At yesterday’s Table.Media event China Strategy 2023, we assembled many well-known names from politics, business and academia to discuss how to engage with the new superpower in the Far East.
Somewhat surprisingly, the traditional EU triad of China as partner, strategic rival and competitor was questioned almost from the outset of our discussion. The tripartite formula is just too simplistic and suggests a simple solution to the China dilemma. European actors can snub their rival China while doing good business with their partner and jointly saving the climate. Really? China itself does not discriminate here. Revenge for a geostrategic insult can happen at the economic level or in the climate dialogue. Our panel discussion on climate issues at the event revealed that China is precisely a market, competitor and partner when it comes to technologies such as electric mobility.
Overall, however, it showed a broad consensus in Germany and Europe on how to further engage with China in the future: Trade is to be possible, but dependencies are to be eliminated. This requires a stocktaking of the risks. Germany and its EU partners also must become faster and regain innovation in order to keep up.
However, there were doubts about the implementation of these noble ideas. After all, Germany generally struggles to translate its concepts into physical reality. It might help to adjust the ideas of who is the driver and who is the driven. It is certainly not too late to respond appropriately to the challenge China. But Germany has already squandered its advantages, like its former technological edge.
Huge dependencies, clouded business climate, and even decoupling in individual sectors: German-Chinese economic relations are currently viewed in a downright negative light. But there was no sign of shock or even fear among German entrepreneurs in the first part of the “China Strategy 2023” event in Berlin on Tuesday. On the contrary: More than 30 renowned China experts from politics, business, science and society presented themselves at the Table.Media event with clear analyses of the current situation and a confident outlook for the future.
Jens Hildebrandt, Executive Director of the German Chamber of Commerce in Beijing, clarified at the very beginning: “Germany’s companies are not waiting for the German government’s China strategy.” Rather, they have long since begun derisking while increasing localization at the same time. In this way, the companies want to mitigate possible risks on the one hand and position themselves strongly in the long term on one of the most important growth and innovation markets on the other.
Friedolin Strack of the Federation of German Industries (BDI) even spoke of balancing act management when it comes to China. Of course, China will remain a very important market in the future, he said, which is why the government and the business community have a clear consensus:
However, to successfully master this balancing act, German companies must first and foremost look to themselves, Strack emphasized. “The weal and woe of the European economy do not depend on China, but on ourselves.” It is important to maintain our own competitiveness and innovative strength.
Because China’s economy is developing steadily. Christina Otte from Germany Trade & Invest (GTAI) highlighted just how much China has caught up over the past few years: In mechanical engineering alone, she said, China now leads in 16 out of 28 areas – ten years ago it was only in six. “The race is not lost,” Otte said. “But China is challenging us.”
The planned investment by the Chinese shipping company Cosco in the Port of Hamburg is a challenge for the German government. Originally, Cosco planned to acquire 35 percent of the container terminal Tollerort of Hamburger Hafen und Logistik AG (HHLA). After a long struggle, Berlin approved a so-called partial prohibition limited to a minority stake of 24.9 percent.
HHLA Executive Board Chairwoman Angela Titzrath compared container trade and logistics to the blood supply in the human body, and backed up her comparison with impressive figures: “Two-thirds of German exports leave the country by sea,” said Titzrath. Regarding the Port of Hamburg, this means: “We are one of the major Asian hubs in Europe.”
The importance of maritime logistics is also reflected in the employment rate, says Titzrath: “In the German maritime economy, there are around 400,000 jobs with a value-added of 30 billion euros. If I extend that to industrial jobs in Germany, it is around 1.4 million industrial jobs.
Titzrath emphasized that trade with China has so far been a classic win-win situation for both sides. “Today, as consumers in Germany and Europe, we can buy things at very low prices, be it toys, textiles or electronics. And conversely, a huge middle class has emerged in China over the past 20 years.”
