It wasn’t a particularly nice congratulation. Shortly before the market launch of NIO’s Chinese EVs in Germany, competitor Audi sued the Chinese start-up for trademark infringement. The German company claims that the ES6 and ES8 model designations are too close to its own S6 and S8 sports models.
Apart from the fact that number-letter combinations are perfectly common for the designation of car models, as Christian Domke Seidel analyzes in his article, the district court set the amount in dispute at a mere €150,000. Petty, one might think. But that does not seem to be Audi’s point. Rather, the action arouses suspicion. Is the German carmaker trying to get one over on potential competitors from the Far East right from the start? It will certainly be enough to overshadow the launch of the Chinese newcomer.
Overshadowed – to put it mildly – are also the trade relations between Lithuania and China. For almost a year, the People’s Republic has blocked imports from the Baltic EU state. However, not entirely, to complicate the search for evidence for the WTO complaint. Lithuanian companies are therefore looking for other solutions to place their goods, Ričardas Sartatavičius from the Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists told us.
The EU’s so-called anti-coercion instrument gives the Lithuanians hope. It is intended to prevent precisely such instances of economic blackmail. Work on this is underway in Brussels and Strasbourg. The EU Parliament wants to finalize its position in the near future.
It will happen this Friday. Then German customers will be able to buy the NIO ET7, an electric sedan. William Li, the brand’s founder, is expected to attend the launch event in Berlin’s Kurfuerstendamm. That is where one of the local NIO houses is located. For the billionaire, this is the last stop on his Germany tour. By then, he will already have visited Hamburg and Munich. The elegant venue of the Berlin presentation gives a first indication from which brands NIO wants to steal customers from: Mercedes, BMW and Audi.
Audi has a problem with the new competition, though. Because of their SUVs – the NIO ES6 and ES8. The German manufacturer has models with the names S6 and S8 on the market and sees its trademark rights violated in Europe. For that reason, Audi filed a lawsuit against Nio. Even though NIO’s SUVs are not yet available for purchase. The next hearing date is on December 6.
At first glance, there is not much at stake. According to media reports, the value in dispute is provisionally set at €150,000 by the Regional Court. “That is not particularly high given the fact that Audi is a globally known car brand,” Christian Solmecke told Table.Media. Solmecke is a lawyer at the Cologne-based law firm Wilde Beuger Solmecke, author of books and managing director of the law firm software producer Legalvisio. In trademark law, object values are generally set at a very high level.
However, the court appearance between Audi and NIO is not the first attempt to resolve the dispute, according to Solmecke. “A lawsuit is usually preceded – as in this case – by a formal warning with a request to refrain from using the brand and to submit a corresponding, pre-formulated cease-and-desist declaration.” NIO either did not respond or refused to do so.
NIO sees things differently. Although the brand – just like Audi – refuses to comment on the ongoing proceedings, the “E” in the name is an important distinguishing feature, according to the Chinese manufacturer. That does not seem to be enough for Audi. “In this case, Audi’s first concern is to avoid a possible risk of confusion, which is also why an injunction has been filed. So NIO would have to rename its cars if Audi wins,” Solmecke said. But Audi is also claiming damages, according to the lawyer.
The fact that the car models of the two squabblers look completely different, on the other hand, is not relevant to the court. “The different shape of the cars is likely to play a minor role here. Because the primary issue here is the comparison of the two word marks, which could possibly cause confusion.” So a customer reading the name “ES6” or “ES8” might believe that it could be a car from Audi. And further, “According to settled case law, three criteria determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion: In addition to the similarity of the characters, the similarity of the products and the reputation of the older brand.”
Since two cars are involved, the general product similarity is basically fulfilled. Furthermore, Audi is very well known. So the similarity of the characters is likely to be decisive for the court’s decision, analyzes Solmecke.
