging him onto consulate grounds along with a handful of consulate staff. The assault has been clearly visible on a video of the incident.
However, Zheng had only been suspected of being involved in last Sunday’s incident because he could not be identified easily with a mask on his face and a cap on his head. After massive demands for clarification from politicians, however, the diplomat shed light on the matter in a letter to the Manchester police.
Later, Zheng defended his behavior in an interview with the TV channel Sky News. He claimed to not have attacked anyone, he had been the peaceful one, the diplomat initially claimed, before the questioner pointed out the hair-pulling. Zheng then stated, “The man insulted my country and my leader (Xi Jinping). It is my duty. I think any diplomat if faced with such kind of behavior should maintain our dignity.”
Shortly before, Zheng Xiyuan tore down two protest posters outside the consulate. They called for the end of the CP dictatorship and a phrase that can be interpreted figuratively as a crude insult. Zheng’s employees also stole a poster showing Xi Jinping. On it, the Chinese president is seen in a suit stained with blood, among other things, while the clothes of his mirror image are spotless. grz
Stock exchange operator Hong Kong Exchanges & Clearing (HKEX) is looking to boost the number of initial public offerings with new rules designed to drastically lower hurdles for technology companies in particular. They are specifically designed to attract the kind of technology companies – especially semiconductor manufacturers – that have become the focus of the trade war between China and the US.
Accordingly, tech IPOs should be possible for companies that demonstrate at least $31 million in annual revenue, about half of what the current rules provide. In addition, companies do not have to meet any revenue requirements as long as they have a market capitalization of more than $1.9 billion and a clear path to reaching $31 million in annual revenue.
The rules will not take effect until December at the earliest, pending public feedback on the proposal from the exchange. HKEX is currently under financial pressure. On Wednesday, the operator reported a 28 percent drop in profits for the first nine months of the year. Trading in stocks slumped during that time, and the number of IPOs has fallen 74 percent compared to the same period last year. mw
The speech of China’s state and party leader Xi Jinping at the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party revealed nothing new. His most telling remarks that revealed his values and true thoughts are from the time when he was the heir apparent to the throne of party general secretary and when he first took that office. A chronological analysis of his statements not only helps to understand Xi himself, but also shows how his mindset gradually became known to the Chinese-speaking world.
“Some well-fed foreigners are so bored that they give uninvited instructions and criticism on our affairs. China exports neither revolution nor hunger nor poverty. Neither do we bother you (the West) and create troubles for you. So why are they making a fuss?” These remarks were made in 2009 when he met with overseas Chinese during his official visit to Mexico in the capacity of China’s vice president.
Xi was tapped as the successor of the then General Secretary Hu Jintao at the 2007 Party congress, set to take power five years later. He had been quiet since that Congress, which was normal. The transition of power to him was still not one hundred percent certain. He was therefore expected to act and speak cautiously to avoid a significant change of opinion about him within the Party.
Chinese politicians generally maintain a very formal style. When it comes to international relations, they would almost always resort to a number of templates with diplomatic, dry wording.
China was on relatively good terms with the West back then. Chinese diplomats would fight back against western criticism on such issues as human rights. But they took generally the defensive position and used much milder words than today.
So Xi’s remarks in 2009 seemed to be taking the offensive out of the blue. Until that point, his values and inclinations were unknown to almost everybody. It was assumed that he would be at least as enlightened as his father, who was also a senior Party official and a liberal ally of Deng Xiaoping. The assumption also stemmed from the fact that Xi had spent most of his political career in the business-friendly coastal provinces of Fujian and Zhejiang.
So when Xi’s scornful candid comment on Western criticism made it to the public, people still believed he did that to please conservatives in the party. People realized years later that those comments were a reflection of his genuinely anti-West mentality. They also heralded the age of China’s Wolf Warrior diplomacy and spiking hostility between the country and the West.
