German politicians have often denounced the massive interventions of the Beijing central government in Hong Kong, the security law, and the arbitrary arrests – sometimes louder, sometimes quieter. But how consistent are they in the end? Activist Glacier Kwong demands: Talking is not enough. Germany must become active. Finn Mayer-Kuckuk explores which means can be used realistically.
Not enough Covid vaccine in Europe – that is the central topic these days. Marcel Grzanna describes Chinese vaccine diplomacy and concludes: While we are arguing, Beijing is securing market shares and political influence worldwide.
That the construction of coal-fired power plants runs counter to global efforts to reduce carbon emissions is a truism. Nico Beckert examines the role Chinese investments are playing globally.
Communication requires understanding – as each of us knows. I would like to recommend today’s Heads about Verena Menzel.
Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vucic and the Chinese ambassador to the country took advantage of the arrival of one million vaccine doses from China at Belgrade airport to publicly close ranks. Vucic stressed gratitude and friendship with China and his conviction that the Chinese vaccine is safe. For his part, Ambassador Chen Bo took the opportunity to outline China’s role in spearheading the supply of vaccines to the world: A classic win-win situation according to Beijing’s usual rhetoric.
When two fancy themselves winners, the question remains whether there is also a loser and who that might be. Supplying parts of the world with the Covid vaccine is important to the People’s Republic of China in advancing its geopolitical interests. Apart from the health of millions of Serbs, Beijing also cares about its own image and growing influence in the world. And where China gains influence through vaccine diplomacy, another actor inevitably loses ground. In this case, the European Union, which regularly criticizes Serbia’s President Vucic. Accordingly, the People’s Republic is now perceived positively in Serbia, while the EU, which the country would actually like to join one day, is portrayed as an unreliable partner.
Judging by the bare numbers of vaccine doses, Europe has poor arguments. Only a few tens of thousands have reached Serbia from the continent so far, while the People’s Republic has already delivered seven figures. Just under a year ago, Beijing managed to turn the Covid crisis in Serbia in its favor by sending aid supplies and specialists. Huge posters in Belgrade’s city center as “thanks to Brother Xi (Jinping)” symbolized Beijing’s stage victory and apparently made many Serbs forget that the EU has announced a billion-euro investment package for the Western Balkans region, from which Serbia is likely to benefit massively. The financial volume of European aid to Serbia is many times greater than the Chinese volume.
Even the higher quality of European vaccines apparently plays no role in the perception of many Serbs, also because the EU refrains from large justification campaigns. For Beijing, this is a ready-made meal that satisfies its hunger for recognition in the world as a leading power. The strategy is also being used in other parts of the world: In Southeast Asia, Central Asia, South America or Africa, China continues to crank up its vaccine diplomacy. But not only there. Beijing has long since looked to Hungary, and thus right into the middle of the EU, to expand its benevolent network of relations. An extra portion of vitamin B in the vaccine, so to speak.
China also agreed with the government in Budapest to supply vaccines. The agreement is still at an early stage, as Ivana Karásková, founder of the China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe (Choice) network, explained to China.Table. But she is not surprised that Central and Eastern European countries are open to vaccines from China and Russia. She said, “Let’s face it: There is not enough vaccine at the moment, and access is going very slowly.” She said that Hungary, a generally EU-critical country, is thinking aloud about the vaccine pact with China is no surprise.
But it is an alarm signal for EU diplomats. After their experience with China’s masked diplomacy, Europeans have become more attentive and aware of their own weakness. “The Chinese are quick to market small things big. We, as Team Europe, need to emphasize that we can do things better. Ad hoc aid from Europe must not be bilateral, but should be bundled through international channels and designated as European aid,” says a German diplomat stationed in Africa, who admits to following Chinese charm offensives with some concern. But he also stresses that “the Africans are not so easy to wrap around one’s finger”.
Nevertheless, Egypt, for example, has been vaccinating with vaccines from the Chinese manufacturer Sinopharm since the weekend. “I guarantee the safety and efficacy of the Chinese vaccine. I believe Sinopharm vaccine is one of the safest,” Mohamed Ahmed Ali, a Professor of virology at Egypt’s National Research Center, told China’s Xinhua news agency. Ali is a member of the committee that recommended the purchase of Sinopharm’s vaccine.
