Are conditions in China worse today than during the Cultural Revolution? Certainly not in the overall picture. In today’s Table.Media interview, Annette Schavan talks about the establishment of diplomatic relations between Germany and China in 1972. Willy Brandt was the German chancellor at the time, and Mao Zedong was the ruler of China. Professors were herded through the streets as enemies of the people, Buddhist temples burned, and society became brutalized. As Chair of the German-Chinese Dialogue Forum, Schavan now urges people to the mindset of the 1970s and to speak with Beijing even when conditions in the country are difficult. Today, things are still easier for us than they were 50 years ago.
This Tuesday marks the official anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. It is understandable, on the one hand, that German politicians did not want to be caught up in the celebratory mood on the Chinese side. After all, China sided with Russia in the wake of the Ukraine invasion, while Germany was dragged into the energy war. On top of that, China’s diplomacy resorted to threats against Taiwan. What is also regrettable is that this anniversary has not been used at all in recent months to open new communication channels. The current crises show how important a minimum of understanding is to avoid fatal miscalculations
Schavan is by no means naive here, by the way. She believes that Beijing also has an obligation to approach Germany. “China must end its strategy of reticence and show the signs of openness of times past,” the former research minister of Germany demands in conversation with Felix Lee. After all, we are still mutually dependent on each other.
Dependence of a more sensitive kind is the subject of today’s analysis. The vast majority of antibiotics used in Germany come from a handful of Chinese manufacturers. In other words, China could cut us off from vital medical supplies, writes Maria Koepf. This gives impetus to demands for subsidies to boost European penicillin production. Greater independence for vital pharmaceuticals would not be dangerous decoupling, but simply common sense.
Ms. Schavan, is there really any reason to celebrate 50 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations, given the current strained ties between China and Germany?
The 50 years have borne much fruit. That is why there are good reasons to look with empathy at our relationship with China. I believe that the attitude once expressed by Helmut Schmidt is correct: We are dealing with a five-thousand-year-old culture. This should encourage us to become even more competent when it comes to China.
How would you describe Germany’s current relationship with China?
The situation is difficult and kind of sad. At the moment, the fruits of past relationships are no longer in focus. This has to do with the pandemic and with the fact that curiosity has been replaced above all by mutual skepticism. In China, the West is defined as a source of manifold dangers. In Germany, China is now perceived as cagey and increasingly aggressive. This is not a good development.
Has China not actually become aggressive under Xi Jinping?
Yes, that is how we feel, and we also experience that more and more issues are classified as “internal affairs” by Chinese interlocutors and are kicked off the agenda. But then dialogue becomes a farce. It is good to discuss joint projects, such as a German-Chinese young academy. But this can only be realized if criticism is tolerated and trust in the dialogue is restored. Otherwise, there is no point in it.
The Chinese say that the USA is to blame for the deteriorating relationship with the West. Under Donald Trump, the US instigated the trade war.
The question of who made what mistakes at what time is not the focus now. I am convinced that, at the beginning of this new decade of our relations, we are faced with central problems for the future that we can only tackle together: Climate protection, biodiversity, the fight against poverty and hunger, future pandemics – these are all issues that occur globally and require global solutions. This also means that China is dependent on us and we are dependent on China.
But what about systemic competition, which is being talked about a lot in Europe lately?
There has always been systemic competition between China and us Europeans; it is nothing new at all. The idea that economic relations have been cultivated up to now and now we are suddenly talking about human rights also ignores reality. The issue of human rights has always played a role in relations. In 2003, in his speech at Nanjing University, Johannes Rau urged that maintaining good economic relations and respecting human rights are not mutually exclusive. Angela Merkel welcomed the Dalai Lama right at the beginning of her term in office. She was harshly criticized for this by her predecessor, Gerhard Schroeder. Merkel has always sent clear signals during her many visits to China. And we always knew: Of course, dealing with China is a systemic competition and will continue to be so. At the same time, this competition includes a mutual curiosity about the great differences between the cultures.