His argument about China not exporting revolution was also a hint that his mind is steeped in the Mao era, when the country attempted to stir communist revolts in developing countries or aided communists there.
“There was not even a single real man.” He was referring to the collapse of the Soviet Union, and bemoaning nobody in the USSR “rose up to fight” for its survival. That was December 2012, two months after he officially came to power as the Party head. Speaking to officials in the wealthy Guangdong Province, he showed his true colors: the communist red.
Although the fall of communist regimes in Europe around 1990 has been a nightmare for Chinese leaders ever since, they rarely talk about it openly.
“A softly spoken sentence by Gorbachev that the communist party of Soviet Union is disbanded and then such a big party was over,” he said with profound regrets. “There was no single real man,” he said, citing a line in a poem from a chaotic 10th century in China lamenting the demise of a small kingdom. (Interestingly, this patriotic-sounding poem was written by an infamous concubine of a playboy king, by the way.)
It is obvious that he sees no problem with the cruel communist rule in the Soviet Union. And he is keen to steer the CPC away from a similar debacle.
By this time, hopes for positive change in China were already history.
“To be fed by the communist party and smash the wok of the Communist Party, this is absolutely not allowed.” He said this at a working conference in 2014 on dissent and criticism towards the Party’s top leadership. He was using a grassroots idiom, which describes an ungrateful person benefitting from something but at the same time damaging it.
Around the same time as this statement, some party and government officials were punished for “unwarranted comments on the central leadership”. “Central leadership” is pretty much a veiled term referring to Xi himself.
The “food-wok” comment quickly spread to non-CCP context and has been used to attack anybody criticizing the party or the government. With that, a totalitarian regime became more totalitarian. His “food-wok” analogy was shocking to many because it painted the party as the patron of the people, instead of a political organization living on money from taxpayers.
By then, Xi’s image as a strongman (or the real man) is fully established within China, and a new wave of emigration and capital flight took off. It took some time for observers outside of China to grasp the true Xi. His soft talks in forums such as Davos promoting globalization mesmerized listeners into believing China would remain a safe, lucrative market.
But then Xi had the constitution amended, laying the foundation for his lifelong rule. Now the whole world recognized who he really was.
“We should have no more weird buildings.” Xi made this remark at a conference for writers and artists in 2014. He lectured them that they should in their works champion “socialist core values,” jargon for the Party line. He was apparently alluding to a 1942 speech by Mao that set the tone for literature and artistic works in Communist China.
But somehow he made this arbitrary side comment about architecture, setting off a scramble in the construction sector for the definition of “weird building”. It is believed Xi referred to several post-modern buildings erected in Beijing and other big cities in the first years of the new millennium. Some of them were designed by renowned international architects such as Zaha Hadid.
Xi’s comments again betrayed his aesthetic taste, which is, to put it politely, very conservative. His talking style also reflected similar taste. He loves to use colloquial expressions, even in formal speeches, and openly encouraged expressions with a common touch.
Xuan Changneng has been appointed Deputy Governor of the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), the Chinese central bank’s website announced Thursday. Born in 1967, Xuan had previously been Deputy Head of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange.
Peter Gierl has been Technology Manager at BASF China since September. Based in Shanghai, he will support the German chemical company in the expansion of its new production sites. Gierl was already on assignment for BASF in China between 2018 and 2020.
Is something changing in your organization? Why not let us know at heads@table.media!
A sea of blossoms meets the splendor of leaves. With all its might, autumn makes everything shine once again – and this lady shines with it. The photo was taken in the Olympic Forest in Beijing, just a few kilometers away from a somewhat less flowery political event.
The 2020s will probably not be relaxing: While China defines its future foreign policy at the 20th Party Congress, Washington presents the US National Security Strategy. This unmistakably puts China in the spotlight as the most dangerous competitor. “If we don’t act with urgency and creativity, our window of opportunity to shape the future of international order will close,” warns Jack Sullivan, Security Advisor to US President Joe Biden.
