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Cosco yes – Elmos no. Where is the logic in that? The entry of a state conglomerate into actual infrastructure would, after all, be more detrimental to Germany than the takeover of a small factory for semiconductor precursors by a Swedish-Chinese company. German economy minister Robert Habeck consistently opposed both deals equally, as our analysis shows. It was Chancellor Olaf Scholz who tipped the scales in favor of Cosco’s entry. Of course, the fact that Scholz used to be the mayor of Hamburg could have nothing to do with it.
Habeck, in turn, explained his concept coherently to the press on Wednesday. Europe should no longer be naive and simply leave takeovers to the market and should be as smart as China. EU member states should join forces to keep important industries in the EU. However, given Europe’s complicated structure, this will hardly work as effectively as in China’s controlled economy.
China is also a dominant player at the COP27 climate conference in Egypt. After all, the People’s Republic remains the largest emission emitter. But hopes are growing that emissions will soon turn peak, as Nico Beckert analyzes. Perhaps, and with a bit of luck, the peak will come as early as 2025 – and not in 2030, as envisioned in China’s official climate target. Thus, emissions could start to fall slowly in just a few years. While this would be a tremendous success, it would not be enough. Because in order to still meet the 1.5-degree target set in Paris, emissions would have to fall dramatically after 2025. It is now up to the conference participants to combine what is possible with what is necessary.
Bao Tong has passed away. The former top cadre and later dissident, who tried to prevent the catastrophe of 1989, turned 90. Michael Radunski has written his obituary.
Was Germany’s security really at risk? Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Climate Protection Robert Habeck has cited geostrategic risks as the reason for prohibiting the takeover of chip manufacturer Elmos by a Swedish-Chinese competitor. With reference to overarching political goals, he managed to block the takeover. It is fitting that he immediately blacklisted another takeover on Wednesday: According to the minister’s will, ERS Electronic will also not go to a Chinese buyer.
On Wednesday, Habeck also very clearly expressed what he is actually concerned about. He sees Elmos Semiconductor, with sales of 320 million euros, not as an isolated case, but as part of an overall global situation. “It is imperative to look at the whole picture.” Habeck senses a “very deliberate, strategic approach” in China’s actions to occupy key industries worldwide. Germany should be an open, “but no longer a naive market economy,” Habeck said on Wednesday in Berlin at a press briefing. With the changing geopolitical situation, dependence on economic actors outside the EU has “moved to the center of the debate,” he said.
The developments in big politics have caught the semiconductor specialist Elmos Semiconductor from Dortmund cold. The acquisition of a factory producing basic chip materials by the Swedish competitor Silex Microsystems from Stockholm was actually a done deal since December 2021 (China.Table reported). Stakeholders did not anticipate any problems with the pending approval. But Silex is owned by the Chinese company Cellwise Microelectronics.
In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Habeck takes his task of protecting Germany from a shortfall of key raw materials and parts under the control of potentially unfriendly powers very seriously. Therefore, he had the acquisition prohibited on Wednesday in the round of federal ministers.
Politically and with an eye to the global situation, it was the right thing to do – but in this particular case, it seems excessive. This is also what Dortmund’s Mayor Thomas Westphal thinks. “My impression is that this decision is not based on economic policy,” Westphal said. “And the decision bothers me because it means 225 jobs in Dortmund are at stake.” With the sale, that would not have been the case. “Now Elmos must think about the next step.”
However, Habeck interprets his role as economy minister differently than his predecessors – and directly disagrees with Westphal’s assessment. “The time when it was said that the best minister was the one who did nothing at all is over.” He wants to intervene with a guiding hand whenever he sees German interests at risk. Instead of just setting the framework and leaving the details to the market, he wants to look closely at individual cases and strengthen Germany’s key sectors. To this end, he is using the “sharp sword” of the Foreign Trade and Payments Act, which in many cases allows for investment scrutiny. At present, there are reportedly a medium double-digit number of review procedures underway, but not all of them involve China.
But Elmos still needs an investor. Although Elmos CEO Arne Schneider spreads optimism and assures that the demand remains high and the products are innovative – especially in the car sector. But it is Schneider’s job as CEO to spread optimism, especially in times of a potential takeover. While demand for chips is high, the company’s own production lines tend to produce outdated chips. These execute fixed functions instead of flexibly processing any programs. Instead, Elmos buys modern semiconductors in Asia and passes them on to its customers. Elmos urgently needs money to invest in new machines if it is to live up to Habeck’s envisioned role of producing top chips for the automotive industry.