Chinese media report that at least 20 countries worldwide have purchased the Chinese vaccine. More than 40 are said to have made inquiries, partly because supplies from manufacturers in Europe or the USA cannot be obtained as quickly as from the People’s Republic, which has issued approvals on a fast-track basis. To underpin the credibility of the substance, the Turkish Health Minister Fahrettin Koca, the Indonesian President Joko Widodo, and the President of Seychelles, Wavel Ramkalawan, for example, had themselves injected live on television. In the Emirates, Bahrain, Jordan or Pakistan, the Chinese vaccine has already been authorized for its administration. China has promised help to other states in Southeast Asia, such as Bangladesh and the Philippines.
Vaccine diplomacy is also starting in Latin America. Beijing promised the states of the continent and the Caribbean to grant loans amounting to $1 billion to the importing states so that they could also settle their accounts with Chinese companies. According to diplomatic circles, Germany and Europe, on the other hand, wanted to avoid a form of patronage diplomacy.
Vaccine diplomacy is flanked by allegations in Chinese state media that deaths related to Covid-19 vaccines are being covered up in Europe. The reporting aims to discredit vaccines from Biontech or Pfizer, although clinical studies have proven the higher reliability of Western vaccines. Beijing Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian circulated a tweet on his Twitter channel in which the author questioned why Western media did not follow up on the deaths of ten people vaccinated in Germany. Scientists had formulated the increased risk of the pre-infected as the reason for their deaths.
Vaccine diplomacy could also get interesting in light of the EU’s simmering dispute with British-Swedish drugmaker AstraZeneca: Monday night, Brussels called for tighter controls on vaccine exports after top officials indirectly accused the UK-based company of cutting supplies destined for EU nations. Doses were to be sold at higher prices to other nations. “The EU wants to know exactly which doses have been produced by AstraZeneca so far, and if, or to whom, they have been delivered,” EU Health Commissioner Stella Kyriakides said. The export mechanism now proposed by the EU Commission requires each company to disclose in advance planned international shipments of EU-manufactured vaccine doses. Another high-level meeting on the case is scheduled for today. with Amelie Richter
The Chinese state cracks down on Hong Kong – hardly anything is left of the free system. That’s why the democratic movement’s expectations of Germany are rising: Its representatives hope for clear words and action from Berlin. On Monday, an envoy of the Hong Kong activists presented concrete concerns to the Petitions Committee of the Bundestag. Members of all parliamentary groups except the AfD showed great sympathy for the petition.
The motion contains two main requests to the Bundestag: Germany should work to impose sanctions on those responsible for persecuting the democratic movement – and it should offer better protection to those persecuted. “We see Germany as having a special responsibility here,” said student Glacier Kwong, who presented the paper to the committee and answered questions from MPs. As a major trading partner of China, which also has a special connection to the protection of human rights, Germany could achieve a lot.
According to Kwong, the sanctions can be imposed on individuals from Hong Kong who have been notably complicit in China’s alignment. She cites Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam as an example. Sanctions should be imposed on individuals, not on institutions or even on the country as a whole.
The German government, represented in the committee by a ministerial director of the Foreign Office, referred to a brand-new EU mechanism. Since December, Europe could punish “serious human rights violations” with sanctions against individuals. The government now refers to this possibility and holds out the prospect of bringing proceedings against those responsible in Hong Kong. It would then be possible to impose restrictions on entry into the EU and to access the assets of those concerned.
But there is a long way to go: The EU is still discussing internally how and in which cases the newly created mechanism should be applied at all. It is questionable whether it will classify the actions in Hong Kong as “serious” human rights violations. Finally, the decision on sanctions must be made with the agreement of all EU countries. That means China’s friends like Hungary may also have a say. So the process would take a long time and have an uncertain outcome. However, it is in line with a pattern of the German government in dealing with human rights issues to refer to EU institutions. But they make only slow progress because of the need for coordination.
Meanwhile, Kwong called it a “mockery of Germany’s values” that the EU had concluded an investment agreement (CAI) with China. “Europe is giving away crucial trump cards with this.” Germany could pursue a “much more robust policy on the Hong Kong issue,” Kwong said. She said even if the EU procedure on the suspicion of human rights violations takes a long time, Germany’s strong commitment already has a considerable signal effect.
Kwong herself is currently doing a doctorate in law in Berlin. She was already one of the activists in Hong Kong who campaigned for the preservation of the democratic constitution. She is explicitly not an official representative of the democratic movement but appears as a Hong Kong student. However, Kwong, 24, remains well-connected with figures in the resistance. She faces arrest if she attempts to return to her home country – something that can be considered almost certain, at least since her appearance before members of the Bundestag. Hong Kong keeps undercover lists with arrest warrants for opposition figures who, in the eyes of the authorities, are working to “destabilize order”.