But if the issue is not just the violation of human rights in China, but also the aggressive behavior displayed by the communist leadership towards Taiwan and the neighboring states in the South China Sea – should Germany not take a very clear position against China?
If China’s self-confidence leads to aggression, then it must be clearly named as such. But I would caution against slamming the doors completely shut in the face of current conflicts. Germany and Europe will require a great deal of perseverance to shape their relations with China. China has more understanding of Germany and Europe than the other way around. We have to work on this. We need to think of new ways of exchange. Agreements are needed on how dialog forums can work in the future. Relationships and trust are quickly ruined. It then takes a lot of time to rebuild. We should not carelessly squander what relationships we have.
The current German government more or less accuses the previous government, including you, of being too naive toward China. There was a lack of strategy.
Naiveté means not knowing who you are dealing with. That was always very clear to us with regard to China. Helmut Schmidt was already aware of this. There were important strategic approaches: The Ministry of Economy developed an innovation strategy in response to China’s technological rise. As the Ministry of Research, we very clearly expressed at an early stage the important issues for the future on which we wanted and needed to cooperate closely with China. As early as 1978, an intergovernmental agreement on scientific and technological cooperation was signed between Germany and China. This formed the basis for a success story that includes numerous research collaborations as well as exchanges of students and scientists. I would say that this exchange was the foundation of our two countries’ relations, from which both sides have greatly benefited. Sometimes scientific cooperation can be pioneering. And that could also be an important bridge in politically challenging times like these.
But there is even friction in the academic exchange. German universities have come under fire for cooperating with Confucius Institutes, which offer courses that do not allow any critical discussion of China-related topics. In addition, there have been attempts to exert political influence on German institutes. On the other hand, the climate at some German universities is so heated that anyone who has anything to do with China is accused of venality.
When relationships have reached a point where everything is under general suspicion, either a phase of differentiation will follow automatically. After all, you cannot get worked up about it endlessly. Or cooperation will end. I can only plead to not let it get that far. But that means that China must end its strategy of closed-mindedness and show signs of opening up, like it did in the past. Whether this will happen in the foreseeable future, I do not dare to predict.
The work of German foundations, which were also pioneers for decades, has also become difficult.
The same thing applies to foundations as it does to scientific organizations. If they get the impression that real work is no longer possible, the verve with which they were active in China will recede. And in the process, a lot of knowledge and exchange would be lost as well. On the other hand, what Pope Francis recently said probably also applies: Whoever talks to China must think in terms of centuries. I would agree with that. A long breath is always important in diplomatic relations and in politics, but it is particularly important with China.
You have emphasized how right you think it is that the Vatican sticks to its policy of rapprochement with Beijing. Some call it a betrayal of the victims, given the current brutal religious persecutions.
Yes, the news about the treatment of religions in China is depressing. This has nothing to do with religious freedom. Since the turn of the millennium, the Vatican has been trying to talk to Beijing. I share the view that a global church cannot be indifferent to the situation of millions of Christians in China. China currently responds brusquely to these efforts. The re-education of the Uyghurs is called a measure of terror prevention. The work of Christian orders is being restricted. This makes it all the more important to work for any kind of improvement. Perhaps a key to future dialogues even lies in the conversation about religious freedom.
What do you mean?
Religious freedom is a universal human right and a source of people’s sense of freedom. To dismiss it as something Western fails to recognize the power of religions. What is now being suppressed remains for many millions of Chinese the source of their hope and values, even to the point of martyrdom. As grim as it may currently seem, the establishment of diplomatic relations between Germany and China was initiated by Helmut Schmidt in 1972, in the midst of the Cultural Revolution. The news out of China at the time was deeply irritating. Nevertheless, Schmidt dared to enter into what would prove to be an often inspiring, highly complicated and yet extremely significant relationship over the following 50 years.
Conservative politician Annette Schavan (CDU) served as Minister of Education and Cultural Affairs in the German state of Baden-Wurttemberg between 1995 and 2005, and as Federal Minister of Education and Research between 2005 and 2013. She then served as German ambassador to the Vatican. She currently chairs the Sino-German Dialogue Forum. The governments of the two countries established this format in 2005 following an agreement to this effect between Wen Jiabao and Angela Merkel to draw up “proposals for the further development of bilateral relations”.