Vera Eichennauer from ETH Zurich, on the other hand, drew attention to the sometimes unequal framework conditions that are increasingly proving to be a disadvantage for German companies – above all the strong influence of the Chinese state. This puts Western companies at a competitive disadvantage – both in China and increasingly outside the EU.
“China does not hesitate to abuse its political influence,” she warned. Economic dependencies are used as leverage, as was evident recently in the case of Lithuania. This results in protectionist measures all over the world. But Eichennauer recommends the opposite: Western governments should also become more active and examine how cross-border investments can be promoted again, at least with partner countries.
Investments, that is what Joerg Wuttke would like to see above all in China. The President of the European Chamber of Commerce in Beijing stated quite provocatively: “We are not yet dependent enough on China.” While Europe shipped just 1.6 million containers to China last year, 6.4 million containers came from China to Europe in the same period. Besides the Covid pandemic, the main reason is China’s high trade barriers.
German and European companies should get more involved in China, Wuttke believes. The People’s Republic is a kind of gym for companies. “If you are not at the table, you are on the menu,” Wuttke said.
Finally, Klaus Muehlhahn undertook an often overlooked but no less important change of perspective: “How does China see competition with Germany and Europe?”, asked the President of Zeppelin University Friedrichshafen, emphasizing: “We are currently building up a threat scenario – and ignoring China’s major internal problems.” The People’s Republic is currently formulating grand goals – and yet will not be able to achieve them all, Muehlhahn believes. Beijing also has to make difficult decisions.
Franziska Brantner, Parliamentary State Secretary at the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, put it as follows: “We know that we need China as a partner when it comes to the major challenges.” There is only one thing that should no longer be neglected: “It is also about our interests and our security in Germany and Europe.”
Michael Roth had nothing good to say about the joint China trip of EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and French President Emmanuel Macron. “I felt like played for a fool. That was disastrous,” said the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the Bundestag in Berlin on Tuesday. The topic was China as a rival in the second part of Table.Media’s “China Strategy 2023”, bringing together more than 30 distinguished China experts from politics, business, academia and society.
Roth attributed a special role to Germany regarding its relationship with China: On the one hand, as a strong economy, Germany is particularly heard in Beijing. On the other hand, it is also the most vulnerable. Therefore, Roth believes that Germany must coordinate closely with its partners in Europe – and avoid a cacophony like the one between von der Leyen and Macron.
Roth does not see any contradiction between values-based and interest-driven foreign policy. “The old foreign policy warhorses [sic] like to make that point. I find that very old-fashioned. That’s 20th century.”
Reinhard Buetikofer, China expert in the European Parliament, pointed out that the EU is an organization that prides itself on its unity with diversity. “The EU will never speak with one voice. But we should not allow contradictions to arise.” Macron allowed himself to be lured onto a little branch in Beijing, which he then tumbled down with. But according to Buetikofer, one thing is clear: “Europe cannot escape its global responsibility. The French president should also remember that.”
Patrick Koellner called the Indo-Pacific the new strategic center of gravity in Asia, calling it not a natural region of the world. Rather, the former Asia-Pacific, which was mainly characterized by economic issues, has been deliberately expanded to include India and the Indian Ocean, Koellner said. “The transition from Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific marks the real Zeitenwende” in international Asia policy, says the Vice President of the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (Giga). This is because adding India would reduce the danger of China’s hegemony in the region.
Köllner pointed to new alliances such as Quad or Aukus as evidence of the new Indo-Pacific geopolitical era. Here, billions are invested in armaments such as nuclear submarines, which Köllner sees as “a daring and expensive bet on the future”. It is questionable whether China will allow itself to be swayed by this or will even quickly create facts as a countermeasure, for example with regard to Taiwan, he said.
May-Britt Stumbaum of the Center for Intelligence and Security Studies (CISS) in Munich made clear: If there were a war over Taiwan, some assembly lines in Germany would come to a standstill and quite a few shelves would be left empty. “Taiwan is not just a historical mission or a legacy to be finished. Taiwan is a very hard-core strategic consideration.” China is after a position on the first island chain, with direct access to the deep sea. President Xi Jinping is currently preparing the military option, Stumbaum said.