Mayor Westphal even sees the company more in the league of a conglomerate from the old days of East Germany. “If the Chinese were to buy all the Trabi engines in Germany, that wouldn’t be a threat to the German car industry either,” he said on Tuesday to illustrate Elmos’ limited technological significance. For that reason, it was “a bad joke to say that the Chinese will be market leaders when they get their hands on this chip technology.”
Habeck left open on Wednesday whether he would seek a state option for the continued existence of Elmos, but he also did not explicitly reject this path. Habeck is currently mobilizing billions from European funding pots in order to attract more semiconductor companies to Germany. So far, however, he has had a hard time putting the funds to good use. During the pandemic, the German automotive industry experienced a chip shortage, and assembly lines came to a standstill. The semiconductor elements come mainly from Asia. The smarter cars become, the more electronics Volkswagen, Mercedes and BMW need.
The German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (BMWK) is now following through with its program of erecting economic safety barriers for Germany. This is also reflected in the trend. In April, Habeck already had an already ready and waiting takeover reversed: That of the medical technology manufacturer Heyer Medical (China.Table reported). Heyer Medical was also in urgent need of fresh capital from its Chinese partner. From this perspective, the Elmos ban fits perfectly into his concept. Habeck also strictly opposed the Cosco entry.
The government of Olaf Scholz, on the other hand, appears fickle in the overall picture. Scholz threw his political weight as chancellor into the balance to push the partial sale of the Tollerort terminal. He apparently did not push as hard for Elmos in North Rhine-Westphalia as he did for the port in the state where he used to serve as prime minister. But Cosco is a central government corporation, practically a public authority, while Silex is a private Swedish company.
China wants to reach the emissions peak “before 2030”. Xi Jinping announced this over two years ago. But neither an exact date nor a target mark for carbon emissions was specified. When it comes to major milestones, the People’s Republic has always set targets that it can definitely achieve – and usually exceeds. Missing growth targets would damage the reputation of the all-dominant Communist Party far more than it would damage the reputation of parties and governments in democratic states. There is much pointing to an earlier carbon peak.
The People’s Republic has massively expanded renewables in recent years. And the provinces want to further step up the pace:
According to calculations by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), China’s additional electricity consumption between 2020 and 2025 can be covered by this rapid expansion of renewables if electricity consumption does not rise above 4 percent.
However, there is also a risk that renewables and coal plants will compete even more in the future. “There will definitely be competition for market share between coal and clean energy,” Myllyvirta says. “As the operating hours of coal plants decrease, owners will increasingly try to slow down the expansion of renewables.” Coal still accounts for 63 percent of the electricity mix and 60 percent of the energy mix.
This is why activists from Greenpeace East Asia are not as optimistic. “It is clear that carbon emissions in China’s energy sector will continue to rise in the coming years,” says Wu Jinghan, who works in Beijing. Due to the electrification of more industrial sectors and economic growth, electricity demand will continue to grow, she adds. And yet, “We expect China’s power sector to reach peak emissions before 2025,” Wu says.
In the past, China has relied massively on the construction sector for its growth. Never before in world history have so many roads, train connections and entire cities been built from scratch in such a short time. But most recently, the industry has presented climate plans (China.Table reported):
“It’s quite possible that emissions for cement and building materials have already peaked,” says CREA’s Xinyi Shen. That is due to increased energy efficiency in the sector coupled with declining demand for building materials. An early emissions peak in this sector would be significant, as it is the third-largest emitter of carbon dioxide.
But this, too, should be taken with a grain of salt. In early November, the government issued an implementation plan for the building materials industry’s carbon targets. It states:
Some analysts predict that the construction industry will pursue its own targets regardless. But the less ambitious targets from the top give leeway and take some pressure off. And the past shows that emissions from the construction sector can also rise again quickly: “In 2015, China’s emissions fell. At the time, it was mainly due to economic factors,” says Byford Tsang of climate think tank E3G. “A slow real estate sector and supply-side reform of heavy industry to reduce inefficient overcapacity were responsible at the time.”