The second request to the Bundestag concerns the creation of residency opportunities for young Hong Kongers who now want to turn their backs on their homeland for safety’s sake. In the demonstrations since 2014, not only a handful of well-known civil rights activists have stood out, but also a broad second tier of young people who have shown their faces and expressed themselves on social media. A purge is now underway against them as well.
The Federal Government points out that Hong Kong citizens can currently enter Germany without any problems and without a visa. So far, only four Hong Kongers have applied for asylum. But according to Kwong, these opportunities miss the real needs. The younger generation would like to come to Germany to study and then would like to work here. “We don’t want to be a burden to anyone. We want to make our productive contribution,” says Kwong. So in concrete terms, more scholarships for Hong Kongers would be helpful. For the period after graduation, generous job-seeking visas would be beneficial – after all, she says, they face significant dangers if their residency status ends and they are forced to return to Chinese territory. For the activists hit hardest by the state crackdown, there would be no possibility to apply for asylum already in Hong Kong – the state does not let them leave.
In the middle of last year, China passed a National Security Act that effectively abolished the “one country, two systems” principle. The six paragraphs undermine the city’s traditional legal autonomy. They set out vaguely defined offenses such as “subversion of state power” and allow unlimited pre-trial detention and extradition to the Chinese judiciary. In addition to the police, a “security bureau” now monitors citizens on Beijing’s behalf. In early January, authorities arrested 50 politically engaged citizens. Some of these had only participated in elections.
Under US President Joe Biden, climate change is once again becoming a priority in US climate policy. Biden’s focus is also on Beijing. China is the world’s largest promoter of coal-fired power plants abroad. Biden already sharply criticized this during the election campaign. In his climate plan, he promises to work with other countries to hold China to high environmental standards in the “New Silk Road” or “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI). The US will urge G20 nations to end export financing for coal-fired power plants. On Monday, EU foreign ministers also called for “an immediate end to all financing of new coal infrastructure in third countries” – but without explicitly naming China. In Germany, Biden’s demands have met with approval from Annalena Baerbock and Robert Habeck. In a guest article for the FAZ, they call for “a constructive involvement of China and a significant reduction of coal financing in emerging and developing countries”.
Between 2000 and 2019, China’s major development banks – Export-Import Bank of China and China Development Bank – financed 66 coal-fired power plants overseas with $51.8 billion, a Boston University database shows. The two state-owned banks finance an average of 50 percent of the cost of the coal plants. Many expensive projects would not be built without these export credits, loans and grants. The funded power plants have a total capacity of 56 gigawatts. The two banks are funding power plants on almost every continent. The biggest recipients are Indonesia ($9.3 billion), India ($7.7 billion), Vietnam ($7 billion), Pakistan ($5.6 billion), South Africa ($4.5 billion) and Ukraine ($3.5 billion). Türkiye is another European country among the ten largest recipients (US$ 1.4 billion).
Beijing’s coal investments run counter to a global trend. Since 2013, more than 100 development banks, private banks, and insurers have exited or adopted stricter guidelines for promoting coal-fired power plants abroad, including the World Bank, the European Investment Bank, and Germany’s Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW). China’s coal-sector financing, on the other hand, has surged since 2010. In 2019, funding was below the $2 billion mark annually for the first time since 2007, at $1.4 billion. It is too early to say whether this marks a turnaround. Because despite a turnaround among Western lenders, there is still demand for coal-fired power plants in countries of the Global South where coal-fired power is perceived as a cheap source of energy and coal deposits are often available locally.
China’s promotion of coal-fired power abroad has massive climate consequences. Coal-fired power plants abroad, subsidized with Chinese money since 2000, will produce nearly 12 gigatons of carbon over their estimated 40-year lifetimes, a study by scientists Xu Chen, Kevin P. Gallagher, Denise L. Mauzerall of Princeton and Boston universities shows. That’s more than China’s total carbon emissions (10.2 gigatons in 2019) and twice as much as the US’s (5.28 Gt in 2019) – each based on emissions from burning fossil fuels for energy production and industrial processes.
In addition, Chinese financiers often finance inefficient coal-fired power plants in which the coal is burned in a very harmful way to the climate. And Chinese policy does not push investors and industry to meet higher environmental standards than those of host countries. The construction of coal-fired power plants contradicts the Paris climate goals. According to calculations by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, coal-fired power production must fall by 73 percent worldwide by 2030 if the 1.5-degree target is to remain achievable.
Under President Biden, the pressure is growing on China to make the “New Silk Road” greener and to put the brakes on coal production abroad. But there also seem to be critics of coal financing within the Chinese power apparatus.