Meanwhile, US measures such as export controls on microchips are more than pinpricks for Beijing. And the rhetoric, for example, in statements made by Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu on the fringes of the 20th Party Congress clearly reflects this. With a patriotic fighting spirit, he praises China’s combat capabilities, which are constantly being improved and will always be the first line of defense for China’s national interests and dignity. Michael Radunski draws a picture of the delicate situation and also examines what the growing tensions mean for the Europeans.
Far from home, numerous Chinese live in African towns and villages. In some places, they have such a strong presence that they have become the stereotypical image of a foreigner for the local population. When Germany’s best-known Africa correspondent Bartholomaeus Grill arrived in African villages, the children would call out Mzungu or Mlungu – “white man.” Today, he is sometimes greeted with “China, China.” Fabian Peltsch spoke with the Africa expert about China’s role on the continent. Is neo-colonialism the appropriate term for the Chinese approach? Has Europe already lost the “race for Africa”? And what soft tools does China use to secure its influence?
On the sidelines of the 20th Party Congress in Beijing on Thursday, the focus was on China’s foreign policy. While the title of the event in Beijing may be a bit unwieldy (“Under the leadership of Xi Jinping’s ideas on diplomacy, move forward and strive to break new ground for Chinese-style great power diplomacy”), the message was clear: China will continue its increasingly aggressive foreign policy under President Xi Jinping. Or to put it in the words of Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu: To dare to fight is the spiritual character of Chinese diplomacy.
“Chinese diplomacy will continue to display fighting spirit, improve our ability to fight, always stand ready at the frontline to protect our national interest and dignity,” Ma added. “We cannot be swayed by deception, deterred by intimidation, or cowed by pressure.”
Meanwhile, Shen Beili, Deputy Head of the International Department at the CP Central Committee, assured that Beijing will continue to firmly oppose “any form of domination and power politics.” “We oppose a Cold War mentality, interference in the internal affairs of others and double standards,” Shen said.
Shen’s words reflect the siege mentality that is all too readily conjured up in China’s foreign policy circles. The underlying narrative is that evil forces abroad are trying to prevent China’s peaceful rise with all their might. It is no longer necessary to mention where these evil forces can be found. And so Shen and Ma left it at hints on Thursday. Everyone in China knows that statements of this kind are directed primarily at one address: the United States.
Something similar can be observed in Washington. A few days ago, it presented the National Security Strategy – no doubt who is regarded as the most dangerous competitor: China.
For example, the highly anticipated document states unmistakably, “China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to do so.”
In the 48-page National Security Strategy, apart from China, only Russia is given a separate chapter – although this is probably mainly due to the current war against Ukraine. Despite American support for Kyiv, Biden does not want his administration’s focus to be diverted: The current task is indeed to contain Russia, but above all, it will be a matter of beating China in the competition.
The Indo-Pacific is identified as the “front” of the smoldering conflict with the People’s Republic. The preservation of a free Taiwan is also mentioned as a strategic goal.
In his speech at the party congress in Beijing, China’s President Xi Jinping once again stated unambiguously with regard to Taiwan: “The reunification of China must be achieved.” And, “We will never promise to renounce the use of force.”
Shortly thereafter, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken warned that China made a fundamental decision: According to him, the status quo is no longer acceptable to Beijing, which is why the Chinese leadership will push for reunification on a much faster schedule. On Thursday, in an interview with the US think tank Atlantic Council, Michael Gilday, Chief of the US Navy, even spoke of a “2022 or potentially a 2023 window” for China to attack Taiwan.
So far, the US has commonly cited 2027 or 2035 as possibilities. But in recent weeks, fears have increasingly spread that China might go on the offensive much earlier – although there are no authoritative public documents or statements from China that would indicate an accelerated timetable.
One thing is clear: Xi Jinping maneuvered himself into a pressured situation with his offensive statements. Even if he prefers a “peaceful” reunification, China’s military might at some point press for action before Taiwan modernizes its military and the US delivers more weapons to the island.