Tim Ruehlig from the German Council on Foreign Relations drew attention to another topic: setting technical standards. Here, too, China is increasingly taking on a leading role – with far-reaching consequences: From practical competitive advantages and patent fees to effects on political and social values, if China is setting standards for security and privacy in products. Such details should be considered in Germany’s China strategy, Ruehlig emphasizes.
But who should formulate this strategy? Marina Rudyak, a sinologist at the University of Heidelberg, warned: “It is like this in the USA: The more China is perceived as a rival there, the more is invested in China expertise. Here in Germany, the opposite is the case: The more difficult the relationship with China becomes, the less we in Germany want to deal with it. That is not very strategic.”
Cora Jungbluth from the Bertelsmann Foundation agreed with her and underlined how China expertise is by no means only missing in the German ministries. “China education is needed at all levels, not only in the federal ministries. You have to start at the education level.” Many Chinese direct investments happen at the municipal level. But it is precisely there that China competence is not particularly well established.
Mikko Huotari then attempted to bring the focus back to the current situation. At present, there is no lack of understanding of China, said the director of the Berlin-based China Institute Merics. “We have a very clear analysis of where China’s domestic development is going, where the relationship between China and the USA is heading. It is now a matter of developing the capacity for action. It is important that we do not completely go on the defensive, but look at where our interests lie and then try to assert them as best we can with our partners.”
No country currently emits as much greenhouse gases per year as China, the world’s second-largest economy. Global climate action can only succeed with China. But China is using the climate and energy transition to serve its own interests. And in certain areas, it is now the more powerful partner. This is one of the conclusions of the China Strategy 2023 conference hosted by Table.Media on Tuesday.
On the path to a zero-emissions global economy, China is a crucial player for several reasons:
China is the driving force behind the global energy transition, said Roland Roesch, Acting Director at the Innovation and Technology Center of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). A large part of the global investments in renewables are made on the Chinese market, he said. And as soon as China decides to invest in important technologies such as hydrogen, batteries or smart meters, this will enable considerable economies of scale and thus open up the opportunity for manufacturers to sharply reduce costs.
German companies could therefore not afford to be absent from the Chinese market, said Roesch. At the same time, China has thanks to its role in the refining and processing of many raw materials critical for the energy transition a “strong position that makes cooperation necessary”.
How equal can cooperation be under such circumstances? IRENA gives governments a platform to consult each other on the progress of the energy transition. On the podium, Roesch praised the “transparent manner” with which China is involved in the talks. The country attaches importance to cooperation and “fair ways“.
Christian Hochfeld, on the other hand, was reluctant to speak of cooperation at eye level: The German economy is “massively dependent on the German car manufacturers that are active on the Chinese market,” said the Director of the think tank Agora Verkehrswende. As soon as “any vehicles are not registered there, we don’t just have a fever, but a serious illness in the German economy.”
The trend in the Chinese car market is currently toward electric mobility. Not so much because of regulation, according to Hochfeld – but simply because many customers now prefer EVs. German car brands are having a hard time competing. China is no longer dependent on cooperation with Germany when it comes to electric mobility, Hochfeld emphasized.
Another requirement for cooperation on an eye-level basis is “that we credibly stand for climate action,” Hochfeld said. At the moment, that is not the case: “The fact that we in Germany are breaking the law, not taking our own climate action law seriously, absolving ministers of their legal obligations,” and then placing demands upon the Chinese side: “I don’t consider that to be eye level.”
Geopolitical interests – in addition to national climate efforts – shape Chinese climate policy, said Margot Schueller, a China researcher at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA). Since January 2017, when President Xi Jinping announced that China would stick to the Paris Agreement despite the US withdrawal, the country has also used climate diplomacy to strengthen its geopolitical position, she said.