But there is another point. “A trademark infringement is more likely the higher the so-called distinctiveness of the plaintiff’s trademark is,” says Solmecke. And this is where Audi has a problem. Because number-letter combinations are perfectly common in the auto industry. “In this case, I would say that the distinctiveness of ‘S6 and S8’ is rather weak, which could make it more difficult for Audi to succeed here,” Solmecke suspects. Basically, however, it would be a case-by-case decision, which makes a prognosis difficult.
But of course the lawsuit has not only a legal, but also an economic policy dimension. One that will continue to unfold on Friday in Berlin. Because the Chinese carmakers are currently hard pressing into Europe. With Volvo, its Chinese owner Geely already gained over 10 years of experience in the EU. Its sister brand Polestar is wholly Chinese and is available for two years.
The London Taxi brand is also in Chinese hands. Aiways is already available in Germany, Xpeng and BYD will follow in the medium term. The German rental car company Sixt is even betting on BYD in a big way (China.Table reported).
Expansion into the birth continent of the automobile is also in line with the will of the communist leadership. According to the 14th Five-Year Plan, the two leading electric car brands in the People’s Republic are to sell 10 percent of their new cars overseas in 2025.
And why not? European manufacturers have been earning good money in the People’s Republic for around twenty years. Thanks to the joint venture obligation, which has now been abolished, they are closely intertwined with China’s industry. Globalization is now going in the other direction.
German manufacturers have also become more Chinese in recent decades. 20 percent of Daimler is in Chinese hands – 10 percent belongs to the state-owned Beijing Automotive Group (BAIC). Li Shufu, Geely’s founder, owns another 10 percent. Volkswagen, in turn, employs more than 100,000 people in China.
In this constellation, Ferdinand Dudenhoeffer, automotive professor at the Center Automotive Research (CAR), sees Audi’s lawsuit against Nio rather critically. The lawsuit was not met with sympathy everywhere in the industry, he told the German newspaper Handelsblatt. Audi’s action was counterproductive and would create a bad climate, he said. “The risk of confusion between an SUV and a sedan is pretty low, after all,” he concludes.
Just over a year ago, an unprecedented trade dispute between an EU state and China unfolded. The reason for the dispute was the opening of a “Taiwan Office” in Lithuania’s capital Vilnius. Beijing subsequently imposed sanctions against Lithuania. The European Union has since filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization (WTO) – but the situation for the Baltic EU state hardly improved since: “Generally speaking, all production is at a standstill. Exports from Lithuania to China have stopped. Only in isolated cases do products from Lithuanian companies make it to the Chinese market – mostly technology companies,” Ričardas Sartatavičius, Director General of the Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists, told China.Table.
The deterioration of relations between the Baltic country and the People’s Republic happened gradually and ultimately peaked with Lithuania disappearing from China’s customs system altogether and downgrading diplomatic relations (China.Table reported). A few days after the tariff scandal in early December, the EU country reappeared as a choice option in the Chinese system. “But that doesn’t change the situation,” Sartatavičius says. Companies could fill out declarations, but then received no confirmation.
A current example is the beverage industry: Containers with beverages including beer were sent back from China to Lithuania because their customs declarations were rejected. The association cannot estimate the extent of the damage to the Lithuanian beverage industry so far. “But if the Chinese market is completely closed to them, companies could lose between €2 and €5 million in revenue a year,” he said. For the Lithuanian government, a small sum, but a lot of money for companies.”
In the spring of this year, the number of accepted goods unexpectedly increased slightly and then fell again over the summer. In September, Lithuanian imports to the People’s Republic fell by 91.4 percent compared to the same month last year, according to Chinese customs data. Metal and wood products, previously among the Baltic state’s top 5 export goods, were reportedly affected. Exports are “completely destroyed,” Sartatavičius said. High-tech lasers and peat exports are also among the affected products.
