His arrest was certain and he probably knew what would happen. The consequences will be severe. And yet one man decided to make a public protest in tightly guarded Beijing – right before the CP Congress. He attached several large system-critical banners to the site of the Sitong Bridge, in full view of passers-by. Police officers removed the writings shortly after and arrested the man. However, numerous videos and pictures had already spread on the Internet. Fabian Kretschmer describes the courageous action and visited the scene. He promptly clashed with the police, too.
Xi Jinping remains one of our main topics around the party congress. He oriented China differently than the West would have wished for – and Europe has to deal with it. Collaboration by the EU is important, but what exactly can be expected from Xi? Will it be possible to improve the battered relations? Experts from think tanks, universities and the political sphere put their heads together at a panel discussion at the European Parliament in Brussels to share ideas and pool their knowledge. The misjudgments should not be repeated in upcoming geopolitical processes, they warned. Amelie Richter was there and captured the most important voices.
The more ideological, the more numbers. That could be an equation for political slogans in China. Mao loved pithy slogans including numbers, but Xi is in no way inferior. But you can’t get anywhere with dictionaries. If you want to know what 2-4-4-2 means, you should read Johnny Erling’s enlightening column.
The upcoming party congress in Beijing is also occupying Europe’s capitals. In Brussels, the view of China with President Xi Jinping in his third term can be characterized by skepticism. There will be no significant improvement in the battered EU-China relations even after the party congress, the German EU ambassador and former ambassador to China, Michael Clauß, sums up at a panel discussion on Thursday in the European Parliament. The event “Xi Jinping’s China: What Can We Expect?” was hosted by MEP Reinhard Bütikofer.
How the relationship between the two blocs will develop from now on depends mainly on Beijing’s further positioning on Russia and the situation around Taiwan, Clauß said. “China does not want relations to develop in a hostile way,” the EU diplomat said. Still, he expects increasing “alienation and friction.” The EU’s ties across the Atlantic also play a role, Clauß said, as Beijing remains concerned that the EU is moving closer to the United States. Two things are needed on both sides for the coming years: “Moderation and pragmatism.”
The EU has been slow to notice that China changed under Xi, Clauß added. He was the ambassador to Beijing from 2013 to 2018. In the past, little attention was initially paid to the People’s Republic, and relations were mainly focused on business. However, such misjudgments were not only made by the EU. Beijing repeatedly misjudged the complex structure of the EU.
For example, the designation as a “systemic rival” in the 2019 China strategy almost caught Beijing unaware. The sanctions in the framework of the mechanism against human rights violations in last year’s spring were also not expected in China. Even if no massive change in EU-China relations is to be expected, the People’s Republic is changing the EU itself in the long term, for example through the new establishment of various trade instruments that would have been unthinkable a few years ago, Clauß said.
The panelists warned that the lack of attention from Brussels should not be repeated in upcoming geopolitical movements. For example, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) must be watched closely, emphasized sinologist Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik of the University of Vienna. She said that the SCO is growing and in direct contrast to the EU. “Unlike the West, there are no common values,” Weigelin-Schwiedrzik warned. Richard McGregor of the Australian think tank Lowy Institute also sees Beijing’s foreign policy priorities in “disadvantaged nations” such as Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan – and Russia.
As a second focus of China’s foreign policy, McGregor expects more engagement by Beijing in the global South, including Southeast Asia. China wants to consolidate its influence there, estimates the former Beijing bureau chief of the Financial Times. China is only in the third priority block concerned with “swing states” – undecided countries. This is where, in McGregor’s point of view, Germany and France are placed. These countries should primarily be kept from getting too close to Washington.
China’s demeanor in this regard is clear: Xi pushed Chinese foreign policy in a “nationalist” direction, according to the long-time China correspondent and China.Table columnist Johnny Erling. Internally, Xi’s firm grip on power has left its mark: “Xi is the chief ideologist.” What he says, is implemented not only ideologically but also operationally. The idolization of the Chinese leader is also due to the history of the former Soviet Union. Xi is in many ways “a hardcore Leninist” who is almost obsessed with the disintegration of the USSR, said US political scientist David Shambaugh of George Washington University. “The party is run like a military organization.”