The Covid crisis and the ailing real estate sector contributed to China’s falling emissions in the last four quarters. Both the central government and the provinces have announced large stimulus programs to boost growth. In the past, this often led to a sharp rise in emissions because the programs tended to be very construction-heavy. This is different now:
“If the economic transition to “high-value growth” succeeds, the massive expansion of clean energy, will mean a peak in emissions soon,” says CREA’s Lauri Myllyvirta.
But even if China, the world’s largest carbon emitter, manages to stabilize emissions at a peak or even slowly reduce them in the next few years, there is little reason for climate optimism. After all, China’s climate targets are not in line with the Paris Agreement. This requires stepping up climate ambitions. To still reach the Paris climate targets, the People’s Republic would have to cut the share of coal-fired power to 35 percent by 2030, according to calculations by the Climate Action Tracker. Before 2040, China should no longer use any coal at all for power generation, the experts calculate. This means that the expansion of renewables must be kept at a constant high level. This requires an annual increase of 150 to 200 gigawatts.
It was just two short lines with which Bao Pu shared the sad news on Wednesday, “My father Bao Tong passed away peacefully at 7:08 a.m. on Nov. 9, 2022. He was born on November 5, 1932 and lived to be 90 years old.”
They were 90 dramatic years. The life of Bao Tong 鮑彤 exemplifies China’s fast-paced years – from the rise of the CP to the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution and the hopes of the era of reform and opening, to the bloody suppression of the protests at Tiananmen Square and the failure to resolve them. Bao Tong made it into the CP’s innermost circle of power – and was subsequently the highest-ranking official ever convicted in connection with the events of 1989.
Bao Tong was born in Haining (Zhejiang) in 1932. He grew up in Shanghai and studied at the Nanyang High School, where he also acquired his own leftist-liberal influence. He was influenced above all by two people close to him: First, his uncle Wu Shichang, an expert on Qing-period literature and a regular writer for the intellectual magazine Guancha; second, his future wife Jiang Zongcao, whom he met at Nanyang and who is said to have been instrumental in Bao joining the Communist Party in the first place. In the CP, Bao made a career that would be closely linked to the highs and lows of Chinese politics.
After joining the party, he first worked in the local organizing committee of the Shanghai CP before moving to the important Central Committee in 1954, where he worked closely with An Ziwen, among others. But his rapid rise was followed by the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, in which many staunch CP members unexpectedly fell from grace. Bao’s superior An Ziwen was one of them. But even then, Bao displayed a trait that would first do him harm, then prove helpful, and ultimately be his downfall: He remained true to his convictions and refused to denounce An publicly. As a consequence, Bao himself was branded a dissident.
When that catastrophic period came to an end, An Ziwen was rehabilitated. And Bao Tong would also return to the CP. What’s more, An Ziwen introduced Bao into the close circle around Deng Xiaoping, and Bao was able to place his political convictions at the very top of the state in the following years – both economically and politically.
As deputy director of the State Commission for Economic Reform and then as director of the Political Reform Office of the CP Central Committee, Bao played a key role in shaping Deng Xiaoping’s policies of reform and opening up. At the same time, Bao became arguably the closest advisor to then-Premier Zhao Ziyang.
In October 1987, the 13th CPC Party Congress followed, Zhao Ziyang delivered a speech drafted by Bao Tong on the need for political reform. The title: Advancing on the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics 沿着有中国特色的社会主义道路前进. Zhao eventually became CP General Secretary, and Bao took over as his political secretary. As such, he drafted Zhao’s speeches and shaped his political views.
It was the time of reforms – in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev, in Poland and Hungary. In China, 改革开放 (Gǎigé kāifàng) was on everyone’s lips. This was also true for the protesters around Tiananmen Square in the summer of 1989. But just like the hopes for reform, Bao Tong should meet a grim fate.
Both Zhao Ziyang and Bao Tong sympathized with the protests and supported their peaceful resolution – in contrast to Deng Xiaoping, who supported a brutal crackdown. Again, Bao remained true to his convictions. It eventually came to an open power struggle: Deng prevailed with his hard line, Zhao Ziyang was placed under house arrest, and Bao Tong was sentenced to seven years in prison for allegedly passing on state secrets. Bao had to serve the full sentence in isolation in Qincheng Prison.