In late 2020, staff of China’s Ministry of Ecology and Environment contributed to a study with international and Chinese experts titled “Green Development Guide for BRI Projects.” It cites phasing out coal financing for overseas projects as the “best government and regulatory practice” in project financing. The authors propose a traffic light system for the “New Silk Road.” Projects with very negative climate and environmental impacts – including coal-fired power plants – should be considered “red projects” and subject to stricter monitoring and regulation. According to the study, even mitigation measures – carbon storage technologies, for example – could not turn coal-fired power plants into yellow or green projects. The authors suggest the incorporation of this traffic light system into decision-making processes on “New Silk Road” projects. Dr. Christoph Nedopil, Founding Director of the Green Belt and Road Initiative Center in Beijing, tells China.Table that it is difficult to assess whether the traffic light system will be translated into policies. He also says China’s announcement of its intention to become carbon neutral before 2060 was a big surprise.
Whether other Chinese ministries will take up the proposal is also unclear due to economic interests. According to Princeton and Boston University researchers, importing 77 percent of the coal-fired power plants supported with Chinese funds are boilers, steam turbines and/or generators from China. Chinese contractors were used in the construction of 65 percent of the coal-fired power plants and “13 percent are majority or jointly owned by a Chinese project developer.” And China’s energy industry is pushing for a coal capacity target in the upcoming five-year plan that would allow for the construction of up to 200 new coal-fired generating units within China by 2025. But with China’s coal-fired power plants already operating at only 50 percent of capacity on average since 2015, new coal-fired power plant production capacity would likely have to be diverted to exports.
As early as October 2020, China’s Ministry of Ecology and Environmental, in cooperation with the National Reform and Development Commission – co-responsible for approving China’s overseas investment projects – and three state regulatory institutions, issued a “Guidance on Promoting Investment and Financing to Address Climate Change.” The guide identified financial institutions as a critical lever for climate change. However, it only mentions the “New Silk Road” in passing. According to Nedopil’s assessment, the major development banks – CDB and CHEXIM – will “take note of the guide and give higher priority to addressing climate risks.” But the guidance is “only a first step and its de-facto impact so far must be seen as limited, particularly for the Belt and Road Initiative.”
Many Germans who regularly travel to China always have to live with one shortcoming: They don’t speak the language. According to Verena Menzel, offers at universities and adult education centers can only teach learners the basics. “Chinese is a very context-oriented language and it is a different culture,” explains the literary scholar. Practice and practical applications are thus very important, she adds. “What really helps is direct communication with Chinese people,” says the 37-year-old. Menzel practiced with a Chinese language partner during her studies in Mainz.
In the meantime, Menzel has also pursued her fascination for the Chinese language professionally. She came to Beijing via an internship and worked as a translator and editor from then on. Later, she founded the language learning portal New-Chinese.org together with the Chinese Peng Peng. “It was a project close to my heart fueled by my admiration for the Chinese language,” Menzel says. Since 2019, the portal has also offered online language lessons. At first, interested parties mainly included high school students, college students and professionals with basic knowledge. In the meantime, Menzel and her colleague are also working on offers for newcomers.
“I think that, with Chinese, there are often certain fears of contact. But without Chinese, you don’t get such an intense impression of the country,” she says. Languages open an important “interpersonal level”, says Menzel. In Chinese, moreover, the information structures are different from those in German, as there is a lot of repetition and the most important message often only appears at the end of the statement.
Menzel herself has lived in Beijing for several years. “Covid was a roller coaster ride,” she reports. “People were scared. You could see some wearing diving goggles in the supermarket.” However, things have since returned to normal, she says. Bars and swimming pools are open again. This is also thanks to the level-headedness of Chinese society, says Menzel: “The Chinese behaved very disciplined even over the Spring Festival.”
Although she has been living in Beijing for a while now, she still keeps an eye out for things that remind her a little of her German homeland. There’s Chaoyang Park, for example. “It’s the green lung of the city,” says Menzel, who grew up not far from nature in Darmstadt. Another place she cherishes is Café Zarah near the Bell and Drum Tower. The location is run by a German-Chinese couple. “Both Chinese and foreigners go there. They even serve latte macchiato and cinnamon waffles. So there’s a bit of Germany on the menu.” Constantin Eckner
Overnight Bernie Sanders became an internet star, and his appearance at the inauguration of the new US president was alienated and shared thousands of times on social media platforms – also in China, where this Twitter montage of Sanders playing mahjong went viral on Weibo. The photo was taken by Kevin Frayer (GettyImages) exactly one year ago in a park in Beijing with his mobile phone camera.