Lithuania’s exports to China suffered an almost complete collapse in December 2021. Only goods worth around €3.35 million made it through Chinese customs that month, as Sartatavičius explains. This represents a massive drop compared to the previous year, when goods worth €38 million made it through. Trade was still going in November 2021. Lithuania exported goods worth a good €37 million to the People’s Republic. In the same month, the Taiwanese trade office opened in Vilnius.
The few goods China allows to trickle into the country seem to be a smokescreen to complicate collecting evidence for the EU’s complaint to the WTO. But Lithuania is also resourceful. For example, they switch to ports in Riga, Latvia, or Gdańsk, Poland. Imports from the People’s Republic are also “tricked” and Riga is declared as the port of unloading. The Latvian capital has good truck transport connections to northern Lithuania. “Companies are naturally looking for different solutions,” says Sartatavičius.
Last year, China exerted pressure on companies from other EU countries that worked with Lithuanian suppliers or produced in Lithuania themselves. Here, too, the situation appears to remain difficult. Requests for talks with affected companies like tire manufacturer Continental have been rejected. Lithuanian companies are now hoping for success at the WTO, as Sartatavičius reports.
That could take some time, though. “We don’t expect a decision soon. It may take a couple of years.” Moreover, the direct benefits for Lithuanian companies are still uncertain: “According to the WTO rulings, there is no obligation to compensate for the losses incurred, nor is there a guarantee that the problems won’t arise again.”
Hope is now resting on Brussels: At the EU level, a new set of instruments to better respond to such practices is currently under deliberation. The EU Commission presented its proposal (China.Table reported) for the so-called Anti-Coercion Instrument at the end of 2021. Currently, the European Parliament and the Council of Member States are working on formulating their amendment requests. The trilogue between the EU institutions is expected to begin in the coming weeks to determine the final version of the regulation.
The Trade Committee is expected to finalize the European Parliament’s position next Monday. The MEPs want to tighten up the Commission’s proposal in some areas, as the amendments compiled by rapporteur Bernd Lange available to Europe.Table show. For example, the threat of coercive measures by third countries should be enough for the Commission to take action. In addition, it should be able to impose more extensive measures to compensate for the damage caused to an EU country.
The planned arsenal includes, for example, the option for the EU to impose higher tariffs on goods from China or other aggressive countries or to exclude their companies from public contracts in the EU. The Commission wants to grant itself far-reaching decision-making powers here. The European Parliament, however, is pushing for more far-reaching information obligations on the part of the authority. Member states also demand a greater say in the Council on the imposition of countermeasures. Collaboration: Till Hoppe
Vladimir Putin’s ongoing failure in Ukraine has put his strategic alliance with Chinese President Xi Jinping to the test. With Putin growing ever more desperate, Xi must finally realize the scale of the threat that his “friendship without limits” with the Russian president poses to China’s economic health, to global stability, and to his own geopolitical ambitions.
While Putin may or may not have been bluffing when he threatened to use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine last month, Xi must assume the worst if he wants to be viewed as a responsible leader. After all, Russia’s military doctrine allows for a nuclear strike to defend Russian territory against an existential threat. Russia’s illegal annexation of the occupied Ukrainian regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia provides the pretext for such an attack.
Xi, who is expected to secure an unprecedented third consecutive term as China’s leader at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China later this month, must now turn his attention to preventing World War III. A Russian nuclear strike in Ukraine – the first use of such weapons since the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 – would ignite a catastrophic global crisis, spoiling Xi’s coronation.
When Xi and Putin met at the Beijing Winter Olympics in February to sign the Sino-Russian cooperation agreement, the plan to invade Ukraine must have seemed like a safe bet: the Russians would quickly topple Ukraine’s leadership, which would make the US and NATO appear weak. A proxy war would also divert US attention from its rivalry with China – or so Xi thought.
Then Ukraine fought back, exposing Russia’s myriad military weaknesses. Russian forces have now retreated from the Kharkiv region in the northeast, following Ukraine’s impressive counteroffensive, and are suffering heavy losses near Kherson in the south.