After his release, Bao Tong then lived in Beijing again, but he would never be truly free again until his death. His residence was guarded, his telephone calls monitored and his personal activities massively restricted, as for example on the day of the death of his comrade Zhao Ziyang: “On the day of his death, my wife and I wanted to visit him again, but we were prevented from leaving our apartment by the security police. My wife was even pushed to the ground by the guards,” Bao later recounted.
And yet Bao never regretted his ties to Zhao Ziyang or the power struggle with the hardliners. On the contrary, Bao never allowed anyone to silence him, even after his imprisonment, and he made no secret of his convictions to the very end. For example, he signed the well-known Charter 08, a manifesto that called for political reform and democratization in China in 2008.
Bao was also instrumental in the publication of Zhao Ziyang’s banned memoirs. The ousted CP Secretary-General managed to smuggle his secretly written thoughts about Bao Tong outside the country. Since then, the book “Prisoner of the State – The Secret Journal of Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang” has provided deep insights into the CP power struggles of 1989 – at least for those interested abroad, because the book is banned in China. Bao later said that the purpose of the book was to show the true nature of the Chinese Communist Party.
And Bao also had clear ideas about China’s future until the very end: “First of all, the rights of every citizen must be restored. If every politician acts like a true official, he will also respect human rights – that is the basic qualification for political leaders. With these two changes, all problems can be solved, including the issue of June 4, 89. Every Chinese person must also have the right to vote. A ballot with only one candidate is garbage, belongs in the trash. If civil and human rights are respected, China can solve any problem,” Bao said in an interview with the German business newspaper Handelsblatt in 2009.
All his life, Bao Tong remained true to his convictions. Thus, he became one of the most important political officials within the Chinese leadership – and later one of China’s greatest dissidents. Michael Radunski
The organizers of the aerospace fair in Zhuhai in southern China probably did not intend this air show to be a statement for more diversity and peace – despite the colors. On the contrary: with numerous new fighter jets, Chinese manufacturers want to prove they have caught up in military technology. On display: The “aerial ballet” of the August First Air Demonstration Team.
Cosco yes – Elmos no. Where is the logic in that? The entry of a state conglomerate into actual infrastructure would, after all, be more detrimental to Germany than the takeover of a small factory for semiconductor precursors by a Swedish-Chinese company. German economy minister Robert Habeck consistently opposed both deals equally, as our analysis shows. It was Chancellor Olaf Scholz who tipped the scales in favor of Cosco’s entry. Of course, the fact that Scholz used to be the mayor of Hamburg could have nothing to do with it.
Habeck, in turn, explained his concept coherently to the press on Wednesday. Europe should no longer be naive and simply leave takeovers to the market and should be as smart as China. EU member states should join forces to keep important industries in the EU. However, given Europe’s complicated structure, this will hardly work as effectively as in China’s controlled economy.
China is also a dominant player at the COP27 climate conference in Egypt. After all, the People’s Republic remains the largest emission emitter. But hopes are growing that emissions will soon turn peak, as Nico Beckert analyzes. Perhaps, and with a bit of luck, the peak will come as early as 2025 – and not in 2030, as envisioned in China’s official climate target. Thus, emissions could start to fall slowly in just a few years. While this would be a tremendous success, it would not be enough. Because in order to still meet the 1.5-degree target set in Paris, emissions would have to fall dramatically after 2025. It is now up to the conference participants to combine what is possible with what is necessary.
Bao Tong has passed away. The former top cadre and later dissident, who tried to prevent the catastrophe of 1989, turned 90. Michael Radunski has written his obituary.
Was Germany’s security really at risk? Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Climate Protection Robert Habeck has cited geostrategic risks as the reason for prohibiting the takeover of chip manufacturer Elmos by a Swedish-Chinese competitor. With reference to overarching political goals, he managed to block the takeover. It is fitting that he immediately blacklisted another takeover on Wednesday: According to the minister’s will, ERS Electronic will also not go to a Chinese buyer.