Western donor countries, by contrast, have repeatedly broken their climate finance promises. This has led to a loss of trust in the countries of the Global South, lamented Belinda Schaepe, a policy advisor on climate diplomacy and EU-China relations at the think tank E3G.
Schaepe praised cooperation with China at the technical level, for example regarding the design of emissions markets or the creation of eco-friendly financial standards. But this technical cooperation has its limits, for example, wherever China completely dominates supply chains for goods important to climate policy. These include solar cells and batteries. Here, she unequivocally calls for “de-risking”.
In our own interest, the search for new partners must “move much more strongly in the direction of the Global South,” Schaepe demanded. However, the industrialized countries should not see the developing countries as mere sources of raw materials, but as equal partners in order to be able to keep up in the competition for global influence. Climate policy also plays a major role in this regard, she said.
Sinolytics is a European research-based consultancy entirely focused on China. It advises European companies on their strategic orientation and concrete business activities in the People’s Republic.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine last year was a wake-up call for many Europeans. For Cornelius Dieckmann, another dimension was added: The thought of the danger of China invading his family’s home country suddenly became much more real. The son of a German and a Taiwanese woman, journalist Dieckmann grew up in Berlin – always aware that the Communist Party wanted to bring the island back into the “motherland”.
Dieckmann works as an editor for the German newspaper Tagesspiegel and has been writing about China and Taiwan since January 2022. He studied neither politics nor sinology, but American literature, and found his way into journalism via the Feuilleton section. But as the son of a Taiwanese mother and a politically interested individual himself, he is nevertheless predestined to write about China politics. “If you deal with China, you can’t avoid Taiwan,” he emphasizes. After all, Xi Jinping identifies very strongly with the goal of forcing Taiwan to unite with China.
Although the situation in Ukraine is different from Taiwan, others are also currently drawing analogies, as he observes: “Since the outbreak of war in Europe, the democratic community has been thinking much more seriously about how to prevent a similar disaster in Asia.”
Nevertheless, the 27-year-old continues to call on European policymakers to talk more with and about Taiwan. For example, he believes that a bilateral investment agreement between the European Union and Taiwan and Taiwan’s involvement in multilateral forums such as the World Health Organization would be a good idea. On the other hand, he feels that Taiwan, as a threatened democratic country and a major economic power in the Pacific, is not at the table at important events: “In German politics, there is a great fear of contact and anticipatory obedience to China. As a symptom, he cites the Munich Security Conference, to which no representative of Taiwan was invited for seven years before 2023.
Dieckmann has been visiting Taiwan regularly since his childhood, and he has also been to China a few times. He gathers the necessary information for his articles from talking to local experts, traveling, German and English-language media, and also from Twitter, where, among other things, many Taiwanese voice their opinions. He has long worked as a freelance journalist for various popular media and writes about everything that matters to him: From Christmas churchgoers to rock impresario Bill Graham and Donald Trump’s border wall to personal topics such as his relationship with his native Chinese language.
Another personal interest that Dieckmann writes about is his obsession with the Rubik’s Cube. Since he was 13, he has almost always carried the “Cube” with him. He is so good at getting the colored stones into the right place at turbo speed that he has already participated in countless tournaments – including in China and Taiwan. During his studies, a Chinese Rubik’s Cube manufacturer sponsored him. But after an unpleasant Facebook post, the latter terminated the contract, Dieckmann recounts. “I posted that Taiwan is, in fact, an independent country. Because that is what it is.” Janna Degener-Storr
Since 2016, China has celebrated China Space Day every year on April 24. This day marks the anniversary of the launch of the first Chinese satellite Dongfanghong-1 (“The East is Red-1”), which was sent into space on April 24, 1970. State television livestreamed the current Shenzhou 15 mission. In addition, space events were held in many cities on Monday – activities for children included. At the Yangzhou Science and Technology Museum, for example, tomorrow’s taikonauts were allowed to slip into space suits for the photo – in keeping with the motto: “You’ll grow into it”.