Similar sentiments can be read in the US National Security Strategy. “If we do not act with urgency and creativity, our window of opportunity to shape the future of international order and tackle shared challenges will close.” In any case, Jack Sullivan, Security Advisor to US President Joe Biden, urges action, saying, “We are in the early years of a decisive decade. The terms of our competition with the People’s Republic of China will be set.”
Change through trade, long thought possible in Europe, is clearly rejected by Washington in its strategy: “Markets alone cannot respond to the rapid pace of technological change, global supply disruptions, nonmarket abuses by the PRC and other actors.”
Accordingly, the USA decided to intervene in the market – in an area that will decisively determine the competition in the information age: the production of semiconductors. After all, whoever designs and manufactures the best chips in the world will also have the best precision weapons, the most efficient factories, and the most intelligent quantum computers.
The USA and its partners are still leading in this area. But China decided on catching up – and America is apparently just as determined to prevent it: With new export control regulations, US citizens will be prohibited from engaging in the development or manufacture of microchips in China without first applying for a special license (China.Table reported).
It’s a move that will hit China hard. Just how hard also became known on Thursday. As the Bloomberg news agency reports, China’s government called a crisis meeting with the affected companies. Memory chip supplier YMTC and supercomputer specialist Dawning were reportedly among those involved in the talks. The managers made it clear that the US ban would mean the demise of the domestic industry, the Bloomberg report said. Moreover, it would make it impossible to technologically decouple the Chinese economy from the US as planned.
These are seminal days in the conflict between the USA and China. While the People’s Republic is defining the future direction of its policy at the CP Party Congress, the USA unequivocally placed its focus on China with the National Security Strategy. And it almost seems as if the signs are currently pointing more toward confrontation than competition: The overtones of Xi’s speech at the party convention were all too grim, while Joe Biden is urged by both the Republicans and his own party to take a hard line toward China.
This also has consequences for Europe and Germany. The administration under Joe Biden is making it clear that it will rely more on its allies again in this dispute. It is a step that had been called for above all in the European capitals. Whether in Paris, Berlin, or London, Donald Trump’s unilateral actions caused resentment everywhere.
But this should be clear to the decision-makers in Berlin: with more say comes more responsibility. But is Europe competent in this matter? Let alone Germany. Europe’s strongest economy still does not have its own China strategy. Being clear about its own goals and interests would be the first step. Beijing and Washington are further along in this respect.
You spent 40 years reporting from Africa as a correspondent for magazines such as ZEIT and SPIEGEL. How did you experience the expansion of the Chinese on the continent personally?
At first, I was surprised that the children in remote villages suddenly no longer called me Mzungu or Mlungu, i.e. “white man,” but instead shouted “China, China.” Since the turn of the millennium, more and more Chinese people appeared. Chinese entrepreneurs, traders, and migrants. And I had the feeling that the white man had now done his duty and was being replaced by the Chinese.
Close cooperation between African countries and the People’s Republic already existed in the 1950s and 1960s. During the Cold War, China also supported African freedom movements, for example in Eritrea. Instead of expansion, could one also speak of continuity when it comes to China and Africa?
Comrade Mao supported Comrade Nyerere in Tanzania. Jonas Savimbi, resistance leader in Angola, had also been to a Chinese school. That was the old solidarity: brother nations must cooperate, similar to what Moscow propagated in African countries. Today, people talk about South-South cooperation and win-win situations. Seen in this light, the ideological guidelines of the Cold War era fit quite well with the new strategy of the Chinese.
In the West, the word neo-colonialism is still often used in this context. As a journalist who has extensively studied African history during the colonial era, how do you assess this terminology? Is China practicing a kind of colonialism in Africa?