Surveillance and repression will increase even more in Xi’s coming term, Shambaugh said. Be it the zero-Covid strategy or the crackdown on technology companies. According to Shambaugh, Xi is almost overwhelmed by the economic consequence and the general economic decline: “Xi has provided no evidence that he understands – much less knows how to contain – these economic challenges.”
Xi’s greatest difficulties in the coming years lie in domestic politics. The important questions are: How will the younger adult generation react to the state apparatus? And how can Xi solve the economic problems? The top income bracket of current young adults, those born after 1990, have never seen the country poor, according to Lucy Hornby, an economic journalist, and fellow at Harvard’s Fairbank Center.
This class and generation now find themselves in a tough academic and professional environment. Anyone who wants to get ahead has to be in the party – anyone who opposes counts as rebellious, says Hornby. How this generation aligns will be crucial in the next five years – because the years of wealth could soon be over. Xi took over the country when China had already left its economic uptrend, says Hornby.
But that was inevitable, says Alicia García-Herrero, a China expert at the Brussels-based think tank Bruegel. “The economic decline would have happened anyway, perhaps just at a different speed.” She sees the reasons for this solely in the domestic politics of the People’s Republic. As a result, she says, the EU must now focus primarily on its own markets and look at how to compete with China in third markets. “We are still a major exporter,” García-Herrero said. He added the EU needs to thoroughly analyze not only the Chinese market but the entire supply chain. “We need to think more about foreign policy together with economic policy.”
EU-China relations will remain exciting even after the party congress. At next Monday’s meeting of EU foreign ministers, the China strategy will be put on the table again. A confirmation of the existing concept – including the triad “partner, competitor, systemic rival” – is expected, EU circles said before the meeting.
It is probably the biggest public protest in the Chinese capital since the turn of the millennium: Just days before the 20th Party Congress, a dissident hung two large protest banners on a bridge above a six-lane main thoroughfare. Written on them was outrageous criticism: “We want food, not PCR tests. We want reform, not cultural revolution. We want freedom, not lockdown. We want to be citizens, not slaves” (不要核酸要吃饭, 不要文革要改革, 不要封控要自由, 不要领袖要选票, 不要谎言要尊严, 不做奴才做公民), reads one of the protest banners. And right next to it, it unmistakably says: “Overthrow the dictator and thief Xi Jinping.”
In the afternoon, there was little to remind passers-by of the incident at Sitong Bridge in the northwestern district of Haidian. Even an increased police presence was not noticeable at first glance. But it only takes a few moments for two policemen with red armbands to approach the German reporter – and promptly confiscate his passport and press card. Over the next few minutes, it becomes apparent that many of the surrounding “passers-by” – including a jogger dressed in running shorts and athletic shoes – are actually plainclothes security police officers. After a 15-minute security check, the situation resolves without escalation. Considering the dicey nature of the subject, the outcome was extremely mild by Chinese standards.
As expected, censors blocked the events on the Chinese network. On foreign online platforms, however, especially Twitter, photos and videos spread in droves. They showed passers-by in front of the Sitong Bridge marveling in disbelief at the protest banners, which had just been removed by police officers. In addition, clouds of smoke rose into the sky. The reasons are as yet unclear.
The fact that the protest succeeded at all seems like a miracle: Not only are Beijing’s streets equipped with surveillance cameras every few meters, but on top of that, the police presence is currently incredibly high due to the upcoming party congress. Security officers routinely watch over the events at the important intersections within the inner city rings.
Who put up the banners remains unknown. But the protest seems extraordinarily courageous in a country where even critical postings on social media result in citations to the police station. And it shows what otherwise remains hidden due to the repressive climate: the cracks in the facade of national unity.
After two and a half years of “zero Covid,” things are increasingly rumbling. The sudden lockdowns, arbitrarily forced quarantine, and daily mass testing have not only brought the economy to the brink of recession but also destroyed the economic livelihood of many families.