At yesterday’s Table.Media event China Strategy 2023, we assembled many well-known names from politics, business and academia to discuss how to engage with the new superpower in the Far East.
Somewhat surprisingly, the traditional EU triad of China as partner, strategic rival and competitor was questioned almost from the outset of our discussion. The tripartite formula is just too simplistic and suggests a simple solution to the China dilemma. European actors can snub their rival China while doing good business with their partner and jointly saving the climate. Really? China itself does not discriminate here. Revenge for a geostrategic insult can happen at the economic level or in the climate dialogue. Our panel discussion on climate issues at the event revealed that China is precisely a market, competitor and partner when it comes to technologies such as electric mobility.
Overall, however, it showed a broad consensus in Germany and Europe on how to further engage with China in the future: Trade is to be possible, but dependencies are to be eliminated. This requires a stocktaking of the risks. Germany and its EU partners also must become faster and regain innovation in order to keep up.
However, there were doubts about the implementation of these noble ideas. After all, Germany generally struggles to translate its concepts into physical reality. It might help to adjust the ideas of who is the driver and who is the driven. It is certainly not too late to respond appropriately to the challenge China. But Germany has already squandered its advantages, like its former technological edge.
Huge dependencies, clouded business climate, and even decoupling in individual sectors: German-Chinese economic relations are currently viewed in a downright negative light. But there was no sign of shock or even fear among German entrepreneurs in the first part of the “China Strategy 2023” event in Berlin on Tuesday. On the contrary: More than 30 renowned China experts from politics, business, science and society presented themselves at the Table.Media event with clear analyses of the current situation and a confident outlook for the future.
Jens Hildebrandt, Executive Director of the German Chamber of Commerce in Beijing, clarified at the very beginning: “Germany’s companies are not waiting for the German government’s China strategy.” Rather, they have long since begun derisking while increasing localization at the same time. In this way, the companies want to mitigate possible risks on the one hand and position themselves strongly in the long term on one of the most important growth and innovation markets on the other.
Friedolin Strack of the Federation of German Industries (BDI) even spoke of balancing act management when it comes to China. Of course, China will remain a very important market in the future, he said, which is why the government and the business community have a clear consensus:
However, to successfully master this balancing act, German companies must first and foremost look to themselves, Strack emphasized. “The weal and woe of the European economy do not depend on China, but on ourselves.” It is important to maintain our own competitiveness and innovative strength.
Because China’s economy is developing steadily. Christina Otte from Germany Trade & Invest (GTAI) highlighted just how much China has caught up over the past few years: In mechanical engineering alone, she said, China now leads in 16 out of 28 areas – ten years ago it was only in six. “The race is not lost,” Otte said. “But China is challenging us.”
The planned investment by the Chinese shipping company Cosco in the Port of Hamburg is a challenge for the German government. Originally, Cosco planned to acquire 35 percent of the container terminal Tollerort of Hamburger Hafen und Logistik AG (HHLA). After a long struggle, Berlin approved a so-called partial prohibition limited to a minority stake of 24.9 percent.
HHLA Executive Board Chairwoman Angela Titzrath compared container trade and logistics to the blood supply in the human body, and backed up her comparison with impressive figures: “Two-thirds of German exports leave the country by sea,” said Titzrath. Regarding the Port of Hamburg, this means: “We are one of the major Asian hubs in Europe.”
The importance of maritime logistics is also reflected in the employment rate, says Titzrath: “In the German maritime economy, there are around 400,000 jobs with a value-added of 30 billion euros. If I extend that to industrial jobs in Germany, it is around 1.4 million industrial jobs.
Titzrath emphasized that trade with China has so far been a classic win-win situation for both sides. “Today, as consumers in Germany and Europe, we can buy things at very low prices, be it toys, textiles or electronics. And conversely, a huge middle class has emerged in China over the past 20 years.”