Perkuhn’s path to China first leads via Mexico. There, she worked as an au pair in 2003. In the southern Mexican province of Oaxaca, a play about Pacific sea voyages sparks her interest in East Asia. She is left with strong impressions; in Germany, Perkuhn digs through the descriptions of the study courses and decides on sinology – and with it, “for the greatest challenge and the unknown.” But is sinology also a decision for China? No, says Perkuhn. “Sinology is a decision for the Chinese cultural region.”
After the turn of the millennium, interest in this cultural region rose sharply in Germany, mainly due to increasing economic linkages. But interest in China does not translate directly into China expertise. Perkuhn recognized this and wants to contribute to a better foundation for political, economic and scientific assessments.
This is more important today than ever before, as the current supply chain problems show. China often confronts us with difficult decisions. Without solar cells from Xinjiang, for example, Germany could not master the energy transition. “Therefore, it is not about the Zhongguotong (China expert) who knows how to order food, but about understanding what is said in China and being able to connect the dots.”
Another problem area when it comes to China expertise is Taiwan. Perkuhn criticizes that knowledge about Taiwan is not given the attention it deserves. Yet Germany could learn a lot from Taiwan’s successful handling of the pandemicrom its digital democracy.
Perkuhn is now in the best position to make a difference in this regard: Since the beginning of 2022, she has been heading the Taiwan as a Pioneer (TAP) project. Docked at three universities and funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research, TAP aims to close the gap left by Mainland-focused sinology.
Perkuhn is also a non-resident fellow at Kiel University Institute for Security Policy. And thus, in times of growing tensions between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan, high in demand. For Perkuhn, it is important to stress that this is not just an internal Chinese conflict. Instead, Taiwan lies on the global conflict line between autocracy and democracy and is consequently in the middle of the race for “innovation-technological superiority.” The question is who will have the better system in the long run. China’s technology dictatorship or Taiwan’s “participatory use of technology”? The two systems could not be any more different. And China feels threatened by the Taiwanese counter model, Perkuhn believes.
But does that have to lead to war? Not necessarily. However, she stresses, “if there is a majority in China that says we’re going to go in there now and solve the problem in the shortest possible time, then it could result in war. But that majority doesn’t exist in China yet.” To keep it that way, Germany should also continue to reach out to Taiwan and at the same time try to appease China’s hardliners, Perkuhn urges. In the spirit of networked China expertise, she is now looking eagerly to the upcoming 20th Party Congress and hopes that even after that, there will only be threatening gestures toward Taiwan. Jonathan Lehrer
So To Speak – Episode 72, 10.10.2022
不明觉厉
bùmíngjuélì
When learning Chinese, the classical four-part proverbs – the so-called Chengyu (成语 chéngyǔ) – open up a fascinating new universe. In just four inconspicuous characters, these linguistically pocket-sized aphorisms summarize profound wisdom and empirical values that have been passed down in China for centuries. The only catch: Chengyu can often only be understood by those who also know the story behind the saying. Or would you know right away what is meant when a Chinese acquaintance suddenly states out of the blue when something goes wrong: “An old man loses his horse at the border” (塞翁失马 sàiwēngshīmǎ “border area – old man – lose horse”).
No clue what that means? Understandable. Because behind many of these “quatrains” is an explanatory anecdote, or sometimes even a longer legend. In China, most elementary school students know these. In the case of the aforementioned saying, they would tell us the story of an old man from the border region of two neighboring kingdoms. In TikTok tempo, the story roughly goes like this: The old man’s horse runs away across the border, but later returns with a fellow horse in tow (and thus profitable). Later, this horse throws off the old man’s son while he is on its back, who breaks his bones, which, however, later saves him from having to take part in a deadly battle. “An old man loses his horse at the border” can thus be translated roughly as “who knows what it’s good for” – provided one knows the associated story.