Xi almost certainly conveyed his displeasure with Russia’s failures when he met with Putin at the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. Putin publicly acknowledged China’s “questions and concerns” about the war – a rare admission of tensions between the two countries – while Xi himself did not publicly mention Ukraine at all. Xi’s silence stood in stark contrast to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who – in a remarkable volte-face – openly rebuked Putin.
Still, it is hard to believe that Xi is not wondering whether he made the right decision when he tied his political fate to so reckless an ally. Putin’s “partial mobilization” of 300,000 Russian men to join the fight in Ukraine has triggered protests across Russia and caused more than 200,000 young men to flee the country. The quality of Putin’s new recruits – who include convicts – is unlikely to help the war effort or assuage Xi’s concerns.
With morale among Russian troops already at rock bottom, an infusion of dispirited and ill-trained draftees may hasten the dissolution of Putin’s military and the fall of his regime, akin to how Czar Nicholas II’s poor leadership during World War I fueled the collapse of the Czar’s armies and the Russian Revolution of 1917. With his direct appeals to Russian soldiers to surrender or die, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky seems to understand the perilous state of the Russian military better than Putin does.
The point of a proxy war is to weaken one’s adversary, but Putin’s incompetence has achieved the exact opposite for Xi. NATO is now stronger than it has been at any point since the Cold War’s end, with previously neutral countries like Sweden and Finland applying to join and Asian countries like Japan, South Korea, and increasingly India voicing support for America’s Ukraine policy.
Instead of helping China to establish itself as a counterweight to US global hegemony, Russia has been exposed as too weak and corrupt to defeat even a middling country. With Putin now issuing direct orders to Russian field commanders, China’s military alliance with Russia must seem almost worthless to Xi.
While the chances of Putin using a nuclear weapon in Ukraine appear slim, they cannot be fully discounted. So, Chinese officials must be trying to assess how the US and NATO would respond if Putin followed through on his threat. Given US President Joe Biden’s tough-minded – if still ambiguous – statements, it is safe to assume that the international economic and military response would be far more severe than the sanctions already imposed on Russia.
But if Putin does decide to use a tactical nuclear device to “defend” the Ukrainian territory that he has illegally annexed, he may well open a Pandora’s Box of horrors. For example, his war has brought considerable chaos to Ukraine’s nuclear power stations, and, in addition to other concerns about their operation, it can no longer be assumed that their spent nuclear fuel rods have always been safely secured during the battles for control of the sites. This opens the terrifying prospect of some mad partisan creating a “dirty” bomb to use in retaliation.
Putin’s annexations may also undermine the “One China” policy regarding Taiwan, which most of the world accepts. Some Eastern European countries are already voicing doubts about the wisdom of that policy. If Xi, who has steadfastly defended the principle of territorial integrity, silently accepts Putin’s annexations, some countries may decide that Xi’s hypocrisy has nullified the “One China” policy.
Ever since he became president ten years ago, Xi has signaled his fear that China could suffer the type of political and economic disintegration that led to the implosion of the Soviet Union. Putin’s current predicament should serve as another cautionary tale. The prospect of a regime so rotten that it collapses from within must haunt China’s president almost as much as the threat of nuclear war.
Charles Tannock, a former member of the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee, is a fellow at GLOBSEC, a think tank based in Bratislava committed to enhancing security, prosperity, and sustainability.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2022.
www.project-syndicate.org
The US pizza chain Pizza Hut is known in Taiwan for its unusual creations. Now, for the fall-and-Halloween month of October, the chain cooked up something spooky – because how often do you find your own food staring back at you? Tangyuan garlic chicken is the flavor of this special pizza. The Tangyuan rice balls are used as eyeballs. And the garlic certainly helps keep evil spirits at bay.
In Wednesday’s edition, we showed a supposed sunrise in Hong Kong in the Dessert section. It was actually a sunset.