Vera Eichennauer from ETH Zurich, on the other hand, drew attention to the sometimes unequal framework conditions that are increasingly proving to be a disadvantage for German companies – above all the strong influence of the Chinese state. This puts Western companies at a competitive disadvantage – both in China and increasingly outside the EU.
“China does not hesitate to abuse its political influence,” she warned. Economic dependencies are used as leverage, as was evident recently in the case of Lithuania. This results in protectionist measures all over the world. But Eichennauer recommends the opposite: Western governments should also become more active and examine how cross-border investments can be promoted again, at least with partner countries.
Investments, that is what Joerg Wuttke would like to see above all in China. The President of the European Chamber of Commerce in Beijing stated quite provocatively: “We are not yet dependent enough on China.” While Europe shipped just 1.6 million containers to China last year, 6.4 million containers came from China to Europe in the same period. Besides the Covid pandemic, the main reason is China’s high trade barriers.
German and European companies should get more involved in China, Wuttke believes. The People’s Republic is a kind of gym for companies. “If you are not at the table, you are on the menu,” Wuttke said.
Finally, Klaus Muehlhahn undertook an often overlooked but no less important change of perspective: “How does China see competition with Germany and Europe?”, asked the President of Zeppelin University Friedrichshafen, emphasizing: “We are currently building up a threat scenario – and ignoring China’s major internal problems.” The People’s Republic is currently formulating grand goals – and yet will not be able to achieve them all, Muehlhahn believes. Beijing also has to make difficult decisions.
Franziska Brantner, Parliamentary State Secretary at the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, put it as follows: “We know that we need China as a partner when it comes to the major challenges.” There is only one thing that should no longer be neglected: “It is also about our interests and our security in Germany and Europe.”
Michael Roth had nothing good to say about the joint China trip of EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and French President Emmanuel Macron. “I felt like played for a fool. That was disastrous,” said the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the Bundestag in Berlin on Tuesday. The topic was China as a rival in the second part of Table.Media’s “China Strategy 2023”, bringing together more than 30 distinguished China experts from politics, business, academia and society.
Roth attributed a special role to Germany regarding its relationship with China: On the one hand, as a strong economy, Germany is particularly heard in Beijing. On the other hand, it is also the most vulnerable. Therefore, Roth believes that Germany must coordinate closely with its partners in Europe – and avoid a cacophony like the one between von der Leyen and Macron.
Roth does not see any contradiction between values-based and interest-driven foreign policy. “The old foreign policy warhorses [sic] like to make that point. I find that very old-fashioned. That’s 20th century.”
Reinhard Buetikofer, China expert in the European Parliament, pointed out that the EU is an organization that prides itself on its unity with diversity. “The EU will never speak with one voice. But we should not allow contradictions to arise.” Macron allowed himself to be lured onto a little branch in Beijing, which he then tumbled down with. But according to Buetikofer, one thing is clear: “Europe cannot escape its global responsibility. The French president should also remember that.”
Patrick Koellner called the Indo-Pacific the new strategic center of gravity in Asia, calling it not a natural region of the world. Rather, the former Asia-Pacific, which was mainly characterized by economic issues, has been deliberately expanded to include India and the Indian Ocean, Koellner said. “The transition from Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific marks the real Zeitenwende” in international Asia policy, says the Vice President of the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (Giga). This is because adding India would reduce the danger of China’s hegemony in the region.
Köllner pointed to new alliances such as Quad or Aukus as evidence of the new Indo-Pacific geopolitical era. Here, billions are invested in armaments such as nuclear submarines, which Köllner sees as “a daring and expensive bet on the future”. It is questionable whether China will allow itself to be swayed by this or will even quickly create facts as a countermeasure, for example with regard to Taiwan, he said.
May-Britt Stumbaum of the Center for Intelligence and Security Studies (CISS) in Munich made clear: If there were a war over Taiwan, some assembly lines in Germany would come to a standstill and quite a few shelves would be left empty. “Taiwan is not just a historical mission or a legacy to be finished. Taiwan is a very hard-core strategic consideration.” China is after a position on the first island chain, with direct access to the deep sea. President Xi Jinping is currently preparing the military option, Stumbaum said.