But criticism is voiced only behind closed doors, if at all. The red lines certainly permit the expression of displeasure with local governments. But the central government in Beijing is taboo, as is questioning the system. And even more so the person Xi Jinping.
The timing of the protest banners is particularly spectacular. After all, the 20th Party Congress will be held in Beijing on Sunday. During the congress Xi Jinping – as the first Chinese Head of State since Mao Zedong – will claim a third term in office.
The fact that quite a few Chinese would like to see a different course for their homeland does not feature in the state-directed discourse of the media. But on this Thursday afternoon, the dissent was visible, at least for a few minutes. Fabian Kretschmer
To understand the language of party officials in the People’s Republic, speaking Chinese is not enough. One should also be familiar with political formulas and numbers. At no time since Mao’s reign has language been so ideologized, stereotyped, and cluttered with party-speak as it has been in the ten years of Xi Jinping’s rule. The 2022 Standardized Dictionary of Contemporary Chinese 现代汉语规范词典 captures few words from political language despite the addition of 2000 pages and 1000 new terms. Included are new terms coined by Xi. But his name is not one of them. It will probably find its way into the dictionaries after the 20th Party Congress.
Party-speak is becoming increasingly important since almost every ninth Chinese is now either a member of the Party or the Communist Youth League. Bloggers sneer that if you want to be on the right side, you should stick to the numbers 2-4-4-2. They are the magic ciphers that open the doors to the upcoming 20th Party Congress in Beijing.
But it is not enough to just mutter this number. You have to write it down properly, like the chief ideologist of the Communist People’s Daily, Ren Zhongping (任仲平). In his latest commentary on the Party Congress, he calls for “even closer unity around Xi Jinping” and for that to profoundly make two determinations, show fourfold awareness and fourfold self-confidence, and also make two defenses. (深刻领悟 “两个确立 “的决定性意义，增强 “四个意识”、坚定 “四个自信”、做到 “两个维护”).
The number gibberish is a new oath of loyalty to Xi and is likely to find its way into the party congress communiqué. What does it mean? “Two determinations” stand for Xi as the core of the party and his thought as its guiding ideology. “Fourfold awareness” means that all comrades must be aware of the Party’s policies, the overall situation, the core issues, and how to stand at attention before the CP. “Fourfold self-confidence”, tells them to be full of self-confidence about the socialist path, in theory, in the system, and in culture. The twofold defense asks them to defend, first, General Secretary Xi as the core of the party, and at the same time, the authority of the CC.
This seems as confusing as the name of the commentator, Ren Zhongping. He does not exist. Behind the pseudonym hides a writing group of the People’s Daily. In the egalitarian political climate of Xi’s China, an increasing number of media are resorting to aliases for their commentaries. Individual opinion is neither wanted nor desired. Once again, courageous bloggers ensured that dozens of such cover names have been uncovered.
Pseudonyms were also used in China’s socialist society in the past. Today, it is striking how often they appear, as do politicized numbers. Even Mao loved catchy ciphers. When he had hundreds of thousands of capitalists and small businessmen and corrupt officials brutally persecuted as counterrevolutionaries in the early 1950s, he called it his “Three Anti” (三反) and “Five Anti” (五反) campaigns. His mass mobilization to hunt sparrows, flies, and vermin were called “Eradication of the Four Evils” (除四害), his socialist education campaign was called “Four Purifications” (四清), and his cultural revolutionary excesses against opposition intellectuals were called the fight against “the stinking number 9” (臭老九). The previous eight groups were other enemies on Mao’s hit lists.
At least after Mao’s death at the beginning of China’s reform policy, many intellectuals and artists still dared to criticize the party overseers’ rapid reintroduction of media conformity, which was the first thing to suppress diverging opinions. The renowned Beijing satirist Hua Junwu once told me that this annoyed him so much, that in 1978 he drew a Chinese couple scrabbling around in a huge manuscript, searching in vain for the author’s opinion. At that time, such cartoons could still be published in major party newspapers.