It wasn’t a particularly nice congratulation. Shortly before the market launch of NIO’s Chinese EVs in Germany, competitor Audi sued the Chinese start-up for trademark infringement. The German company claims that the ES6 and ES8 model designations are too close to its own S6 and S8 sports models.
Apart from the fact that number-letter combinations are perfectly common for the designation of car models, as Christian Domke Seidel analyzes in his article, the district court set the amount in dispute at a mere €150,000. Petty, one might think. But that does not seem to be Audi’s point. Rather, the action arouses suspicion. Is the German carmaker trying to get one over on potential competitors from the Far East right from the start? It will certainly be enough to overshadow the launch of the Chinese newcomer.
Overshadowed – to put it mildly – are also the trade relations between Lithuania and China. For almost a year, the People’s Republic has blocked imports from the Baltic EU state. However, not entirely, to complicate the search for evidence for the WTO complaint. Lithuanian companies are therefore looking for other solutions to place their goods, Ričardas Sartatavičius from the Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists told us.
The EU’s so-called anti-coercion instrument gives the Lithuanians hope. It is intended to prevent precisely such instances of economic blackmail. Work on this is underway in Brussels and Strasbourg. The EU Parliament wants to finalize its position in the near future.
It will happen this Friday. Then German customers will be able to buy the NIO ET7, an electric sedan. William Li, the brand’s founder, is expected to attend the launch event in Berlin’s Kurfuerstendamm. That is where one of the local NIO houses is located. For the billionaire, this is the last stop on his Germany tour. By then, he will already have visited Hamburg and Munich. The elegant venue of the Berlin presentation gives a first indication from which brands NIO wants to steal customers from: Mercedes, BMW and Audi.
Audi has a problem with the new competition, though. Because of their SUVs – the NIO ES6 and ES8. The German manufacturer has models with the names S6 and S8 on the market and sees its trademark rights violated in Europe. For that reason, Audi filed a lawsuit against Nio. Even though NIO’s SUVs are not yet available for purchase. The next hearing date is on December 6.
At first glance, there is not much at stake. According to media reports, the value in dispute is provisionally set at €150,000 by the Regional Court. “That is not particularly high given the fact that Audi is a globally known car brand,” Christian Solmecke told Table.Media. Solmecke is a lawyer at the Cologne-based law firm Wilde Beuger Solmecke, author of books and managing director of the law firm software producer Legalvisio. In trademark law, object values are generally set at a very high level.
However, the court appearance between Audi and NIO is not the first attempt to resolve the dispute, according to Solmecke. “A lawsuit is usually preceded – as in this case – by a formal warning with a request to refrain from using the brand and to submit a corresponding, pre-formulated cease-and-desist declaration.” NIO either did not respond or refused to do so.
NIO sees things differently. Although the brand – just like Audi – refuses to comment on the ongoing proceedings, the “E” in the name is an important distinguishing feature, according to the Chinese manufacturer. That does not seem to be enough for Audi. “In this case, Audi’s first concern is to avoid a possible risk of confusion, which is also why an injunction has been filed. So NIO would have to rename its cars if Audi wins,” Solmecke said. But Audi is also claiming damages, according to the lawyer.
The fact that the car models of the two squabblers look completely different, on the other hand, is not relevant to the court. “The different shape of the cars is likely to play a minor role here. Because the primary issue here is the comparison of the two word marks, which could possibly cause confusion.” So a customer reading the name “ES6” or “ES8” might believe that it could be a car from Audi. And further, “According to settled case law, three criteria determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion: In addition to the similarity of the characters, the similarity of the products and the reputation of the older brand.”
Since two cars are involved, the general product similarity is basically fulfilled. Furthermore, Audi is very well known. So the similarity of the characters is likely to be decisive for the court’s decision, analyzes Solmecke.