The unique thing is, as already hinted: The anecdotes behind popular phrases like this are common knowledge for Chinese. The corresponding canon of stories is already taught during childhood. The character quartets are thus, so to speak, only the delicate, shimmering blossoms that float on the linguistic surface. Underneath, however, there is a dense information network – invisible to us foreigners at first – that is automatically activated in Chinese native speakers’ minds as soon as they hear them. On the one hand, this shows how deeply rooted native Chinese speakers are in their cultural heritage. On the other hand, the Chengyu also demonstrates to some degree the context sensitivity of Mandarin. China is known to be a highly contextual culture, which requires a certain degree of background information and situational context to fully understand. Chengyu plays its part in this as well.
Those who now believe that such aphorisms are only for intellectuals and linguists and are on the verge of extinction in the digital age are mistaken. On the contrary: In our world of instant messaging, the Internet, and social media, the four-part aphorisms not only live on, but new ones are even emerging! In recent years, China’s online community repeatedly created new words in traditional linguistic guise, which – following the example of the Chengyu – compress longer sentences, memes, or situations as four-character inside sayings.
不明觉厉 bùmíngjuélì is one example of such new “online chengyu”. Said idiom was born in the expanses of the Web, but has since passed into common usage. It is the four-character essence of a long saying, even an entire scene from the Hong Kong comedy classic “The God of Cookery” (食神 shí shén). Loosely paraphrased, it says, “I have no clue (what someone is doing or saying), but it seems awesome.” In Chinese: 虽然不明白，但是觉得很厉害 (Suīrán bù míngbai, dànshì juéde hěn lìhai). And the netizens condensed this sentence to the four characters 不明觉厉.
Depending on the context, the new hipster chengyu has two interpretations: On the one hand, it can express admiration for the statements or actions of true experts (“I don’t quite understand what you’re saying, but I’m in awe of your skill.”). Another way is for the speaker to use it to poke fun at “wannabe experts” (“I have no idea what that is supposed to be/what you’re getting at, but it sounds totally impressive/at least looks impressive.”).
Verena Menzel runs the online language school New Chinese in Beijing.
Are conditions in China worse today than during the Cultural Revolution? Certainly not in the overall picture. In today’s Table.Media interview, Annette Schavan talks about the establishment of diplomatic relations between Germany and China in 1972. Willy Brandt was the German chancellor at the time, and Mao Zedong was the ruler of China. Professors were herded through the streets as enemies of the people, Buddhist temples burned, and society became brutalized. As Chair of the German-Chinese Dialogue Forum, Schavan now urges people to the mindset of the 1970s and to speak with Beijing even when conditions in the country are difficult. Today, things are still easier for us than they were 50 years ago.
This Tuesday marks the official anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. It is understandable, on the one hand, that German politicians did not want to be caught up in the celebratory mood on the Chinese side. After all, China sided with Russia in the wake of the Ukraine invasion, while Germany was dragged into the energy war. On top of that, China’s diplomacy resorted to threats against Taiwan. What is also regrettable is that this anniversary has not been used at all in recent months to open new communication channels. The current crises show how important a minimum of understanding is to avoid fatal miscalculations
Schavan is by no means naive here, by the way. She believes that Beijing also has an obligation to approach Germany. “China must end its strategy of reticence and show the signs of openness of times past,” the former research minister of Germany demands in conversation with Felix Lee. After all, we are still mutually dependent on each other.
Dependence of a more sensitive kind is the subject of today’s analysis. The vast majority of antibiotics used in Germany come from a handful of Chinese manufacturers. In other words, China could cut us off from vital medical supplies, writes Maria Koepf. This gives impetus to demands for subsidies to boost European penicillin production. Greater independence for vital pharmaceuticals would not be dangerous decoupling, but simply common sense.
Ms. Schavan, is there really any reason to celebrate 50 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations, given the current strained ties between China and Germany?
The 50 years have borne much fruit. That is why there are good reasons to look with empathy at our relationship with China. I believe that the attitude once expressed by Helmut Schmidt is correct: We are dealing with a five-thousand-year-old culture. This should encourage us to become even more competent when it comes to China.