China’s liberal awakening is long over. Under Xi, stereotypical propaganda phrases and numerical formulas have regained the upper hand in China, and his speeches are filled with them. In two speeches recently published in the journal Qiushi to get in the mood for the 20th Party Congress, Xi uses terms such as “Ten we insist on” (十个坚持), “Two great layers and five in one arrangement” (两个大局，统筹五位一体), or “strategy of the four comprehensive” (四个全面战略布局). He warns of “16 specific risks in 8 areas” (8个方面16个具体风险) without naming them.
Such meaningless rows of numbers can also be seen as political messages along the streets. In 2013, I photographed a particularly absurd slogan in a Beijing suburb. The red banner said, “In the time of leadership change, strictly follow the 5 prohibitions, the 17 one must not do, and stick to the 5 punishments.”
It takes a lot of effort and the help of online search engines like Baidu (China’s Google) to decipher party-speak. China’s three major reference works for the contemporary language, “Xinhua Dictionary” (新华字典), “Modern Chinese” (现代汉语词典), and “Standardized Modern Chinese” (现代汉语规范词典) are of little help, although they are constantly updated and can now be used digitally. The widely used Xinhua dictionary, which is used in all schools and has sold more than 600 million copies to date, published its latest version in 2020, with a slew of new words. Along with this, a QR code on every page helps users learn the correct spelling, pronunciation, and origin, and provides example sentences of the characters.
The part official language, however, remains a jargon for insiders. For eight years, 20 linguists worked on updating the “Xinhua Dictionary.” The new 2022 edition was published with a thousand new words and terms.
Among them are nearly two dozen language creations that can be traced back to Xi Jinping, such as his Silk Road Initiative, called “Belt and Road” (一带一路). The added explanation only says, as a reference, that this project, which now spans the globe, “was first proposed by China.” The name Xi does not appear, as it is absent throughout the dictionary, unlike in the term “Mao Zedong Thought” or “Deng Xiaoping Theory.” A “Xi Jinping Thought,” which is quoted every day everywhere in China, has not yet been immortalized as a lexical term, although Xi had the party statutes and constitution amended for it in 2018.
His name will likely become part of the dictionaries after the 20th Party Congress, once it receives even higher consecrations. Until then, words shaped by Xi, such as “China’s Dream” (中国梦) or China’s “New Normality” (新常态), will remain in the dictionary without his name. The same applies to other included expressions coined by Xi, such as “overtaking in the curve” (弯道超车) aimed at “Made in China 2025,” or “top-level design” (顶层设计) characterizing his authoritarian style of ruling.
Most new additions to the standardized dictionary reflect China’s transformation since 2014, such as “sharing economy” (共享经济), “carbon vertex” (碳达峰), “climate neutrality” (碳中和), “particulate matter” (细颗粒物), “mobile payment” (移动支付), or Internet terms such as “WeChat” (微信), “group chat” (群聊) “cloud computing” (云计算), and “smartphone selfie” (自拍).
China’s lexicons can still evade politicization by party-speak. This has not always been the case. Every political movement has been reflected in the Xinhua dictionary, Endymion Wilkinson, then EU ambassador to Beijing and a renowned sinologist and historian, once told me. For example, in the 1971 edition of the Xinhua dictionary published during the Cultural Revolution, 46 quotations from Chairman Mao had to be included. Nearly 2000 entries were given a new Cultural Revolutionary meaning. After Mao’s death in 1976, it took 35 years for a professional dictionary to be published in 2011, with words translated into Chinese for “futures trading,” “white collar,” “sex education,” or “generation gap.” At the time, the official China Daily celebrated the return of depoliticized everyday language with a pun in its headline, “Better read than Red.”
Ideological conversion has long been on the agenda in China. It should not be too long before the meaning of 2-4-4-2 can be found in dictionaries.
If it has to be distance learning, then go all the way. For the third time, astronauts from the Chinese space station held a lesson from space. The topics covered included growing rice in space, drinking with a long straw, and capillary effects. The astronauts had the children’s full attention, here in a classroom at the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing. Students from other provinces were also tuned in. The Tiangong series of lessons is intended to promote enthusiasm for science in China.