On Wednesday, Habeck also very clearly expressed what he is actually concerned about. He sees Elmos Semiconductor, with sales of 320 million euros, not as an isolated case, but as part of an overall global situation. “It is imperative to look at the whole picture.” Habeck senses a “very deliberate, strategic approach” in China’s actions to occupy key industries worldwide. Germany should be an open, “but no longer a naive market economy,” Habeck said on Wednesday in Berlin at a press briefing. With the changing geopolitical situation, dependence on economic actors outside the EU has “moved to the center of the debate,” he said.
The developments in big politics have caught the semiconductor specialist Elmos Semiconductor from Dortmund cold. The acquisition of a factory producing basic chip materials by the Swedish competitor Silex Microsystems from Stockholm was actually a done deal since December 2021 (China.Table reported). Stakeholders did not anticipate any problems with the pending approval. But Silex is owned by the Chinese company Cellwise Microelectronics.
In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Habeck takes his task of protecting Germany from a shortfall of key raw materials and parts under the control of potentially unfriendly powers very seriously. Therefore, he had the acquisition prohibited on Wednesday in the round of federal ministers.
Politically and with an eye to the global situation, it was the right thing to do – but in this particular case, it seems excessive. This is also what Dortmund’s Mayor Thomas Westphal thinks. “My impression is that this decision is not based on economic policy,” Westphal said. “And the decision bothers me because it means 225 jobs in Dortmund are at stake.” With the sale, that would not have been the case. “Now Elmos must think about the next step.”
However, Habeck interprets his role as economy minister differently than his predecessors – and directly disagrees with Westphal’s assessment. “The time when it was said that the best minister was the one who did nothing at all is over.” He wants to intervene with a guiding hand whenever he sees German interests at risk. Instead of just setting the framework and leaving the details to the market, he wants to look closely at individual cases and strengthen Germany’s key sectors. To this end, he is using the “sharp sword” of the Foreign Trade and Payments Act, which in many cases allows for investment scrutiny. At present, there are reportedly a medium double-digit number of review procedures underway, but not all of them involve China.
But Elmos still needs an investor. Although Elmos CEO Arne Schneider spreads optimism and assures that the demand remains high and the products are innovative – especially in the car sector. But it is Schneider’s job as CEO to spread optimism, especially in times of a potential takeover. While demand for chips is high, the company’s own production lines tend to produce outdated chips. These execute fixed functions instead of flexibly processing any programs. Instead, Elmos buys modern semiconductors in Asia and passes them on to its customers. Elmos urgently needs money to invest in new machines if it is to live up to Habeck’s envisioned role of producing top chips for the automotive industry.
Mayor Westphal even sees the company more in the league of a conglomerate from the old days of East Germany. “If the Chinese were to buy all the Trabi engines in Germany, that wouldn’t be a threat to the German car industry either,” he said on Tuesday to illustrate Elmos’ limited technological significance. For that reason, it was “a bad joke to say that the Chinese will be market leaders when they get their hands on this chip technology.”
Habeck left open on Wednesday whether he would seek a state option for the continued existence of Elmos, but he also did not explicitly reject this path. Habeck is currently mobilizing billions from European funding pots in order to attract more semiconductor companies to Germany. So far, however, he has had a hard time putting the funds to good use. During the pandemic, the German automotive industry experienced a chip shortage, and assembly lines came to a standstill. The semiconductor elements come mainly from Asia. The smarter cars become, the more electronics Volkswagen, Mercedes and BMW need.
The German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (BMWK) is now following through with its program of erecting economic safety barriers for Germany. This is also reflected in the trend. In April, Habeck already had an already ready and waiting takeover reversed: That of the medical technology manufacturer Heyer Medical (China.Table reported). Heyer Medical was also in urgent need of fresh capital from its Chinese partner. From this perspective, the Elmos ban fits perfectly into his concept. Habeck also strictly opposed the Cosco entry.
The government of Olaf Scholz, on the other hand, appears fickle in the overall picture. Scholz threw his political weight as chancellor into the balance to push the partial sale of the Tollerort terminal. He apparently did not push as hard for Elmos in North Rhine-Westphalia as he did for the port in the state where he used to serve as prime minister. But Cosco is a central government corporation, practically a public authority, while Silex is a private Swedish company.
China wants to reach the emissions peak “before 2030”. Xi Jinping announced this over two years ago. But neither an exact date nor a target mark for carbon emissions was specified. When it comes to major milestones, the People’s Republic has always set targets that it can definitely achieve – and usually exceeds. Missing growth targets would damage the reputation of the all-dominant Communist Party far more than it would damage the reputation of parties and governments in democratic states. There is much pointing to an earlier carbon peak.