German politicians have often denounced the massive interventions of the Beijing central government in Hong Kong, the security law, and the arbitrary arrests – sometimes louder, sometimes quieter. But how consistent are they in the end? Activist Glacier Kwong demands: Talking is not enough. Germany must become active. Finn Mayer-Kuckuk explores which means can be used realistically.
Not enough Covid vaccine in Europe – that is the central topic these days. Marcel Grzanna describes Chinese vaccine diplomacy and concludes: While we are arguing, Beijing is securing market shares and political influence worldwide.
That the construction of coal-fired power plants runs counter to global efforts to reduce carbon emissions is a truism. Nico Beckert examines the role Chinese investments are playing globally.
Communication requires understanding – as each of us knows. I would like to recommend today’s Heads about Verena Menzel.
Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vucic and the Chinese ambassador to the country took advantage of the arrival of one million vaccine doses from China at Belgrade airport to publicly close ranks. Vucic stressed gratitude and friendship with China and his conviction that the Chinese vaccine is safe. For his part, Ambassador Chen Bo took the opportunity to outline China’s role in spearheading the supply of vaccines to the world: A classic win-win situation according to Beijing’s usual rhetoric.
When two fancy themselves winners, the question remains whether there is also a loser and who that might be. Supplying parts of the world with the Covid vaccine is important to the People’s Republic of China in advancing its geopolitical interests. Apart from the health of millions of Serbs, Beijing also cares about its own image and growing influence in the world. And where China gains influence through vaccine diplomacy, another actor inevitably loses ground. In this case, the European Union, which regularly criticizes Serbia’s President Vucic. Accordingly, the People’s Republic is now perceived positively in Serbia, while the EU, which the country would actually like to join one day, is portrayed as an unreliable partner.
Judging by the bare numbers of vaccine doses, Europe has poor arguments. Only a few tens of thousands have reached Serbia from the continent so far, while the People’s Republic has already delivered seven figures. Just under a year ago, Beijing managed to turn the Covid crisis in Serbia in its favor by sending aid supplies and specialists. Huge posters in Belgrade’s city center as “thanks to Brother Xi (Jinping)” symbolized Beijing’s stage victory and apparently made many Serbs forget that the EU has announced a billion-euro investment package for the Western Balkans region, from which Serbia is likely to benefit massively. The financial volume of European aid to Serbia is many times greater than the Chinese volume.
Even the higher quality of European vaccines apparently plays no role in the perception of many Serbs, also because the EU refrains from large justification campaigns. For Beijing, this is a ready-made meal that satisfies its hunger for recognition in the world as a leading power. The strategy is also being used in other parts of the world: In Southeast Asia, Central Asia, South America or Africa, China continues to crank up its vaccine diplomacy. But not only there. Beijing has long since looked to Hungary, and thus right into the middle of the EU, to expand its benevolent network of relations. An extra portion of vitamin B in the vaccine, so to speak.
China also agreed with the government in Budapest to supply vaccines. The agreement is still at an early stage, as Ivana Karásková, founder of the China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe (Choice) network, explained to China.Table. But she is not surprised that Central and Eastern European countries are open to vaccines from China and Russia. She said, “Let’s face it: There is not enough vaccine at the moment, and access is going very slowly.” She said that Hungary, a generally EU-critical country, is thinking aloud about the vaccine pact with China is no surprise.
But it is an alarm signal for EU diplomats. After their experience with China’s masked diplomacy, Europeans have become more attentive and aware of their own weakness. “The Chinese are quick to market small things big. We, as Team Europe, need to emphasize that we can do things better. Ad hoc aid from Europe must not be bilateral, but should be bundled through international channels and designated as European aid,” says a German diplomat stationed in Africa, who admits to following Chinese charm offensives with some concern. But he also stresses that “the Africans are not so easy to wrap around one’s finger”.
Nevertheless, Egypt, for example, has been vaccinating with vaccines from the Chinese manufacturer Sinopharm since the weekend. “I guarantee the safety and efficacy of the Chinese vaccine. I believe Sinopharm vaccine is one of the safest,” Mohamed Ahmed Ali, a Professor of virology at Egypt’s National Research Center, told China’s Xinhua news agency. Ali is a member of the committee that recommended the purchase of Sinopharm’s vaccine.