His arrest was certain and he probably knew what would happen. The consequences will be severe. And yet one man decided to make a public protest in tightly guarded Beijing – right before the CP Congress. He attached several large system-critical banners to the site of the Sitong Bridge, in full view of passers-by. Police officers removed the writings shortly after and arrested the man. However, numerous videos and pictures had already spread on the Internet. Fabian Kretschmer describes the courageous action and visited the scene. He promptly clashed with the police, too.
Xi Jinping remains one of our main topics around the party congress. He oriented China differently than the West would have wished for – and Europe has to deal with it. Collaboration by the EU is important, but what exactly can be expected from Xi? Will it be possible to improve the battered relations? Experts from think tanks, universities and the political sphere put their heads together at a panel discussion at the European Parliament in Brussels to share ideas and pool their knowledge. The misjudgments should not be repeated in upcoming geopolitical processes, they warned. Amelie Richter was there and captured the most important voices.
The more ideological, the more numbers. That could be an equation for political slogans in China. Mao loved pithy slogans including numbers, but Xi is in no way inferior. But you can’t get anywhere with dictionaries. If you want to know what 2-4-4-2 means, you should read Johnny Erling’s enlightening column.
The upcoming party congress in Beijing is also occupying Europe’s capitals. In Brussels, the view of China with President Xi Jinping in his third term can be characterized by skepticism. There will be no significant improvement in the battered EU-China relations even after the party congress, the German EU ambassador and former ambassador to China, Michael Clauß, sums up at a panel discussion on Thursday in the European Parliament. The event “Xi Jinping’s China: What Can We Expect?” was hosted by MEP Reinhard Bütikofer.
How the relationship between the two blocs will develop from now on depends mainly on Beijing’s further positioning on Russia and the situation around Taiwan, Clauß said. “China does not want relations to develop in a hostile way,” the EU diplomat said. Still, he expects increasing “alienation and friction.” The EU’s ties across the Atlantic also play a role, Clauß said, as Beijing remains concerned that the EU is moving closer to the United States. Two things are needed on both sides for the coming years: “Moderation and pragmatism.”
The EU has been slow to notice that China changed under Xi, Clauß added. He was the ambassador to Beijing from 2013 to 2018. In the past, little attention was initially paid to the People’s Republic, and relations were mainly focused on business. However, such misjudgments were not only made by the EU. Beijing repeatedly misjudged the complex structure of the EU.
For example, the designation as a “systemic rival” in the 2019 China strategy almost caught Beijing unaware. The sanctions in the framework of the mechanism against human rights violations in last year’s spring were also not expected in China. Even if no massive change in EU-China relations is to be expected, the People’s Republic is changing the EU itself in the long term, for example through the new establishment of various trade instruments that would have been unthinkable a few years ago, Clauß said.
The panelists warned that the lack of attention from Brussels should not be repeated in upcoming geopolitical movements. For example, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) must be watched closely, emphasized sinologist Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik of the University of Vienna. She said that the SCO is growing and in direct contrast to the EU. “Unlike the West, there are no common values,” Weigelin-Schwiedrzik warned. Richard McGregor of the Australian think tank Lowy Institute also sees Beijing’s foreign policy priorities in “disadvantaged nations” such as Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan – and Russia.
As a second focus of China’s foreign policy, McGregor expects more engagement by Beijing in the global South, including Southeast Asia. China wants to consolidate its influence there, estimates the former Beijing bureau chief of the Financial Times. China is only in the third priority block concerned with “swing states” – undecided countries. This is where, in McGregor’s point of view, Germany and France are placed. These countries should primarily be kept from getting too close to Washington.
China’s demeanor in this regard is clear: Xi pushed Chinese foreign policy in a “nationalist” direction, according to the long-time China correspondent and China.Table columnist Johnny Erling. Internally, Xi’s firm grip on power has left its mark: “Xi is the chief ideologist.” What he says, is implemented not only ideologically but also operationally. The idolization of the Chinese leader is also due to the history of the former Soviet Union. Xi is in many ways “a hardcore Leninist” who is almost obsessed with the disintegration of the USSR, said US political scientist David Shambaugh of George Washington University. “The party is run like a military organization.”