I think the word colonialism in connection with China’s expansion is inaccurate; the term and the history of colonialism are misunderstood. The colonial powers conquered, subjugated, and expropriated the colonies, they seized political power. The people had no say at all, they were simply objects of exploitation. China, on the other hand, does not interfere in the internal affairs of partner countries. Beijing cannot be accused of a colonial strategy, but it can be accused of an imperial strategy: An imperialist power strives for world domination. This can be a colonial power, but it can also be an aggressively expanding economic power like China.
Do former colonial powers possibly want to relativize their own colonial crimes with this accusation?
No, I don’t think so. It is the similarities that are striking: When foreign powers hunt for raw materials today, this can certainly be compared with the “race for Africa” in the 19th century. At that time, it was also about mineral resources, agricultural products, and plantation products. China, too, is plundering Africa’s resources. And it sells its cheap goods on the continent. However, China does not see Africa as a risk, as many Western countries and companies do, but as a great opportunity. The Chinese have fewer fears of contact with Africa than we do.
Do you see a new “race for Africa” dawning as a result of China’s massive involvement on the continent, or are we even in the middle of it already?
There is definitely a race for raw materials. Resources are becoming scarcer, competition is becoming fiercer. But this is not only true for Africa, but for the entire global South. Everywhere we see predatory capitalism, which in China is also driven by a communist party.
Has Europe already fallen behind in this respect in Africa?
China has long since overtaken its European and North American trading partners. As I said, Europeans, unlike the Chinese, have reservations about the continent; people still see investment as a high risk. But they also know that Africa has a lot to offer, for example, strategic raw materials and rare earths, which we need above all in the new technologies: Copper, aluminum, columbite, tantalite, coltan, and so on.
According to surveys, many Africans welcome Chinese investment and the Chinese have a better image in Africa than the Europeans.
Chinese involvement has done more economically in 20 years than Western development aid has done in 60 years. We are talking about mega-projects, dams, airports and seaports, mobile phone networks, pipelines, hospitals, and so on. This is seen and also rewarded by the population. Conversely, however, there are also growing reservations because the Chinese often create fewer jobs than hoped for and bring many of their own people with them from China. The second objection I hear more and more often concerns the racism of the Chinese toward black people. Some consider them to be a variety of monkeys. An African once said to me: “We are used to your white racism, we can deal with it. Chinese racism is something new. But in the end, it is no difference.”
What do you think of the narrative that China is luring economically weak countries into a debt trap?
I was recently in Zambia, a country that has a massive debt problem with the Chinese. The government overstretched itself, it has let the Chinese talk it into any number of large projects that turned out to be “white elephants.” Large sports stadiums, for example, stand around uselessly in the countryside. As a result, the mountain of debt has grown. In the meantime, the Chinese have become more cautious. The global crisis brought on by the Ukraine war is also slowing their expansionist drive. China’s Silk Road initiative is no longer running with the same force and speed.
Are such problems and dangers openly discussed?
In some countries, civil society is increasingly mobilizing against Chinese expansion. The effects are also felt in politics: The last president of Zambia was voted out of office amid accusations that he was selling out the country to the Chinese. A change of government has been achieved there. But the debt problem remains.
Is this criticism also felt in other African countries?
Criticism is heard primarily from civil society, but politicians praise cooperation with China because it stabilizes their power. Moreover, the model of the Chinese development dictatorship has become very attractive in countries like Rwanda and Ethiopia. After all, the Western model has not brought the promised prosperity. West is best – that was once the case. Now the motto in many places is: Look East!
What is your assessment of the Chinese military presence in Africa, such as the establishment of a naval base in Djibouti?
China is on its way to becoming the world power of the 21st century. This includes economic expansion, but also securing the empire through military presence. Added to this are the instruments of soft power.
What do you mean by that?
China is rapidly expanding its media in Africa. CCTV established a base in Nairobi, where it employs about 100 people. It cooperates with African media outlets, for example, by providing free programs, mostly propaganda. Nothing negative is to be reported about China, and the news business also looks at its African partners through rose-colored glasses. Confucius Institutes are also expanded throughout Africa. The pace at which the Chinese are proceeding is breathtaking. More and more Africans are studying in China. Exchanges are growing much faster than those with Europe.