But there is another point. “A trademark infringement is more likely the higher the so-called distinctiveness of the plaintiff’s trademark is,” says Solmecke. And this is where Audi has a problem. Because number-letter combinations are perfectly common in the auto industry. “In this case, I would say that the distinctiveness of ‘S6 and S8’ is rather weak, which could make it more difficult for Audi to succeed here,” Solmecke suspects. Basically, however, it would be a case-by-case decision, which makes a prognosis difficult.
But of course the lawsuit has not only a legal, but also an economic policy dimension. One that will continue to unfold on Friday in Berlin. Because the Chinese carmakers are currently hard pressing into Europe. With Volvo, its Chinese owner Geely already gained over 10 years of experience in the EU. Its sister brand Polestar is wholly Chinese and is available for two years.
The London Taxi brand is also in Chinese hands. Aiways is already available in Germany, Xpeng and BYD will follow in the medium term. The German rental car company Sixt is even betting on BYD in a big way (China.Table reported).
Expansion into the birth continent of the automobile is also in line with the will of the communist leadership. According to the 14th Five-Year Plan, the two leading electric car brands in the People’s Republic are to sell 10 percent of their new cars overseas in 2025.
And why not? European manufacturers have been earning good money in the People’s Republic for around twenty years. Thanks to the joint venture obligation, which has now been abolished, they are closely intertwined with China’s industry. Globalization is now going in the other direction.
German manufacturers have also become more Chinese in recent decades. 20 percent of Daimler is in Chinese hands – 10 percent belongs to the state-owned Beijing Automotive Group (BAIC). Li Shufu, Geely’s founder, owns another 10 percent. Volkswagen, in turn, employs more than 100,000 people in China.
In this constellation, Ferdinand Dudenhoeffer, automotive professor at the Center Automotive Research (CAR), sees Audi’s lawsuit against Nio rather critically. The lawsuit was not met with sympathy everywhere in the industry, he told the German newspaper Handelsblatt. Audi’s action was counterproductive and would create a bad climate, he said. “The risk of confusion between an SUV and a sedan is pretty low, after all,” he concludes.
Just over a year ago, an unprecedented trade dispute between an EU state and China unfolded. The reason for the dispute was the opening of a “Taiwan Office” in Lithuania’s capital Vilnius. Beijing subsequently imposed sanctions against Lithuania. The European Union has since filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization (WTO) – but the situation for the Baltic EU state hardly improved since: “Generally speaking, all production is at a standstill. Exports from Lithuania to China have stopped. Only in isolated cases do products from Lithuanian companies make it to the Chinese market – mostly technology companies,” Ričardas Sartatavičius, Director General of the Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists, told China.Table.
The deterioration of relations between the Baltic country and the People’s Republic happened gradually and ultimately peaked with Lithuania disappearing from China’s customs system altogether and downgrading diplomatic relations (China.Table reported). A few days after the tariff scandal in early December, the EU country reappeared as a choice option in the Chinese system. “But that doesn’t change the situation,” Sartatavičius says. Companies could fill out declarations, but then received no confirmation.
A current example is the beverage industry: Containers with beverages including beer were sent back from China to Lithuania because their customs declarations were rejected. The association cannot estimate the extent of the damage to the Lithuanian beverage industry so far. “But if the Chinese market is completely closed to them, companies could lose between €2 and €5 million in revenue a year,” he said. For the Lithuanian government, a small sum, but a lot of money for companies.”
In the spring of this year, the number of accepted goods unexpectedly increased slightly and then fell again over the summer. In September, Lithuanian imports to the People’s Republic fell by 91.4 percent compared to the same month last year, according to Chinese customs data. Metal and wood products, previously among the Baltic state’s top 5 export goods, were reportedly affected. Exports are “completely destroyed,” Sartatavičius said. High-tech lasers and peat exports are also among the affected products.