Tim Ruehlig from the German Council on Foreign Relations drew attention to another topic: setting technical standards. Here, too, China is increasingly taking on a leading role – with far-reaching consequences: From practical competitive advantages and patent fees to effects on political and social values, if China is setting standards for security and privacy in products. Such details should be considered in Germany’s China strategy, Ruehlig emphasizes.
But who should formulate this strategy? Marina Rudyak, a sinologist at the University of Heidelberg, warned: “It is like this in the USA: The more China is perceived as a rival there, the more is invested in China expertise. Here in Germany, the opposite is the case: The more difficult the relationship with China becomes, the less we in Germany want to deal with it. That is not very strategic.”
Cora Jungbluth from the Bertelsmann Foundation agreed with her and underlined how China expertise is by no means only missing in the German ministries. “China education is needed at all levels, not only in the federal ministries. You have to start at the education level.” Many Chinese direct investments happen at the municipal level. But it is precisely there that China competence is not particularly well established.
Mikko Huotari then attempted to bring the focus back to the current situation. At present, there is no lack of understanding of China, said the director of the Berlin-based China Institute Merics. “We have a very clear analysis of where China’s domestic development is going, where the relationship between China and the USA is heading. It is now a matter of developing the capacity for action. It is important that we do not completely go on the defensive, but look at where our interests lie and then try to assert them as best we can with our partners.”
No country currently emits as much greenhouse gases per year as China, the world’s second-largest economy. Global climate action can only succeed with China. But China is using the climate and energy transition to serve its own interests. And in certain areas, it is now the more powerful partner. This is one of the conclusions of the China Strategy 2023 conference hosted by Table.Media on Tuesday.
On the path to a zero-emissions global economy, China is a crucial player for several reasons:
China is the driving force behind the global energy transition, said Roland Roesch, Acting Director at the Innovation and Technology Center of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). A large part of the global investments in renewables are made on the Chinese market, he said. And as soon as China decides to invest in important technologies such as hydrogen, batteries or smart meters, this will enable considerable economies of scale and thus open up the opportunity for manufacturers to sharply reduce costs.
German companies could therefore not afford to be absent from the Chinese market, said Roesch. At the same time, China has thanks to its role in the refining and processing of many raw materials critical for the energy transition a “strong position that makes cooperation necessary”.
How equal can cooperation be under such circumstances? IRENA gives governments a platform to consult each other on the progress of the energy transition. On the podium, Roesch praised the “transparent manner” with which China is involved in the talks. The country attaches importance to cooperation and “fair ways“.
Christian Hochfeld, on the other hand, was reluctant to speak of cooperation at eye level: The German economy is “massively dependent on the German car manufacturers that are active on the Chinese market,” said the Director of the think tank Agora Verkehrswende. As soon as “any vehicles are not registered there, we don’t just have a fever, but a serious illness in the German economy.”
The trend in the Chinese car market is currently toward electric mobility. Not so much because of regulation, according to Hochfeld – but simply because many customers now prefer EVs. German car brands are having a hard time competing. China is no longer dependent on cooperation with Germany when it comes to electric mobility, Hochfeld emphasized.
Another requirement for cooperation on an eye-level basis is “that we credibly stand for climate action,” Hochfeld said. At the moment, that is not the case: “The fact that we in Germany are breaking the law, not taking our own climate action law seriously, absolving ministers of their legal obligations,” and then placing demands upon the Chinese side: “I don’t consider that to be eye level.”
Geopolitical interests – in addition to national climate efforts – shape Chinese climate policy, said Margot Schueller, a China researcher at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA). Since January 2017, when President Xi Jinping announced that China would stick to the Paris Agreement despite the US withdrawal, the country has also used climate diplomacy to strengthen its geopolitical position, she said.