Surveillance and repression will increase even more in Xi’s coming term, Shambaugh said. Be it the zero-Covid strategy or the crackdown on technology companies. According to Shambaugh, Xi is almost overwhelmed by the economic consequence and the general economic decline: “Xi has provided no evidence that he understands – much less knows how to contain – these economic challenges.”
Xi’s greatest difficulties in the coming years lie in domestic politics. The important questions are: How will the younger adult generation react to the state apparatus? And how can Xi solve the economic problems? The top income bracket of current young adults, those born after 1990, have never seen the country poor, according to Lucy Hornby, an economic journalist, and fellow at Harvard’s Fairbank Center.
This class and generation now find themselves in a tough academic and professional environment. Anyone who wants to get ahead has to be in the party – anyone who opposes counts as rebellious, says Hornby. How this generation aligns will be crucial in the next five years – because the years of wealth could soon be over. Xi took over the country when China had already left its economic uptrend, says Hornby.
But that was inevitable, says Alicia García-Herrero, a China expert at the Brussels-based think tank Bruegel. “The economic decline would have happened anyway, perhaps just at a different speed.” She sees the reasons for this solely in the domestic politics of the People’s Republic. As a result, she says, the EU must now focus primarily on its own markets and look at how to compete with China in third markets. “We are still a major exporter,” García-Herrero said. He added the EU needs to thoroughly analyze not only the Chinese market but the entire supply chain. “We need to think more about foreign policy together with economic policy.”
EU-China relations will remain exciting even after the party congress. At next Monday’s meeting of EU foreign ministers, the China strategy will be put on the table again. A confirmation of the existing concept – including the triad “partner, competitor, systemic rival” – is expected, EU circles said before the meeting.
It is probably the biggest public protest in the Chinese capital since the turn of the millennium: Just days before the 20th Party Congress, a dissident hung two large protest banners on a bridge above a six-lane main thoroughfare. Written on them was outrageous criticism: “We want food, not PCR tests. We want reform, not cultural revolution. We want freedom, not lockdown. We want to be citizens, not slaves” (不要核酸要吃饭, 不要文革要改革, 不要封控要自由, 不要领袖要选票, 不要谎言要尊严, 不做奴才做公民), reads one of the protest banners. And right next to it, it unmistakably says: “Overthrow the dictator and thief Xi Jinping.”
In the afternoon, there was little to remind passers-by of the incident at Sitong Bridge in the northwestern district of Haidian. Even an increased police presence was not noticeable at first glance. But it only takes a few moments for two policemen with red armbands to approach the German reporter – and promptly confiscate his passport and press card. Over the next few minutes, it becomes apparent that many of the surrounding “passers-by” – including a jogger dressed in running shorts and athletic shoes – are actually plainclothes security police officers. After a 15-minute security check, the situation resolves without escalation. Considering the dicey nature of the subject, the outcome was extremely mild by Chinese standards.
As expected, censors blocked the events on the Chinese network. On foreign online platforms, however, especially Twitter, photos and videos spread in droves. They showed passers-by in front of the Sitong Bridge marveling in disbelief at the protest banners, which had just been removed by police officers. In addition, clouds of smoke rose into the sky. The reasons are as yet unclear.
The fact that the protest succeeded at all seems like a miracle: Not only are Beijing’s streets equipped with surveillance cameras every few meters, but on top of that, the police presence is currently incredibly high due to the upcoming party congress. Security officers routinely watch over the events at the important intersections within the inner city rings.
Who put up the banners remains unknown. But the protest seems extraordinarily courageous in a country where even critical postings on social media result in citations to the police station. And it shows what otherwise remains hidden due to the repressive climate: the cracks in the facade of national unity.
After two and a half years of “zero Covid,” things are increasingly rumbling. The sudden lockdowns, arbitrarily forced quarantine, and daily mass testing have not only brought the economy to the brink of recession but also destroyed the economic livelihood of many families.