Chinese media report that at least 20 countries worldwide have purchased the Chinese vaccine. More than 40 are said to have made inquiries, partly because supplies from manufacturers in Europe or the USA cannot be obtained as quickly as from the People’s Republic, which has issued approvals on a fast-track basis. To underpin the credibility of the substance, the Turkish Health Minister Fahrettin Koca, the Indonesian President Joko Widodo, and the President of Seychelles, Wavel Ramkalawan, for example, had themselves injected live on television. In the Emirates, Bahrain, Jordan or Pakistan, the Chinese vaccine has already been authorized for its administration. China has promised help to other states in Southeast Asia, such as Bangladesh and the Philippines.
Vaccine diplomacy is also starting in Latin America. Beijing promised the states of the continent and the Caribbean to grant loans amounting to $1 billion to the importing states so that they could also settle their accounts with Chinese companies. According to diplomatic circles, Germany and Europe, on the other hand, wanted to avoid a form of patronage diplomacy.
Vaccine diplomacy is flanked by allegations in Chinese state media that deaths related to Covid-19 vaccines are being covered up in Europe. The reporting aims to discredit vaccines from Biontech or Pfizer, although clinical studies have proven the higher reliability of Western vaccines. Beijing Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian circulated a tweet on his Twitter channel in which the author questioned why Western media did not follow up on the deaths of ten people vaccinated in Germany. Scientists had formulated the increased risk of the pre-infected as the reason for their deaths.
Vaccine diplomacy could also get interesting in light of the EU’s simmering dispute with British-Swedish drugmaker AstraZeneca: Monday night, Brussels called for tighter controls on vaccine exports after top officials indirectly accused the UK-based company of cutting supplies destined for EU nations. Doses were to be sold at higher prices to other nations. “The EU wants to know exactly which doses have been produced by AstraZeneca so far, and if, or to whom, they have been delivered,” EU Health Commissioner Stella Kyriakides said. The export mechanism now proposed by the EU Commission requires each company to disclose in advance planned international shipments of EU-manufactured vaccine doses. Another high-level meeting on the case is scheduled for today. with Amelie Richter
The Chinese state cracks down on Hong Kong – hardly anything is left of the free system. That’s why the democratic movement’s expectations of Germany are rising: Its representatives hope for clear words and action from Berlin. On Monday, an envoy of the Hong Kong activists presented concrete concerns to the Petitions Committee of the Bundestag. Members of all parliamentary groups except the AfD showed great sympathy for the petition.
The motion contains two main requests to the Bundestag: Germany should work to impose sanctions on those responsible for persecuting the democratic movement – and it should offer better protection to those persecuted. “We see Germany as having a special responsibility here,” said student Glacier Kwong, who presented the paper to the committee and answered questions from MPs. As a major trading partner of China, which also has a special connection to the protection of human rights, Germany could achieve a lot.
According to Kwong, the sanctions can be imposed on individuals from Hong Kong who have been notably complicit in China’s alignment. She cites Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam as an example. Sanctions should be imposed on individuals, not on institutions or even on the country as a whole.
The German government, represented in the committee by a ministerial director of the Foreign Office, referred to a brand-new EU mechanism. Since December, Europe could punish “serious human rights violations” with sanctions against individuals. The government now refers to this possibility and holds out the prospect of bringing proceedings against those responsible in Hong Kong. It would then be possible to impose restrictions on entry into the EU and to access the assets of those concerned.
But there is a long way to go: The EU is still discussing internally how and in which cases the newly created mechanism should be applied at all. It is questionable whether it will classify the actions in Hong Kong as “serious” human rights violations. Finally, the decision on sanctions must be made with the agreement of all EU countries. That means China’s friends like Hungary may also have a say. So the process would take a long time and have an uncertain outcome. However, it is in line with a pattern of the German government in dealing with human rights issues to refer to EU institutions. But they make only slow progress because of the need for coordination.
Meanwhile, Kwong called it a “mockery of Germany’s values” that the EU had concluded an investment agreement (CAI) with China. “Europe is giving away crucial trump cards with this.” Germany could pursue a “much more robust policy on the Hong Kong issue,” Kwong said. She said even if the EU procedure on the suspicion of human rights violations takes a long time, Germany’s strong commitment already has a considerable signal effect.
Kwong herself is currently doing a doctorate in law in Berlin. She was already one of the activists in Hong Kong who campaigned for the preservation of the democratic constitution. She is explicitly not an official representative of the democratic movement but appears as a Hong Kong student. However, Kwong, 24, remains well-connected with figures in the resistance. She faces arrest if she attempts to return to her home country – something that can be considered almost certain, at least since her appearance before members of the Bundestag. Hong Kong keeps undercover lists with arrest warrants for opposition figures who, in the eyes of the authorities, are working to “destabilize order”.