Lithuania’s exports to China suffered an almost complete collapse in December 2021. Only goods worth around €3.35 million made it through Chinese customs that month, as Sartatavičius explains. This represents a massive drop compared to the previous year, when goods worth €38 million made it through. Trade was still going in November 2021. Lithuania exported goods worth a good €37 million to the People’s Republic. In the same month, the Taiwanese trade office opened in Vilnius.
The few goods China allows to trickle into the country seem to be a smokescreen to complicate collecting evidence for the EU’s complaint to the WTO. But Lithuania is also resourceful. For example, they switch to ports in Riga, Latvia, or Gdańsk, Poland. Imports from the People’s Republic are also “tricked” and Riga is declared as the port of unloading. The Latvian capital has good truck transport connections to northern Lithuania. “Companies are naturally looking for different solutions,” says Sartatavičius.
Last year, China exerted pressure on companies from other EU countries that worked with Lithuanian suppliers or produced in Lithuania themselves. Here, too, the situation appears to remain difficult. Requests for talks with affected companies like tire manufacturer Continental have been rejected. Lithuanian companies are now hoping for success at the WTO, as Sartatavičius reports.
That could take some time, though. “We don’t expect a decision soon. It may take a couple of years.” Moreover, the direct benefits for Lithuanian companies are still uncertain: “According to the WTO rulings, there is no obligation to compensate for the losses incurred, nor is there a guarantee that the problems won’t arise again.”
Hope is now resting on Brussels: At the EU level, a new set of instruments to better respond to such practices is currently under deliberation. The EU Commission presented its proposal (China.Table reported) for the so-called Anti-Coercion Instrument at the end of 2021. Currently, the European Parliament and the Council of Member States are working on formulating their amendment requests. The trilogue between the EU institutions is expected to begin in the coming weeks to determine the final version of the regulation.
The Trade Committee is expected to finalize the European Parliament’s position next Monday. The MEPs want to tighten up the Commission’s proposal in some areas, as the amendments compiled by rapporteur Bernd Lange available to Europe.Table show. For example, the threat of coercive measures by third countries should be enough for the Commission to take action. In addition, it should be able to impose more extensive measures to compensate for the damage caused to an EU country.
The planned arsenal includes, for example, the option for the EU to impose higher tariffs on goods from China or other aggressive countries or to exclude their companies from public contracts in the EU. The Commission wants to grant itself far-reaching decision-making powers here. The European Parliament, however, is pushing for more far-reaching information obligations on the part of the authority. Member states also demand a greater say in the Council on the imposition of countermeasures. Collaboration: Till Hoppe
Vladimir Putin’s ongoing failure in Ukraine has put his strategic alliance with Chinese President Xi Jinping to the test. With Putin growing ever more desperate, Xi must finally realize the scale of the threat that his “friendship without limits” with the Russian president poses to China’s economic health, to global stability, and to his own geopolitical ambitions.
While Putin may or may not have been bluffing when he threatened to use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine last month, Xi must assume the worst if he wants to be viewed as a responsible leader. After all, Russia’s military doctrine allows for a nuclear strike to defend Russian territory against an existential threat. Russia’s illegal annexation of the occupied Ukrainian regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia provides the pretext for such an attack.
Xi, who is expected to secure an unprecedented third consecutive term as China’s leader at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China later this month, must now turn his attention to preventing World War III. A Russian nuclear strike in Ukraine – the first use of such weapons since the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 – would ignite a catastrophic global crisis, spoiling Xi’s coronation.
When Xi and Putin met at the Beijing Winter Olympics in February to sign the Sino-Russian cooperation agreement, the plan to invade Ukraine must have seemed like a safe bet: the Russians would quickly topple Ukraine’s leadership, which would make the US and NATO appear weak. A proxy war would also divert US attention from its rivalry with China – or so Xi thought.
Then Ukraine fought back, exposing Russia’s myriad military weaknesses. Russian forces have now retreated from the Kharkiv region in the northeast, following Ukraine’s impressive counteroffensive, and are suffering heavy losses near Kherson in the south.