What was the most interesting story you could write about the Chinese presence during your time in Africa?
This story appeared in Der Spiegel and was about a Chinese private entrepreneur in Zambia who developed a technology to extract copper residues from old tailings piles. Zhang Mengtao created 1,000 jobs in this way. He was very open as a Chinese interlocutor, which is not common. I didn’t get the feeling that he wanted to hide anything or that he rejected the Western media. Zhang supported the expansion of a local school and donated computers. This man was, in my eyes, one of those Chinese who came to Africa not only to take but also to give. He provided the example of a Chinese entrepreneur in Africa who refutes all clichés and prejudices.
Bartholomäus Grill, born in 1954 in Oberaudorf am Inn, is Germany’s best-known Africa correspondent. He worked as a journalist on the continent for four decades. His reports have appeared in Die Zeit and Der Spiegel. Grill is the author of the bestseller “Ach, Afrika” (2003). His most recent publications are “Wir Herrenmenschen,” a reckoning with German colonial historiography, and “Afrika!” a summary of his work as a correspondent over the past 20 years. Grill lives in Cape Town.
25.10.2022, 02:30 PM (08:30 PM Beijing time)
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The Chancellor’s Office may want to push through the sale of 35 percent of the Port of Hamburg to the Chinese state-owned company Cosco – even though it was rejected by all six ministries involved in the investment review. This results from research by NDR and WDR for the political magazine Panorama.
The potential acquisition must go through an investment review process, as the port is considered critical infrastructure. Leading this process is the Ministry of Economics, which, according to the report, already requested the final rejection of the project in the federal cabinet. It fears too much influence from China. However, the Chancellor’s Office is apparently delaying the process by not putting the issue on the agenda for weeks. Without a timely cabinet decision, the law automatically comes into effect. According to the research, the Chancellor’s Office also instructed the departments involved to find a compromise to be able to approve the deal. When asked by journalists, neither the Economics Ministry nor the Chancellor’s Office wanted to comment.
Cosco is one of the largest shipping companies in the world. The Chinese state-owned company already purchased most of the port of Piraeus. As a result, the Greek container hub developed very positively. The company plans to pay the Hamburg port operator HHLA €65 million for its 35 percent share. The stake could help the Port of Hamburg to strengthen its competitive position with other ports, such as Antwerp and Rotterdam.
China experts, however, are extremely critical of Cosco’s involvement, as the group systematically buys into European ports and is under the direct control of the Chinese state. China scholar Mareike Ohlberg, for example, warns in a book on the subject that China could use economic dependencies to demand political loyalties. “Beijing asserts that it only wants to promote trade by taking over ports, but the People’s Republic is pursuing a long-term plan to build strategic pressure,” Ohlberg says. This is a strategy already being used in Europe as well, she said. (China.Table reported) jul
Reports of a 16-year-old girl who is believed to have died in quarantine are causing a stir in China. The footage, which has not yet been verified independently, shows the teenager gasping for breath in a bunk bed. The incident allegedly happened in a quarantine center in the city of Ruzhou in Henan province. Images of the lifeless body also went viral on China’s social media channels.
In another video, the girl’s alleged aunt explains that her niece died after suffering from fever, cramps, and vomiting for days. The family asked for medical aid but did not receive any. Calls to official agencies went unanswered, she said. “I just want my family and friends to see this video and spread it, so I can find a place for help, and seek justice.”
In the city of Ruzhou, buildings and neighborhoods have been sealed off in recent days. Thousands of people are said to be in quarantine. In Henan, a region of nearly 100 million people, 13 COVID-19 cases were reported on Monday and 26 on Tuesday. fpe
China may soon shorten quarantine for incoming visitors from 10 to 7 days. This was reported by Bloomberg, citing people familiar with the matter.