How would you describe Germany’s current relationship with China?
The situation is difficult and kind of sad. At the moment, the fruits of past relationships are no longer in focus. This has to do with the pandemic and with the fact that curiosity has been replaced above all by mutual skepticism. In China, the West is defined as a source of manifold dangers. In Germany, China is now perceived as cagey and increasingly aggressive. This is not a good development.
Has China not actually become aggressive under Xi Jinping?
Yes, that is how we feel, and we also experience that more and more issues are classified as “internal affairs” by Chinese interlocutors and are kicked off the agenda. But then dialogue becomes a farce. It is good to discuss joint projects, such as a German-Chinese young academy. But this can only be realized if criticism is tolerated and trust in the dialogue is restored. Otherwise, there is no point in it.
The Chinese say that the USA is to blame for the deteriorating relationship with the West. Under Donald Trump, the US instigated the trade war.
The question of who made what mistakes at what time is not the focus now. I am convinced that, at the beginning of this new decade of our relations, we are faced with central problems for the future that we can only tackle together: Climate protection, biodiversity, the fight against poverty and hunger, future pandemics – these are all issues that occur globally and require global solutions. This also means that China is dependent on us and we are dependent on China.
But what about systemic competition, which is being talked about a lot in Europe lately?
There has always been systemic competition between China and us Europeans; it is nothing new at all. The idea that economic relations have been cultivated up to now and now we are suddenly talking about human rights also ignores reality. The issue of human rights has always played a role in relations. In 2003, in his speech at Nanjing University, Johannes Rau urged that maintaining good economic relations and respecting human rights are not mutually exclusive. Angela Merkel welcomed the Dalai Lama right at the beginning of her term in office. She was harshly criticized for this by her predecessor, Gerhard Schroeder. Merkel has always sent clear signals during her many visits to China. And we always knew: Of course, dealing with China is a systemic competition and will continue to be so. At the same time, this competition includes a mutual curiosity about the great differences between the cultures.
But if the issue is not just the violation of human rights in China, but also the aggressive behavior displayed by the communist leadership towards Taiwan and the neighboring states in the South China Sea – should Germany not take a very clear position against China?
If China’s self-confidence leads to aggression, then it must be clearly named as such. But I would caution against slamming the doors completely shut in the face of current conflicts. Germany and Europe will require a great deal of perseverance to shape their relations with China. China has more understanding of Germany and Europe than the other way around. We have to work on this. We need to think of new ways of exchange. Agreements are needed on how dialog forums can work in the future. Relationships and trust are quickly ruined. It then takes a lot of time to rebuild. We should not carelessly squander what relationships we have.
The current German government more or less accuses the previous government, including you, of being too naive toward China. There was a lack of strategy.
Naiveté means not knowing who you are dealing with. That was always very clear to us with regard to China. Helmut Schmidt was already aware of this. There were important strategic approaches: The Ministry of Economy developed an innovation strategy in response to China’s technological rise. As the Ministry of Research, we very clearly expressed at an early stage the important issues for the future on which we wanted and needed to cooperate closely with China. As early as 1978, an intergovernmental agreement on scientific and technological cooperation was signed between Germany and China. This formed the basis for a success story that includes numerous research collaborations as well as exchanges of students and scientists. I would say that this exchange was the foundation of our two countries’ relations, from which both sides have greatly benefited. Sometimes scientific cooperation can be pioneering. And that could also be an important bridge in politically challenging times like these.
But there is even friction in the academic exchange. German universities have come under fire for cooperating with Confucius Institutes, which offer courses that do not allow any critical discussion of China-related topics. In addition, there have been attempts to exert political influence on German institutes. On the other hand, the climate at some German universities is so heated that anyone who has anything to do with China is accused of venality.
When relationships have reached a point where everything is under general suspicion, either a phase of differentiation will follow automatically. After all, you cannot get worked up about it endlessly. Or cooperation will end. I can only plead to not let it get that far. But that means that China must end its strategy of closed-mindedness and show signs of opening up, like it did in the past. Whether this will happen in the foreseeable future, I do not dare to predict.