Xi almost certainly conveyed his displeasure with Russia’s failures when he met with Putin at the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. Putin publicly acknowledged China’s “questions and concerns” about the war – a rare admission of tensions between the two countries – while Xi himself did not publicly mention Ukraine at all. Xi’s silence stood in stark contrast to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who – in a remarkable volte-face – openly rebuked Putin.
Still, it is hard to believe that Xi is not wondering whether he made the right decision when he tied his political fate to so reckless an ally. Putin’s “partial mobilization” of 300,000 Russian men to join the fight in Ukraine has triggered protests across Russia and caused more than 200,000 young men to flee the country. The quality of Putin’s new recruits – who include convicts – is unlikely to help the war effort or assuage Xi’s concerns.
With morale among Russian troops already at rock bottom, an infusion of dispirited and ill-trained draftees may hasten the dissolution of Putin’s military and the fall of his regime, akin to how Czar Nicholas II’s poor leadership during World War I fueled the collapse of the Czar’s armies and the Russian Revolution of 1917. With his direct appeals to Russian soldiers to surrender or die, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky seems to understand the perilous state of the Russian military better than Putin does.
The point of a proxy war is to weaken one’s adversary, but Putin’s incompetence has achieved the exact opposite for Xi. NATO is now stronger than it has been at any point since the Cold War’s end, with previously neutral countries like Sweden and Finland applying to join and Asian countries like Japan, South Korea, and increasingly India voicing support for America’s Ukraine policy.
Instead of helping China to establish itself as a counterweight to US global hegemony, Russia has been exposed as too weak and corrupt to defeat even a middling country. With Putin now issuing direct orders to Russian field commanders, China’s military alliance with Russia must seem almost worthless to Xi.
While the chances of Putin using a nuclear weapon in Ukraine appear slim, they cannot be fully discounted. So, Chinese officials must be trying to assess how the US and NATO would respond if Putin followed through on his threat. Given US President Joe Biden’s tough-minded – if still ambiguous – statements, it is safe to assume that the international economic and military response would be far more severe than the sanctions already imposed on Russia.
But if Putin does decide to use a tactical nuclear device to “defend” the Ukrainian territory that he has illegally annexed, he may well open a Pandora’s Box of horrors. For example, his war has brought considerable chaos to Ukraine’s nuclear power stations, and, in addition to other concerns about their operation, it can no longer be assumed that their spent nuclear fuel rods have always been safely secured during the battles for control of the sites. This opens the terrifying prospect of some mad partisan creating a “dirty” bomb to use in retaliation.
Putin’s annexations may also undermine the “One China” policy regarding Taiwan, which most of the world accepts. Some Eastern European countries are already voicing doubts about the wisdom of that policy. If Xi, who has steadfastly defended the principle of territorial integrity, silently accepts Putin’s annexations, some countries may decide that Xi’s hypocrisy has nullified the “One China” policy.
Ever since he became president ten years ago, Xi has signaled his fear that China could suffer the type of political and economic disintegration that led to the implosion of the Soviet Union. Putin’s current predicament should serve as another cautionary tale. The prospect of a regime so rotten that it collapses from within must haunt China’s president almost as much as the threat of nuclear war.
Charles Tannock, a former member of the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee, is a fellow at GLOBSEC, a think tank based in Bratislava committed to enhancing security, prosperity, and sustainability.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2022.
www.project-syndicate.org
The US pizza chain Pizza Hut is known in Taiwan for its unusual creations. Now, for the fall-and-Halloween month of October, the chain cooked up something spooky – because how often do you find your own food staring back at you? Tangyuan garlic chicken is the flavor of this special pizza. The Tangyuan rice balls are used as eyeballs. And the garlic certainly helps keep evil spirits at bay.
In Wednesday’s edition, we showed a supposed sunrise in Hong Kong in the Dessert section. It was actually a sunset.