The second request to the Bundestag concerns the creation of residency opportunities for young Hong Kongers who now want to turn their backs on their homeland for safety’s sake. In the demonstrations since 2014, not only a handful of well-known civil rights activists have stood out, but also a broad second tier of young people who have shown their faces and expressed themselves on social media. A purge is now underway against them as well.
The Federal Government points out that Hong Kong citizens can currently enter Germany without any problems and without a visa. So far, only four Hong Kongers have applied for asylum. But according to Kwong, these opportunities miss the real needs. The younger generation would like to come to Germany to study and then would like to work here. “We don’t want to be a burden to anyone. We want to make our productive contribution,” says Kwong. So in concrete terms, more scholarships for Hong Kongers would be helpful. For the period after graduation, generous job-seeking visas would be beneficial – after all, she says, they face significant dangers if their residency status ends and they are forced to return to Chinese territory. For the activists hit hardest by the state crackdown, there would be no possibility to apply for asylum already in Hong Kong – the state does not let them leave.
In the middle of last year, China passed a National Security Act that effectively abolished the “one country, two systems” principle. The six paragraphs undermine the city’s traditional legal autonomy. They set out vaguely defined offenses such as “subversion of state power” and allow unlimited pre-trial detention and extradition to the Chinese judiciary. In addition to the police, a “security bureau” now monitors citizens on Beijing’s behalf. In early January, authorities arrested 50 politically engaged citizens. Some of these had only participated in elections.
Under US President Joe Biden, climate change is once again becoming a priority in US climate policy. Biden’s focus is also on Beijing. China is the world’s largest promoter of coal-fired power plants abroad. Biden already sharply criticized this during the election campaign. In his climate plan, he promises to work with other countries to hold China to high environmental standards in the “New Silk Road” or “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI). The US will urge G20 nations to end export financing for coal-fired power plants. On Monday, EU foreign ministers also called for “an immediate end to all financing of new coal infrastructure in third countries” – but without explicitly naming China. In Germany, Biden’s demands have met with approval from Annalena Baerbock and Robert Habeck. In a guest article for the FAZ, they call for “a constructive involvement of China and a significant reduction of coal financing in emerging and developing countries”.
Between 2000 and 2019, China’s major development banks – Export-Import Bank of China and China Development Bank – financed 66 coal-fired power plants overseas with $51.8 billion, a Boston University database shows. The two state-owned banks finance an average of 50 percent of the cost of the coal plants. Many expensive projects would not be built without these export credits, loans and grants. The funded power plants have a total capacity of 56 gigawatts. The two banks are funding power plants on almost every continent. The biggest recipients are Indonesia ($9.3 billion), India ($7.7 billion), Vietnam ($7 billion), Pakistan ($5.6 billion), South Africa ($4.5 billion) and Ukraine ($3.5 billion). Türkiye is another European country among the ten largest recipients (US$ 1.4 billion).
Beijing’s coal investments run counter to a global trend. Since 2013, more than 100 development banks, private banks, and insurers have exited or adopted stricter guidelines for promoting coal-fired power plants abroad, including the World Bank, the European Investment Bank, and Germany’s Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW). China’s coal-sector financing, on the other hand, has surged since 2010. In 2019, funding was below the $2 billion mark annually for the first time since 2007, at $1.4 billion. It is too early to say whether this marks a turnaround. Because despite a turnaround among Western lenders, there is still demand for coal-fired power plants in countries of the Global South where coal-fired power is perceived as a cheap source of energy and coal deposits are often available locally.
China’s promotion of coal-fired power abroad has massive climate consequences. Coal-fired power plants abroad, subsidized with Chinese money since 2000, will produce nearly 12 gigatons of carbon over their estimated 40-year lifetimes, a study by scientists Xu Chen, Kevin P. Gallagher, Denise L. Mauzerall of Princeton and Boston universities shows. That’s more than China’s total carbon emissions (10.2 gigatons in 2019) and twice as much as the US’s (5.28 Gt in 2019) – each based on emissions from burning fossil fuels for energy production and industrial processes.
In addition, Chinese financiers often finance inefficient coal-fired power plants in which the coal is burned in a very harmful way to the climate. And Chinese policy does not push investors and industry to meet higher environmental standards than those of host countries. The construction of coal-fired power plants contradicts the Paris climate goals. According to calculations by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, coal-fired power production must fall by 73 percent worldwide by 2030 if the 1.5-degree target is to remain achievable.
Under President Biden, the pressure is growing on China to make the “New Silk Road” greener and to put the brakes on coal production abroad. But there also seem to be critics of coal financing within the Chinese power apparatus.