Currently, travelers to China must isolate for ten days after entering the country, including seven days in a hotel room followed by three days at home. According to Bloomberg, the planned new regulation includes a reduction of the hotel quarantine to two days and five days at home.
The National Health Commission has not yet commented on the report. An inquiry from Reuters went unanswered. rtr/fpe
China’s Consul General in Manchester admitted his direct involvement in a physical altercation with Hong Kong protesters. Zheng Xiyuan admitted to pulling a protester by the hair, dragging him onto consulate grounds along with a handful of consulate staff. The assault has been clearly visible on a video of the incident.
However, Zheng had only been suspected of being involved in last Sunday’s incident because he could not be identified easily with a mask on his face and a cap on his head. After massive demands for clarification from politicians, however, the diplomat shed light on the matter in a letter to the Manchester police.
Later, Zheng defended his behavior in an interview with the TV channel Sky News. He claimed to not have attacked anyone, he had been the peaceful one, the diplomat initially claimed, before the questioner pointed out the hair-pulling. Zheng then stated, “The man insulted my country and my leader (Xi Jinping). It is my duty. I think any diplomat if faced with such kind of behavior should maintain our dignity.”
Shortly before, Zheng Xiyuan tore down two protest posters outside the consulate. They called for the end of the CP dictatorship and a phrase that can be interpreted figuratively as a crude insult. Zheng’s employees also stole a poster showing Xi Jinping. On it, the Chinese president is seen in a suit stained with blood, among other things, while the clothes of his mirror image are spotless. grz
Stock exchange operator Hong Kong Exchanges & Clearing (HKEX) is looking to boost the number of initial public offerings with new rules designed to drastically lower hurdles for technology companies in particular. They are specifically designed to attract the kind of technology companies – especially semiconductor manufacturers – that have become the focus of the trade war between China and the US.
Accordingly, tech IPOs should be possible for companies that demonstrate at least $31 million in annual revenue, about half of what the current rules provide. In addition, companies do not have to meet any revenue requirements as long as they have a market capitalization of more than $1.9 billion and a clear path to reaching $31 million in annual revenue.
The rules will not take effect until December at the earliest, pending public feedback on the proposal from the exchange. HKEX is currently under financial pressure. On Wednesday, the operator reported a 28 percent drop in profits for the first nine months of the year. Trading in stocks slumped during that time, and the number of IPOs has fallen 74 percent compared to the same period last year. mw
The speech of China’s state and party leader Xi Jinping at the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party revealed nothing new. His most telling remarks that revealed his values and true thoughts are from the time when he was the heir apparent to the throne of party general secretary and when he first took that office. A chronological analysis of his statements not only helps to understand Xi himself, but also shows how his mindset gradually became known to the Chinese-speaking world.
“Some well-fed foreigners are so bored that they give uninvited instructions and criticism on our affairs. China exports neither revolution nor hunger nor poverty. Neither do we bother you (the West) and create troubles for you. So why are they making a fuss?” These remarks were made in 2009 when he met with overseas Chinese during his official visit to Mexico in the capacity of China’s vice president.
Xi was tapped as the successor of the then General Secretary Hu Jintao at the 2007 Party congress, set to take power five years later. He had been quiet since that Congress, which was normal. The transition of power to him was still not one hundred percent certain. He was therefore expected to act and speak cautiously to avoid a significant change of opinion about him within the Party.
Chinese politicians generally maintain a very formal style. When it comes to international relations, they would almost always resort to a number of templates with diplomatic, dry wording.
China was on relatively good terms with the West back then. Chinese diplomats would fight back against western criticism on such issues as human rights. But they took generally the defensive position and used much milder words than today.
So Xi’s remarks in 2009 seemed to be taking the offensive out of the blue. Until that point, his values and inclinations were unknown to almost everybody. It was assumed that he would be at least as enlightened as his father, who was also a senior Party official and a liberal ally of Deng Xiaoping. The assumption also stemmed from the fact that Xi had spent most of his political career in the business-friendly coastal provinces of Fujian and Zhejiang.