The People’s Republic has massively expanded renewables in recent years. And the provinces want to further step up the pace:
According to calculations by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), China’s additional electricity consumption between 2020 and 2025 can be covered by this rapid expansion of renewables if electricity consumption does not rise above 4 percent.
However, there is also a risk that renewables and coal plants will compete even more in the future. “There will definitely be competition for market share between coal and clean energy,” Myllyvirta says. “As the operating hours of coal plants decrease, owners will increasingly try to slow down the expansion of renewables.” Coal still accounts for 63 percent of the electricity mix and 60 percent of the energy mix.
This is why activists from Greenpeace East Asia are not as optimistic. “It is clear that carbon emissions in China’s energy sector will continue to rise in the coming years,” says Wu Jinghan, who works in Beijing. Due to the electrification of more industrial sectors and economic growth, electricity demand will continue to grow, she adds. And yet, “We expect China’s power sector to reach peak emissions before 2025,” Wu says.
In the past, China has relied massively on the construction sector for its growth. Never before in world history have so many roads, train connections and entire cities been built from scratch in such a short time. But most recently, the industry has presented climate plans (China.Table reported):
“It’s quite possible that emissions for cement and building materials have already peaked,” says CREA’s Xinyi Shen. That is due to increased energy efficiency in the sector coupled with declining demand for building materials. An early emissions peak in this sector would be significant, as it is the third-largest emitter of carbon dioxide.
But this, too, should be taken with a grain of salt. In early November, the government issued an implementation plan for the building materials industry’s carbon targets. It states:
Some analysts predict that the construction industry will pursue its own targets regardless. But the less ambitious targets from the top give leeway and take some pressure off. And the past shows that emissions from the construction sector can also rise again quickly: “In 2015, China’s emissions fell. At the time, it was mainly due to economic factors,” says Byford Tsang of climate think tank E3G. “A slow real estate sector and supply-side reform of heavy industry to reduce inefficient overcapacity were responsible at the time.”
The Covid crisis and the ailing real estate sector contributed to China’s falling emissions in the last four quarters. Both the central government and the provinces have announced large stimulus programs to boost growth. In the past, this often led to a sharp rise in emissions because the programs tended to be very construction-heavy. This is different now:
“If the economic transition to “high-value growth” succeeds, the massive expansion of clean energy, will mean a peak in emissions soon,” says CREA’s Lauri Myllyvirta.
But even if China, the world’s largest carbon emitter, manages to stabilize emissions at a peak or even slowly reduce them in the next few years, there is little reason for climate optimism. After all, China’s climate targets are not in line with the Paris Agreement. This requires stepping up climate ambitions. To still reach the Paris climate targets, the People’s Republic would have to cut the share of coal-fired power to 35 percent by 2030, according to calculations by the Climate Action Tracker. Before 2040, China should no longer use any coal at all for power generation, the experts calculate. This means that the expansion of renewables must be kept at a constant high level. This requires an annual increase of 150 to 200 gigawatts.
It was just two short lines with which Bao Pu shared the sad news on Wednesday, “My father Bao Tong passed away peacefully at 7:08 a.m. on Nov. 9, 2022. He was born on November 5, 1932 and lived to be 90 years old.”
They were 90 dramatic years. The life of Bao Tong 鮑彤 exemplifies China’s fast-paced years – from the rise of the CP to the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution and the hopes of the era of reform and opening, to the bloody suppression of the protests at Tiananmen Square and the failure to resolve them. Bao Tong made it into the CP’s innermost circle of power – and was subsequently the highest-ranking official ever convicted in connection with the events of 1989.
Bao Tong was born in Haining (Zhejiang) in 1932. He grew up in Shanghai and studied at the Nanyang High School, where he also acquired his own leftist-liberal influence. He was influenced above all by two people close to him: First, his uncle Wu Shichang, an expert on Qing-period literature and a regular writer for the intellectual magazine Guancha; second, his future wife Jiang Zongcao, whom he met at Nanyang and who is said to have been instrumental in Bao joining the Communist Party in the first place. In the CP, Bao made a career that would be closely linked to the highs and lows of Chinese politics.