But criticism is voiced only behind closed doors, if at all. The red lines certainly permit the expression of displeasure with local governments. But the central government in Beijing is taboo, as is questioning the system. And even more so the person Xi Jinping.
The timing of the protest banners is particularly spectacular. After all, the 20th Party Congress will be held in Beijing on Sunday. During the congress Xi Jinping – as the first Chinese Head of State since Mao Zedong – will claim a third term in office.
The fact that quite a few Chinese would like to see a different course for their homeland does not feature in the state-directed discourse of the media. But on this Thursday afternoon, the dissent was visible, at least for a few minutes. Fabian Kretschmer
To understand the language of party officials in the People’s Republic, speaking Chinese is not enough. One should also be familiar with political formulas and numbers. At no time since Mao’s reign has language been so ideologized, stereotyped, and cluttered with party-speak as it has been in the ten years of Xi Jinping’s rule. The 2022 Standardized Dictionary of Contemporary Chinese 现代汉语规范词典 captures few words from political language despite the addition of 2000 pages and 1000 new terms. Included are new terms coined by Xi. But his name is not one of them. It will probably find its way into the dictionaries after the 20th Party Congress.
Party-speak is becoming increasingly important since almost every ninth Chinese is now either a member of the Party or the Communist Youth League. Bloggers sneer that if you want to be on the right side, you should stick to the numbers 2-4-4-2. They are the magic ciphers that open the doors to the upcoming 20th Party Congress in Beijing.
But it is not enough to just mutter this number. You have to write it down properly, like the chief ideologist of the Communist People’s Daily, Ren Zhongping (任仲平). In his latest commentary on the Party Congress, he calls for “even closer unity around Xi Jinping” and for that to profoundly make two determinations, show fourfold awareness and fourfold self-confidence, and also make two defenses. (深刻领悟 “两个确立 “的决定性意义，增强 “四个意识”、坚定 “四个自信”、做到 “两个维护”).
The number gibberish is a new oath of loyalty to Xi and is likely to find its way into the party congress communiqué. What does it mean? “Two determinations” stand for Xi as the core of the party and his thought as its guiding ideology. “Fourfold awareness” means that all comrades must be aware of the Party’s policies, the overall situation, the core issues, and how to stand at attention before the CP. “Fourfold self-confidence”, tells them to be full of self-confidence about the socialist path, in theory, in the system, and in culture. The twofold defense asks them to defend, first, General Secretary Xi as the core of the party, and at the same time, the authority of the CC.
This seems as confusing as the name of the commentator, Ren Zhongping. He does not exist. Behind the pseudonym hides a writing group of the People’s Daily. In the egalitarian political climate of Xi’s China, an increasing number of media are resorting to aliases for their commentaries. Individual opinion is neither wanted nor desired. Once again, courageous bloggers ensured that dozens of such cover names have been uncovered.
Pseudonyms were also used in China’s socialist society in the past. Today, it is striking how often they appear, as do politicized numbers. Even Mao loved catchy ciphers. When he had hundreds of thousands of capitalists and small businessmen and corrupt officials brutally persecuted as counterrevolutionaries in the early 1950s, he called it his “Three Anti” (三反) and “Five Anti” (五反) campaigns. His mass mobilization to hunt sparrows, flies, and vermin were called “Eradication of the Four Evils” (除四害), his socialist education campaign was called “Four Purifications” (四清), and his cultural revolutionary excesses against opposition intellectuals were called the fight against “the stinking number 9” (臭老九). The previous eight groups were other enemies on Mao’s hit lists.
At least after Mao’s death at the beginning of China’s reform policy, many intellectuals and artists still dared to criticize the party overseers’ rapid reintroduction of media conformity, which was the first thing to suppress diverging opinions. The renowned Beijing satirist Hua Junwu once told me that this annoyed him so much, that in 1978 he drew a Chinese couple scrabbling around in a huge manuscript, searching in vain for the author’s opinion. At that time, such cartoons could still be published in major party newspapers.