Western donor countries, by contrast, have repeatedly broken their climate finance promises. This has led to a loss of trust in the countries of the Global South, lamented Belinda Schaepe, a policy advisor on climate diplomacy and EU-China relations at the think tank E3G.
Schaepe praised cooperation with China at the technical level, for example regarding the design of emissions markets or the creation of eco-friendly financial standards. But this technical cooperation has its limits, for example, wherever China completely dominates supply chains for goods important to climate policy. These include solar cells and batteries. Here, she unequivocally calls for “de-risking”.
In our own interest, the search for new partners must “move much more strongly in the direction of the Global South,” Schaepe demanded. However, the industrialized countries should not see the developing countries as mere sources of raw materials, but as equal partners in order to be able to keep up in the competition for global influence. Climate policy also plays a major role in this regard, she said.
Sinolytics is a European research-based consultancy entirely focused on China. It advises European companies on their strategic orientation and concrete business activities in the People’s Republic.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine last year was a wake-up call for many Europeans. For Cornelius Dieckmann, another dimension was added: The thought of the danger of China invading his family’s home country suddenly became much more real. The son of a German and a Taiwanese woman, journalist Dieckmann grew up in Berlin – always aware that the Communist Party wanted to bring the island back into the “motherland”.
Dieckmann works as an editor for the German newspaper Tagesspiegel and has been writing about China and Taiwan since January 2022. He studied neither politics nor sinology, but American literature, and found his way into journalism via the Feuilleton section. But as the son of a Taiwanese mother and a politically interested individual himself, he is nevertheless predestined to write about China politics. “If you deal with China, you can’t avoid Taiwan,” he emphasizes. After all, Xi Jinping identifies very strongly with the goal of forcing Taiwan to unite with China.
Although the situation in Ukraine is different from Taiwan, others are also currently drawing analogies, as he observes: “Since the outbreak of war in Europe, the democratic community has been thinking much more seriously about how to prevent a similar disaster in Asia.”
Nevertheless, the 27-year-old continues to call on European policymakers to talk more with and about Taiwan. For example, he believes that a bilateral investment agreement between the European Union and Taiwan and Taiwan’s involvement in multilateral forums such as the World Health Organization would be a good idea. On the other hand, he feels that Taiwan, as a threatened democratic country and a major economic power in the Pacific, is not at the table at important events: “In German politics, there is a great fear of contact and anticipatory obedience to China. As a symptom, he cites the Munich Security Conference, to which no representative of Taiwan was invited for seven years before 2023.
Dieckmann has been visiting Taiwan regularly since his childhood, and he has also been to China a few times. He gathers the necessary information for his articles from talking to local experts, traveling, German and English-language media, and also from Twitter, where, among other things, many Taiwanese voice their opinions. He has long worked as a freelance journalist for various popular media and writes about everything that matters to him: From Christmas churchgoers to rock impresario Bill Graham and Donald Trump’s border wall to personal topics such as his relationship with his native Chinese language.
Another personal interest that Dieckmann writes about is his obsession with the Rubik’s Cube. Since he was 13, he has almost always carried the “Cube” with him. He is so good at getting the colored stones into the right place at turbo speed that he has already participated in countless tournaments – including in China and Taiwan. During his studies, a Chinese Rubik’s Cube manufacturer sponsored him. But after an unpleasant Facebook post, the latter terminated the contract, Dieckmann recounts. “I posted that Taiwan is, in fact, an independent country. Because that is what it is.” Janna Degener-Storr
Since 2016, China has celebrated China Space Day every year on April 24. This day marks the anniversary of the launch of the first Chinese satellite Dongfanghong-1 (“The East is Red-1”), which was sent into space on April 24, 1970. State television livestreamed the current Shenzhou 15 mission. In addition, space events were held in many cities on Monday – activities for children included. At the Yangzhou Science and Technology Museum, for example, tomorrow’s taikonauts were allowed to slip into space suits for the photo – in keeping with the motto: “You’ll grow into it”.