The work of German foundations, which were also pioneers for decades, has also become difficult.
The same thing applies to foundations as it does to scientific organizations. If they get the impression that real work is no longer possible, the verve with which they were active in China will recede. And in the process, a lot of knowledge and exchange would be lost as well. On the other hand, what Pope Francis recently said probably also applies: Whoever talks to China must think in terms of centuries. I would agree with that. A long breath is always important in diplomatic relations and in politics, but it is particularly important with China.
You have emphasized how right you think it is that the Vatican sticks to its policy of rapprochement with Beijing. Some call it a betrayal of the victims, given the current brutal religious persecutions.
Yes, the news about the treatment of religions in China is depressing. This has nothing to do with religious freedom. Since the turn of the millennium, the Vatican has been trying to talk to Beijing. I share the view that a global church cannot be indifferent to the situation of millions of Christians in China. China currently responds brusquely to these efforts. The re-education of the Uyghurs is called a measure of terror prevention. The work of Christian orders is being restricted. This makes it all the more important to work for any kind of improvement. Perhaps a key to future dialogues even lies in the conversation about religious freedom.
What do you mean?
Religious freedom is a universal human right and a source of people’s sense of freedom. To dismiss it as something Western fails to recognize the power of religions. What is now being suppressed remains for many millions of Chinese the source of their hope and values, even to the point of martyrdom. As grim as it may currently seem, the establishment of diplomatic relations between Germany and China was initiated by Helmut Schmidt in 1972, in the midst of the Cultural Revolution. The news out of China at the time was deeply irritating. Nevertheless, Schmidt dared to enter into what would prove to be an often inspiring, highly complicated and yet extremely significant relationship over the following 50 years.
Conservative politician Annette Schavan (CDU) served as Minister of Education and Cultural Affairs in the German state of Baden-Wurttemberg between 1995 and 2005, and as Federal Minister of Education and Research between 2005 and 2013. She then served as German ambassador to the Vatican. She currently chairs the Sino-German Dialogue Forum. The governments of the two countries established this format in 2005 following an agreement to this effect between Wen Jiabao and Angela Merkel to draw up “proposals for the further development of bilateral relations”.
Perkuhn’s path to China first leads via Mexico. There, she worked as an au pair in 2003. In the southern Mexican province of Oaxaca, a play about Pacific sea voyages sparks her interest in East Asia. She is left with strong impressions; in Germany, Perkuhn digs through the descriptions of the study courses and decides on sinology – and with it, “for the greatest challenge and the unknown.” But is sinology also a decision for China? No, says Perkuhn. “Sinology is a decision for the Chinese cultural region.”
After the turn of the millennium, interest in this cultural region rose sharply in Germany, mainly due to increasing economic linkages. But interest in China does not translate directly into China expertise. Perkuhn recognized this and wants to contribute to a better foundation for political, economic and scientific assessments.
This is more important today than ever before, as the current supply chain problems show. China often confronts us with difficult decisions. Without solar cells from Xinjiang, for example, Germany could not master the energy transition. “Therefore, it is not about the Zhongguotong (China expert) who knows how to order food, but about understanding what is said in China and being able to connect the dots.”
Another problem area when it comes to China expertise is Taiwan. Perkuhn criticizes that knowledge about Taiwan is not given the attention it deserves. Yet Germany could learn a lot from Taiwan’s successful handling of the pandemicrom its digital democracy.
Perkuhn is now in the best position to make a difference in this regard: Since the beginning of 2022, she has been heading the Taiwan as a Pioneer (TAP) project. Docked at three universities and funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research, TAP aims to close the gap left by Mainland-focused sinology.
Perkuhn is also a non-resident fellow at Kiel University Institute for Security Policy. And thus, in times of growing tensions between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan, high in demand. For Perkuhn, it is important to stress that this is not just an internal Chinese conflict. Instead, Taiwan lies on the global conflict line between autocracy and democracy and is consequently in the middle of the race for “innovation-technological superiority.” The question is who will have the better system in the long run. China’s technology dictatorship or Taiwan’s “participatory use of technology”? The two systems could not be any more different. And China feels threatened by the Taiwanese counter model, Perkuhn believes.