So when Xi’s scornful candid comment on Western criticism made it to the public, people still believed he did that to please conservatives in the party. People realized years later that those comments were a reflection of his genuinely anti-West mentality. They also heralded the age of China’s Wolf Warrior diplomacy and spiking hostility between the country and the West.
His argument about China not exporting revolution was also a hint that his mind is steeped in the Mao era, when the country attempted to stir communist revolts in developing countries or aided communists there.
“There was not even a single real man.” He was referring to the collapse of the Soviet Union, and bemoaning nobody in the USSR “rose up to fight” for its survival. That was December 2012, two months after he officially came to power as the Party head. Speaking to officials in the wealthy Guangdong Province, he showed his true colors: the communist red.
Although the fall of communist regimes in Europe around 1990 has been a nightmare for Chinese leaders ever since, they rarely talk about it openly.
“A softly spoken sentence by Gorbachev that the communist party of Soviet Union is disbanded and then such a big party was over,” he said with profound regrets. “There was no single real man,” he said, citing a line in a poem from a chaotic 10th century in China lamenting the demise of a small kingdom. (Interestingly, this patriotic-sounding poem was written by an infamous concubine of a playboy king, by the way.)
It is obvious that he sees no problem with the cruel communist rule in the Soviet Union. And he is keen to steer the CPC away from a similar debacle.
By this time, hopes for positive change in China were already history.
“To be fed by the communist party and smash the wok of the Communist Party, this is absolutely not allowed.” He said this at a working conference in 2014 on dissent and criticism towards the Party’s top leadership. He was using a grassroots idiom, which describes an ungrateful person benefitting from something but at the same time damaging it.
Around the same time as this statement, some party and government officials were punished for “unwarranted comments on the central leadership”. “Central leadership” is pretty much a veiled term referring to Xi himself.
The “food-wok” comment quickly spread to non-CCP context and has been used to attack anybody criticizing the party or the government. With that, a totalitarian regime became more totalitarian. His “food-wok” analogy was shocking to many because it painted the party as the patron of the people, instead of a political organization living on money from taxpayers.
By then, Xi’s image as a strongman (or the real man) is fully established within China, and a new wave of emigration and capital flight took off. It took some time for observers outside of China to grasp the true Xi. His soft talks in forums such as Davos promoting globalization mesmerized listeners into believing China would remain a safe, lucrative market.
But then Xi had the constitution amended, laying the foundation for his lifelong rule. Now the whole world recognized who he really was.
“We should have no more weird buildings.” Xi made this remark at a conference for writers and artists in 2014. He lectured them that they should in their works champion “socialist core values,” jargon for the Party line. He was apparently alluding to a 1942 speech by Mao that set the tone for literature and artistic works in Communist China.
But somehow he made this arbitrary side comment about architecture, setting off a scramble in the construction sector for the definition of “weird building”. It is believed Xi referred to several post-modern buildings erected in Beijing and other big cities in the first years of the new millennium. Some of them were designed by renowned international architects such as Zaha Hadid.
Xi’s comments again betrayed his aesthetic taste, which is, to put it politely, very conservative. His talking style also reflected similar taste. He loves to use colloquial expressions, even in formal speeches, and openly encouraged expressions with a common touch.
Xuan Changneng has been appointed Deputy Governor of the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), the Chinese central bank’s website announced Thursday. Born in 1967, Xuan had previously been Deputy Head of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange.
Peter Gierl has been Technology Manager at BASF China since September. Based in Shanghai, he will support the German chemical company in the expansion of its new production sites. Gierl was already on assignment for BASF in China between 2018 and 2020.
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A sea of blossoms meets the splendor of leaves. With all its might, autumn makes everything shine once again – and this lady shines with it. The photo was taken in the Olympic Forest in Beijing, just a few kilometers away from a somewhat less flowery political event.