After joining the party, he first worked in the local organizing committee of the Shanghai CP before moving to the important Central Committee in 1954, where he worked closely with An Ziwen, among others. But his rapid rise was followed by the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, in which many staunch CP members unexpectedly fell from grace. Bao’s superior An Ziwen was one of them. But even then, Bao displayed a trait that would first do him harm, then prove helpful, and ultimately be his downfall: He remained true to his convictions and refused to denounce An publicly. As a consequence, Bao himself was branded a dissident.
When that catastrophic period came to an end, An Ziwen was rehabilitated. And Bao Tong would also return to the CP. What’s more, An Ziwen introduced Bao into the close circle around Deng Xiaoping, and Bao was able to place his political convictions at the very top of the state in the following years – both economically and politically.
As deputy director of the State Commission for Economic Reform and then as director of the Political Reform Office of the CP Central Committee, Bao played a key role in shaping Deng Xiaoping’s policies of reform and opening up. At the same time, Bao became arguably the closest advisor to then-Premier Zhao Ziyang.
In October 1987, the 13th CPC Party Congress followed, Zhao Ziyang delivered a speech drafted by Bao Tong on the need for political reform. The title: Advancing on the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics 沿着有中国特色的社会主义道路前进. Zhao eventually became CP General Secretary, and Bao took over as his political secretary. As such, he drafted Zhao’s speeches and shaped his political views.
It was the time of reforms – in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev, in Poland and Hungary. In China, 改革开放 (Gǎigé kāifàng) was on everyone’s lips. This was also true for the protesters around Tiananmen Square in the summer of 1989. But just like the hopes for reform, Bao Tong should meet a grim fate.
Both Zhao Ziyang and Bao Tong sympathized with the protests and supported their peaceful resolution – in contrast to Deng Xiaoping, who supported a brutal crackdown. Again, Bao remained true to his convictions. It eventually came to an open power struggle: Deng prevailed with his hard line, Zhao Ziyang was placed under house arrest, and Bao Tong was sentenced to seven years in prison for allegedly passing on state secrets. Bao had to serve the full sentence in isolation in Qincheng Prison.
After his release, Bao Tong then lived in Beijing again, but he would never be truly free again until his death. His residence was guarded, his telephone calls monitored and his personal activities massively restricted, as for example on the day of the death of his comrade Zhao Ziyang: “On the day of his death, my wife and I wanted to visit him again, but we were prevented from leaving our apartment by the security police. My wife was even pushed to the ground by the guards,” Bao later recounted.
And yet Bao never regretted his ties to Zhao Ziyang or the power struggle with the hardliners. On the contrary, Bao never allowed anyone to silence him, even after his imprisonment, and he made no secret of his convictions to the very end. For example, he signed the well-known Charter 08, a manifesto that called for political reform and democratization in China in 2008.
Bao was also instrumental in the publication of Zhao Ziyang’s banned memoirs. The ousted CP Secretary-General managed to smuggle his secretly written thoughts about Bao Tong outside the country. Since then, the book “Prisoner of the State – The Secret Journal of Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang” has provided deep insights into the CP power struggles of 1989 – at least for those interested abroad, because the book is banned in China. Bao later said that the purpose of the book was to show the true nature of the Chinese Communist Party.
And Bao also had clear ideas about China’s future until the very end: “First of all, the rights of every citizen must be restored. If every politician acts like a true official, he will also respect human rights – that is the basic qualification for political leaders. With these two changes, all problems can be solved, including the issue of June 4, 89. Every Chinese person must also have the right to vote. A ballot with only one candidate is garbage, belongs in the trash. If civil and human rights are respected, China can solve any problem,” Bao said in an interview with the German business newspaper Handelsblatt in 2009.
All his life, Bao Tong remained true to his convictions. Thus, he became one of the most important political officials within the Chinese leadership – and later one of China’s greatest dissidents. Michael Radunski
The organizers of the aerospace fair in Zhuhai in southern China probably did not intend this air show to be a statement for more diversity and peace – despite the colors. On the contrary: with numerous new fighter jets, Chinese manufacturers want to prove they have caught up in military technology. On display: The “aerial ballet” of the August First Air Demonstration Team.