China’s liberal awakening is long over. Under Xi, stereotypical propaganda phrases and numerical formulas have regained the upper hand in China, and his speeches are filled with them. In two speeches recently published in the journal Qiushi to get in the mood for the 20th Party Congress, Xi uses terms such as “Ten we insist on” (十个坚持), “Two great layers and five in one arrangement” (两个大局，统筹五位一体), or “strategy of the four comprehensive” (四个全面战略布局). He warns of “16 specific risks in 8 areas” (8个方面16个具体风险) without naming them.
Such meaningless rows of numbers can also be seen as political messages along the streets. In 2013, I photographed a particularly absurd slogan in a Beijing suburb. The red banner said, “In the time of leadership change, strictly follow the 5 prohibitions, the 17 one must not do, and stick to the 5 punishments.”
It takes a lot of effort and the help of online search engines like Baidu (China’s Google) to decipher party-speak. China’s three major reference works for the contemporary language, “Xinhua Dictionary” (新华字典), “Modern Chinese” (现代汉语词典), and “Standardized Modern Chinese” (现代汉语规范词典) are of little help, although they are constantly updated and can now be used digitally. The widely used Xinhua dictionary, which is used in all schools and has sold more than 600 million copies to date, published its latest version in 2020, with a slew of new words. Along with this, a QR code on every page helps users learn the correct spelling, pronunciation, and origin, and provides example sentences of the characters.
The part official language, however, remains a jargon for insiders. For eight years, 20 linguists worked on updating the “Xinhua Dictionary.” The new 2022 edition was published with a thousand new words and terms.
Among them are nearly two dozen language creations that can be traced back to Xi Jinping, such as his Silk Road Initiative, called “Belt and Road” (一带一路). The added explanation only says, as a reference, that this project, which now spans the globe, “was first proposed by China.” The name Xi does not appear, as it is absent throughout the dictionary, unlike in the term “Mao Zedong Thought” or “Deng Xiaoping Theory.” A “Xi Jinping Thought,” which is quoted every day everywhere in China, has not yet been immortalized as a lexical term, although Xi had the party statutes and constitution amended for it in 2018.
His name will likely become part of the dictionaries after the 20th Party Congress, once it receives even higher consecrations. Until then, words shaped by Xi, such as “China’s Dream” (中国梦) or China’s “New Normality” (新常态), will remain in the dictionary without his name. The same applies to other included expressions coined by Xi, such as “overtaking in the curve” (弯道超车) aimed at “Made in China 2025,” or “top-level design” (顶层设计) characterizing his authoritarian style of ruling.
Most new additions to the standardized dictionary reflect China’s transformation since 2014, such as “sharing economy” (共享经济), “carbon vertex” (碳达峰), “climate neutrality” (碳中和), “particulate matter” (细颗粒物), “mobile payment” (移动支付), or Internet terms such as “WeChat” (微信), “group chat” (群聊) “cloud computing” (云计算), and “smartphone selfie” (自拍).
China’s lexicons can still evade politicization by party-speak. This has not always been the case. Every political movement has been reflected in the Xinhua dictionary, Endymion Wilkinson, then EU ambassador to Beijing and a renowned sinologist and historian, once told me. For example, in the 1971 edition of the Xinhua dictionary published during the Cultural Revolution, 46 quotations from Chairman Mao had to be included. Nearly 2000 entries were given a new Cultural Revolutionary meaning. After Mao’s death in 1976, it took 35 years for a professional dictionary to be published in 2011, with words translated into Chinese for “futures trading,” “white collar,” “sex education,” or “generation gap.” At the time, the official China Daily celebrated the return of depoliticized everyday language with a pun in its headline, “Better read than Red.”
Ideological conversion has long been on the agenda in China. It should not be too long before the meaning of 2-4-4-2 can be found in dictionaries.
If it has to be distance learning, then go all the way. For the third time, astronauts from the Chinese space station held a lesson from space. The topics covered included growing rice in space, drinking with a long straw, and capillary effects. The astronauts had the children’s full attention, here in a classroom at the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing. Students from other provinces were also tuned in. The Tiangong series of lessons is intended to promote enthusiasm for science in China.