But does that have to lead to war? Not necessarily. However, she stresses, “if there is a majority in China that says we’re going to go in there now and solve the problem in the shortest possible time, then it could result in war. But that majority doesn’t exist in China yet.” To keep it that way, Germany should also continue to reach out to Taiwan and at the same time try to appease China’s hardliners, Perkuhn urges. In the spirit of networked China expertise, she is now looking eagerly to the upcoming 20th Party Congress and hopes that even after that, there will only be threatening gestures toward Taiwan. Jonathan Lehrer
So To Speak – Episode 72, 10.10.2022
不明觉厉
bùmíngjuélì
When learning Chinese, the classical four-part proverbs – the so-called Chengyu (成语 chéngyǔ) – open up a fascinating new universe. In just four inconspicuous characters, these linguistically pocket-sized aphorisms summarize profound wisdom and empirical values that have been passed down in China for centuries. The only catch: Chengyu can often only be understood by those who also know the story behind the saying. Or would you know right away what is meant when a Chinese acquaintance suddenly states out of the blue when something goes wrong: “An old man loses his horse at the border” (塞翁失马 sàiwēngshīmǎ “border area – old man – lose horse”).
No clue what that means? Understandable. Because behind many of these “quatrains” is an explanatory anecdote, or sometimes even a longer legend. In China, most elementary school students know these. In the case of the aforementioned saying, they would tell us the story of an old man from the border region of two neighboring kingdoms. In TikTok tempo, the story roughly goes like this: The old man’s horse runs away across the border, but later returns with a fellow horse in tow (and thus profitable). Later, this horse throws off the old man’s son while he is on its back, who breaks his bones, which, however, later saves him from having to take part in a deadly battle. “An old man loses his horse at the border” can thus be translated roughly as “who knows what it’s good for” – provided one knows the associated story.
The unique thing is, as already hinted: The anecdotes behind popular phrases like this are common knowledge for Chinese. The corresponding canon of stories is already taught during childhood. The character quartets are thus, so to speak, only the delicate, shimmering blossoms that float on the linguistic surface. Underneath, however, there is a dense information network – invisible to us foreigners at first – that is automatically activated in Chinese native speakers’ minds as soon as they hear them. On the one hand, this shows how deeply rooted native Chinese speakers are in their cultural heritage. On the other hand, the Chengyu also demonstrates to some degree the context sensitivity of Mandarin. China is known to be a highly contextual culture, which requires a certain degree of background information and situational context to fully understand. Chengyu plays its part in this as well.
Those who now believe that such aphorisms are only for intellectuals and linguists and are on the verge of extinction in the digital age are mistaken. On the contrary: In our world of instant messaging, the Internet, and social media, the four-part aphorisms not only live on, but new ones are even emerging! In recent years, China’s online community repeatedly created new words in traditional linguistic guise, which – following the example of the Chengyu – compress longer sentences, memes, or situations as four-character inside sayings.
不明觉厉 bùmíngjuélì is one example of such new “online chengyu”. Said idiom was born in the expanses of the Web, but has since passed into common usage. It is the four-character essence of a long saying, even an entire scene from the Hong Kong comedy classic “The God of Cookery” (食神 shí shén). Loosely paraphrased, it says, “I have no clue (what someone is doing or saying), but it seems awesome.” In Chinese: 虽然不明白，但是觉得很厉害 (Suīrán bù míngbai, dànshì juéde hěn lìhai). And the netizens condensed this sentence to the four characters 不明觉厉.
Depending on the context, the new hipster chengyu has two interpretations: On the one hand, it can express admiration for the statements or actions of true experts (“I don’t quite understand what you’re saying, but I’m in awe of your skill.”). Another way is for the speaker to use it to poke fun at “wannabe experts” (“I have no idea what that is supposed to be/what you’re getting at, but it sounds totally impressive/at least looks impressive.”).
Verena Menzel runs the online language school New Chinese in Beijing.