In late 2020, staff of China’s Ministry of Ecology and Environment contributed to a study with international and Chinese experts titled “Green Development Guide for BRI Projects.” It cites phasing out coal financing for overseas projects as the “best government and regulatory practice” in project financing. The authors propose a traffic light system for the “New Silk Road.” Projects with very negative climate and environmental impacts – including coal-fired power plants – should be considered “red projects” and subject to stricter monitoring and regulation. According to the study, even mitigation measures – carbon storage technologies, for example – could not turn coal-fired power plants into yellow or green projects. The authors suggest the incorporation of this traffic light system into decision-making processes on “New Silk Road” projects. Dr. Christoph Nedopil, Founding Director of the Green Belt and Road Initiative Center in Beijing, tells China.Table that it is difficult to assess whether the traffic light system will be translated into policies. He also says China’s announcement of its intention to become carbon neutral before 2060 was a big surprise.
Whether other Chinese ministries will take up the proposal is also unclear due to economic interests. According to Princeton and Boston University researchers, importing 77 percent of the coal-fired power plants supported with Chinese funds are boilers, steam turbines and/or generators from China. Chinese contractors were used in the construction of 65 percent of the coal-fired power plants and “13 percent are majority or jointly owned by a Chinese project developer.” And China’s energy industry is pushing for a coal capacity target in the upcoming five-year plan that would allow for the construction of up to 200 new coal-fired generating units within China by 2025. But with China’s coal-fired power plants already operating at only 50 percent of capacity on average since 2015, new coal-fired power plant production capacity would likely have to be diverted to exports.
As early as October 2020, China’s Ministry of Ecology and Environmental, in cooperation with the National Reform and Development Commission – co-responsible for approving China’s overseas investment projects – and three state regulatory institutions, issued a “Guidance on Promoting Investment and Financing to Address Climate Change.” The guide identified financial institutions as a critical lever for climate change. However, it only mentions the “New Silk Road” in passing. According to Nedopil’s assessment, the major development banks – CDB and CHEXIM – will “take note of the guide and give higher priority to addressing climate risks.” But the guidance is “only a first step and its de-facto impact so far must be seen as limited, particularly for the Belt and Road Initiative.”
Many Germans who regularly travel to China always have to live with one shortcoming: They don’t speak the language. According to Verena Menzel, offers at universities and adult education centers can only teach learners the basics. “Chinese is a very context-oriented language and it is a different culture,” explains the literary scholar. Practice and practical applications are thus very important, she adds. “What really helps is direct communication with Chinese people,” says the 37-year-old. Menzel practiced with a Chinese language partner during her studies in Mainz.
In the meantime, Menzel has also pursued her fascination for the Chinese language professionally. She came to Beijing via an internship and worked as a translator and editor from then on. Later, she founded the language learning portal New-Chinese.org together with the Chinese Peng Peng. “It was a project close to my heart fueled by my admiration for the Chinese language,” Menzel says. Since 2019, the portal has also offered online language lessons. At first, interested parties mainly included high school students, college students and professionals with basic knowledge. In the meantime, Menzel and her colleague are also working on offers for newcomers.
“I think that, with Chinese, there are often certain fears of contact. But without Chinese, you don’t get such an intense impression of the country,” she says. Languages open an important “interpersonal level”, says Menzel. In Chinese, moreover, the information structures are different from those in German, as there is a lot of repetition and the most important message often only appears at the end of the statement.
Menzel herself has lived in Beijing for several years. “Covid was a roller coaster ride,” she reports. “People were scared. You could see some wearing diving goggles in the supermarket.” However, things have since returned to normal, she says. Bars and swimming pools are open again. This is also thanks to the level-headedness of Chinese society, says Menzel: “The Chinese behaved very disciplined even over the Spring Festival.”
Although she has been living in Beijing for a while now, she still keeps an eye out for things that remind her a little of her German homeland. There’s Chaoyang Park, for example. “It’s the green lung of the city,” says Menzel, who grew up not far from nature in Darmstadt. Another place she cherishes is Café Zarah near the Bell and Drum Tower. The location is run by a German-Chinese couple. “Both Chinese and foreigners go there. They even serve latte macchiato and cinnamon waffles. So there’s a bit of Germany on the menu.” Constantin Eckner
Overnight Bernie Sanders became an internet star, and his appearance at the inauguration of the new US president was alienated and shared thousands of times on social media platforms – also in China, where this Twitter montage of Sanders playing mahjong went viral on Weibo. The photo was taken by Kevin Frayer (GettyImages) exactly one year ago in a park in Beijing with his mobile phone camera.
